Public Interest Legal Foundation v. Jocelyn Benson, in her official capacity as Secretary of State of Michigan

RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)
File Name: 25a0116p.06
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
PUBLIC INTEREST LEGAL FOUNDATION,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
JOCELYN BENSON, in her official capacity as Secretary
of State of Michigan,
Defendant-Appellee,
ELECTRONIC REGISTRATION INFORMATION CENTER,
INC.,
Movant-Appellee.
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No. 24-1255
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Western District of Michigan at Grand Rapids.
No. 1:21-cv-00929—Jane M. Beckering, District Judge.
Decided and Filed: May 6, 2025
Before: CLAY, WHITE, and DAVIS, Circuit Judges.
_________________
COUNSEL
ON BRIEF: J. Christian Adams, Kaylan Phillips, Joseph M. Nixon, Noel H. Johnson, PUBLIC
INTEREST LEGAL FOUNDATION, Alexandria, Virginia, for Appellant. Erik A. Grill,
Heather S. Meingast, OFFICE OF THE MICHIGAN ATTORNEY GENERAL, Lansing,
Michigan, for Appellee Jocelyn Benson. Robert A. Wiygul, Peter V. Keays, HANGLEY
ARONCHICK SEGAL PUDLIN & SCHILLER, Philadelphia, Pennsylvania, for Appellee
Electronic Registration Information Center. Benjamin M. Flowers, ASHBROOK BYRNE
KRESGE LLC, Cincinnati, Ohio, Thomas R. McCarthy, CONSOVOY MCCARTHY PLLC,
Arlington, Virginia, David Eric Lycan, EMBRY MERRITT WOMACK NANCE, PLLC,
Lexington, Kentucky, T. Russell Nobile, JUDICIAL WATCH, INC., Gulfport, Mississippi, for
Amici Curiae.
>

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_________________
OPINION
_________________
CLAY, Circuit Judge. This case concerns the National Voter Registration Act of
1993 (“NVRA”), 52 U.S.C. § 20507. Plaintiff Public Interest Legal Foundation (“PILF”) filed a
two-count complaint alleging that Defendant Jocelyn Benson (“Secretary Benson”), in her
official capacity as Michigan Secretary of State, has not complied with the NVRA by (1) failing
to conduct maintenance of voter registration lists, and (2) failing to allow inspection of public
records and data. PILF specifically alleges that the State of Michigan has failed to make
adequate efforts to remove dead registrants from voter rolls and has refused to grant PILF access
to public records relating to those voter rolls. Secretary Benson subsequently moved for
summary judgment, which the district court granted. For the reasons that follow, we AFFIRM
the district court’s judgment.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Federal and State Election Laws at Issue
This case centers on the obligations the NVRA imposes on states to remove deceased
registrants from voter rolls. The NVRA was passed by Congress to protect the integrity of the
nation’s elections. Congress specifically outlined that the law’s central goal was to establish
“procedures that will increase the number of eligible citizens who register to vote in elections for
Federal office,” making “it possible for Federal, State, and local governments to implement this
[Act] in a manner that enhances the participation of eligible citizens as voters in elections for
Federal office,” protecting “the integrity of the electoral process,” and ensuring “that accurate
and current voter registration rolls are maintained.” 52 U.S.C. § 20501(b).
In keeping with this goal, § 8 of the NVRA—the section at issue in this case—focuses on
the removal of ineligible registrants from voting rolls. Among the classes of voters contemplated
by § 8 is the class of deceased registrants. Section 8 prescribes that states must, inter alia,
“conduct a general program that makes a reasonable effort to remove the names of ineligible
voters from the official lists of eligible voters by reason of . . . the death of the registrant.”

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52 U.S.C. § 20507(a)(4)(A). The section also requires that states allow public inspection of “all
records concerning the implementation of programs and activities conducted for the purpose of
ensuring the accuracy and currency of official lists of eligible voters.” Id.§ 20507(i)(1). The
NVRA provides a private right of action for “declaratory or injunctive relief” by a “person who
is aggrieved by a violation” of the NVRA. Id. § 20510(b).
Congress continued its attempt to secure voting integrity in 2002 when it passed the Help
America Vote Act of 2002 (“HAVA”), Pub. L. No. 107-252, 116 Stat. 1666 (codified as amended
at 52 U.S.C. §§ 20901–21145 (2012)). HAVA’s provisions include a requirement that states
“shall implement, in a uniform and nondiscriminatory manner, a single, uniform, official, . . .
computerized statewide voter registration list . . . that contains the name and registration
information of every legally registered voter in the State. . . .” 52 U.S.C. § 21083(a)(1)(A). The
statute further requires that this “computerized list shall serve as the official voter registration list
for the conduct of all elections for Federal office in the State.” Id. § 21083(a)(1)(A)(viii).
The State of Michigan has enacted a statutory scheme to come into compliance with both
the NVRA and HAVA. The relevant portions of that scheme include language stating that the
Michigan Secretary of State serves as the state’s top election official and is responsible for
ensuring Michigan’s compliance with the NVRA and HAVA. Mich. Comp. Laws § 168.509n.
The scheme also created the “qualified voter file” (“QVF”), which is the state’s computerized
statewide voter registration list as required by HAVA. Id. §§ 168.509m(1)(a), 168.509o,
168.509p, 168.509q, 168.509r. Michigan law requires that, to keep the QVF current, the
Secretary of State must establish
a process by which information obtained through the United States Social
Security Administration’s death master file that is used to cancel an operator’s or
chauffeur’s license . . . or an official state personal identification card . . . of a
deceased resident of this state is also used at least once a month to update the
qualified voter file to cancel the voter registration of any elector determined to be
deceased.
Id. § 168.509o(4). The law also requires that the Secretary “make the canceled voter registration
information . . . available to the clerk of each county, city, or township to assist with the clerk’s
obligations under section 510.” Id.

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Michigan law prescribes a variety of avenues to keep the QVF current and ensure that
deceased voters are removed from the roll. For example, one statute prescribes that “[a]t least
once a month, the county clerk shall forward a list of the last known address and birth date of all
individuals over 17- ½ years of age who have died in the county to the clerk of each city or
township in the county.” Mich. Comp. Laws § 168.510(1). Additionally, local clerks are
empowered to operate programs “to remove names of registered voters who are no longer
qualified to vote in the city or township from the registration records of that city or township.”
Mich. Comp. Laws § 168.509dd(1). Local clerks may also engage in house-to-house canvassing,
send “general mailing to voters for address verifications,” participate “in the national change of
address program established by the postal service,” or “[o]ther means the clerk considers
appropriate.” Mich. Comp. Laws § 168.509dd(3).
Outside of statutory prescriptions, the Secretary of State’s office oversees a number of
operations to keep the QVF current. According to Secretary Benson, her office uses four
separate steps to remove deceased voters from the QVF. First, the state maintains a software
system known as “CARS,” which supports the “driver file,” a database that includes the personal
information of all vehicle drivers and individuals with state identification in Michigan. CARS
receives weekly updates from federal agencies regarding deaths of Michigan residents. If there
is an exact match between the information from the federal agency (name, date of birth, and
social security number) and the information stored in CARS, and if that individual is listed on
the QVF, the QVF is automatically updated to reflect the voter registrant’s death. If the
information provided from the federal government partially matches the information in CARS,
the potential match is manually reviewed by a state unit to determine whether there is a match.1
Second, state officials utilize CARS in conjunction with the federal Social Security
Administration. State officials produce a weekly report from CARS that lists individuals whose
license or state identification are expiring within 90 days so that the state can mail the individuals
1According to Secretary Benson, “[i]f there are at least 3 data points that match, the individual will
be marked as deceased in CARS. Once the customer record is updated in CARS, QVF is automatically updated.”
R. 149-3, Page ID #3086. Partial matches are typically reviewed within 7 to 10 days, though Secretary Benson
acknowledges that backlogs of up to four weeks sometimes occur. R. 149-4, Page ID #3101–02.

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renewal notices. Before mailing these notices, the file is shared with the Social Security
Administration, and the Social Security Administration will provide a death indicator on the
report if an individual is reported deceased. CARS will then update the individual’s record as
deceased and transmit that information to the QVF.
Third, members of the public can send information relating to the death of a registrant.
For example, an individual may send in a death certificate of an immediate family member. This
information from the public would then be updated in CARS and sent to the QVF.
Fourth, the Bureau of Elections (“BOE”) works in conjunction with Movant-Appellee
Electronic Registration Information Center, Inc. (“ERIC”), a non-profit, non-partisan
membership organization that is incorporated in Delaware.2 ERIC transmits records of
potentially deceased individuals to BOE. ERIC creates these reports by comparing the QVF
against the Social Security Administration’s death index and identifying potential matches. BOE
then reviews the records manually to determine whether there is a match between ERIC’s records
and a voter’s records. ERIC’s bimonthly reports help address a subset of voters that may
otherwise be overlooked by relying solely on the CARS database: voters who lack a driver’s
license or state ID card.
From 2019 to March 2023, Michigan cancelled between 400,000 and 450,000
registrations because the voters were deceased. R. 149-2, Page ID #3077. Michigan is
consistently among the most active states in cancelling the registrations of deceased individuals;
despite the fact that Michigan ranks 10th in voting-age population, the U.S. Election Assistance
Commission reported that Michigan removed the sixth largest total number of registrations based
on death in the 2016 election cycle; the fourth most in the 2018 cycle; the fifth most in the 2020
cycle; and the fifth most in the 2022 cycle.3
2ERIC is involved in this appeal because certain of the discovery orders challenged by PILF pertained to
third-party subpoenas directed at ERIC.
3U.S. Election Assistance Comm’n, The Election Administration and Voting Survey 2016 Comprehensive;
U.S. Election Assistance Comm’n, The Election Administration and Voting Survey 2018 Comprehensive Rep. 82
(NVRA Table 3b) (2018), https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/eac_assets/1/6/2018_EAVS_Report.pdf; U.S.
Election Assistance Comm’n, The Election Administration and Voting Survey 2020 Comprehensive Rep. 165 U.S.
Election Assistance Comm’n, The Election Administration and Voting Survey 2022 Comprehensive Rep. 188 (Voter
Registration Table 5) (2022), https://www.eac.gov/sites/default/files/2023-06/2022_EAVS_Report_508c.pdf (last
visited Oct. 22, 2024).

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B. PILF’s Correspondence with Secretary Benson’s Office
PILF is a “is a non-partisan, non-profit, public interest organization” that “seeks to promote
the integrity of elections in Michigan and other jurisdictions nationwide.” Compl., R. 1, Page
ID #2. In the lead-up to, and in the months following, the 2020 election, PILF contacted
Secretary Benson and BOE multiple times regarding deceased registrants on the active voter
rolls. PILF’s first contact with Secretary Benson occurred on September 18, 2020, in which the
organization alleged that Secretary Benson’s office had failed to adequately monitor deceased
voters and that the organization had conducted its own study showing “34,000 deceased
individuals” were actively registered in the State of Michigan. R. 1-4, Page ID #48–50. The
letter further requested “an immediate meeting . . . to discuss what action will be taken to bring
Michigan into compliance with state and federal law.” Id. at Page ID #48. BOE responded to
this letter 12 days later, requesting that PILF “provide a written description of the matching
criteria used . . . to substantiate these allegations” and a list of the voters that PILF identified as
potentially deceased. R. 11-2, Page ID #126. On October 5, 2020, PILF provided a spreadsheet
and a letter (“October 5, 2020 Letter”) describing the findings, stating that the organization
produced “more than 27,000 records of concern” by comparing Michigan’s QVR with the Social
Security Death Index and “matching full names, full dates of birth, Social Security numbers, and
credit address history information.” R. 1-6, Page ID #52–53. PILF noted that the remainder
matched “other verifiable death record sources.” Id. Neither BOE nor the Michigan Department
of State (“MDOS”) responded to this letter.4
On November 25, 2020, PILF sent another letter to Secretary Benson and Jonathan
Brater, BOE Director. This letter was a “follow-up” to the previous correspondence,
reflected PILF’s findings as to a new copy of the QVF, and requested a meeting. R. 1-8, Page
ID #61–62. After failing to receive a response, PILF sent “another follow-up” letter on
December 11, 2020 (“December 11, 2020 Letter”), requesting that Secretary Benson
4Michigan Director of Elections Jonathan Brater stated in a deposition that BOE did not respond to the
letter because of time constraints on the BOE. Specifically, Director Brater outlined that the BOE was consumed with
mailing and later counting larger-than-normal absentee ballots due to the COVID-19 pandemic, staff shortages due to
the pandemic, post-election canvasses that faced turbulence due to attempts to prevent certification of the election,
and countering “a high volume of false information being made about the election.” R. 149-2, Page ID #3083.

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“permit inspection or provide copies” of records relating to deceased voters. Dec. 11, 2020
Letter, R. 1-9, Page ID #63–64. Specifically, PILF sought four categories of records: (1) data
files received from the federal Social Security Administration listing deceased individuals; (2)
records relating to the cancellation of deceased registrants from the QVF, including but not
limited to reports that have or can be generated from Michigan’s QVF; (3) records relating to the
investigation of potentially deceased registrants who are listed on the QVF, including but not
limited to correspondence with local election officials; and (4) records and correspondence
regarding use of ERIC to conduct voter roll list maintenance. PILF also stated that it planned
“to send a representative to [Secretary Benson’s and/or the BOE’s] office to inspect these
documents on December 18, 2020.” Id. at Page ID #64. The BOE responded on December 17,
2020, again requesting PILF’s matching criteria. A week later, PILF sent a letter to Secretary
Benson stating “that the Michigan Secretary of State is in violation of the [NVRA] for failure to
permit inspection and duplication of public records . . . .” R. 1-11, Page ID #67. The letter
further requested that because Secretary Benson’s office was “closed to the public,” that the
office “provide the requested records electronically immediately.” Id. at Page ID #68. PILF
sent one final letter requesting inspection on January 13, 2021; MDOS did not respond to the
letter.
C. Procedural History
On November 2, 2021, PILF filed a two-count complaint against Secretary Benson in
the district court, alleging two violations of the NVRA: (1) failure to conduct list maintenance
and (2) failure to allow inspection of records and data. The parties then proceeded to
discovery.
A number of PILF’s discovery requests are relevant to the instant appeal. First, in
February 2023, PILF sought to depose Secretary Benson. Secretary Benson moved for a
protective order against the deposition unless PILF could establish that the information sought
could not come from other witnesses or means. The magistrate judge granted Secretary
Benson’s protective order without prejudice, noting that she was “unpersuaded” that the
deposition was necessary for PILF’s action. Protective Order Hr’g Tr., R. 75, Page ID #813.
However, the magistrate judge did note that PILF could seek to depose Secretary Benson if

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“depositions or something else reveals that there is some information or some issue about
which only Secretary Benson would testify or if Defendant were to insert Secretary Benson’s
testimony in the litigation in some way.” Id. at Page ID #810. PILF did not appeal the
magistrate judge’s order or renew its effort to depose Secretary Benson.
Second, PILF served subpoenas on non-party ERIC in March 2023, requesting
production of documents and a deposition of the organization. ERIC moved to quash the
subpoena. In a June 2023 hearing on the matter, the magistrate judge stated that PILF’s
subpoena “appear[s] to be a fishing expedition, and not only that but also because [the
subpoena requests are] so far outside the core of this case to be potentially an abuse of the
process before this Court.” Mot. Quash Hr’g Tr., R. 108, Page ID #1956–57. The magistrate
judge also found that PILF’s requested discovery into ERIC was irrelevant to the litigation,
and thus quashed the subpoena. PILF appealed the magistrate judge’s determination, which
the district court denied.
Finally, after discovery had closed in July 2023, PILF filed a motion to depose Stuart
Talsma, an MDOS analyst, for a second time. This motion was filed in response to a
supplemental document production that Secretary Benson filed in September 2023, also after
the close of discovery. That supplement included a document produced by Talsma (“Talsma
Supplement”) regarding the status of the 27,000 “potentially deceased” voters PILF had
identified in the October 5, 2020 Letter. PILF filed a motion to “depose Mr. Talsma regarding
this document because it is relevant to the claims and defenses in this case.” R. 144, Page ID
#2971. The magistrate judge denied this request. Specifically, the magistrate judge noted
that PILF had failed to explain “what additional discovery is required at this point of Mr.
Talsma and why you’re entitled to it.” Talsma Mot. Hr’g Tr., R. 163, Page ID #3304.
Furthermore, the magistrate judge noted that the information sought could be obtained through
other means, including either requesting Secretary Benson to produce the underlying
spreadsheet used to produce the Talsma Supplement, or requesting Secretary Benson update
her response to PILF’s interrogatory request relating to “categories of voter status and status
reasons that are included in the report and what those mean.” Id. at Page ID #3320.
Secretary Benson subsequently agreed to both provide the underlying spreadsheet to PILF and

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to update her interrogatory response. Id. at Page ID #3321. Secretary Benson provided these
materials on October 19, 2023, and PILF did not appeal the magistrate judge’s order.
Following discovery, both PILF and Secretary Benson moved for summary judgment.
PILF also filed a motion pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56(d), arguing that
Secretary Benson’s motion for summary judgment should be denied or deferred because PILF
“ha[d] not been permitted to conduct all relevant discovery.” Mot. for Disc., R. 170, Page ID
#3517–18. Specifically, PILF argued that it had not been permitted to (1) depose Secretary
Benson, (2) obtain documents from ERIC, and (3) depose Talsma. The district court
ultimately denied PILF’s summary judgment motion and granted Secretary Benson’s summary
judgment motion, finding that PILF had failed to show sufficient evidence for its list-
maintenance count and that its disclosure-obligations count was moot. The district court also
denied PILF’s Rule 56(d) motion, stating that each of the evidentiary issues were already
litigated in previously filed motions and that PILF did not “articulate any specific facts that it
believes it will obtain from Secretary Benson, ERIC, or Talsma that would demonstrate the
existence of a question of fact.” Summ. J. Order, R. 180, Page ID #3660.
II. DISCUSSION
A. Standard of Review
“We review the district court’s grant of summary judgment de novo.” Kirilenko-Ison
v. Bd. of Educ. of Danville Indep. Schs., 974 F.3d 652, 660 (6th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted).
Summary judgment is proper “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute as to any
material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
“A dispute of a material fact is genuine so long as ‘the evidence is such that a reasonable jury
could return a verdict for the non-moving party.’” Kirilenko-Ison, 974 F.3d at 660 (quoting
Jackson v. VHS Detroit Receiving Hosp., Inc., 814 F.3d 769, 775 (6th Cir. 2016)). This Court
reviews decisions on summary judgment by “view[ing] the factual evidence and draw[ing] all
reasonable inferences in favor of the non-moving party.” See v. City of Elyria, 502 F.3d 484,
491 (6th Cir. 2007).
In reviewing a district court’s decisions to deny or limit the scope of discovery, this

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Court reviews for an abuse of discretion. Siggers v. Campbell, 652 F.3d 681, 695–96 (6th Cir.
2011). A court abuses its discretion “when the reviewing court is left with a definite and firm
conviction that the court below committed a clear error of judgment.” Pittman v. Experian
Info. Sols., Inc., 901 F.3d 619, 642 (6th Cir. 2018) (citation and quotation marks omitted).
B. Analysis
1. Discovery Dispute
PILF argues that during the course of litigation, it was unfairly deprived of its
opportunity to conduct the following discovery: (1) deposing Secretary Benson regarding “list
maintenance procedures and directives,” (2) obtaining documents from ERIC regarding the
comparison between the QVF and the Social Security Administration’s death records, and
(3) deposing Stuart Talsma regarding the Talsma Supplement. Appellant Br., ECF No. 21,
39–41. According to PILF, these denials by both the district court and the magistrate judge
touched “the heart of the ultimate factual questions” in this case, and it was therefore improper
for the district court to grant summary judgment without this evidence.5 Id. at 39. This
argument misses the mark.
To begin, the only discovery-related appeal PILF filed in the district court was its appeal
of the magistrate judge’s decision to quash PILF’s subpoena to ERIC. PILF did not appeal the
magistrate judge’s discovery orders regarding the requested depositions of Secretary Benson
and Talsma. Because of this failure, we lack jurisdiction to review any more than the quashed
ERIC subpoena. Hoven v. Walgreen Co., 751 F.3d 778, 782 (6th Cir. 2014) (finding that
where a magistrate judge considers pretrial matters on a “limited grant of authority . . .
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 636(b)(1)(A),” not a grant of “plenary jurisdiction pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 636(c)(1),” then “we are ‘without jurisdiction to review the magistrate’s order unless
the parties have sought review in the district court’” (quoting McQueen v. Beecher Cmty.
5Secretary Benson notes that PILF’s brief “does not specify whether it seeks to appeal the district court’s
denial of its Rule 56(d) motion, or if it is appealing the underlying discovery motions.” Def.-Appellee Br., ECF
No. 35, 68–69. However, PILF’s brief does not mention the Rule 56(d) motion, and instead focuses on the denial
of the discovery requests themselves. PILF’s Reply Brief also focuses on the denial of the discovery requests and
not the Rule 56(d) motion. It therefore appears that PILF is appealing the district court and magistrate judge’s
denial of the three relevant discovery requests.

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Schs., 433 F.3d 460, 472 (6th Cir. 2006))). In a series of unnumbered docket entries, the
district court referred the issues of the Secretary Benson and Talsma depositions to the
magistrate judge on a limited grant of authority pursuant to § 636(b)(1)(A). PILF’s failure to
appeal the magistrate judge’s subsequent decisions is therefore fatal to its present appeal.
We therefore limit our review to the ERIC subpoena, which PILF did appeal. Lower
courts are afforded broad leeway in managing discovery. See Pittman, 901 F.3d at 642. As
this Court has recognized, “[i]t is well established that the scope of discovery is within the
sound discretion of the trial court.” Lavado v. Keohane, 992 F.2d 601, 604 (6th Cir. 1993)
(citation omitted). To demonstrate that reversal of the court’s exercise of discretion is
warranted, a litigant must make “a clear showing that the denial of discovery resulted in actual
and substantial prejudice to the complaining litigant.” Pittman, 901 F.3d at 642 (cleaned up).
At the summary judgment phase, the complaining litigant must “demonstrate that the
discovery sought would have precluded summary judgment.” Stiltner v. Donini, No. 20-4136,
2021 WL 5232339, at *3 (6th Cir. Aug. 9, 2021).
Regarding the discovery requests pertaining to ERIC, PILF has failed to demonstrate
prejudice. PILF’s Reply Brief speaks at length on the magistrate judge’s abuse of discretion
with respect to the ERIC discovery request, but does not reference PILF’s burden in showing
prejudice. PILF’s conclusory statement that “[p]rejudice is inherent on an unequal playing
field” does not meet its burden. Appellant Reply Br., ECF No. 38, 24. PILF has not
demonstrated how the requested discovery would have altered the district court’s summary
judgment determination. For example, PILF has not concretely articulated what facts it believes
it could have obtained from ERIC that would have impacted the district court’s order.
Considering PILF has not demonstrated prejudice, this Court cannot find that either the
magistrate judge or the district court abused their discretion in resolving PILF’s discovery
motion relating to the ERIC subpoena. As such, PILF cannot maintain its argument that the
district court erred in determining summary judgment without reviewing the requested
evidence.

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2. Summary Judgment as to Count I
Count I of PILF’s complaint alleged a violation of the NVRA for failure to conduct list
maintenance. The district court granted Secretary Benson summary judgment on this count,
finding that undisputed facts in the record demonstrated that Michigan’s dead-registrant-
removal program constituted a reasonable effort under the NVRA.
a. Interpretation of the NVRA’s Reasonableness Standard
The core of this case centers on a question of statutory interpretation: what efforts must
a state make in order to meet the NVRA’s “reasonable effort” requirement? The language of
the statute requires, in relevant part, that states “conduct a general program that makes a
reasonable effort to remove the names of ineligible voters from the official lists of eligible
voters by reason of . . . the death of the registrant.” 52 U.S.C. § 20507(a)(4)(A) (emphasis
added). Beyond this, Congress did not give any further guidance on what a “reasonable effort”
must look like. Congress did not, for example, enumerate what steps a state should take to
come into compliance with this standard.6 In interpreting this language, the district court
found that PILF had failed to identify any “genuine issue for trial regarding its claim that”
Michigan’s program for removal of dead registrants “is not reasonable.” Summ. J. Order,
R. 180, Page ID #3660–61. The district court specifically noted that “the NVRA requires
only a ‘reasonable effort,’ not a perfect effort, to remove registrants who have died,” and that
Michigan’s program meets the requisite level of effort. Id. at Page ID #3659.
PILF argues that the district court erred in its interpretation of what a reasonable effort
requires. According to PILF, a reasonable effort “to remove deceased registrants must amount
to a quantifiable, objective standard that may be applied to all entities subject to the NVRA,
including [Secretary Benson].” Appellant Br., ECF No. 21, 17. To support its articulation of
what it believes should constitute the reasonable effort standard, PILF looks to a number of
supporting guides. PILF draws on the NVRA’s legislative history by, for example, indicating
that the negotiations during the NVRA’s passage process produced multiple drafts of the bill,
in which later versions included much stronger language related to removal of dead
6This Circuit has also not opined on what measures constitute a reasonable effort under the NVRA.

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registrants.7 Outside of legislative history, PILF highlights the U.S. Department of Justice’s
efforts in enforcing the NVRA. It notes that the Justice Department has issued statements
highlighting that voter list maintenance requires a vigorous effort and that the Justice
Department has also filed suit against a number of states for failing to maintain proper list
maintenance.
PILF’s interpretation of the NVRA’s “reasonable effort” language is misplaced. To
determine the meaning of a statute, this Court has emphasized that “[t]he starting point . . . is
the language of the statute itself.” United States v. Plavcak, 411 F.3d 655, 660 (6th Cir. 2005)
(quoting Group Life & Health Ins. Co. v. Royal Drug Co., 440 U.S. 205, 210 (1979)). “This
inquiry begins—and sometimes ends—with the plain language of the statute. If the language
of the statute is clear, the court applies the statute as written.” Donovan v. FirstCredit, Inc.,
983 F.3d 246, 253 (6th Cir. 2020) (cleaned up). In looking at the language of a statute, “words
will be interpreted as taking their ordinary, contemporary, common meaning,” as “it is
appropriate to assume that the ordinary meaning of the language that Congress employed
‘accurately expresses its legislative purpose.’” Plavcak, 411 F.3d at 660–61 (first citing Perrin
v. United States, 444 U.S. 37, 42 (1979); and then quoting Mills Music, Inc. v. Snyder, 469 U.S.
153, 164 (1985)). A review of the plain, ordinary meaning of § 8’s language demonstrates
that PILF’s reading of the reasonable effort requirement is flawed.
The NVRA does not include a definition of “reasonable effort.” Thus, to determine
the common meaning of the phrase “reasonable effort,” a turn to dictionary definitions is
instructive. See Vander Boegh v. EnergySolutions, Inc., 772 F.3d 1056, 1060 (6th Cir. 2014)
(“Where no statutory definition exists, a court may consult a dictionary definition for
guidance in discerning the plain meaning of a statute’s language.”) (citation omitted).
Webster’s Third New International Dictionary—published in 1993, the year of the NVRA’s
passage—defines “reasonable” as “being in agreement with right thinking or right judgment :
not conflicting with reason : not absurd : not ridiculous.” Reasonable, Webster’s Third New
7Amici curiae Republican National Committee and Restoring Integrity and Trust in Elections turn the
Court’s attention to the statements of legislators during the bill’s negotiations. Those statements, according to amici,
demonstrate that ensuring a rigorous attention to voter list maintenance was crucial to the NVRA’s passage.

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International Dictionary (1993). Contemporary dictionaries provide similar definitions of
reasonable, as the Oxford English Dictionary’s online dictionary defines reasonable as
“[w]ithin the limits of what it would be rational or sensible to expect; not
extravagant or excessive; moderate.” Reasonable, Oxford English Dictionary,
https://www.oed.com/dictionary/reasonable_adj?tab=meaning_and_use#26885710. Relatedly,
contemporary dictionaries define “effort” as “a serious attempt : try.” Effort, Merriam-
Webster, https://www.merriam-webster.com/dictionary/effort.
In looking at these dictionary definitions, a fairly straightforward definition of
“reasonable effort” can be constructed: a serious attempt that is rational and sensible; the
attempt need not be perfect, or even optimal, so long as it remains within the bounds of
rationality. This definition can then be placed in the broader context of § 8’s dead registrant
language. The statute states that a state must “conduct a general program that makes a
reasonable effort to remove the names of ineligible voters from the official lists of eligible
voters by reason of . . . the death of the registrant. ” 52 U.S.C. § 20507(a)(4)(A). Thus, a
state must establish a program that makes a rational and sensible attempt to remove dead
registrants; a state need not, however, go to “extravagant or excessive” lengths in creating and
maintaining such a program. This definition of the NVRA’s language is drawn from the
plain, ordinary meaning of the statute; accordingly, the Court’s analysis ends there and
“applies the statute as written.” Donovan, 983 F.3d at 253. PILF is thus mistaken in relying on
extratextual sources to guide its interpretation of § 8. The plain language of the statute, not
legislative history or the Justice Department’s actions, determine the law’s meaning.
In addition, PILF’s definition of “reasonable effort” is incongruent with the NVRA’s
common meaning. PILF states that a reasonable effort “to remove deceased registrants must
amount to a quantifiable, objective standard that may be applied to all entities subject to the
NVRA.” Appellant Br., ECF No. 21, 17. To interpret the language of the NVRA as
imposing a “quantifiable” target finds no support in § 8 and is not anchored to the common
meaning of the statute. It is unclear what counts as “a quantifiable, objective standard,” how a
state could meet that standard, or how such a requirement could be derived from the plain
language of the statute.

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b. Application of the Reasonable Effort Standard to Summary Judgment
In its order, the district court found that undisputed evidence established that
Michigan’s program of removing deceased registrants fell squarely within the NVRA’s
reasonable-effort requirement. The district court’s order outlined several reasons to explain
this conclusion.
First, the court turned to Eleventh Circuit case law. In Bellitto v. Snipes, a nonprofit
corporation filed suit against a county elections official in Florida who allegedly “failed to
satisfy her list-maintenance obligations” under the NVRA.8 935 F.3d 1192, 1194 (11th Cir.
2019). While the issues discussed in Bellitto are largely unconnected to the issues of this case,
the Eleventh Circuit briefly touched on § 8’s reasonable efforts standard. Specifically, the
court noted:
As for voters who become ineligible because of death, we agree with the district
court that a jurisdiction’s reliance on reliable death records, such as state health
department records and the Social Security Death Index, to identify and remove
deceased voters constitutes a reasonable effort. The state is not required to
exhaust all available methods for identifying deceased voters; it need only use
reasonably reliable information to identify and remove such voters.
Id. at 1205. The district court highlighted that Michigan employs a similarly “reasonable”
program. Like Florida, Michigan “relies on [the Social Security Death Index] and state health
records in order to identify and remove deceased registrants, in addition to other tools to
capture both in-state and out-of-state deaths.” Summ. J. Order, R. 180, Page ID #3659.
Second, the district court turned to state-specific statistics demonstrating the
reasonableness of Michigan’s program. In its October 5, 2020 Letter, PILF identified 27,000
“potentially deceased” voters on Michigan’s registration rolls. Oct. 2020 Letter, R. 1-6, Page
ID #52–53. The district court calculated that this figure “would comprise
8PILF argues that the district court’s reliance on Bellitto was inapposite as that case had a different
procedural posture and factual record. Specifically, PILF states that Bellitto “was decided following a bench trial”
and PILF relies on evidence that is qualitatively different from the evidence at issue in Bellitto. Appellant’s Br.,
ECF No. 21, 25. Yet the portions of Bellitto that the district court cites to are either not particular to the procedural
history, or constitute irrelevant evidence. Instead, those portions cited by the district court consider broad
interpretations of the NVRA’s reasonable-effort standard—interpretations that are readily applicable to this case.

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approximately 0.3 percent of the total number of [8.2 million] registered voters in Michigan.”
Summ. J. Order, R. 180, Page ID #3657. This relatively small percentage, according to the
district court, “would simply not be unreasonable in a state the size of Michigan”—especially
considering that “federally collected data shows that Michigan is consistently among the most
active states in the United States in cancelling the registrations of deceased individuals.” Id.
Third, the district court analyzed the mechanics of Michigan’s program. The court
noted that Michigan undertakes a number of steps to ensure a well-functioning program,
including: (1) comparing Social Security Administration death reports on a weekly basis to the
CARS list; (2) reconciling the QVF with the CARS driver file on a quarterly basis; and (3)
manually reviewing the bimonthly ERIC reports, which are created by comparing the QVF to
the Social Security Death Index. Under this program, the district court noted, “nearly 8,000 of
the ‘potentially deceased’ voters identified by PILF in its October 5, 2020 list had already been
removed” by September 2023, and 5,766 had been removed before PILF filed its action in
November 2021. Id. at Page ID #3658. While PILF argued that it is not enough to merely
schedule registrant removal under these procedures, and that the entire list of 27,000 deceased
registrants “should be fixed now,” Pl.’s Resp. Summ. J., R. 168, Page ID #3413, the district
court disagreed. The court found that the NVRA “does not require states to immediately
remove every voter who may have become ineligible,” and it was instead sufficient that the
“record demonstrate[d] that deceased voters are removed from Michigan’s voter rolls on a
regular and ongoing basis.” Summ. J. Order, R. 180, Page ID #3658.
These factors ultimately led the district court to the conclusion that Michigan’s
program fell squarely within the NVRA’s reasonable effort language. That determination was
correct.
Neither party disputes the factual record with respect to certain core elements of
Michigan’s registrant removal program. Both parties agree that (1) the QVF is updated
automatically when an exact death is reported on CARS and manually when a “close match” is
reported on CARS, (2) the QVF is updated based on information from the Social Security
Administration’s death records, and (3) the MDOS updates voter registrations manually based
on “potentially deceased” records from ERIC. While PILF disputes whether these

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components of Michigan’s program are enough to be considered a reasonable effort, it does
not contest whether Michigan does in fact utilize these tools. With these elements of the
program established as a factual matter, we must determine whether this program constitutes a
reasonable effort under the NVRA.
While this Circuit has yet to opine on what efforts are enough to be considered
reasonable, Bellitto is instructive.9 There, the Eleventh Circuit found that Florida’s “reliance on
reliable death records, such as state health department records and the Social Security Death
Index, to identify and remove deceased voters constitutes a reasonable effort.” Bellitto,
935 F.3d at 1205. This reading of the reasonable effort requirement falls squarely in line with
the ordinary, common meaning of the statute’s language. A state that actively makes efforts
to remove dead registrants based on state and federal death records is engaging in an
inherently rational, sensible attempt at maintaining accurate voter registration lists. Michigan
not only undertakes the kind of effort described in Bellitto, but it also adopts additional
standards as well. The defendant in Bellitto “utilized reliable death records from the Florida
Department of Health and the Social Security administration to identify and regularly remove
deceased voters,” id. at 1195, which parallels Michigan’s regular QVF updates based on
information from state records and the Social Security Administration. Yet Michigan goes
further by also actively employing a third party, ERIC, to assist in identifying deceased
registrants. This additional effort only further enhances the reasonableness of Michigan’s
efforts to maintain accurate voter rolls.
That Michigan makes a reasonable effort can also be demonstrated through
basic statistical evidence that, again, PILF does not dispute. As the district court notes, there
are 8.2 million registered voters in Michigan. Assuming, arguendo, that PILF’s calculation of
27,000 deceased voters on the state’s voter rolls is correct, this would only constitute “0.3
percent of the total number of registered voters in Michigan.” Summ. J. Order, R. 180, Page
9Given that the parties do not dispute key facts, PILF’s attempt to distinguish Bellitto on the basis that it
involved a bench trial falls flat. And although the Bellitto panel applied clear error review to the district
court’s factual findings, not the de novo review we apply here, the Bellitto panel also applied de novo review to
issues of statutory interpretation—such as the meaning of the NVRA’s “reasonable effort” requirement. 935 F.3d at
1197–98.

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ID #3657. That vanishingly small percentage is in-and-of-itself indicative that Michigan has
taken rational, sensible steps to maintain accurate voter rolls.
PILF argues that these efforts are not, in fact, sufficiently reasonable, and takes issue
with a number of features within Michigan’s processes. For example, PILF states that the
Social Security Administration’s death files are not compared directly with the QVF, but rather
the files contained in CARS. PILF argues that a better—i.e., more reasonable— process would
compare the Social Security Administration’s death records directly with the QVF. PILF also
posits that Michigan could improve its program by (1) utilizing the entire Social Security
Administration death index, not just updates to it; (2) looking specifically for individuals
registered after their death; and (3) changing a state policy that stops processing deceased
notices two weeks prior to elections. Appellee’s Br., ECF No. 35, 30–32. In fact, much of
PILF’s brief is filled with examples of ways in which Michigan’s program is suboptimal and in
which the program could be improved. Yet the language of the NVRA does not require a
perfect effort, nor does it require the most optimal effort, nor does it even require a very good
effort. Instead, the NVRA only requires a reasonable effort. As the Eleventh Circuit noted:
“The state is not required to exhaust all available methods for identifying deceased voters.”
Bellitto, 935 F.3d at 1205. And Michigan’s multi-layered efforts are more than reasonable.
PILF also argues that the district court improperly granted summary judgment because
a finding of reasonableness is “indivisible from a factual inquiry” and should be left to a jury.
Appellant’s Reply Br., ECF No. 38, 1–2. Neither this Circuit nor its sister circuits have
explored whether determining if a state’s registrant removal program “makes a reasonable
effort” is an inquiry of fact, law, or both. Yet the undisputed material facts of this case
demonstrate that the district court was drawing a legal conclusion at summary judgment. The
district court was presented with broad set of undisputed evidence outlining the operations and
results of Michigan’s registrant removal program. With these uncontested facts, the district
court looked to determine the precise contours and requirements of the NVRA’s reasonable
efforts wording. This is a task of deciphering legislative language, which is inherently a legal
inquiry. See CFE Racing Prod., Inc. v. BMF Wheels, Inc., 793 F.3d 571, 597 (6th Cir. 2015).
Where, as here, a district court has wide-ranging, undisputed facts concerning a state’s

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registrant removal program, the court is well within its discretion to make a legal finding and
grant summary judgment.
3. Summary Judgment as to Count II
Count II of PILF’s complaint alleges that Secretary Benson violated the NVRA’s
inspection of records and data provision by failing to produce records in response to the
December 18, 2020 Letter. Both parties moved for summary judgment on this count; the
district court granted it in favor of Secretary Benson, finding that the claim was moot.
Whether the district court erred in finding that the count was moot is a determination we
need not reach. Instead, Count II must be dismissed because PILF does not have standing to
assert this claim.10
“For a dispute to qualify as an Article III case or controversy that a federal court may
resolve, the plaintiff who brings the dispute to the court must have standing.” Barber
v. Charter Twp. of Springfield, 31 F.4th 382, 389 (6th Cir. 2022) (cleaned up). To
demonstrate standing under Article III, “a plaintiff must have suffered some actual or
threatened injury due to the alleged illegal conduct of the defendant; the injury must be ‘fairly
traceable’ to the challenged action; and there must be a substantial likelihood that the relief
requested will redress or prevent the plaintiff’s injury.” Coyne v. Am. Tobacco Co., 183 F.3d
488, 494 (6th Cir. 1999) (quoting Valley Forge Christian Coll. v. Ams. United for Separation of
Church & State, Inc., 454 U.S. 464, 472 (1982)). Courts “look only to ‘the facts existing
when the complaint is filed’” to determine standing. Barber, 31 F.4th at 390 (quoting Lujan
v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 569 n.4 (1992)). To show injury, a plaintiff must allege that
it “suffered an injury in fact, which is ‘concrete, particularized, and actual or imminent.’”
Shearson v. Holder, 725 F.3d 588, 592 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA,
568 U.S. 398, 409 (2013)). A plaintiff may allege an “informational injury,” but it must
identify concrete “‘downstream consequences’ from failing to receive the required
information.” TransUnion LLC v. Ramirez, 594 U.S. 413, 442 (2021) (citation omitted).
10Secretary Benson raised the issue of standing at summary judgment; however, the district court declined to
rule on the issue because the court dismissed the case on mootness grounds.

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The Fifth Circuit’s recent holding in Campaign Legal Center v. Scott, which presented
very similar facts as this case, is instructive. 49 F.4th 931 (5th Cir. 2022). There, the
plaintiffs filed a request to the Texas Secretary State for documents relating to voter registrants
identified by the state “as potential non-U.S. citizens.” Id. at 934. The Texas Secretary of
State refused to release the documents on privacy grounds. In response, the plaintiffs filed
suit under the same NVRA public disclosure provision at issue in this case, alleging that Texas
had unlawfully failed to produce records as required by federal law. On appeal, the Fifth
Circuit reviewed whether the plaintiffs had standing to bring the case; specifically, whether the
plaintiffs had sufficiently alleged an informational injury. The plaintiffs provided three
arguments as to why they had established injury: first, as “civic engagement organizations,”
they had “standing to request records under the NVRA;” second, “there is a downstream injury
with respect to the public not having visibility into how Texas is keeping its voter lists;” and
third, “there is a downstream injury with respect to the public not having visibility into
properly registered Texans being discriminated against and burdened in their right to vote.”
Id. at 936 (cleaned up).
The Fifth Circuit rejected these arguments on multiple grounds. First, the court
pointed out that under the Supreme Court’s TransUnion doctrine, a plaintiff does not
“automatically satisf[y] the injury-in-fact requirement whenever a statute grants a person a
statutory right and purports to authorize that person to sue to vindicate that right.” Id.
(quoting TransUnion, 594 U.S. at 426). In other words, it is not enough for a plaintiff to simply
allege that it was unlawfully denied records requests; instead, a plaintiff must also show that
some concrete downstream injury resulted.11 The court also emphasized the Supreme Court’s
11The Fifth Circuit noted that the plaintiffs relied on “superficially appealing” Supreme Court case law
prior to TransUnion. Id. at 937. That case law found that “government refusals to compel disclosures of
information arguably required by law constituted a concrete Article III injury.” Id. at 938 (citing FEC v. Akins, 524
U.S. 11, 15–16 (1998); Pub. Citizen v. U.S. Dep’t of Just., 491 U.S. 440, 449 (1989)). Yet the Fifth Circuit noted
that those cases—which are the same cases that PILF cites to in this case—cannot be read out of context. In
reviewing the Supreme Court’s TransUnion opinion in context with earlier cases, the Fifth Circuit correctly
interpreted the Supreme Court’s case law to hold that “even in public disclosure-based cases, plaintiffs must and can
assert ‘downstream consequences,’ which is another way of identifying concrete harm from governmental failures to
disclose.” Id. at 937–38; accord Grae v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 57 F.4th 567, 570–71 (6th Cir.) (reconciling Akins
and Public Citizen with TransUnion by noting that the former two cases, although public disclosure cases, nonetheless
involved downstream harms that “transformed what otherwise would have been a ‘bare procedural violation’ of a
public-disclosure law into a concrete injury”), cert. denied sub nom. Tardy v. Corr. Corp. of Am., 144 S. Ct. 285 (2023).

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warning that “Article III standing requires a concrete injury even in the context of a statutory
violation.” Id. at 937 (quoting TransUnion, 594 U.S. at 426). Second, the court found that
the plaintiffs had not demonstrated “any downstream consequences from an alleged injury in
law under the NVRA.” Id. The plaintiffs’ theories regarding “visibility” failed to establish a
“cognizable injury in fact” as these were not examples of a “concrete and particularized harm.”
Id. Third, the court emphasized that “[t]he lack of concrete harm . . . is reinforced because
not a single Plaintiff is a Texas voter, much less a voter wrongfully identified as ineligible, and
the Plaintiffs have not claimed organizational standing on behalf of any Texas voter
members.” Id. Finally, the court stated that the plaintiffs did “not allege that identification of
voter names and identification numbers [would] directly lead to action relevant to the NVRA
or any other statute, nor that their direct participation in the electoral process [would] be
hindered.” Id. at 938. Thus, the Fifth Circuit concluded that the plaintiffs had failed to
establish an informational injury, as they had failed to demonstrate concrete downstream
consequences from Texas’ failure to produce the requested records.
Campaign Legal Center is directly analogous to this case. Like the Campaign Legal
Center plaintiffs, PILF sought voter records pursuant to the NVRA; and like the Campaign
Legal Center plaintiffs, PILF is not a registered voter, nor has it claimed organizational
standing on behalf of registered voters, in the voting jurisdiction at issue.12 PILF’s legal
argument also mirrors the Campaign Legal Center plaintiffs’ argument in that PILF states that
it suffered a cognizable injury under the informational injury doctrine. PILF attempts to
draw a distinction between this case and Campaign Legal Center with respect to “downstream
consequences.” PILF argues that unlike the Fifth Circuit case, the complaint in this action
directly references concrete downstream harms. Specifically, PILF alleges in its complaint that
Secretary Benson’s failure to produce relevant records “prevents [PILF] from engaging in its
research, educational, and remedial activities.” Compl., R. 1, Page ID #19. In its reply brief,
PILF further argues that Secretary Benson “has impaired the accumulation of institutional
knowledge to assist and inform” PILF’s “core functions” because such knowledge is
12PILF is not located in Michigan. Instead, it is “incorporated and based in Indianapolis, Indiana.”
Compl., R. 1, Page ID #2.

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“informed by [the] state’s compliance with the NVRA.” Appellant Reply Br., ECF No. 38,
17.
PILF’s downstream consequences argument is unavailing. This stance is similar to one
of the unsuccessful arguments made by the plaintiffs in Campaign Legal Center. In its brief,
the plaintiffs argued that Texas’ failure to release records prevented the plaintiffs from
achieving their organizational goal of “monitoring Texas’s compliance with the NVRA”
because the “refusal to produce records of the individuals identified under the list maintenance
program” denied the plaintiffs “the opportunity to identify eligible voters improperly flagged
by the program.” Appellee Br. at 35, Campaign Legal Ctr. v. Scott, No. 22-50692 (5th Cir.
Aug. 24, 2022), ECF No. 60-1. In effect, the plaintiffs argued that Texas’ failure to produce
documents broadly harmed the organizational goals of the plaintiffs—an argument very similar
to the one made by PILF, and which the Fifth Circuit found unconvincing. See Campaign
Legal Ctr., 49 F.4th at 937–38.
Furthermore, the allegation in PILF’s complaint that Secretary Benson’s actions
prevent PILF “from engaging in its research, educational, and remedial activities” is, at most, a
vague and unspecific injury. See Campaign Legal Ctr., 49 F.4th at 937 (“[T]he district court’s
concern about Plaintiffs’ lack of ‘opportunity’ to identify voters incorrectly described by the
Secretary’s data base expresses a speculative rather than concrete grievance. To support
standing, however, Plaintiffs’ injury must be more than speculative and must be ‘certainly
impending.’” (quoting Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 568 U.S. 398, 409 (2013))). Neither the
complaint nor PILF’s briefs identify, for example, specific projects, research papers, or
educational outreach efforts that were directly impacted by Secretary Benson’s failure to
produce relevant records. This Circuit has cautioned that “‘mere allegations’ are insufficient to
establish jurisdiction; at summary judgment, plaintiffs must set forth ‘specific facts.’” Fair
Elections Ohio v. Husted, 770 F.3d 456, 460 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Lujan, 504 U.S. at 561)
(finding that an election advocacy organization had failed to establish standing where it alleged
only that a state’s actions diverted the organization’s “limited resources,” and failed to identify
“specific facts” to support this assertion); see also Merck v. Walmart, Inc., 114 F.4th 762,
776 (6th Cir. 2024) (holding that a plaintiff “must point to specific evidence tending to prove

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that he has an interest in using the withheld information . . . for some purpose beyond his
statutory right to receive it” (emphasis added)); Ctr. for Biological Diversity v. Lueckel, 417
F.3d 532, 537 (6th Cir. 2005) (“Because the plaintiffs’ standing was challenged in a motion
for summary judgment, the plaintiffs must[] . . . ‘set forth specific facts,’ in affidavits or
through other evidence, demonstrating that each element of standing is satisfied.” (quoting
Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e) (2005) (amended 2007)). Indeed, the Third Circuit recently considered
nearly identical injuries claimed by PILF—including the inability to “study and analyze” list
maintenance “to promote the integrity of elections,” as well as the “inability to publish
‘educational materials’”—and faulted PILF for “submit[ting] no evidence of any specific
plans for the records it sought.” Pub. Int. Legal Found. v. Sec’y Commonwealth of Pa., No.
23-1590, --- F.4th ----, 2025 WL 1242229, at *8–9 (3d Cir. Apr. 25, 2025). The court
concluded that PILF “failed to identify some specific adverse downstream consequence for its
mission or future plans” and, therefore, lacked standing. Id. at *10. PILF faces the same
deficiencies here as well.
The combination of analogous case law from the Fifth and Third Circuits and PILF’s
failure to articulate specific downstream consequences demonstrates that PILF has failed to
show a sufficient injury to confer Article III standing. Count II must therefore be dismissed.
III. CONCLUSION
Neither the district court nor the magistrate judge abused their discretion in the discovery
determinations relevant to this appeal. Nor did the district court err in its summary judgment
determination. Accordingly, we AFFIRM the district court in full.

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