Lanetra Kellar v. the Yunion, Inc.

RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)
File Name: 25a0297p.06
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
LANETRA KELLAR,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
THE YUNION, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee.
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No. 25-1136
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Eastern District of Michigan at Flint.
No. 4:21-cv-12133—F. Kay Behm, District Judge.
Decided and Filed: October 31, 2025
Before: GIBBONS, McKEAGUE, and RITZ, Circuit Judges.
_________________
COUNSEL
ON BRIEF: Carla D. Aikens, CARLA D. AIKENS, P.L.C., Detroit, Michigan, for Appellant.
Todd Russell Perkins, PERKINS LAW GROUP, Detroit, Michigan, for Appellee.
_________________
OPINION
_________________
McKEAGUE, Circuit Judge. LaNetra Kellar sued her former employer, The Yunion,
Inc. (“Yunion”), for discrimination, retaliation, and wrongful termination. The district court
granted summary judgment to Yunion, dismissing the case.
In Kellar’s appeal, she challenges nearly all of the district court’s conclusions. But
because she did not present sufficient evidence to survive summary judgment, we AFFIRM.
>

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I. BACKGROUND
Yunion is a nonprofit organization that provides educational programming and family
services to at-risk youth in the Detroit area. As is the case for many nonprofits, Yunion relies on
grants and public funding to operate. Yunion had a relationship with Wayne County, Michigan
that was particularly important. Through three contracts with Wayne County, Yunion was able
to fund its diversion department, the sector of Yunion’s operations that supported students with
an elevated risk of interacting with the juvenile justice system. Yunion performed its services
and obtained funding from Wayne County through a reimbursement structure—the more
services Yunion performed, the more funding it would receive. While Yunion historically relied
on independent contractors to provide its services, in 2018, Yunion and Wayne County
implemented a new program model that would fund a full-time case manager position for the
diversion department. Yunion relied on projected Wayne County reimbursements to maintain
this position.
Enter LaNetra Kellar. Kellar had been an independent contractor with Yunion, serving as
an educator. When the full-time case manager position opened, Kellar applied and got the job.
In this new role, Kellar monitored the students who worked with the diversion department and
helped direct them to community resources. Kellar was a strong employee who did not
experience issues with her performance. Nonetheless, conflict arose.
A. Kellar’s Health Concerns and Accommodation Request
The origin of Kellar’s lawsuit against Yunion dates back to May 2019, when Yunion’s
office building flooded. A pipe burst on the second floor of Yunion’s building, which caused
considerable water damage to the floors below. The building needed professional cleaners to
remediate potentially hazardous conditions.
Nicole Wilson, Yunion’s Executive Director, sought to alleviate employee anxieties. She
emailed Yunion’s staff to assure them that, according to the building director, the environment
was safe. She encouraged everyone to “continue to communicate [their] concerns” and offered
to provide alternative office space in the building for those who would feel more comfortable

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working on a different floor. Email from Nicole Wilson, Exec. Dir. of Yunion, to Yunion Staff
(June 18, 2019 at 09:18 AM), R.15-7 at PageID 441.
Despite this assurance from Wilson that the office building was safe, Kellar was
unconvinced. Kellar first articulated her skepticism about the building’s safety by replying-all to
Wilson’s staff email, noting that the air purifiers in use throughout the building typically indicate
the presence of mold and asbestos. Days later, in a statement forwarded to the email chain, the
environmental company that was hired to fix the damage declared the building safe for business
as usual, with any hazards “under full containment.”
Over the next few months, Kellar periodically renewed her concerns about building
safety to Wilson. Kellar observed “visible signs of water damage in the ceilings on the second
and lower levels.” Email from LaNetra Kellar, Yunion Case Manager, to Nicole Wilson, Exec.
Dir. of Yunion (Sep. 18, 2019 at 08:10 AM), R.15-7 at PageID 447. Kellar also alerted Wilson
to her “runny and stuffy nose, sore throat, sinusitis[,] and headaches,” symptoms that she felt “on
at least three separate occasions” over the course of the last couple days. Id. Kellar concluded
that the building’s air quality was to blame for her ailments, notifying Wilson of her plan to be
out of the office for the day. Id.
The following Monday, Eric Reed, Yunion’s Director of Operations, sent Kellar
documents that explained the building was safe, and he informed her that if she were to continue
working remotely as an accommodation for a medical condition, she would need to provide a
doctor’s note.1 Kellar remained unsatisfied. She challenged the findings in the documents and
informed Reed that she would continue to work remotely. She also told him that she would
obtain a doctor’s note. A couple days later, Kellar sent Reed a letter from Dr. Kathleen J. Dass
that stated in its entirety:
1There were times when Kellar was able to work remotely before she raised her health concerns, but only
on a periodic basis. If an employee’s health-related request for remote work or medical leave exceeded three days,
Yunion would request a doctor’s note.

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To Whom It May Concern: LaNetra has evidence of allergic rhinitis, vocal cord
dysfunction, and possible developing allergic asthma. Mold is one of her triggers,
and she should not have mold exposure, as this may worsen her symptoms. If you
have any questions, please do not hesitate to call my office.
Sep. 29, 2019 Doctor’s Note, R.15-7 at PageID 452. Reed forwarded the letter to Wilson.
Wilson was not satisfied with this doctor’s note, as it did not explicitly say that Kellar
needed to work remotely. Wilson informed Kellar that she would need to come into the office
for in-person work unless she provided a “specific letter from [her] doctor stating that [she]
cannot work from the building.” Email from Nicole Wilson, Exec. Dir. of Yunion, to LaNetra
Kellar, Yunion Case Manager (Oct. 14, 2019 at 07:53), R.15-7 at PageID 455.
Kellar remained undeterred; she informed Wilson and Reed that she was not comfortable
coming back to the building, and she would use her vacation-day allotment until she was able to
obtain sufficient medical justification to work remotely. In response, Wilson let Kellar know
that if she were to work remotely, she would be shifted to part-time work, explaining that around
50% of her responsibilities were case file management, which had to be conducted in the office.
Wilson also informed Kellar that there would be a staff meeting to discuss the new
environmental reports that confirmed the building was safe. When Kellar asked if she could
attend remotely, Wilson replied that there were no virtual options, and that the expectation was
for all staff to attend onsite.
Subsequently, Kellar provided a second doctor’s note from Dr. Dass. The note stated that
Dr. Dass “would recommend” Kellar work offsite from Yunion’s office building. Oct. 15, 2019
Doctor’s Note, R.15-7 at PageID 461. The note did not say that offsite work was medically
necessary. Kellar also arranged an offsite meeting with Reed to discuss the findings of the new
environmental reports.
After reviewing the new reports, Kellar still did not feel comfortable returning to the
office, so she emailed Reed to inquire about an accommodation. As part of her accommodation
request, Kellar acknowledged that she would be unable to perform her onsite case file
management duties, so she suggested Reed direct some of Yunion’s Wayne State University
School of Social Work interns to take on her filing responsibilities without needing to hire a new

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staff person. Reed informed Kellar that the interns could not handle her onsite filing because
they had their own caseloads to manage. He then forwarded Kellar’s request to Wilson with a
“shrug” emoji.
In the midst of these email exchanges over Kellar’s accommodations, Wilson mistakenly
sent Kellar a text insinuating that Kellar would be fired. Wilson was hoping to acquire contact
information for Kellar’s sister—Phyllis—who was on Yunion’s Board of Directors. Wilson
asked Kellar for Phyllis’s phone number; then, one minute later, Wilson texted Kellar again,
saying: “Hope her sister will still be on our board after I fire her [shrug emoji].” Text Messages,
R.20-43 at PageID 919. Wilson did not realize that she had mistakenly texted Kellar until the
discovery phase of this litigation. Wilson explained that the text was intended for Reed,
prompted by Kellar’s perceived unexcused absences at the office.
Kellar eventually responded to the text with Phyllis’s number, not acknowledging the
message about potential termination. Kellar also sent an email to Wilson and Reed outlining the
history of her health concerns and accommodation requests, asking, once again, for an
accommodation to work remotely. In response, Wilson granted Kellar’s request to work from
home, implementing the previously discussed plan to shift Kellar to part-time work so Yunion
could hire someone to handle her onsite case file management duties. But Wilson also clarified
that this accommodation would be temporary, and once Yunion provided additional test results
that proved the building did not present any health hazards, Kellar would need to return to in-
person work onsite.
Kellar worked remotely as a part-time employee for approximately three weeks. While
Kellar worked remotely, Yunion increased another employee’s hours to compensate for Kellar’s
unfulfilled onsite case file management duties.
Wilson and Reed were particularly concerned with ensuring an employee took on
Kellar’s case file management responsibilities because the organization was preparing for an
onsite file audit from Wayne County. Yunion’s contract with Wayne County required onsite,
hard copies of each case file, subject to audit. Because Yunion’s funding was conditioned on
satisfactory Wayne County audits, Yunion case managers would conduct biweekly reviews of

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their files. These hard-copy-file reviews “had to be done on-site.” Reed Dep., R.15-4 at PageID
283; see also Kellar Dep., 15-2 at PageID 149 (recognizing that in order to ensure the hard
copies were complete and accurate, the case managers had to go onsite to the cabinets where the
files were located). Kellar agreed that onsite file management was an “important” part of the
case manager job. Kellar Dep., R.15-2 at PageID 143.
When Reed presented Kellar with additional documentation about the remediation
efforts, Kellar returned to in-person, full-time work. In November 2019, seemingly disgruntled
by the negotiation over her request to work remotely, Kellar filed a complaint with the Michigan
Occupational Safety and Health Administration, alleging discrimination. She claimed Reed and
Wilson reduced her hours in retaliation for raising concerns about the building’s safety. Around
this time, Kellar also filed a disability-based discrimination complaint with the Michigan
Department of Civil Rights, but that claim was eventually closed.
B. Kellar’s Additional Complaints
Moving forward, Kellar did not report any additional health concerns, and in the start of
2020, Yunion moved to a new office building. But in the summer and early fall of 2020, Kellar
filed additional complaints against her Yunion supervisors.
First, in July 2020, Kellar filed a complaint with the Michigan Department of Labor
alleging Reed had failed to reimburse her for mileage. Responding on behalf of Yunion, Wilson
explained—both to Kellar and the Michigan Department of Labor—that an employee would
have to travel to a location that is at least 15 miles (one way) from Yunion’s headquarters to
receive reimbursement for mileage. Kellar withdrew the matter a few weeks later.
Then, in September 2020, Kellar filed another complaint with the Michigan Department
of Labor because she did not receive paystubs for a period of three months. The Michigan
Department of Labor notified Yunion of this complaint on September 30, 2020. A few weeks
later, Wilson, again responding on behalf of Yunion, informed the Michigan Department of
Labor that, moving forward, the company would make paystubs available for all of its employees
through its payroll vendor. By mid-November, the complaint was considered resolved and
closed.

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C. COVID’s Impact on Yunion
Due to the pandemic, Yunion’s diversion department took a significant financial hit.
Schools and families were reluctant to participate in Yunion’s programing, and as case
managers’ client portfolios plummeted, so too did Yunion’s reimbursement revenue from Wayne
County. Kellar’s workload was indicative of Yunion’s struggles. Kellar was responsible for 50
students in the first quarter of 2020, but by the end of the second quarter, her client list had
decreased to 16 students. With fewer services to provide—and fewer reimbursements to
collect—the diversion department received only 47.5% of its projected fiscal year 2020 budget.
During the pandemic, Yunion tried to shift operations to accommodate the remote-
working world. Case managers started providing some virtual services to students, and Yunion
created staggered schedules to limit interactions with other staff during onsite case file
management responsibilities. Taking advantage of additional public funds, Yunion applied for,
and received, a federal Paycheck Protection Program loan in an effort to retain employees
through these challenges. But the financial difficulties loomed large.
D. Kellar’s Relationship with Yunion Ends
In September 2020, Wayne County informed Yunion that it could no longer provide any
virtual services. Because many families were not ready to participate in face-to-face
programming, Yunion anticipated an even greater decrease in reimbursement revenues for the
diversion department. So Yunion decided to shift Kellar’s full-time position to an independent
contractor position. This reclassification would standardize the diversion department and save
Yunion money; all the case managers would be independent contractors, and with this change,
Yunion could at least retain all its employees in some capacity. But for Kellar, it meant she
would be paid on an hourly scale instead of a salary, and she would work less (at most 25 hours
per week as opposed to her full-time 40-hour weeks). She would also lose her employee benefits
and holidays.
Yunion presented Kellar two options: she could either accept the independent contractor
role or accept a severance package that provided 12 weeks of her full salary and insurance
coverage. Kellar did not accept either option, which effectively terminated her employment

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relationship with Yunion. According to Kellar, she thought the independent contractor offer did
not provide enough stability, and she felt her work-related disputes with Yunion were harassing
and discriminatory. She did not accept the severance package because it included a clause that
released Yunion of any liability related to employment disputes.
Kellar filed a lawsuit against Yunion claiming discrimination, retaliation, and wrongful
termination under federal and state law. Yunion filed a motion for summary judgment on all of
Kellar’s claims, which the district court granted in its entirety. Kellar timely appealed.
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
Summary judgment is appropriate where “there is no genuine dispute as to any material
fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A genuine
dispute of material fact exists where “the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could return a
verdict for the nonmoving party.” Saunders v. Ford Motor Co., 879 F.3d 742, 748 (6th Cir.
2018) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986)). The movant bears
the initial burden of demonstrating that summary judgment is warranted. Celotex Corp. v.
Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 323 (1986). If met, the burden then shifts to the non-movant, who must
cite specific evidence indicating that a genuine dispute of material fact exists. Id. at 324; see
also Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(c), (e). We view the facts and draw inferences in favor of the non-
movant, Taylor v. City of Saginaw, 11 F.4th 483, 486-87 (6th Cir. 2021), but the non-movant
must provide more than a mere “‘scintilla’ of evidence to support its claims.” Walden v. Gen.
Elec. Int’l, Inc., 119 F.4th 1049, 1056 (6th Cir. 2024) (quoting Anderson, 477 U.S. at 252). We
review the district court’s legal conclusions de novo and its factual findings for clear error.
Energy Mich., Inc. v. Mich. Pub. Serv. Comm’n, 126 F.4th 476, 485 (6th Cir. 2025).2
2Some of Kellar’s claims require analysis via the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting framework. Kellar
argues that we should consider Justice Thomas’s dissent from the denial of certiorari in Hittle v. City of Stockton,
145 S. Ct. 759, 759-61 (2025), which questions both the wisdom of this burden-shifting approach and whether its
preponderance standard is consistent with Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 56. We are bound by precedent that
applies the McDonnell Douglas framework in this manner. Tex. Dep’t of Cmty. Affs. v. Burdine, 450 U.S. 248, 252-
53 (1981).

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III. ANALYSIS
Kellar raises five issues on appeal, arguing that the district court erred by granting
Yunion summary judgment on (1) her disability-based hostile-work-environment claims; (2) her
disability-based adverse-employment-action claims; (3) her failure-to-accommodate claims;
(4) her disability-based and whistleblower-based retaliation claims; and (5) her wrongful
termination claim.
A. Disability-Based Discrimination Claims
Under the Americans with Disabilities Act (“ADA”), employers cannot “discriminate
against a qualified individual on the basis of disability.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). As stated in the
statute, this prohibited discrimination can take many forms. Employers cannot make “hiring and
firing” decisions (or other discrete adverse employment decisions) based on an individual’s
disability. Hostettler v. Coll. of Wooster, 895 F.3d 844, 852 (6th Cir. 2018) (citing 42 U.S.C.
§ 12112(a)); see also Hrdlicka v. Gen. Motors, LLC, 63 F.4th 555, 566 (6th Cir. 2023). Nor can
employers refuse to make “reasonable accommodations” for their disabled employees.
Hostettler, 895 F.3d at 852 (quoting 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A)). Additionally, courts
recognize hostile-work-environment claims under the anti-discrimination provisions of the ADA.
Bryant v. McDonough, 72 F.4th 149, 151-52 (6th Cir. 2023) (order) (citing Plautz v. Potter, 156
F. App’x 812, 818 (6th Cir. 2005) (per curiam) (recognizing that the elements for a hostile-work-
environment claim are consistent across the various anti-discrimination statutes)).
While Kellar blends her arguments together at times, she sued Yunion for disability-
based discrimination under each of these three distinct causes of action. First, Kellar claims she
was subjected to a hostile work environment at Yunion due to her disability. Second, she argues
Yunion engaged in adverse employment actions against her based on her disability. Finally, she
claims Yunion failed to provide her with reasonable accommodations as is required for qualified
disabled persons. Kellar brought these claims under federal law via the ADA, and state law via

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Michigan’s Persons with Disabilities Civil Rights Act.3 On appeal, she argues that the district
court erred in granting summary judgment in favor of Yunion on each claim. We disagree.
1. Hostile-Work-Environment Claims
Kellar claims she was subjected to a hostile work environment due to her disability
because Yunion denied her mileage reimbursement request, failed to timely provide paystubs,
reduced her hours and rate of pay, revoked her benefits and paid holidays, and sent her a text
insinuating she would be fired.
The hostile-work-environment cause of action allows a plaintiff to sue for discrimination
when “sufficiently abusive harassment adversely affects a ‘term, condition, or privilege’ of
employment.” Crawford v. Medina Gen. Hosp., 96 F.3d 830, 834 (6th Cir. 1996) (citing Ellison
v. Brady, 924 F.2d 872, 876 (9th Cir. 1991)). Just like Title VII of the Civil Rights Act, the Age
Discrimination in Employment Act, and other statutes that comprise the “wider statutory scheme
[that] protect[s] employees in the workplace nationwide,” id., the ADA and Michigan’s disability
civil rights law prohibit discrimination that affects the “terms, conditions, or privileges of
employment.” 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a); Mich. Comp. Laws § 37.1202(1)(b).
Given the analogous statutory language and elements, courts look to the principles that
generally govern hostile-work-environment claims as a guide to address hostile-work-
environment claims arising under other workplace anti-discrimination statutes—so long as those
statutes contain the parallel “terms, conditions, or privileges of employment” language. See, e.g.,
Bryant, 72 F.4th at 151-52 (quoting Plautz, 156 F. App’x at 818 (borrowing the hostile-work-
environment framework from Title VII for a disability-based claim, and recognizing that the
elements for a hostile-work-environment claim are consistent across the various federal anti-
discrimination statutes)); Downey v. Charlevoix Cnty. Bd. of Road Comm’rs, 576 N.W.2d 712,
3 Michigan’s anti-disability-discrimination law “substantially mirrors the ADA, so resolving an ADA claim
will generally resolve a plaintiff’s [state-law-based] claim” as well. Pemberton v. Bell’s Brewery, Inc., 150 F.4th
751, 769 (6th Cir. 2025) (quoting Donald v. Sybra, Inc., 667 F.3d 757, 764 (6th Cir. 2012)). Michigan state law
differs from the ADA in its exhaustion requirement, and unlike the ADA, Michigan state law does not “require[]
accommodation in the form of reassignment,” Id. at 770 (quoting Rourk v. Oakwood Hosp. Corp., 580 N.W.2d.
397, 400-01 (Mich. 1998)), but neither issue is raised in this appeal. Both parties agree that the standards are the
same. Thus, we utilize the same analysis for the federal- and state-law disability discrimination claims.

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715-17 (Mich. Ct. App. 1998) (citing Harris v. Forklift Sys., Inc., 510 U.S. 17, 20-22 (1993))
(basing Michigan’s disability-based hostile-work-environment analysis on the federal Title VII
framework)). Thus, it is no surprise that as courts change the hostile-work-environment analysis
as it pertains to one protected class, the principles extend to other hostile-work-environment
claims, including those based on disability discrimination. See Trepka v. Bd. of Educ.,
28 F. App’x 455, 461 (6th Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (extending Title VII hostile-work-
environment caselaw to disability-based claims); McNeal v. City of Blue Ash, 117 F.4th 887,
897-99 (6th Cir. 2024) (citing Ogbonna-McGruder v. Austin Peay State Univ., 91 F.4th 833,
837-40 (6th Cir. 2024)) (extending new developments in the Title VII hostile-work-environment
analysis to age-based discrimination claims).
After the district court decided Yunion’s motion for summary judgment, this circuit
decided McNeal, which established two significant changes to the general hostile-work-
environment analysis: (1) courts can now consider discrete, separately actionable adverse
employment actions as evidence contributing to a hostile work environment; and (2) plaintiffs
are no longer required to show unreasonable interference with work performance to mount a
claim. 117 F.4th at 899-900. Because these changes should extend to disability-based hostile-
work-environment claims, the parties argued under a now-outdated standard in the district court.4
Nonetheless, these changes do not alter the ultimate result: Kellar failed to provide evidence
from which a jury could reasonably rule in her favor.5
a. New Changes to Hostile-Work-Environment Caselaw
Expanding the Scope of Conduct that Contributes to a Hostile Work Environment
In McNeal, our court reconciled the messy precedent that distinguishes separately
actionable discrete acts of workplace discrimination (often described as “adverse employment
4Neither party referenced McNeal in their appellate briefing, even though the opinion was published before
Kellar filed her notice of appeal. This does not change our obligation to apply the binding law of the circuit.
5In the district court proceedings, Kellar disregarded contemporaneous caselaw and sought to use
separately actionable adverse employment acts as evidence of a hostile work environment. See Ogbonna-
McGruder, 91 F.4th at 840. She thus created a record that accommodates the updated hostile-work-environment
standard.

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actions”) from harassment that can contribute to a hostile work environment. 117 F.4th at 899-
903. The distinction was based on National Railroad Passenger Corp. v. Morgan, 536 U.S. 101
(2002), which held that discrimination claims based on “[d]iscrete acts such as termination,
failure to promote, denial of transfer, or refusal to hire” are “different in kind” from hostile-
work-environment claims. Id. at 114-15. While discrete acts “constitute[] a separate actionable
‘unlawful employment practice,’” a hostile-work-environment claim necessarily involves
“repeated conduct” that creates a “workplace . . . permeated with ‘discriminatory intimidation,
ridicule, and insult, . . . sufficiently severe or pervasive to alter the conditions of the victim’s
employment and create an abusive working environment.’” Id. at 114-16 (quoting Harris, 510
U.S. at 21).
Because a claim alleging a discrete act of discrimination was treated as “different in
kind” from a claim alleging a hostile work environment, the Sixth Circuit had “consistently held
that allegations of discrete acts . . . ‘cannot properly be characterized as part of a continuing
hostile work environment.’” Ogbonna-McGruder, 91 F.4th at 840 (quoting Sasse v. U.S. Dep’t
of Labor, 409 F.3d 773, 783 (6th Cir. 2005)). In other words, a discrete act that causes an
employee to suffer “a loss of pay or benefits, a detrimental change in responsibilities, a negative
change in the terms or conditions of employment, or some other actual and unfavorable change
in job status,” Milczak v. Gen. Motors, LLC, 102 F.4th 772, 786 (6th Cir. 2024) (explaining when
a discrete act becomes separately actionable), was not considered harassment and was thus
excluded from the hostile-work-environment analysis. See Ogbonna-McGruder, 91 F.4th at 840.
In steps McNeal. When asked to analyze allegations of age-based discrimination that
blurred the line between discrete-act and continuing-harassment, McNeal recognized that our
long-standing precedent only determined that “allegations of discrete discriminatory acts
otherwise actionable as independent disparate-treatment claims do not by themselves constitute
harassment supporting a hostile-work-environment claim.” 117 F.4th at 899 (emphasis added).
The McNeal panel further noted that there are some discrete acts that “affect employment terms
or conditions on two registers.” Id. at 901. A discrete act may, in and of itself, affect the terms
of employment, but the discrete act’s ancillary effects (or the way in which the discrete act was
carried out) may constitute harassment that contributes to a hostile work environment. Id. at

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901-02 (“[A] discrete discriminatory act may have ‘occurred’ on one day and thus be actionable,
but it also may be part of a separate harm that ‘occurs over a series of days or perhaps years.’”
(quoting Morgan, 536 U.S. at 110)).
For example, a decrease in compensation constitutes a discrete act that causes a change in
the terms or conditions of employment in a traditional sense—a loss of pay or benefits that could
form the basis of a separately actionable claim for adverse-action-based disability discrimination.
Milczak, 102 F.4th at 786. But a decrease in compensation, if “deployed strategically as
harassment[,] can also add to a climate of hostility that represents a different change in the terms
or conditions of the job.” See McNeal, 117 F.4th at 901. While long-standing precedent
instructs courts to determine which alleged acts of harassment should be excluded from the
hostile-work-environment analysis due to their potential to serve as the basis of a separate claim,
McNeal clarified that courts should also determine whether—and to what extent—a separately-
actionable-discrete-act’s “ancillary impacts” provide “evidence of harassment” that “may be
used to support a hostile-work-environment claim.” Id. at 902 & n.14. Simply put, McNeal
determined that precedent did not categorically prohibit courts from considering a separately
actionable discrete act as conduct contributing to a hostile work environment; a closer analysis of
the discrete act’s impact is necessary, as it might “provide[] evidence of the environment of
harassment . . . allege[d] in [a] hostile-work-environment claim. Id. at 901-03. If it does, “we
may consider that evidence.” Id. at 903.6
Lowering the Bar for a Plaintiff’s Alleged Harm
McNeal made an additional change to the hostile-work-environment analysis. McNeal
came shortly after the Supreme Court decided Muldrow, which held that a plaintiff bringing a
Title VII discrimination claim based on a “‘disadvantageous’ change in an employment term or
condition” did not have to show that “the harm [he] incurred was ‘significant[]’ . . . [o]r serious,
6Some of our sister circuits go a step further, not limiting the ways in which a separately actionable adverse
employment action can serve as evidence of a hostile work environment. McNeal, 117 F.4th at 902 n.15 (collecting
cases). But we are bound by our in-circuit precedent that distinguishes the separately actionable adverse
employment action from its ancillary impacts. Id.

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or substantial, or any similar adjective suggesting that the disadvantage to the employee must
exceed a heightened bar.” 601 U.S. 346, 354-55 (2024).
While Muldrow addressed an adverse employment action (an employee transfer), McNeal
extended this holding to hostile-work-environment claims, recognizing that hostile-work-
environment claims are similarly based on a disadvantageous change to a term, condition, or
privilege of employment. McNeal, 117 F.4th at 904 (citing Muldrow, 601 U.S. at 355). The
anti-workplace-discrimination statutes do not require a heightened showing of harm, so courts
should ask whether a work culture permeated with discriminatory harassment “left an employee
‘worse off respecting employment terms or conditions,’” not whether an employee was
significantly worse off. Id. (quoting Muldrow, 601 U.S. at 355).
The pre-McNeal standard, under which a plaintiff had to show unreasonable interference
with work performance, see Bryant, 72 F.4th at 151-52, required a heightened showing of harm
that is incongruent with the new, diminished burden on plaintiffs. Muldrow noted that a
reasonableness standard created the kind of heightened bar for harm that is not required in a
discrimination claim. 601 U.S. at 357-58 (explaining that while retaliation claims “capture those
(and only those) employer actions serious enough to ‘dissuade[] a reasonable worker from
making or supporting a charge of discrimination,’” discrimination claims do not “distinguish[]
between significant and less significant harms” (quoting Burlington N. & Santa Fe Ry. Co. v.
White, 548 U.S. 53, 68 (2006)). Thus, a plaintiff no longer needs to show unreasonable
interference with work performance to mount a hostile-work-environment claim; an employee
need only show that the work environment “produce[d] ‘some harm respecting an identifiable
term or condition of employment.’” McNeal, 117 F.4th at 904 (quoting Muldrow, 601 U.S. at
355).
Importantly, McNeal did not discard the objective standard that stands as a core
requirement to hostile-work-environment claims. Id. at 898 (“[T]he harassment [must have]
affected the employee ‘by creating an objectively intimidating, hostile, or offensive work
environment.’” (quoting Crawford, 96 F.3d at 834-35)). Plaintiffs still must show a work
environment that “would reasonably be perceived . . . as hostile or abusive.” Id. at 904 (quoting
Harris, 510 U.S. at 22). And, in this regard, the considerations remain the same: “we consider

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the totality of the circumstances, including the ‘frequency of the discriminatory conduct; its
severity; whether it is physically threating or humiliating, or a mere offensive utterance; and
whether it unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work performance.’” Id. (quoting
Faragher v. City of Boca Raton, 524 U.S. 775, 787-88 (1998)).7 This remains a high bar, as the
employer’s conduct must still reflect a workplace culture of harassment permeated with hostility
towards the protected class. Id. at 897; see also, e.g., Faragher, 524 U.S. at 787-88
(“A recurring point in these opinions is that ‘simple teasing,’ . . . offhand comments, and isolated
incidents (unless extremely serious) will not amount to discriminatory changes in the ‘terms and
conditions of employment.’” (collecting cases) (quoting Oncale v. Sundowner Offshore Servs.,
Inc., 523 U.S. 75, 82 (1998))).
But now, after Muldrow and McNeal, courts cannot require a plaintiff to show that he
suffered a heightened level of harm to succeed on a hostile-work-environment claim. For
summary judgment purposes, once a plaintiff provides evidence that the environment itself was
objectively hostile to the protected class, so long as the hostility “produce[d] ‘some harm
respecting an identifiable term or condition of employment,’” he meets his burden. McNeal, 117
F.4th at 904, 906 (quoting Muldrow, 601 U.S. at 355) (denying a police officer the discretion
afforded to colleagues—based on an environment permeated with agism—constituted a
disadvantageous change in an employment term or condition sufficient for a hostile-work-
environment claim).
7In light of the declaration—consistent with Muldrow—that an essential question becomes whether the
hostile work environment merely leaves an employee “worse off respecting employment terms or conditions,”
requiring only “some harm” as opposed to any heightened harm, it is worth discussing McNeal’s language that
allows courts to consider “whether [the discriminatory conduct] unreasonably interferes with an employee’s work
performance.” McNeal, 117 F.4th at 904 (emphasis added) (quoting Faragher, 524 U.S. at 788). While requiring a
plaintiff to show unreasonable interference with his work performance would establish a heightened bar for harm
that contradicts the command of Muldrow, the McNeal panel was careful to clarify that this was no mandatory
consideration; unreasonable interference with employee work performance remained one consideration in a totality-
of-the-circumstances analysis. See id. Showing unreasonable interference with work performance would bolster a
hostile-work-environment claim, but the flexibility for courts to consider such interference with an employee’s work
performance should not be construed as a requirement that conflicts with the ultimate holding from McNeal: the
plaintiff need not show a significantly disadvantageous change to the terms or conditions of employment. See id. In
fact, McNeal excluded any mention of unreasonable interference with work performance from its articulation of the
hostile-work-environment-claim elements, id. at 898, deviating from precedent that had required it. See Milczak,
102 F.4th at 783, 785 (including unreasonable interference with work performance as an element of a hostile-work-
environment claim, but ultimately concluding that the alleged harassment “was neither objectively severe nor
pervasive”).

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* * *
Thus, to align with these developments in discrimination caselaw, for a disability-based
hostile-work-environment claim, the standard is as follows: a plaintiff must show that (1) he is
disabled; (2) he “was subjected to harassment, either through words or actions, based on” his
disability; (3) the harassment “create[ed] an objectively intimidating, hostile, or offensive work
environment” that “produce[d] ‘some harm respecting an identifiable term or condition of
employment’”; and (4) “there is some basis of liability on the part of the employer.” See
McNeal, 117 F.4th at 898, 904, 906 (quoting Crawford, 96 F.3d at 834-35 and Muldrow, 601
U.S. at 355).
b. Applying the Updated Standard
Kellar needed to provide evidence showing that, due to harassment based on her
disability,8 her work environment was “objectively intimidating, hostile, or offensive.” Id. at
898 (quoting Crawford, 96 F.3d at 834-35). She did not. “Whether harassment is sufficiently
severe or pervasive to create an abusive work environment is ‘quintessentially a question of
fact.’” Id. at 904 (quoting Crawford, 96 F.3d at 835-36). Courts answer this question looking to
the totality of the circumstances. Id. (quoting Faragher, 524 U.S. at 787-88).
“Conversations between an employee and his superiors about his performance” do not
create a hostile work environment “simply because they cause the employee distress.” Keever v.
City of Middletown, 145 F.3d 809, 813 (6th Cir. 1998). Similarly, a single incident of a
supervisor “express[ing] skepticism regarding [an employee’s] condition” is not enough.
Trepka, 28 F. App’x at 461. The workplace must be “permeated with discriminatory
intimidation, ridicule, and insult.” McNeal, 117 F.4th at 897 (quoting Oncale, 523 U.S. at 78).
Kellar claims she was subjected to a hostile work environment due to her disability
because Yunion denied her mileage reimbursement request, failed to timely provide paystubs,
reduced her hours and rate of pay, revoked her benefits and paid holidays, and sent her a text
insinuating she would be fired. Beyond conclusory statements, Kellar does not explain how,
8The parties did not discuss whether Kellar should be considered disabled under the relevant statutes, so we
will not address it.

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from this alleged harassment, her work environment “would reasonably be perceived . . . as
hostile or abusive.” McNeal, 117 F.4th at 904 (quotation marks omitted). Nor does she provide
evidence from which a reasonable jury could infer such an environment existed at Yunion.
Denying Kellar’s Mileage Request. Yunion denied Kellar’s mileage reimbursement
request in accordance with company policy; Kellar presented no evidence indicating the denial
was improper or the product of selective enforcement. Nor does she show how the denial—or its
ancillary effects—perpetuated an environment of hostile, discriminatory harassment.
Failing to Provide Paystubs. Yunion violated Michigan law by failing to provide
paystubs for all of its employees. Kellar complained to the Michigan Department of Labor about
this shortcoming. When the Michigan Department of Labor notified Yunion about the
complaint, Yunion corrected its policies and ensured paystubs were available for all employees.
Kellar does nothing to suggest Yunion specifically withheld her paystubs as a strategic form of
harassment, let alone harassment based on her claimed disability.
Reducing Kellar’s Hours and Rate of Pay; Revoking Kellar’s Holidays. Yunion only
ever adjusted Kellar’s hours as part of her temporary health-concern accommodation, and during
that period, she maintained full benefits. Granting her request for remote work is not
harassment, and Kellar fails to explain how the email seeking confirmation of her medical
condition, which expressed a desire to appease her concerns, helps prove an environment
permeated with hostility. Yunion proposed reducing her pay and benefits as part of its plan to
shift her to an independent contractor role, but Kellar rejected the offer. Kellar does not provide
evidence from which a jury could reasonably conclude that the ancillary effects of the decision to
offer her an independent contractor role, or the way in which Yunion presented this option,
contributed to a hostile environment. See McNeal, 117 F.4th at 902 & n.14.
Text Message. Kellar testified that the allegedly harassing text message from Wilson,
which insinuated that Kellar would be fired, merely made her nervous about losing her job; it did
not display disability-based hostility or contribute to a workplace permeated by harassment.
Kellar does not provide evidence that calls into question Wilson’s frustration with what was
perceived as Kellar’s unexcused absences, and she presents no evidence indicating the text

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message was strategically deployed as harassment, or that the ancillary effects of the text
message contributed to a hostile work environment. Without any additional evidence or
explanation, Kellar’s conclusory declaration that the “shrug” emoji indicates disability-based
hostility is too large a leap. The conduct Kellar cites, even when considered cumulatively, is
insufficient to survive summary judgment on a hostile-work-environment claim.
Kellar suggests—for the first time in her reply brief—that other indicia of a hostile work
environment exist. She asserts that her work environment was hostile because she was allegedly
“excluded from meetings, mocked for her condition, told she was the problem, denied access to
staff celebrations, and ultimately isolated and pushed out,” supposedly experiencing “a
consistent pattern of disrespect and marginalization following her accommodation request.”
Appellant’s Reply Br. 5-6, D.27. She does not provide any citations to the record to support
these allegations.
Kellar’s sworn declaration makes no reference to harassing conduct. Her attorneys
deposed Yunion supervisors and uncovered no harassing conduct. And when Kellar testified at
her own deposition, she only mentioned two types of conduct that could conceivably constitute
harassment: (1) Yunion allegedly excluded her from events and meetings; and (2) Yunion
allegedly questioned or minimized her claimed disability and publicly “broadcast[ed]” her health
concerns to staff.9
But the record indicates that, even with these additional allegations of purported
harassment, Kellar still did not provide sufficient evidence to show an objectively hostile
environment. While Kellar did not attend some onsite company events and meetings, her
“exclusion” was not attributable to Yunion; she refused to enter the building. See, e.g., Email
from LaNetra Kellar, Yunion Case Manager, to Nicole Wilson, Exec. Dir. of Yunion (Oct. 21,
9Kellar introduces evidence to suggest that Yunion’s treatment of Raynetta Bradley—another employee
who claimed to have experienced health complications from the post-flood work conditions—supports her hostile-
work-environment claim. “In a hostile-work-environment claim, a plaintiff may introduce evidence of
‘discriminatory acts or practices [directed] at the protected group of which the plaintiff is a member, and not just at
the plaintiff.’” McNeal, 117 F.4th at 898 (alteration in original) (quoting Jackson v. Quanex Corp., 191 F.3d 647,
661 (6th Cir. 1999)). But the evidence, which alleges Yunion took extreme measures to confirm Bradley’s alleged
medical condition and eventually terminated Bradley for supposedly falsifying work hours—does not provide
sufficient support for Kellar’s hostile-work-environment claim. See Bradley Decl., R.20-6 at PageID 803-06.

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2019 at 03:33 PM), R.15-7 at PageID 468; Kellar Dep., R.15-2 at PageID 145. Further, Kellar
presents no evidence that Yunion minimized or “mocked” her condition, or that she was “told
she was the problem.” See Kellar Reply Br. 5-6, R.27. Nor is there evidence that Yunion
publicly broadcasted her health concerns to other staff in a harassing way. Kellar needs more
than broad, conclusory statements alleging harassment. Viet v. Le, 951 F.3d 818, 823 (6th Cir.
2020) (“Conclusory statements unadorned with supporting facts are insufficient to establish a
factual dispute that will defeat summary judgment.” (quoting Alexander v. CareSource, 576 F.3d
551, 560 (6th Cir. 2009))). She has failed to provide supporting evidence for these assertions of
alleged hostility.
Aside from Kellar’s conclusory allegations, the record indicates that Yunion took
Kellar’s complaints seriously and tried to make her feel comfortable with regard to office safety.
See Email from Nicole Wilson, Exec. Dir. of Yunion, to LaNetra Kellar, Yunion Case Manager
(Oct. 22, 2019 at 11:48 AM), R.15-7 at PageID 472 (“We are making these temporary
accommodations out of consideration for the concerns you have about your health and well
being. . . . We truly appreciate the work that you do as a Case Manager for the Yunion. You are
excellent at your job. We hope we can continue our work together as a ministry and as a family
and put all of this behind us.”).
True, after Kellar relayed her health concerns to Yunion and provided the initial doctor’s
note, Wilson asked for more sufficient medical proof explicitly stating that Kellar could not work
in Yunion’s building. See Email from Nicole Wilson, Exec. Dir. of Yunion, to LaNetra Kellar,
Yunion Case Manager (Oct. 14, 2019 at 07:53), R.15-7 at PageID 455. But Yunion had the right
to ask for documentation from a health care provider articulating the medical necessity of her
accommodation. See Tchankpa v. Ascena Retail Grp., Inc., 951 F.3d 805, 813 (6th Cir. 2020)
(explaining that an employee “must” provide proof that an accommodation is medically
necessary “when asked by his employer”). And Kellar’s second doctor’s note did not suffice.
Compare Oct. 15, 2019 Doctor’s Note, R.15-7 at PageID 461 (“I would recommend [Kellar]
works off site.”), with Kennedy v. Superior Printing Co., 215 F.3d 650, 652, 656 (6th Cir. 2000)
(holding that a doctor’s note that stated a medical problem and merely proposed a solution did

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not articulate medical necessity). Nonetheless, Yunion still granted Kellar’s request without an
obligation to do so, allowing her to work remotely in an effort to relieve her concerns.
Kellar also did not provide any evidence—beyond conclusory statements—indicating the
work environment at Yunion “produce[d] ‘some harm respecting an identifiable term or
condition of employment.’” McNeal, 117 F.4th at 904 (quoting Muldrow, 601 U.S. at 355). She
provides no evidence showing that, due to harassment, she faced any limitations—or other
harm—with respect to performing the case manager responsibilities or her general standing in
the office. While “some harm” is a lower bar than unreasonable interference, she still does not
meet it. In all, applying the updated hostile-work-environment standard does not change the
result; Kellar does not provide evidence from which a jury could reasonably determine that an
objectively hostile environment produced some harm with respect to the terms or conditions of
her employment. See Est. of Hill v. Miracle, 853 F.3d 306, 317 (6th Cir. 2017) (holding that
remand to apply a different legal standard is “unnecessary if ‘the record permits only one
resolution of the factual issue’” (quoting Pullman-Standard v. Swint, 456 U.S. 273, 292 (1982))).
2. Adverse-Employment-Action and Failure-to-Accommodate Claims
Kellar claims she was subjected to adverse employment actions at Yunion due to her
disability. She also claims Yunion failed to accommodate her disability. Even though these are
distinct discrimination claims, because they share a common element that proved dispositive, the
district court analyzed them together. So do we.
For Kellar to succeed on either her adverse-employment-action claims or her failure-to-
accommodate claims, she must demonstrate that she was otherwise qualified for the case
manager position despite her disability. Williams v. AT&T Mobility Servs. LLC, 847 F.3d 384,
391-95 (6th Cir. 2017) (analyzing both an adverse-employment-action claim and a failure-to-
accommodate claim). To do so, Kellar would need to show that she could perform the essential
functions of the job with a reasonable accommodation. Id.
According to our circuit’s precedent, satisfying this element is itself a three-part inquiry.
First, “the employee typically bears ‘the initial burden of proposing an accommodation and
showing that [the] accommodation is objectively reasonable.’” Cooper v. Dolgencorp, LLC, 93

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No. 25-1136 Kellar v. Yunion, Inc. Page 21
F.4th 360, 371 (6th Cir. 2024) (quoting Kleiber v. Honda of Am. Mfg., Inc., 485 F.3d 862, 870
(6th Cir. 2007)). If the employee satisfies this first step, he must then demonstrate that with this
proposed accommodation, he could perform the essential functions of the job. Jakubowski v.
Christ Hosp., Inc., 627 F.3d 195, 202 (6th Cir. 2010); see also 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(o). If the
employee makes such a showing, then the employer would need to provide the reasonable
accommodation “unless [the employer] can demonstrate that the accommodation would impose
an undue hardship” on its operations. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(b)(5)(A); see also King v. Steward
Trumbull Mem’l Hosp., Inc., 30 F.4th 551, 568 (6th Cir. 2022) (“[A] defendant can still be
granted summary judgment[] if there are no genuine issues of material fact controverting the
conclusion that the reasonable accommodation would impose an undue hardship on the
employer.” (quoting Cleveland v. Fed. Express Corp., 83 F. App’x 74, 79 (6th Cir. 2003))).
a. Proposing a Reasonable Accommodation
An accommodation allows an individual to perform a job despite any limitations imposed
by the disability. See Jakubowski, 627 F.3d at 202 (evaluating whether a physician’s proposed
accommodation actually improved his ability to treat patients). That accommodation is
reasonable if it “mak[es] existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to and usable by
individuals with disabilities,” or if it represents an “appropriate adjustment or modification[]
of . . . policies” that already exist. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9). Both “job restructuring” and “part-
time or modified work schedules” constitute reasonable accommodations. Id.
As her proposed accommodation, Kellar requested the opportunity to work from home
for an extended period of time. Kellar provided evidence showing Yunion allowed employees to
periodically work from home for short periods of time. Allowing Kellar to continue working
offsite would merely “mak[e] existing facilities used by employees readily accessible to and
usable by individuals with disabilities,” reflecting an “appropriate adjustment or modification[]”
to Yunion’s policies that permitted remote work. See id. Thus, even if it would only allow for
Kellar to work on a part-time basis, in this context, an extended period of remote work amounts
to a reasonable accommodation.

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b. Performing the Essential Functions of the Job
The question becomes: could Kellar perform the essential functions of the job while
working from home for an extended period of time? As made clear by the record, the answer is
no.
“Whether a job function is essential is a question of fact that is typically not suitable for
resolution on a motion for summary judgment.” Thompson v. Fresh Prods., LLC, 985 F.3d 509,
525 (6th Cir. 2021) (emphasis added) (quoting Rorrer v. City of Stow, 743 F.3d 1025, 1039 (6th
Cir. 2014)). In attempting the analysis, courts consider “[t]he employer’s judgment,” “[w]ritten
job descriptions prepared before advertising or interviewing applicants for the job,” “[t]he
amount of time spent on the job performing the function,” and “[t]he consequences of not
requiring the incumbent to perform the function.” 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(3). Ultimately, a “job
function may be considered essential because (1) the position exists to perform the function, (2) a
limited number of employees are available that can perform it, or (3) it is highly specialized.”
Rorrer, 743 F.3d at 1039 (citing 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(n)(2)).
Kellar argues that while working from home, she would be able to complete all essential
functions of her job. But she does not provide evidence to support this assertion. On the
contrary, the record—including Kellar’s sworn testimony—shows that case managers had to be
onsite to perform essential functions of the job.
For Yunion to comply with the parameters of Wayne County’s funding contract, Yunion
was required to keep hard copies of each case file. These files would remain locked in a file
cabinet onsite, and Wayne County could audit the files “without prior notice.” Because
Yunion’s funding was conditioned on satisfactory Wayne County audits, onsite case file
management—which ensured the records were complete and accurate—was a crucial part of the
job. Reed Dep., R.15-4 at PageID 283. In Kellar’s own words, “maintaining the [case] file is
important.” Kellar Dep., R.15-2 at PageID 143. And she recognized that in order to manage the
hard copy files, she would have to be onsite with the locked file cabinets—she knew that if she
worked offsite for an extended period of time, someone else would have to handle her onsite
work. Id. at PageID 149; Email Exchange Between LaNetra Kellar, Eric Reed, and Nicole

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Wilson, R.15-7 at PageID 464. Yunion’s case manager job description provides additional
support for this notion, listing file management and document review as some of the principal
responsibilities for the position.
Kellar’s onsite file management responsibilities were even more essential at the time of
her request. Yunion was preparing for an upcoming audit, so case managers were expected to
“fine-tooth-comb their files.” Wilson Dep., R.15-3 at PageID 202. In the weeks leading up to an
audit, case managers spent around half of their time managing the onsite files. Further, although
the case manager position did not exist solely to perform the onsite case file management,
Yunion relied on its case managers to complete this critical task. Even through COVID, Yunion
created a staggered schedule that allowed case managers to go onsite for case file management.
And with limitations on case manager caseload, and preestablished responsibilities for interns,
there were only so many other employees who could take on Kellar’s onsite file management.
Kellar offers no evidence showing the onsite file management was anything but essential.
Instead, she offers an orthogonal argument: because she created the records offsite, Yunion did
not require all forms of the case files to remain in the locked cabinet. But the existence of other
forms of the case files does not negate the necessity of maintaining complete and accurate
versions of the onsite, hard copy files subject to Wayne County audits.
Kellar also argues that interns could have handled her case management responsibilities.
But the duty to provide a reasonable accommodation “does not require employers ‘to create new
jobs [or] displace existing employees from their positions . . . to accommodate a disabled
individual.’” Cooper, 93 F.4th at 372 (alterations in original) (quoting Kleiber, 485 F.3d at 869).
“Nor does a reasonable accommodation require employers to eliminate or reallocate an essential
job function.” Id. Kellar’s request for Yunion to reallocate this essential function of her job to
others was not reasonable.
By all accounts, managing hard copies of case files was an essential function of the case
manager role, and it had to be done onsite. Thus, Kellar could not perform the essential
functions of her job even with her proposed accommodation (working from home).

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Accordingly, she fails to satisfy this essential element of her adverse-employment-action and
failure-to-accommodate claims.
B. Retaliation Claims
Kellar argues that, because she requested a disability accommodation and filed
complaints with state agencies, Yunion retaliated against her by reducing her hours and pay,
revoking her benefits, denying her mileage reimbursement request, and ultimately firing her.
She thus brings two different kinds of retaliation claims. Her claims alleging retaliation for
requesting an accommodation and filing a disability-based discrimination complaint arise under
the federal and state disability statutes. See Pemberton v. Bell’s Brewery, Inc., 150 F.4th 751,
760, 767 (6th Cir. 2025). Her claims alleging retaliation for filing workplace complaints (related
to building safety, mileage reimbursement, and paystubs) with state agencies arise under
Michigan’s Whistleblower Protection Act. See Kuhn v. Washtenaw County, 709 F.3d 612, 629
(6th Cir. 2013).10
Each claim proceeds with a nearly identical analysis that follows the familiar McDonnell
Douglas burden-shifting framework. Pemberton, 150 F.4th at 767, 769-70; Kuhn, 709 F.3d at
629. Kellar must first establish a prima facie case for her respective retaliation claims; if she
does, the burden shifts, and Yunion must provide a “legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason” for
the adverse action. McDonnell Douglas Corp. v. Green, 411 U.S. 792, 802 (1973). If Yunion
provides such a reason, the burden shifts back to Kellar to show that the proffered reason was
pretextual. Id. at 804.
1. Establishing a Prima Facie Case
a. Disability-Based Retaliation
For Kellar to establish a prima facie case under the ADA and Michigan’s anti-disability
discrimination statute, she must show that “(1) [s]he engaged in activity protected under the
ADA”; (2) Yunion “knew of that activity”; (3) Yunion “took an adverse action against [her]; and
10Kellar blends her retaliation claims together, but she argues they fall under the anti-disability statutes and
Michigan’s Whistleblower Protection Act.

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(4) there was a causal connection between the protected activity and the adverse action.”
Pemberton, 150 F.4th at 767, 769 (quoting Rorrer, 743 F.3d at 1046). Under the anti-disability-
discrimination statutes, Kellar’s only protected activities would be her request for an
accommodation and the disability-related complaint she filed with the Michigan Department of
Civil Rights. See id. at 760, 767. Kellar does not provide any evidence indicating her other
complaints—related to workplace safety, denial of mileage reimbursement, and failure to
provide pay stubs—had any connection to her disability or other activity protected under these
anti-disability-discrimination statutes.
Request for Disability-Based Accommodation. Kellar argues that Yunion reduced her
pay, hours, and benefits due to her accommodation request. While Yunion did shift her to part-
time work when she could not perform the onsite functions of her job, which reduced her hours
(but did not revoke her benefits), this alleged adverse action was the reasonable accommodation
she sought. For retaliation claims, an adverse action is conduct that could “dissuade a reasonable
person from engaging in the protected activity.” A.C. v. Shelby Cnty. Bd. of Educ., 711 F.3d 687,
698 (6th Cir. 2013) (citing White, 548 U.S. at 68). Granting Kellar’s requested accommodation,
by shifting her to part-time work, is not an adverse action in this context; it is employer activity
the ADA explicitly endorses to accommodate an individual. 42 U.S.C. § 12111(9); 29 C.F.R.
§ 1630.2(o). Certainly, the act of granting an employee’s request would not dissuade a
reasonable person from seeking a similar—or even a different—accommodation request.
And to the extent Kellar tries to pin her purported termination on her accommodation
request, she again falls short of establishing a prima facie case. She requested the
accommodation to work from home in September and October of 2019. She argues temporal
proximity and the text message from Wilson establish causation. Not so. Kellar continued to
work as a Yunion case manager for a year after her accommodation request, which constitutes
enough time to defeat her temporal proximity argument. Pemberton, 150 F.4th at 768; see also
Kenney v. Aspen Techs., Inc., 965 F.3d 443, 449 (6th Cir. 2020) (“[A] roughly 75-day delay
between [plaintiff’s] protected activity and an adverse employment action is not, standing alone,
a convincing case for proving causation.”). Similarly, Wilson’s intemperate text message—
which was sent a year prior to Kellar’s purported termination—does not allow for a reasonable

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inference that Kellar was terminated due to her accommodation request. The communication
between Wilson and Kellar after the text, and Yunion’s conduct (accommodating her request and
continuing an employment relationship for an additional year thereafter) undermine this sole
piece of circumstantial evidence, particularly when it stands alone. “‘The mere existence of a
scintilla of evidence in support of the plaintiff’s position’ is not enough” to survive summary
judgment. United States ex rel. O’Laughlin v. Radiation Therapy Servs., P.S.C., 148 F.4th 791,
802 (6th Cir. 2025) (quoting Baker v. City of Trenton, 936 F.3d 523, 529 (6th Cir. 2019)). The
text message is a mere single beam too feeble to serve as the foundation of her causation
argument.
Disability-Related Complaint. Kellar’s disability-related complaint, filed with the
Michigan Department of Civil Rights, fares no better. Yunion became aware of this complaint
on December 17, 2019. The almost year-long gap between protected activity and alleged
adverse action extinguishes the temporal proximity argument, and because Yunion became
aware of Kellar’s civil rights complaint after Wilson had sent the text message, the text
message’s value as circumstantial evidence is even further diminished. Wilson sent that text
message without any knowledge of Kellar’s complaint. Kellar fails to provide evidence from
which a reasonable jury could infer retaliation based on activity protected by the anti-disability
discrimination statutes.
b. Whistleblower-Based Retaliation
For Kellar to establish a prima facie case under the Whistleblower Protection Act, Kellar
must show that (1) she engaged in protected activity as defined by the statute; (2) she suffered an
adverse employment action; and (3) there exists a causal connection between the protected
activity and the adverse action. See Kuhn, 709 F.3d at 628-29. She claims her various work-
related complaints to the Michigan Occupational Safety and Health Administration and the
Michigan Department of Labor constitute protected activity.
Kellar, again, fails to establish a prima facie case because she does not provide evidence
of causation. Instead, Kellar declares that temporal proximity suffices. However, Michigan
courts make clear that temporal proximity alone does not establish causation for a retaliation

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claim under the Whistleblower Protection Act. West v. Gen. Motors Corp., 665 N.W.2d 468,
472-73 (Mich. 2003) (citing Taylor v. Mod. Eng’g, Inc., 653 N.W.2d 625, 630 (Mich. Ct. App.
2002) (analyzing a Whistleblower Protection Act claim)); see also Kuhn, 709 F.3d at 629-30.
Kellar offers no other evidence of causation. Thus, she has not established a prima facie case.
2. Pretext
Even if Kellar could establish a prima facie case for her retaliation claims, Yunion’s
legitimate, nondiscriminatory explanations for its conduct are not pretextual. Yunion asserts that
it reduced Kellar’s hours during her employment tenure due to her accommodation request, and
it presented Kellar with the option to accept an independent contractor position (which would
have reduced her pay and hours, revoked her benefits, taken away her holidays, and ultimately
led to her employment relationship ending) due to budget constraints. Kellar does not argue that
Yunion’s decision to reduce her hours as a disability accommodation was pretextual. Instead,
Kellar only argues that Yunion’s asserted budgetary rationale was pretextual. Whether it was
due to her activity protected under the anti-disability-discrimination statutes or the
Whistleblower Protection Act, Kellar insists the decision to offer her the independent contractor
position was retaliatory.
“Our caselaw does not prescribe any particular method for showing pretext.” Gray v.
State Farm Mut. Auto. Ins. Co., 145 F.4th 630, 640 (6th Cir. 2025). “Usually, plaintiffs show
pretext by arguing that the employer’s proffered reason lacked a factual basis, did not actually
motivate the adverse action, or was insufficient to motivate the adverse action.” Id. Here, Kellar
is unable to show pretext by any of these methods.
Yunion’s proffered budgetary reason for offering Kellar an independent contractor role is
supported by facts in the record. Due to COVID, and the limited opportunities to provide
reimbursable services, Yunion lost over half of its budget for the diversion department. Despite
serving one-third of her typical client load, Kellar was earning a full salary with benefits. By
shifting Kellar to an independent contractor role, Yunion could adjust its workforce to match the
decreased demand for its services, save money on payroll, and maintain an employment
relationship with a successful employee. Kellar was the only full-time case manager in a

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financially struggling department; Yunion asserts this was a “necessary fiscal decision for the
organization.” Wilson Dep., R.15-3 at PageID 182-83. The record provides ample support for
Yunion’s proffered motivation.
And Kellar does not present evidence that challenges the factual basis of Yunion’s
legitimate, nondiscriminatory reason for her purported termination. Nor does she present
evidence indicating Yunion actually had an ulterior motive, or that the budgetary constraints
were insufficient to explain Yunion’s conduct. Kellar notes that Yunion received a Paycheck
Protection Plan loan for $129,600. This loan allowed Yunion to maintain its payroll (including
Kellar’s full-time position) for the covered period, as intended. The loan did not sufficiently
make up for the significant budgetary shortfall in the diversion department, and the loan was
intended to support Yunion’s entire staff.
Kellar also points to the fact that Yunion hired one full-time case manager in May 2020
and other case managers after Kellar’s departure, insinuating that these staff additions undermine
Yunion’s alleged budgetary issues. But at the time Kellar left Yunion, the full-time case
manager hired in 2020 provided services exclusively in Yunion’s workforce development
department, which was funded through a different contract, and thus financially independent
from Kellar’s diversion department. Further, the case managers hired after Kellar left Yunion
were independent contractors. Yunion maintains that it had funding for an independent
contractor role—indeed, it offered that position to Kellar first. Yunion hiring different
independent contractors does not call into question the organization’s inability to support a full-
time case manager and the associated benefits.
Finally, Kellar raises temporal proximity, arguing that the timing of Yunion’s offer to
shift her to an independent contract role indicates pretext. Because Kellar’s other arguments
related to pretext are insufficient, temporal proximity is her only remaining evidence of pretext.
But “temporal proximity cannot be the sole basis for finding pretext.” Seeger v. Cincinnati Bell
Tel. Co., LLC, 681 F.3d 274, 285 (6th Cir. 2012) (quoting Donald v. Sybra, Inc., 667 F.3d 757,
763 (6th Cir. 2012)). Thus, Kellar has failed to provide evidence that would allow a jury to
reasonably reject Yunion’s legitimate, nondiscriminatory motivations.

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C. Wrongful-Termination Claim
Kellar also argues that Michigan’s public policy principles prohibit Yunion’s conduct.
She claims she was fired for her refusal to work in a building that was unsafe. Michigan is an
“at-will” termination state, so employers can fire an employee “for any reason or no reason at
all” unless the termination violates public policy. Jackson v. Genesee Cnty. Road Comm’n, 999
F.3d 333, 353 (6th Cir. 2021). An at-will termination violates public policy if
(1) the employee is discharged in violation of an explicit legislative statement
prohibiting discharge of employees who act in accordance with a statutory right or
duty; (2) the employee is discharged for the failure or refusal to violate the law in
the course of employment; or (3) the employee is discharged for exercising a right
conferred by a well-established legislative enactment.
Id. (quoting McNeil v. Charlevoix Cnty., 772 N.W.2d 18, 24 (Mich. 2009)).
Kellar runs into a number of issues with this claim. First, as the district court correctly
noted, Kellar abandoned this claim by failing to defend it in response to Yunion’s motion for
summary judgment, so we “need not consider [it].” Doe v. Bredesen, 507 F.3d 998, 1007 (6th
Cir. 2007).
Second, to the extent Kellar attempts to revive this claim, she failed. Kellar’s 90-word,
citationless paragraph in her opening brief that merely alludes to the wrongful termination
doctrine falls woefully short of her obligation to develop an argument upon which she seeks
relief. See Warman v. Mount St. Joseph Univ., 144 F.4th 880, 896 (6th Cir. 2025) (“It is not
sufficient for a party to mention a possible argument in the most skeletal way, leaving the court
to put flesh on its bones.” (cleaned up) (quoting McPherson v. Kelsey, 125 F.3d 989, 995-96 (6th
Cir. 1997))). And Kellar’s reply brief only discusses general concepts of public policy doctrines.
In all, Kellar points to no law or facts that warrant granting her relief under Michigan’s wrongful
termination doctrine, a fatal shortcoming.11 She mentions this issue only in “a perfunctory
11Notably, Kellar does not provide evidence showing Yunion actually terminated her. Kellar’s
employment relationship with Yunion ended when she refused to accept a different position within the organization.
And Kellar has not presented evidence that shows she was subjected to a constructive discharge. See Joliet v.
Pitoniak, 715 N.W.2d 60, 67 (Mich. 2006) (explaining that constructive discharge “occurs when a reasonable person
in the employee’s place would feel compelled to resign”).

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manner, unaccompanied by some effort at developed argumentation,” so we “deem[] [her
argument] waived.” Id. at 896 (quoting McPherson, 125 F.3d at 995-96).
IV. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, we AFFIRM the district court’s judgment.

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