John Doe v. WILLIAM BYRON LEE, Governor of the State of Tennessee

RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)
File Name: 25a0125p.06
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
JOHN DOE,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
WILLIAM BYRON LEE, Governor of the State of
Tennessee, in his official capacity; DAVID B. RAUSCH,
Director of the Tennessee Bureau of Investigation, in
his official capacity,
Defendants-Appellants.
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No. 24-6020
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee at Nashville.
No. 3:23-cv-01332—Waverly D. Crenshaw, Jr., District Judge.
Decided and Filed: May 12, 2025
Before: CLAY, THAPAR, and READLER, Circuit Judges.
_________________
COUNSEL
ON BRIEF: Gabriel Krimm, Matthew Dowty, Taylor Davidson, OFFICE OF THE
TENNESSEE ATTORNEY GENERAL, Nashville, Tennessee, for Appellants. Kyle
Mothershead, Brian Daniel Mounce, RELENTLESS ADVOCACY, PLLC, Brentwood,
Tennessee, for Appellee.
_________________
OPINION
_________________
THAPAR, Circuit Judge. The district court below issued a preliminary injunction barring
certain Tennessee officials from enforcing any of the state’s sex-offender statutes. After an
intervening Sixth Circuit decision called that relief into question, the Tennessee officials asked
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the district court to dissolve or modify the preliminary injunction. But the district court refused.
Instead, it ordered the case administratively closed and dismissed the officials’ motion without
prejudice. Because that’s an appealable order, and because the district court abused its discretion
in refusing to dissolve or modify the preliminary injunction, we reverse.
I.
Tennessee has long required individuals convicted of sex offenses to register with the
Tennessee Bureau of Investigation and comply with other reporting requirements and
restrictions. The state first implemented this system in 1994, when it passed a registration and
reporting statute and disseminated certain information about convicted sex offenders to the
public. Tennessee wasn’t alone in enacting such a regulatory scheme. That same year, Congress
passed a law requiring states to adopt sex-offender registration laws if they wanted to receive
federal law-enforcement funding. See Violent Crime Control and Law Enforcement Act of
1994, Pub. L. No. 103-322, § 170101, 108 Stat. 1796, 2038–42 (1994). Within two years, every
state, the District of Columbia, and the federal government had enacted some form of sex-
offender registration statute. See Smith v. Doe, 538 U.S. 84, 89–90 (2003). This coordinated
regulatory regime was meant to give the public information about sex offenders and limit
offenders’ access to potential victims. In 2004, Tennessee passed a new version of its sex-
offender regime and has amended it several times since.
In brief, the Tennessee sex-offender statutes do three main things: (1) they require
offenders to appear in person quarterly and to update their personal information; (2) they limit
where offenders can live, work, and move; and (3) they allow the state to publish information
about registrants. See Doe v. Lee, 102 F.4th 330, 334 (6th Cir. 2024) (“Does #1–9”).
Plaintiff John Doe, meanwhile, is a convicted sex offender who committed his offenses
before the passage of the 2004 statutes. Because Tennessee imposes the requirements on Doe,
he argues that the requirements are a retroactive punishment in violation of the Constitution’s Ex
Post Facto Clause. See U.S. Const. art. I, § 10, cl. 1. So, he sued to stop Tennessee Governor
William Lee and Tennessee Bureau of Investigation Director David Rausch from enforcing the
statutes against him.

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In a related case, a district court had already issued an injunction for nine other convicted
sex-offenders against these same defendants. That case was pending before the Sixth Circuit
when Doe filed this suit. See Does #1–9, 102 F.4th at 342. Thus, neither the governor nor the
director objected to Doe’s request for an injunction. So, the district court entered an injunction
prohibiting them from enforcing the sex-offender laws.
Before the injunction was entered, the parties jointly moved to administratively stay the
case until this court ruled on Does #1–9. After issuing the injunction, the district court granted
the motion to stay the case.
Soon after, the Sixth Circuit handed down Does #1–9. First, the court held that the
plaintiffs lacked standing to sue Governor Lee. Id. at 336. Second, the Sixth Circuit directed the
trial court to modify its injunction against Director Rausch. Id. at 342. The Sixth Circuit held
that, in issuing the sweeping injunction, the district court had “misread” our analogous precedent
relating to a Michigan law, which invalidated only two amendments to Michigan’s scheme, not
the whole framework. Id. at 340; see also Does #1–5 v. Snyder, 834 F.3d 696, 706 (6th Cir.
2016). Thus, the Sixth Circuit explained that Snyder didn’t authorize the district court here to
enjoin Director Rausch from enforcing Tennessee’s entire sex-offender registry. Does #1–9, 102
F.4th at 338–39. And it said that much of Tennessee’s sex-offender regime posed no problem.
Id. at 341. So, at most, the plaintiffs could obtain an injunction against the enforcement of those
provisions of Tennessee’s regime that were analogous to the provisions of Michigan’s regime
that Snyder invalidated. Id. at 341–42. The court remanded so that the parties could determine
which Tennessee provisions were like the problematic amendments in Snyder and clarify what
provisions the director actually enforced. Id. at 342. That way, an injunction against the director
would redress the plaintiffs’ injuries. That case is pending before that district court now.
Following Does #1–9, the district court re-opened this case. Governor Lee and Director
Rausch then moved to dissolve the district court’s preliminary injunction. They argued that it
was too broad, since it had enjoined the entire Tennessee scheme—something Does #1–9 said
was erroneous. In the alternative, they asked the district court to “narrowly tailor” any remaining
preliminary relief. R. 31, Pg. ID 169. Doe, for his part, asked the court to drop Governor Lee
from the proceedings and stay the remaining proceedings during the Does # 1–9 remand.

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The district court agreed with Doe. Observing that the Does #1–9 remand might “inform
the disposition of this matter,” the court ordered the docket “administratively closed pending
final judgment” in Does #1–9. R. 43, Pg. ID 451. The court then “terminate[d] all pending
motions without prejudice to refiling upon reopening of the case.” Id. Once Does #1–9 reached
a “final judgment,” the governor and director could refile their motion to dissolve the
preliminary injunction. Id.
Governor Lee and Director Rausch appealed.
II.
The federal judicial power extends to cases in equity. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. The
power to enjoin parties is an awesome one, but it’s also “meaningfully constrained.” Trump v.
Hawaii, 585 U.S. 667, 716 (2018) (Thomas, J., concurring). Since the Founding, the Anti-
Federalists feared that it would be “very dangerous” to vest judges with the combined power of
legal and equitable relief. Letter No. 3 (Oct. 10, 1787), reprinted in 2 The Complete Anti-
Federalist 234, 244 (Storing ed., 1981). Operating outside the strict confines of the law, judges
could “step into [the] shoes of equity, and give what judgment [their] reason or opinion may
dictate.” Id. The Federalists understood this concern and responded that “[t]he great and
primary use of a court of equity is to give relief in extraordinary cases, which are exceptions to
general rules.” The Federalist No. 83, at 473 (Alexander Hamilton) (Clinton Rossiter ed., 1961)
(emphases in original). Justice Joseph Story agreed. He observed that injunctive relief is
“attended with no small danger, both from its summary nature and its liability to abuse.”
2 Commentaries on Equity Jurisprudence: As Administered in England and America § 959(b), at
303 (6th ed. 1853). He advised that courts ought to “guard[]” it with “extreme caution,” and
apply it “only in very clear cases.” Id. Otherwise, equitable relief risked becoming a “means of
extensive, and perhaps, of irreparable injustice.” Id. For these reasons, law, tradition, and
precedent have kept the preliminary injunction a tightly guarded remedy. See Del. State
Sportsmen’s Ass’n, Inc. v. Del. Dep’t of Safety & Homeland Sec., 108 F.4th 194, 198–200
(3d Cir. 2024).

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Congress recognized the strength of the injunction. Thus, it granted parties immediate
review of district court orders “granting, continuing, modifying, refusing or dissolving
injunctions, or refusing to dissolve or modify injunctions.” 28 U.S.C. § 1292(a)(1).
A.
Thus, the first question we must answer is whether we have authority to review the
district court’s administrative closure of the docket. In effect, does that administrative closure,
plus the court’s dismissal without prejudice of appellants’ motion, count as an order “refusing to
dissolve or modify” an injunction?
When deciding whether a district court order falls within our power to review
interlocutory decisions, we focus on the order’s nature and substance, not on what the district
court called it. Cooey v. Strickland, 588 F.3d 921, 922–23 (6th Cir. 2009) (per curiam).
Otherwise, a district court could prevent review simply by labeling its order a certain way.
Abbott v. Perez, 585 U.S. 579, 595 (2018); see also 11A Charles Alan Wright, Arthur R. Miller,
& Mary Kay Kane, Federal Practice and Procedure § 2962 (3d ed. 2002) (hereinafter Wright &
Miller).
To determine when an order—no matter how it’s labeled—is appealable, the Supreme
Court has set out the following test. To be appealable, the district court’s action must: (1) have
the “practical effect” of granting or denying an injunction, (2) have “serious, perhaps irreparable,
consequence[s]” for a party, and (3) be “effectually challenged” only by immediate appeal.
Carson v. Am. Brands, Inc., 450 U.S. 79, 84 (1981) (citation omitted).1
Here, the district court’s order (1) has the practical effect of refusing to dissolve an
injunction, (2) has serious, irreparable consequences, and (3) can be effectually challenged only
by immediate appeal. Thus, it is appealable.
1It’s unclear why a litigant must show the latter two prongs once he can establish that the district court’s
action has the “practical effect” of an injunction. Carson seems to have added the irreparable-consequence and
immediate-review requirements because § 1292(a)(1) “was intended to carve out only a limited exception to the
final-judgment rule.” 450 U.S. at 84. But since Congress made ordinary injunctions appealable through § 1292,
there’s no reason to treat orders that act like an injunction differently than regular injunctions.

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1.
While styled as a docket-management tool, the district court’s order had the “practical
effect” of refusing to dissolve an injunction. Abbott, 585 U.S. at 594–95. How do we know
when an order has that effect? Asking the following simple question will typically suffice: is
the request for injunctive relief still pending before the district court? If so, then it’s not
appealable. But if no motion is pending, then the court’s order has the “practical effect” of
providing injunctive relief. See In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate Litig., No. 19-3398, 2019 WL
13493113, at *3 (6th Cir. Nov. 18, 2019) (Thapar, J., dissenting).
This rule makes sense. Courts can’t disguise orders that are “injunctive in nature and in
effect” by cloaking them in the garb of docket-management. Cooey, 588 F.3d at 923.
Otherwise, a party would never have the opportunity for direct appellate review. Instead, the
party would have to seek mandamus, which is “no easy road.” In re Nat’l Prescription Opiate
Litig., 2019 WL 13493113, at *3 (Thapar, J., dissenting). So, we need a test for determining
when a docket management order has the “practical effect” of an injunctive order. It usually
depends on whether the party’s motion is still pending. See Wright & Miller, supra, at § 3924.2.
Here, Tennessee’s motion is no longer pending; the district court dismissed it without
prejudice. Once a district court has terminated a motion to dissolve an injunction—as the court
did here—that amounts to a refusal to dissolve the injunction. The order here therefore falls
within the class of interlocutory orders that are appealable.
Indeed, this posture is a lot like Cooey, where we held that we could review a similar
district court order. 588 F.3d at 922. There, the district court stayed the defendant’s execution
based on separate litigation challenging Ohio’s execution protocol. Id. But Ohio changed its
execution protocol. So, the government moved to vacate the court’s stay of the execution,
arguing that the new protocol mooted the earlier order. Id. The district court refused. Id. Ohio
appealed, and we had jurisdiction because the lower court’s order was “injunctive in nature and
in effect.” Id. at 923. Here, an intervening case—Does #1–9—undermined the foundation of the
district court’s preliminary injunction. But the district court refused to dissolve or modify its

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injunction, just like the district court in Cooey. In both cases, the courts’ orders had the practical
effect of an injunction.
2.
Next, the officials must show that the district court’s order “might have a ‘serious,
perhaps irreparable, consequence.’” Carson, 450 U.S. at 84 (citation omitted).
They meet that burden here. A district court’s preliminary injunction has irreparable
consequences anytime a court enjoins duly enacted statutes. Thompson v. DeWine, 976 F.3d
610, 619 (6th Cir. 2020). And appellants articulate an “ongoing and concrete harm to
[Tennessee’s] law enforcement and public safety interests.” Maryland v. King, 567 U.S. 1301,
1303 (2012) (Roberts, C.J., in chambers); see also Abbott, 585 U.S. at 602 n.17 (same). They
point to the reason for enacting the sex-offender registry in the first place: “[s]exual offenders
pose a high risk of engaging in further offenses,” so Tennessee sought to ensure that the public
had the necessary information “to adequately protect themselves and their children from these
persons.” Tenn. Code Ann. §§ 40-39-201(b)(1)–(2) (2025). Thus, the fact that Tennessee “may
not employ a duly enacted statute to help prevent these injuries constitutes irreparable harm.”
King, 567 U.S. at 1303.
In response, Doe says that the sex-offender scheme isn’t necessary to public safety. But a
court can’t second-guess Tennessee’s judgment that the statute is necessary to prevent sex-
offender recidivism and protect the public. That’s a policy judgment reserved for the Tennessee
legislature. In any event, appellants have shown that Tennessee’s sex-offender statute promotes
the public safety and combats recidivism.
Further, Doe points out that he’s been off the registry for over a year, and nothing bad has
happened. But Tennessee isn’t required to wait until a sex offender recidivates before it can
enforce its laws. The whole point of a sex-offender registry is to prevent recidivism through
tracking and disclosure requirements. See Smith, 538 U.S. at 103.

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3.
Finally, only an immediate appeal can protect appellants’ interest in enforcing Tennessee
law. See Abbott, 585 U.S. at 602–03. Otherwise, the district court’s docket will remain closed
until the end of the remand in Does #1–9. Thus, absent immediate appeal, Tennessee cannot
“effectually challenge” the district court’s order. Carson, 450 U.S. at 84 (citation omitted).
* * *
In sum, we have jurisdiction over the district court’s order refusing to rule on appellants’
motion to dissolve the preliminary injunction and administratively closing the docket.
B.
There is, however, one more jurisdiction-related prerequisite to address. Not every
request to modify or dissolve an injunction is appealable. Rather, according to Sixth Circuit
precedent, to “obtain modification or dissolution of an injunction, a movant must demonstrate
significant ‘changes in fact, law, or circumstances since the previous ruling.’” Gooch v. Life
Invs. Ins. Co. of Am., 672 F.3d 402, 414 (6th Cir. 2012) (citation omitted). Otherwise, a litigant
could cast an unappealable motion for reconsideration as a motion to dissolve an injunction and
enjoy immediate appeal. Id. at 415.
But what counts as an intervening change in law? Does it require an overturned
precedent? A statutory change? Or something less stark, like doctrinal changes? The Supreme
Court provided an answer in Agostini v. Felton. 521 U.S. 203 (1997). There, New York City
sought relief from an injunction, arguing that the underlying jurisprudence had shifted. Id. at
214–15. The Court agreed with the City: “subsequent changes in either statutory or decisional
law” justify the modification of equitable relief, and a court “errs when it refuses to modify an
injunction or consent decree in light of such changes.” Id. at 215. Thus, Agostini illustrates that
a court may abuse its discretion if it refuses to dissolve or modify an injunction in light of
changing caselaw.
Our circuit confirmed as much in Sweeton v. Brown. 27 F.3d 1162 (6th Cir. 1994) (en
banc). In that case, the en banc court recounted a history of “considerable confusion” about a

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question of constitutional law. Id. at 1164. But after an on-point Supreme Court holding, “it
became clear” that the “legal theory and analysis upon which the consent decree was formulated
was erroneous.” Id. So, the intervening legal change meant that the court had power to modify
the ongoing relief. As the court put it, “[t]he foundation upon which the claim for injunctive
relief was built ha[d] crumbled.” Id. at 1166; see also Doe v. Briley, 562 F.3d 777, 783–84 (6th
Cir. 2009); California by & through Becerra v. EPA, 978 F.3d 708, 711 (9th Cir. 2020).
That logic applies in full force to the effect of Does #1–9 on the district court’s
preliminary injunction. Tennessee district courts like the one below relied on Snyder to enjoin
the wholesale enforcement of Tennessee’s sex-offender statutes. But these courts were
“misread[ing]” Snyder: that case had only invalidated two amendments to Michigan’s sex-
offender scheme. Does #1–9, 102 F.4th at 340. So, after Does #1–9, “it became clear” that the
district courts had been “confus[ed].” Sweeton, 27 F.3d at 1164. Thus, an intervening opinion
from a higher court caused the “foundation” of the district court’s injunction to “crumble[].” Id.
at 1166.
All’s to say, appellants are right to argue that Does #1–9 changed the law. Their motion
to dissolve the preliminary injunction is therefore properly before us.
III.
As to the merits, Does #1–9 compels the reversal of the district court’s order to
administratively close the docket and remand for proceedings consistent with that opinion.
The preliminary injunction here and the injunction in Does #1–9 are materially identical:
they prohibit Governor Lee and Director Rausch from enforcing Tennessee’s sex-offender
statutes. Compare Does # 1–9, 102 F.4th at 332, with R. 17, Pg. ID 72. And the Does #1–9
panel held that such relief was improper against both the governor and the director. As to the
governor, the court ordered the injunction dissolved because the governor played no enforcement
role in Tennessee’s sex-offender scheme. Does #1–9, 102 F.4th at 336. And as to the director,
the court held that most of what the director enforces is constitutional. Id. at 341. The court then
remanded for the district court to determine which specific unconstitutional provisions, if any,

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the director enforces and to modify the injunction against him accordingly. Id. at 341–42. Those
holdings are directly on-point to this appeal.
Doe, for his part, advances two new legal theories to try to circumvent the holdings in
Does #1–9. Neither is availing.
Civil conspiracy. First, Doe claims that Director Rausch is part of a civil conspiracy to
violate his constitutional rights. Doe alleges that Director Rausch, along with Tennessee’s other
law enforcement agencies, “share[s] a plan” to violate Doe’s rights. Appellee Br. at 31.
This claim fails, for two reasons. First, the intracorporate conspiracy doctrine precludes
it. Under that doctrine, “individuals acting in their capacities as employees of the same
entity . . . cannot conspire with each other.” Blick v. Ann Arbor Pub. Sch. Dist., 105 F.4th 868,
887 (6th Cir. 2024) (citation omitted). Thus, Doe must show an agreement between Director
Rausch and someone who isn’t a state officer. Id. He hasn’t. And Doe has provided only
conclusory allegations of a conspiracy, which he plans to flesh out “with the benefit of
discovery.” Appellee Br. at 30. Such bare allegations, however, don’t amount to the necessary
“clear showing” for preliminary relief. See Enchant Christmas Light Maze & Mkt. Ltd. v.
Glowco, LLC, 958 F.3d 532, 539 (6th Cir. 2020) (citation omitted). Thus, this argument falls
short.
Due Process. Doe’s other fallback argument is that, if he were to re-register as a sex
offender, the remand in Does #1–9 would “impose a hopeless level of ambiguity with regard to
what he can or cannot do.” Appellee Br. at 37. In Does #1–9, we instructed the district court on
remand to figure out which portions of Tennessee’s sex-offender statutes flouted the Ex Post
Facto Clause. So, Doe argues, until that case reaches final decision, he doesn’t know which
provisions appellants can enforce against him.
But this argument is mooted by remanding with instructions to modify the injunction
consistent with Does #1–9. As the district court adjusts the injunction, Doe will know which
provisions the director may or may not enforce.

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In sum, the holdings in Does #1–9 control this case. Wright v. Spaulding, 939 F.3d 695,
700 (6th Cir. 2019) (emphasizing that “a published panel opinion binds all later panels”); see
also 6 Cir. R. 32.1(b). Thus, Does #1–9 mandates reversing the district court’s administrative-
closure order and remanding with instructions to modify the injunction consistent with that case.2
* * *
Almost two hundred years ago, Justice Story articulated the benefits and costs of
equitable relief: by preventing irreparable harm, an injunction can often be “manifestly
indispensable for the purposes of social justice.” Story, supra, at 303. But if deployed with too
heavy a hand, the injunction risks becoming a means of “extensive, and perhaps, of irreparable
injustice.” Id. Here, the district court’s refusal to dissolve or modify the preliminary injunction
perpetuated one such “irreparable injustice.” It prevented Tennessee from enforcing important—
and constitutional—regulations to protect society’s most vulnerable. So, we reverse the district
court’s order administratively closing the case and remand for proceedings consistent with Does
#1–9 and this opinion.
2Appellants, for their part, seek vacatur of all preliminary relief because Director Rausch allegedly plays no
role in enforcing the unconstitutional portions of Tennessee’s sex-offender statutes. But we decline to address that
fact-bound argument here, since the district court hasn’t passed on it. After all, we are “a court of review, not of
first view.” Byrd v. Haas, 17 F.4th 692, 700 (6th Cir. 2021) (citation omitted). The director presented those
arguments to the district court before the administrative-closure order and may present them again on remand.

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