United States of America v. Devante Glenn

RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)
File Name: 25a0196p.06
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
DEVANTE GLENN,
Defendant-Appellant.
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No. 23-3926
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio at Cleveland.
No. 1:18-cr-00692-1—Solomon Oliver, Jr., District Judge.
Decided and Filed: July 28, 2025
Before: GILMAN, STRANCH, and LARSEN, Circuit Judges.
_________________
COUNSEL
ON BRIEF: Christian J. Grostic, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL PUBLIC DEFENDER,
Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellant. Matthew B. Kall, UNITED STATES ATTORNEY’S OFFICE,
Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellee.
GILMAN, J., delivered the opinion of the court in which STRANCH, J., concurred.
LARSEN, J. (pp. 12–16), delivered a separate dissenting opinion.
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OPINION
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RONALD LEE GILMAN, Circuit Judge. Devante Glenn, who was accused of selling
drugs that led to an overdose death, appeals his conviction on two counts of distributing
carfentanil, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1) and (b)(1)(C), and one count of using a
telecommunications device to facilitate the transaction, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 843(b).
>

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Glenn contends that there was insufficient evidence to support his conviction and that the district
court erred by allowing a law-enforcement officer, Agent Orlando Almonte, to testify as an
expert about the meaning of common words and phrases contained in text messages sent between
Glenn and the decedent. For the reasons set forth below, we VACATE Glenn’s conviction and
REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual background
On July 19, 2017, Renee Ducatman died of a carfentanil overdose in her home in Solon,
Ohio. Throughout June and July of 2017, Ducatman had six or seven conversations with
multiple people whom she met through Backpage.com, an escorting-advertising site, seemingly
about sex and illegal drugs.
On July 17, 2017, at 6:27 p.m., Ducatman called a 702 number and spoke for seven
minutes. She then sent a number of texts to that number, saying: “Maake it happen,” “Please
dude,” and “I have a hundred dollars.” The 702 number responded with “U can’t this phone like
that. . . I’m about to give it back to him. . . I’m on it. I’ll call you in a little bit.” At trial, the
government’s expert witness, Ohio Bureau of Criminal Investigations Special Agent Almonte,
testified that Ducatman was seeking drugs in those texts. Ducatman continued texting and
calling the 702 number until 7:21 p.m. Her last text to the 702 number at 7:21 p.m. read: “Ok I
guess, not you said you’d call me in thirty minutes its been an hour I got ready.”
That same day, at 8:26 p.m., Ducatman called Glenn, whose number was saved in her
phone as “Polo.” They were on a series of brief phone calls over the course of an hour. During
that time, Ducatman also called a 446 number three times. At 10:21 p.m., she called the 702
number again. Cell-tower data from the evening of July 17 through the early morning the next
day indicated that Ducatman was not at home.
On July 18, Glenn called Ducatman around noon but did not get an answer. That night,
Ducatman sent texts to various numbers, including a 785 number from a contact on Tinder.
Glenn called Ducatman again at 10:45 p.m. but received no answer. Ducatman texted Glenn

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No. 23-3926 United States v. Glenn Page 3
about 10 minutes later, saying that she would call him back. They exchanged texts and phone
calls, and cell-tower records showed that Glenn was traveling from the Cleveland area to Solon.
From 11:40 p.m. to 12:44 a.m., they sent the following texts:
Ducatman Ill make it worth it
Ducatman I got you I know the game
Glenn Ok
Ducatman I’m excited
Glenn Why u say dat
Ducatman BC I’m,excited you’re coming
Ducatman Ill,make it worth it
Ducatman You close
Glenn U better naw on da eway. I’m cumin baby
Ducatman Dude I got you I know the game
Glenn Ok ok
Glenn It says ur 30 mins away
Ducatman Okay I;m waiting
Ducatman Tell me when you’re close
Ducatman Or call me
Ducatman I’m ready
Glenn Ima call u
Ducatman Yay
Ducatman Close I got dressed for you
Glenn Ok an 15
Ducatman Ok
Ducatman Ill meet you at Verizon
Ducatman On the corner
Glenn Yup
Glenn Im bout to get off
Ducatman Ok ill go verizon
Glenn Ok

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At 12:46 a.m. on July 19, Glenn was on the phone with Ducatman for 3 minutes and 54
seconds. Cell-tower data showed that both Glenn and Ducatman were near the Verizon store in
Solon next to Ducatman’s home. Until 1:08 a.m. there was no activity from either Glenn’s or
Ducatman’s phone. Cell-tower data showed that Glenn left the area near Ducatman’s home
between 1:08 a.m. and 1:20 a.m.
Between 1:15 a.m. and 1:28 a.m., Ducatman called Glenn six times. At 1:33 a.m., she
texted Glenn: “I can’t find it please come get me ill,literally do anything I’m dope sick bad.”
She called Glenn again at 1:35 a.m. and 1:43 a.m. Cell-tower data showed that Glenn turned
back towards Ducatman’s home around this time. At 1:53 a.m., Ducatman sent Glenn photos of
an Hermès jewelry box and an iPad. They exchanged four more calls between 1:54 a.m. and
2:10 a.m., and cell-tower data showed that they were near her home from 2:00 a.m. to at least
2:11 a.m. before Glenn began driving back towards Cleveland. Ducatman’s security system
showed that she returned home at 2:15 a.m.
Ducatman called a friend for approximately five minutes at 2:18 a.m. An hour later,
Glenn texted Ducatman, “U good,” and then called her three times in a row. He continued to call
her in the morning and early afternoon. Other friends, including “Randy” and “Cass,” texted and
called Ducatman during this same time period.
Shortly after 2:00 p.m. on July 19, Ducatman’s mother found Ducatman unresponsive on
the bathroom floor. The estimated time of death was approximately 2:30 a.m. on July 19. An
autopsy confirmed that Ducatman died from intoxication caused by a combination of carfentanil,
sertraline, and clonazepam. The government’s forensic toxicologist testified that a urine test was
positive for carfentanil, and that using carfentanil one to three days prior would yield a positive
urine test, but that when a person dies from a carfentanil overdose, there would not be sufficient
time for the drug to metabolize into urine. He also testified that carfentanil was the “but-for
cause of [Ducatman’s] death.”
In May 2018, Detective Kristi Harvey interviewed Glenn. Detective Harvey did not tell
Glenn why he was being questioned, and Glenn denied knowing Ducatman or being called
“Polo.” In that interview, he stated that he had not been to Solon the previous summer and that

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he had not used the number linked to Polo’s contact for a long time. But before trial, he
stipulated that “Polo” was his nickname and that he had used the number linked to Polo’s contact
in July 2017. The officers interviewing him did not ask about drugs or mention that Ducatman
had died. And Glenn asked whether Ducatman was claiming that he had raped her. The officers
also showed him a picture of the Hermès box and iPad that Ducatman had texted to him, to
which he responded by asking if he was being accused of robbing her.
B. Procedural history
A grand jury indicted Glen on three counts: Two were for distributing carfentanil on July
19, 2017, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C), with an enhancement on the second
count for causing death. The third count was for the use of a communication facility to facilitate
a felony drug offense, in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 843(b).
Trial began in April 2023. At trial, the government called Agent Almonte as an expert
witness to present and interpret the text messages between Glenn and Ducatman. As to the
conversation that occurred between 11:40 p.m. on July 18 and 12:44 a.m. on July 19, he asserted:
“They are meeting for—in my opinion, they are meeting to conduct some type of exchange or
some type of drug exchange.” He concluded that Ducatman’s text at 1:33 a.m. on July 19,
referring to being “dope sick,” meant “[s]omething was given to her, and she needs something
else to help her with the fact that she is dope sick,” and explained that “dope sick” referred to the
withdrawal symptoms that begin to set in six to twelve hours after a dose of an addictive
substance.
Agent Almonte also interpreted the series of text messages involving photos of the
Hermès box and the iPad as follows: “[S]he is in a state where she is trying to barter with Polo
by providing items of, material items such as the Hermès box, which I am assuming contains
jewelry of some sort and an electronic tablet to barter for maybe another supply or a supply of
drugs.” At approximately 2:10 a.m., he believed that Glenn and Ducatman met for a short time
where Glenn exchanged something for Ducatman’s Hermès box and iPad. The government
asked Agent Almonte if he had “any interpretation or opinion as to what the item was based on

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the series of text messages.” Over Glenn’s objections, Agent Almonte testified that, in his
opinion, Glenn gave Ducatman drugs.
At the end of Agent Almonte’s direct testimony, the government again asked him what
he believed had happened between Glenn and Ducatman. Glenn again objected, but the court
overruled the objection. Agent Almonte then testified:
I believe Renee was able to entice Mr. Polo to come to her the first time, whether
it was an exchange for sex or any type of sex act for drugs. That occurred, and
then once the meeting, I guess, was completed, she then, based on that one text,
could not find what drugs were provided to her.
And at that point, she then had to entice him out again to conduct another sale or
exchange for drugs to which she used the jewelry and the tablet itself as a form of
payment this time.
Agent Almonte did not elaborate on any methodology or special expertise on which his opinion
was based.
At the close of the government’s case in chief, Glenn moved for a judgment of acquittal
pursuant to Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The district court reserved a
decision on the motion. After the close of all the evidence, Glenn renewed his motion, and the
court again reserved a ruling.
The jury convicted Glenn of all charges. Both parties filed post-trial briefs on the motion
for a judgment of acquittal, which the district court denied. In November 2023, the court
sentenced Glenn to 240 months of imprisonment on Count 2 and 48 months of imprisonment on
Counts 1 and 3, to be served concurrently. This timely appeal followed.
II. ANALYSIS
A. Standard of review
A district court’s evidentiary decisions are generally reviewed under the abuse-of-
discretion standard. United States v. Matthews, 31 F.4th 436, 452 (6th Cir. 2022). The
government argues, however, that this issue should be reviewed under the plain-error standard
because Glenn did not properly object at trial. The government notes that Glenn objected only
twice: first, when the government asked Agent Almonte to opine on what Glenn had given

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No. 23-3926 United States v. Glenn Page 7
Ducatman in exchange for her Hermès box and iPad, and second when the government asked
Agent Almonte summarize the interactions between Glenn and Ducatman over the course of the
evening. Each time, Glenn’s counsel simply stated “Objection, your honor” rather than
providing an extensive explanation of the grounds for the objection. The government notes the
evidentiary rule that an objection is not preserved for appellate review unless the objecting party
“states the specific ground, unless it was apparent from the context.” Fed. R. Evid. 103(a)(1)(B).
But Glenn’s objections were clear from the context of the surrounding testimony because
he objected to questions asking Agent Almonte to give his interpretation or opinion about what
happened between Glenn and Ducatman based on Agent Almonte’s review of the text messages,
call logs, and cell-tower data. And the district court clearly understood the nature of the
objections without further explanation, as evidenced by the court’s response that “of course, as a
person with background in this, [Agent Almonte] is allowed to testify, and he is allowed to talk
about in his experience what normally, what drug dealers normally do.” We will therefore
review this issue under the abuse-of-discretion standard with regard to the two portions of the
text messages that Glenn objected to Agent Almonte interpreting. See Torres v. County of
Oakland, 758 F.2d 147, 149 n.1 (6th Cir. 1985) (holding that an objection to improper opinion
testimony under the Federal Rules of Evidence was apparent from the context because the
district court overruled the objection and allowed the witness to “state her opinion on that”).
B. The court erred by allowing Agent Almonte to testify about the meaning of
the text messages
Under Rule 702 of the Federal Rules of Evidence,
[a] witness who is qualified as an expert by knowledge, skill, experience, training,
or education may testify in the form of an opinion or otherwise if the proponent
demonstrates to the court that it is more likely than not that: (a) the expert's
scientific, technical, or other specialized knowledge will help the trier of fact to
understand the evidence or to determine a fact in issue; (b) the testimony is based
on sufficient facts or data; (c) the testimony is the product of reliable principles
and methods; and (d) the expert’s opinion reflects a reliable application of the
principles and methods to the facts of the case.

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The great bulk of the text messages between Glenn and Ducatman were not a proper subject for
expert testimony, and Agent Almonte was not qualified to testify as an expert regarding those
messages.
True enough, courts often permit officers to testify as expert witnesses under Rule 702 of
the Federal Rules of Evidence to interpret conversations concerning drug trafficking that use
“slang, street language, and the jargon of the illegal drug trade.” United States v. Young, 847
F.3d 328, 350 (6th Cir. 2017); see also United States v. Kilpatrick, 798 F.3d 365, 379 (6th Cir.
2015) (“Courts often qualify law enforcement officers as expert witnesses under Rule 702 to
interpret intercepted conversations that use. . . the jargon of the illegal drug trade.”) (internal
quotation marks omitted)). Law-enforcement officers may give expert opinions about coded
language or “common practices of the drug trade,” provided that “the testimony is relevant and
reliable.” United States v. Maya, 966 F.3d 493, 505 (6th Cir. 2020).
Agent Almonte testified about his training and experience investigating drug trafficking,
including reading text messages between drug traffickers and customers and listening to their
calls. There were certainly aspects of his testimony, such as his interpretation of what “dope
sickness” means, or his statement that drug users “have also bartered things as material items
and/or sex” for drugs, that drew from his expertise.
But, apart from those narrow instances, the text messages between Glenn and Ducatman
were nearly devoid of any such specialized language, and Agent Almonte did not lay a
foundation for how his expertise would be helpful in interpreting common words and phrases in
texts. He did not discuss any qualifications for interpreting common words and phrases that
would assist the jury in distinguishing between people exchanging drugs and people discussing
something other than drugs, such as sex or money. Accordingly, the jury was just as competent
as Agent Almonte to interpret the common words and phrases used in these text messages. See
United States v. Freeman, 730 F.3d 590, 597 (6th Cir. 2013) (“A witness, lay or expert, may not
form conclusions for a jury that they are competent to reach on their own.”). Agent Almonte’s
testimony involved interpreting ordinary English language to effectively tell the jury the
government’s theory of the case. In similar cases, we have vacated convictions where a law-

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enforcement officer “effectively spoon-fed his interpretations of the [text messages] and the
government’s theory of the case to the jury, interpreting even ordinary English language.” Id.
Evidentiary errors mandate reversal unless they are harmless. An error is harmless if the
court has a “fair assurance” that the verdict was not “substantially swayed” by the error. See
United States v. Haywood, 280 F.3d 715, 724 (6th Cir. 2002). The error here was not harmless.
Ambiguous text messages between Glenn and Ducatman made up virtually all of the evidence
that implicated Glenn in Ducatman’s drug overdose. There was, for example, no eyewitness
identification or search-warrant evidence that connected Glenn to the drug transaction in
question. Agent Almonte instead testified about the meaning of the text messages with an “aura
of expertise and authority.” See Freeman, 730 F.3d at 599 (“An agent presented to a jury with
an aura of expertise and authority increases the risk that the jury will be swayed improperly by
the agent's testimony, rather than rely on its own interpretation of the evidence.”). The jury,
therefore, might well have been “substantially swayed” by his testimony. See Haywood, 280
F.3d at 724.
But the government argues that there was an abundance of other testimony, including the
strength of the text messages, phone-location information, and uncontested autopsy and forensic
evidence. We have already noted, however, that these text messages were ambiguous, and
although the other evidence demonstrated that Glenn was in the same vicinity as Ducatman on
the night before her death and that Ducatman died from a carfentanil overdose, it did not
conclusively establish that Glenn gave Ducatman the carfentanil that she eventually overdosed
on.
Similarly, the dissent opines that the contested testimony is merely cumulative of Agent
Almonte’s other testimony. Dissent at 14–15. But most of the statements that the dissent points
to are more general statements regarding drug users, including several explaining Ducatman’s
dope sickness. Only three of the statements that the dissent cites are arguably cumulative. The
first is Agent Almonte’s opinion that the meeting appeared “to conduct some type of exchange or
some type of drug exchange.” Second is the reference to the jewelry-box and iPad photos as
instances where Glenn and Ducatman are discussing “maybe another supply or a supply of
drugs.” And the third is one that an “exchange for the[] items . . . occurred.” The third

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statement, however, comes from Agent Almonte’s testimony that “[t]he individual by the name
of Polo met with this [Ducatman] for a short period of time, short term and whatever they did,
whether it was an exchange for these items that occurred and completed.”
All three of these statements are far more speculative and are not stated with the same
“aura of expertise and authority” as those objected to by Glenn. See Freeman, 730 F.3d at 599.
In sum, the contested statements were not merely cumulative.
The government further argues that there was a lack of evidence pointing to any other
drug source, but there were multiple texts and phone calls in the record between Ducatman and
other numbers that seemingly reference drug use. In any event, the government is the party with
the burden to prove that Glenn provided the drugs, not Glenn’s burden to prove otherwise. And
the verdict appears to have been much closer than the government and the dissent suggest, as
demonstrated by the almost full day of jury deliberations and a note from the jury to the court at
one point saying that they “are deadlocked.” Because so much of the case revolves around
Agent Almonte’s testimony and the text messages in question, we do not have a “fair assurance”
that the verdict was unaffected by Agent Almonte’s improper testimony. Id.
C. Sufficiency of the evidence
Agent Almonte’s improper expert testimony requires a new trial, but the Double
Jeopardy Clause prohibits the government from retrying Glenn if it did not present sufficient
evidence to get a conviction at the first trial. See United States v. Miller, 767 F.3d 585, 601 (6th
Cir. 2014). “The question is whether, ‘after viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to
the prosecution, any rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt.’” United States v. Houston, 792 F.3d 663, 669 (6th Cir. 2015)
(quoting Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979)). We must therefore consider whether
the evidence against Glenn, including the erroneous evidence, was sufficient. See Lockhart v.
Nelson, 488 U.S. 33, 40 (1988).
Viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, including Agent
Almonte’s improper testimony, we conclude that the government presented sufficient evidence
to support each of the charges against Glenn. The government presented evidence that Glenn

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and Ducatman met the night of her death. Through texts and cell-phone data, it showed that the
two met for roughly 20 minutes, and that shortly after he left, Ducatman texted him: “I can’t
find it please come get me ill,literally do anything I’m dope sick bad.” She then texted a picture
of the Hermès box and iPad, and a reasonable jury could make the inference that Ducatman was
attempting to lure Glenn back to her home with those items. The government also presented
evidence that Glenn then returned to the area around Ducatman’s home, and that she died 20
minutes later. Finally, the government presented Agent Almonte’s testimony interpreting the
texts as a deal to exchange drugs.
A rational trier of fact could thus find beyond a reasonable doubt that Glenn knowingly
or intentionally distributed a controlled substance that caused Ducatman’s death, see 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(C), and that he knowingly or intentionally used a communication facility to
facilitate the distribution, see 21 U.S.C. § 843(b). In sum, the evidence that includes Agent
Almonte’s testimony is sufficient to convict Glenn, but is not so overwhelming as to make the
admission of the improper testimony harmless. We therefore find no Double Jeopardy bar if the
government elects on remand to retry Glenn.
III. CONCLUSION
For all the reasons set forth above, we VACATE Glenn’s conviction and REMAND for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

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_________________
DISSENT
_________________
LARSEN, Circuit Judge, dissenting. The majority opinion concludes that two
inadmissible statements by Agent Almonte, which largely overlapped with his uncontested
testimony, could have swayed the jury’s verdict. I believe the record shows otherwise.
Accordingly, I respectfully dissent.
To be clear, Glenn contests only two statements by Agent Almonte—the two he objected
to below. His appeal objects to no other parts of Almonte’s testimony. The only two contested
statements are: “I would say an exchange did occur between Polo and Renee for these items for
drugs,” and
I believe Renee was able to entice Mr. Polo to come to her the first time, whether
it was an exchange for sex or any type of sex act for drugs. That occurred, and
then once the meeting, I guess, was completed, she then, based on that one text,
could not find what drugs were provided to her.
And at that point, she then had to entice him out again to conduct another sale or
exchange for drugs to which she used the jewelry and the tablet itself as a form of
payment this time.
R. 183, Trial Tr., PageID 2224, 2227. The majority opinion concludes that these two challenged
statements (1) violated Federal Rule of Evidence 702 and (2) substantially swayed the jury’s
verdict. Even if the majority is correct on the first point, I disagree on the second. Because the
government provided compelling evidence of Glenn’s guilt, and Almonte’s challenged
statements were largely cumulative of his unchallenged testimony, I have fair assurance that
these two opinions did not “substantially sway[]” the jury’s verdict. United States v. Kettles, 970
F.3d 637, 643 (6th Cir. 2020) (quoting Kotteakos v. United States, 328 U.S. 750, 765 (1946)).
The government presented the following substantial evidence of Glenn’s
guilt: Ducatman and Glenn planned to meet the night of July 18. Cell phone data shows that
they were in the same location between roughly 12:46 AM and 1:08 AM on July 19. Following
the apparent meeting, Glenn traveled north toward Cleveland, where he lived. As he was
heading north, Ducatman repeatedly called him. She then texted him saying, “I can’t find it

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please come get me ill,literally do anything I’m dope sick bad.” R. 186-12, Gov. Trial Ex.,
PageID 2579. Glenn picked up her next call. When she called once again after that, Glenn
answered and proceeded to turn back toward Solon, where Ducatman lived. Right after the call
ended, Ducatman sent him photos of a jewelry box and an iPad. Glenn arrived back in Solon,
and his and Ducatman’s cell phones were in the same vicinity for a couple of minutes. Glenn
then headed north again, and Ducatman promptly returned home. Approximately twenty
minutes later, Ducatman died of a drug overdose.
Events following Ducatman’s death further conveyed Glenn’s guilt. Glenn texted
Ducatman, “U good,” at 3:14 AM on July 19 (an hour after his final meeting with her) and called
her nine times throughout the day. Id. When Solon Police Detective Kristi Harvey finally
answered Ducatman’s phone, Glenn didn’t ask for Ducatman or inquire about her. Instead, he
hung up and stopped calling. Ducatman’s mother, meanwhile, never found the jewelry box or
iPad captured in the photos. And investigators never discovered leftover drugs in Ducatman’s
home. Lastly, when Detective Harvey interviewed Glenn, he told multiple lies—denying that he
went by the name “Polo,” that he had ever seen Ducatman, and that he had been to Solon that
summer. See United States v. Jackson, 55 F.3d 1219, 1226 (6th Cir. 1995) (remarking that the
defendant’s “affirmative attempts to disassociate” himself from contraband “showed
consciousness of guilt”).
The lack of other suspects bolstered the case against Glenn. Though the majority opinion
observes that Ducatman had multiple texts referencing drug use on her phone, those texts did
not occur the night she died—when she was “dope sick bad” and would “literally do anything.”
R. 186-12, Gov. Trial Ex., PageID 2579. Rather, Ducatman’s communications with others
the night of her death were unremarkable. She and a “785” number, for example, talked about
what they were up to, what restaurants they liked, and what they sought from the dating
app Tinder. Meanwhile, Ducatman told “Randy” that she was depressed and didn’t want to go
out. She also spoke with “Cass” on the phone a few times, including right before she died,
and their conversations appeared to be about dates Cass had been on and plans for Cass’s
upcoming visit. When all three individuals attempted to communicate with Ducatman the
next day, their messages were nothing like Glenn’s repeated phone calls. The 785 number

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texted: “Hope you’re having a nice day.” R. 187-2, Def. Trial Ex., PageID 2857. Randy
messaged: “Hiii!” Id. And Cass sent texts like: “Where are you?”; “Please pick up I’ll cry”; “I
just want to hug you I’ve been through hell and back please text me.” Id. at 2857–58.
This evidence strongly indicates that Glenn sold Ducatman drugs in exchange for the
jewelry box and iPad and that the drugs killed her. Though the government may have erred in
using Almonte to “spoon-fe[e]d” its case theory to the jury, these incriminating facts readily lend
themselves to the same conclusion. United States v. Freeman, 730 F.3d 590, 597 (6th Cir.
2013).
Other portions of Almonte’s testimony provide further assurance that any error in
allowing the two challenged statements was harmless. As noted above, Glenn doesn’t object to
the bulk of Almonte’s testimony, most of which was incriminating and largely overlapped with
his two contested opinions. For example, Glenn does not object to Almonte’s testimony in
which he:
• Shared that “dope sickness” occurs when a narcotics addict lacks access to
drugs and feels physically ill, depressed, and as if “they just can’t live without
the drug itself”;
• Stated that drug users sometimes barter “material items and/or sex” to pay for
drugs;
• Opined on what Ducatman and Glenn’s first meeting appeared to be for—“to
conduct some type of exchange or some type of drug exchange”;
• Interpreted Ducatman’s message saying she was “dope sick” and would
“literally do anything” to mean that “[s]omething was given to her, and she
needs something else to help her with the fact that she is dope sick”;
• Stated that Ducatman’s earlier messages to friends about feeling sick and
depressed aligned with dope sickness symptoms;
• Interpreted the jewelry box and iPad photos Ducatman sent Glenn to mean
that she was bartering with Glenn in exchange for “maybe another supply or a
supply of drugs”;
• Expressed his belief that, based on the brief encounter between Ducatman and
Glenn at 2:10 AM, it appeared that an “exchange for the[]
items . . . occurred”; and

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• Opined that Glenn’s message to Ducatman at 3:14 AM—“U good”—was
Glenn checking in on her because “[n]ow that she has dope, she feels better or
okay, and it is over an hour [since] she used it.”
R. 183, Trial Tr., PageID 2212, 2218, 2220–24. Uncontested, then, is Almonte’s opinion that
Ducatman was suffering from drug withdrawals and his three suggestions that Ducatman and
Glenn had met for a drug deal. In light of this uncontested evidence, along with the evidence
recounted earlier, Almonte’s two challenged opinions did not have any significant effect on the
jury’s verdict. See United States v. Rios, 830 F.3d 403, 416–17 (6th Cir. 2016) (concluding error
was harmless because the testimony was cumulative of other testimony).
The majority opinion disagrees. It starts by explaining that “[t]he ambiguous text
messages” between Ducatman and Glenn “made up virtually all of the evidence” against Glenn.
Maj. Op. at 9. True, the messages made up a large part of the case against Glenn. But they
hardly made up all the evidence against him. Plenty of circumstantial evidence did as well.
Nor are the text messages that ambiguous—at least not the most incriminating one: “I
can’t find it please come get me ill,literally do anything I’m dope sick bad.” R. 187-1, Trial Tr.,
PageID 2676. Clearly, Ducatman had lost something—“it.” Clearly, she was suffering from
drug withdrawals. And clearly, she was desperate for Glenn to return. To be sure, if one reads
the message in a vacuum, “it” and “anything” may seem ambiguous. That ambiguity slips away,
however, if one reads the message in context: after Ducatman sent the text, Glenn returned to
Solon, where he and Ducatman briefly met up; Ducatman apparently gave Glenn valuable items;
Ducatman died of a carfentanil overdose shortly thereafter; Glenn, concerned about whether
Ducatman was “good,” repeatedly tried to contact her the next day; and investigators never
found any leftover drugs in Ducatman’s home.
Rather than placing the messages in context, the majority opinion silos them. This
enables the majority to deem the messages ambiguous and to minimize the import of the
circumstantial evidence. But the jury learned of the messages in conjunction with the other
evidence, and we must consider them in that light too. See United States v. Campbell, 122 F.4th
624, 632–33 (6th Cir. 2024) (“[H]armless error review is based on an assessment of all ‘relevant
and reliable information’ in the ‘entire record’ . . . .” (quoting Greer v. United States, 593 U.S.

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No. 23-3926 United States v. Glenn Page 16
503, 511 (2021))). When we do, the meaning of the messages and the significance of the
circumstantial evidence come into focus. See supra at 12–14.
Finally, the majority opinion is concerned that the “aura of expertise and authority”
accompanying Agent Almonte’s testimony unduly influenced the jury. Maj. Op. at 9 (quoting
Freeman, 730 F.3d at 599). Yet any improper influence that Almonte’s two contested opinions
might have had was minor. As outlined above, the texts, cell locations, and timeline alone were
highly incriminating, and the opinions largely overlapped with Almonte’s uncontested testimony.
To reiterate, the jury heard from Almonte, in unchallenged testimony, that Ducatman and
Glenn’s first meeting appeared to be “some type of exchange or some type of drug exchange”;
that Ducatman was bartering with Glenn for “maybe another supply or a supply of drugs”; and
that, around 3 AM on July 19, Ducatman “has dope, she feels better or okay, and it is over an
hour [since] she used it.” R. 183, Trial Tr., PageID 2218, 2222, 2224 (emphasis added).
Moreover, the threat of improper influence is more acute when the agent worked on the case and
testifies as both an expert and a lay witness, because “the jury [may] suspect[] that he has
investigative information they do not.” Freeman, 730 F.3d at 599. Almonte did not work on
Glenn’s case and testified solely as an expert, thereby mitigating any such threat here. Lastly,
the district court instructed the jury that Almonte “testified as an opinion witness” and that it
“d[id] not have to accept his opinion.” R. 184, Trial Tr., PageID 2467. So the jurors were on
notice not to defer to Almonte’s beliefs. See Samia v. United States, 599 U.S. 635, 646 (2023)
(observing that the law “assum[es] that jurors can be relied upon to follow the trial judge’s
instructions”).
* * *
For the foregoing reasons, the two challenged opinions offered by Agent Almonte did
not have a marked impact on the jury’s verdict. I therefore would affirm Glenn’s convictions.
I respectfully dissent.

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