Daniel Grand v. City of University Heights, Ohio

RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)
File Name: 25a0310p.06
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
DANIEL GRAND,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
CITY OF UNIVERSITY HEIGHTS, OHIO; MICHAEL DYLAN
BRENNAN, Mayor, in his official and individual
capacity; LUKE MCCONVILLE, City Law Director, in
his individual capacity; PAUL SIEMBORSKI, City
Planning Commission member, in his individual
capacity,
Defendants-Appellees.
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No. 24-3876
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Northern District of Ohio at Cleveland.
No. 1:22-cv-01594—Bridget Meehan Brennan, District Judge.
Argued: October 21, 2025
Decided and Filed: November 13, 2025
Before: SUTTON, Chief Judge; BATCHELDER and LARSEN, Circuit Judges.
_________________
COUNSEL
ARGUED: Eden Quainton, QUAINTON LAW, PLLC, New York, New York, for Appellant.
Frank H. Scialdone, MAZANEC, RASKIN, AND RYDER CO., L.P.A., Cleveland, Ohio, for
Appellees. ON BRIEF: Eden Quainton, QUAINTON LAW, PLLC, New York, New York,
Jonathan Gross, LAW OFFICE OF JONATHAN GROSS, Baltimore, Maryland, for Appellant.
Frank H. Scialdone, Steven K. Kelley, Zachary W. Anderson, MAZANEC, RASKIN, AND
RYDER CO., L.P.A., Cleveland, Ohio, for Appellees. Elizabeth Parr Hecker, Barbara A.
Schwabauer, UNITED STATES DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE, Washington, D.C., for Amicus
Curiae.
>

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_________________
OPINION
_________________
SUTTON, Chief Judge. Daniel Grand lives in University Heights, Ohio. In 2021, he
applied for a special use permit to use his home as “a place of religious assembly” under the
local zoning laws. R.81-6 at 4. Before City officials could finally resolve his petition, however,
Grand withdrew the request, stating that he did not “wish to operate a house of worship as is
defined under the zoning ordinance.” R.88-4 at 1. He nonetheless filed this federal lawsuit
against the City and several officials, raising an assortment of statutory and constitutional claims.
The district court granted summary judgment for the City and its officials on the ground that
some of Grand’s challenges were unripe and the rest failed on the merits. We affirm.
I.
Daniel Grand and his family live in University Heights. Grand’s Orthodox Jewish faith
requires him to pray thrice daily with a group of ten men, what’s known as a “minyan” in
Hebrew. R.81 at 7. His faith also forbids him from driving on the Sabbath, which makes
traveling to and from synagogues difficult. To more easily, and more “seriously,” pray on the
Sabbath, Grand began inviting friends to pray with him on the holy day. R.82-1 at 7; see R.81-1
at 3. To that end, he emailed around twelve of his neighbors, inviting them to three prayer
sessions “for the inauguration of the Shomayah Tefilah Beis Hakeneset” at “[t]he Daniel J.
Grand Residence.” R.88-2. The invitation referred to the event as a “shul,” which in Hebrew
refers to a synagogue or a house where prayer groups are held. R.88. Grand introduced the
Rabbi, Rabbi Rosskam, for the event and asked guests to “spread the word” and “consider
bring[ing] someone with you.” R.88-2.
A displeased neighbor forwarded Grand’s email to University Heights Mayor Michael
Brennan, who forwarded it to University Heights Law Director Luke McConville. On January
21, 2021, McConville emailed Grand a cease-and-desist letter and told him to stop violating the
City’s zoning laws. The letter informed Grand that the City “has been made aware that [he]
intend[s] to use” his house as “a place of religious assembly.” R.81-6 at 4. Grand’s house is

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zoned U-1, the letter continued, which prohibits the “use of the Premises as a place of religious
assembly and/or in operation of a shul or synagogue.” R.81-6 at 4. Violations of local
ordinances, the letter added, could result in “building code citations against you.” R.81-6 at 4.
After Grand received the letter, he told Brennan over the phone that he wanted to host only a
small, informal prayer group. Brennan, who claimed to have observed at least 120 people in the
basement of another residential shul, expressed skepticism. Grand cancelled the next prayer
meeting.
A day later, Grand applied to the City’s Planning Commission for a Special Use Permit.
In a U-1 zone, the Code of Ordinances permits only single-family dwellings, municipal or library
buildings, and buildings owned by a board of education. UHCO § 1250.02. If a property owner
obtains a Special Use Permit, however, he may operate a “[h]ouse[] of worship” within a U-1
zone. UHCO § 1274.01(b)(1); see UHCO § 1250.02(g). The City’s Planning Commission
issues the permits, and unsuccessful applicants may appeal to the City Council. UHCO
§ 1274.01(d)(2). A separate body, the Board of Zoning Appeals, “decide[s] any question
involving the interpretation of any provision” in the zoning code. UHCO § 1244.03. In his
application, Grand indicated that he had “11 tables” and “21 chairs” in his recreation room, and
that he wanted to use the room “for periodic religious gatherings.” R.81-8 at 2.
On March 4, 2021, the Planning Commission held a public hearing on Grand’s
application. Through counsel, Grand described his plans for a men’s only prayer group, to meet
“once a week and on certain high holidays.” R.82-1 at 140. Grand did “not disput[e]” that his
proposed use would render his home “a place of religious assembly” within the meaning of
UHCO § 1274.01(b)(1). R.82-1 at 140. But he distinguished his proposal from the “usual
image[] of a formal synagogue.” R.82-1 at 140. Some of Grand’s neighbors spoke against the
proposal on the grounds that Grand understated the size of his proposed gatherings, that he had
advertised the meetings on the internet, and that his proposed use would create traffic, fire, and
parking issues in the area. Grand pointed out that the prayer group could not be the source of
parking problems, as members of his religion “can’t drive” on the “Sabbath and high holidays.”
R.81-11 at 9. The Planning Commission tabled the discussion, requesting more details from
Grand. It scheduled another hearing on Grand’s application for a few days later.

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In emails exchanged after the first meeting, some members of the five-member
Commission doubted whether Grand’s use would constitute a “[h]ouse of worship” and thus
wondered whether he needed a permit at all. R.82-1 at 192–96. It is not clear, as one
commissioner put it, when “a social gathering become[s] a house of worship.” R.82-1 at 192.
Just before the Commission’s second hearing, Grand withdrew his application. “I do not
wish to operate a house of worship,” he stated, as it is “defined under the zoning ordinance.”
R.88-4 at 1. The Commission still held the meeting as planned, and Mayor Brennan emphasized
that Grand could not operate a “house of worship” without a permit. He also asked community
members to report any violations to the City. The Commission never acted further on Grand’s
application.
The Planning Commission was not the only arm of City government that interacted with
Grand during the spring of 2021. A Lieutenant in the University Heights Police Department
directed patrol units to drive past Grand’s house and check for code violations. A City
prosecutor sought to investigate housing code violations inside the Grand residence. With the
permission of Grand’s wife, a housing inspector searched the house for violations. He
apparently did not find any.
Around 18 months after withdrawing his application for a zoning variance, Grand filed
this lawsuit in federal court against the City and several of its officials. He raised claims under
the Religious Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act (RLUIPA), the Freedom of Access to
Clinic Entrances Act (FACE Act), the First, Fourth, and Fourteenth Amendments of the U.S.
Constitution, the Ohio Constitution, and other state laws. After the parties filed motions for
summary judgment, the district court dismissed Grand’s RLUIPA, Ohio Constitution, First
Amendment, and Fourteenth Amendment claims as unripe. It then rejected as a matter of law his
FACE Act, Fourth Amendment, and several state law claims on the merits. The district court
declined supplemental jurisdiction over Grand’s Ohio Public Records Act claim.
II.
Article III confines the jurisdiction of the federal courts to “Cases” and “Controversies.”
U.S. Const. art. III, § 2. Certain “landmarks”—ripeness, mootness, and standing—distinguish

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the disputes amenable to the judicial process from those over which we have no power. Lujan v.
Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). The judicial power of the United States does not
extend to a claim when “it is filed too early (making it unripe), when it is filed too late (making it
moot) or when the claimant lacks a sufficiently concrete and redressable interest in the dispute
(depriving the plaintiff of standing).” Warshak v. United States, 532 F.3d 521, 525 (6th Cir.
2008) (en banc). Several of Grand’s claims face ripeness problems.
A.
Ripeness emerges from constitutional limitations on the authority of the federal judiciary
and prudential concerns about how and when we exercise that power. Nat’l Park Hospitality
Ass’n v. Dep’t of Interior, 538 U.S. 803, 808 (2003). The doctrine disciplines the exercise of our
jurisdiction, requiring us to stay our hand until a dispute comes into focus. Warshak, 532 F.3d at
525. To that end, we consider (1) whether the claim is fit for judicial decision in that it arises out
of a concrete factual context and an actual or likely dispute, Trump v. New York, 592 U.S. 125,
131 (2020) (per curiam), and (2) whether withholding adjudication would do hardship to the
parties, id. at 134; accord Abbott Lab’ys v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967).
In the land-use context, one important factor in a dispute’s fitness for judicial decision is
a “finality” requirement—a concrete and final decision by the local authorities. Williamson
Cnty. Reg’l Plan. Comm’n v. Hamilton Bank of Johnson City, 473 U.S. 172, 193 (1985),
overruled in part on other grounds by Knick v. Township of Scott, 588 U.S. 180, 188 (2019).
State and local regulators often have authority to grant variances, waivers, rezoning, and other
forms of relief. See Suitum v. Tahoe Reg’l Plan. Agency, 520 U.S. 725, 738 (1997). Challenges
to land policy often allege that a given regulation breaks this law or that one because it “goes too
far.” Penn. Coal Co. v. Mahon, 260 U.S. 393, 415 (1922). But “a court cannot determine
whether a regulation has gone ‘too far’ unless it knows how far the regulation goes.”
MacDonald, Sommer & Frates v. Yolo County, 477 U.S. 340, 348 (1986). For that reason, land-
use challenges are generally unripe until the “relevant administrative agency resolve[s] the
appropriate application of the zoning ordinance to the property in dispute.” Miles Christi
Religious Ord. v. Township of Northville, 629 F.3d 533, 537 (6th Cir. 2010); see Knick, 588 U.S.
at 197 (describing this “settled” finality requirement).

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This approach ensures that municipal land-use policy begins in local, politically
accountable hands. And it prevents us from swinging at a moving target. See Miles Christi, 629
F.3d at 537–38. We have applied this requirement to a variety of constitutional and statutory
challenges to land-use policy. See id. at 536–37 (RLUIPA); Bannum, Inc. v. City of Louisville,
958 F.2d 1354, 1362 (6th Cir. 1992) (Equal Protection Clause); Insomnia Inc. v. City of
Memphis, 278 F. App’x 609, 613 (6th Cir. 2008) (Speech Clause).
Gauged by these requirements, most of Grand’s challenges to the ordinance are unripe.
Grand does not point to a final decision implementing the challenged ordinance, and he does not
show that delayed adjudication will harm him. As a result, his First Amendment, Fourteenth
Amendment, Ohio Constitution, and RLUIPA claims are unripe, both because they are not fit for
review and because Grand will not be prejudiced by any delay.
Unfit for review in the absence of a final decision. The relevant local agencies never
reached a final decision about the application of the City’s zoning rules to Grand. The Planning
Commission implements the City’s zoning ordinances, including any decisions about special use
permits, and its decisions may be appealed to the City Council. Meanwhile, the Board of Zoning
Appeals hears challenges to the Commission’s interpretation of the zoning code. UHCO
§ 1244.03. As Grand concedes, neither the Planning Commission nor the City Council nor the
Board of Zoning Appeals has ever determined whether UHCO § 1274.01 applies to the kinds of
gatherings he has in mind. And because Grand withdrew his application, the zoning board has
never issued a final decision—or for that matter any decision—about his eligibility for a special
use permit. The government body “charged with implementing the regulations,” in short, has not
“reached a final decision regarding the application of the regulations to the property at issue.”
Williamson Cnty., 473 U.S. at 186–87. Grand’s claims thus never ripened into a dispute suitable
for federal review.
Grace Community Church v. Lenox Township illustrates the point. 544 F.3d 609 (6th Cir.
2008). A town revoked a special use permit that it had previously granted to a church after
learning that the church violated the permit’s conditions. Id. at 611. The church offered “no
comment” at the revocation hearing, declined to appeal the decision, and failed to apply for
reinstatement. Id. at 616. It instead sued the town in federal court. Id. at 612. Although the

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local planning commission revoked the permit, the church’s silence meant that the commission
rested the revocation on an “inconclusive but essentially unrebutted” finding that the church
violated the permit. Id. at 616. That unappealed and inconclusive decision, we held, failed to
ripen into a cognizable claim. Id. at 616–17.
Just so here. The University Heights Planning Commission never determined whether
the ordinance applied to Grand’s gatherings and never determined his eligibility for a special use
permit. Nor was this the City’s fault. Grand withdrew his application for a special use permit
before anyone had a chance to adopt an interpretation of the ordinance or even to determine
whether Grand needed a special use permit in the first place. Grand’s claims, in truth, are further
from maturity than Grace Community Church’s claims.
Grand offers a few rejoinders. He contends that the cease-and-desist letter counts as a
final decision. The problem with the argument is that it misapprehends the finality requirement.
To ripen his claims, Grand needed a final decision from the agency with authority over the
challenged regulations. That final decision would come from the Board of Zoning Appeals.
McConville, the University Heights Law Director who sent the zoning-violation letter, has no
role in the relevant agencies. And Mayor Brennan neither controls the Planning Commission nor
sits on the Board of Zoning Appeals. Grand’s case, at bottom, turns on whether his proposed
gatherings would render his home a “house[] of worship” under the ordinance. UHCO
§ 1274.01(b)(1). Only the zoning board, not Brennan or McConville, can answer that question.
Due to Grand’s decision to withdraw his special use application, the zoning board had no
application to act on, leaving us with “no idea” how the ordinance works in this setting. Toilet
Goods Ass’n, Inc. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 158, 163 (1967).
Even though Grand did not need to exhaust his local remedies, he did need to obtain a
final decision. The point of this requirement is not to channel disputes through elaborate local
procedures or three layers of state-court review. See Palazzolo v. Rhode Island, 533 U.S. 606,
624 (2001). Its purpose is simply to determine the government’s position, which is why
“nothing more than de facto finality is necessary.” Pakdel v. City & Cnty. of San Francisco, 594
U.S. 474, 479 (2021) (per curiam). No such finality exists.

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Grand claims that any effort to obtain a final decision would have been futile, insisting
that further proceedings before the Planning Commission had nowhere to go. Local authorities,
it is true, may not hide behind “repetitive or unfair land-use procedures in order to avoid a final
decision.” Palazzolo, 533 U.S. at 621. Ripeness, it is also true, does not require further
proceedings after the government has already “dug in its heels.” Murphy v. New Milford Zoning
Comm’n, 402 F.3d 342, 349 (2d Cir. 2005). But “futility” is not an exception to finality; it’s
another way to state the rule. See Bannum, 958 F.2d at 1363. A government’s position is final
when it has adopted a settled position or refused to answer a complaint. See id.
While the legal premise of this argument has merit, its application here does not. These
zoning proceedings had not become an empty affair. The Commission tabled Grand’s
application before it could act on it. Then, after the Commissioners went back and forth by
email about the merits of the application, the Commission scheduled a second hearing to
consider Grand’s position in greater detail. When Grand withdrew his application on the eve of
the second hearing, he said that he was doing so because the ordinance did not apply to his
planned use, and he therefore did not need a permit. Nothing about this sequence of events
demonstrates prejudgment of Grand’s claim. Quite the opposite. The emails between the
Commissioners suggest that they found the issue complicated, and some viewed his use of his
house for small prayer meetings as consistent with the ordinance. In the last analysis, we cannot
say whether the City has “dug in its heels” because we still do not know where it stands on this
application of the ordinance. Murphy, 402 F.3d at 349.
Grand insists that, at a minimum, his due process claim ripened immediately after the
first Commission hearing. But it’s difficult to see how Grand can have a cognizable due process
claim when his actions—dropping any effort to obtain relief—brought to an end whatever
process is due. See Alvin v. Suzuki, 227 F.3d 107, 116 (3d Cir. 2000) (“In order to state a claim
for failure to provide due process, a plaintiff must have taken advantage of the processes that are
available to him or her . . . .”); Dusanek v. Hannon, 677 F.2d 538, 543 (7th Cir. 1982).
No hardship to Grand. This approach does not unfairly harm Grand. It was his actions,
not anyone else’s, that created the ripeness problem. A dismissal on ripeness grounds is without
prejudice, and Grand remains free to file a new action if the City applies the ordinance to him in

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a way that violates his statutory or constitutional rights. Hardship from the denial of pre-
enforcement review ordinarily emerges from a forced choice. Unable to assert his rights
judicially, the plaintiff is left to pick between (1) compliance with a burdensome and potentially
unlawful policy or (2) refusal to comply and the risk of sanctions that comes with it. See, e.g.,
Abbott Lab’ys, 387 U.S. at 153; Susan B. Anthony List v. Driehaus, 573 U.S. 149, 68 (2014);
Columbia Broadcasting Sys., Inc. v. United States, 316 U.S. 407, 417–19 (1942). Not every
claimant faces that dilemma, however. Some challenged policies do not “force” the plaintiff “to
modify [his] behavior in order to avoid future adverse consequences.” Ohio Forestry Ass’n,
Inc. v. Sierra Club, 523 U.S. 726, 734 (1998).
The ordinance is such a policy, and Grand is such a plaintiff. If Grand wants clarity
about the challenged policies, the local agencies remain available to provide it. Grand retains the
right to apply for a permit, “complete the factual record,” “more fully explain [his] position,” or
appeal any adverse determination by the Planning Commission. Grace Community, 544 F.3d at
616; see Miles Christi, 629 F.3d at 539. Any gate to relief is locked from within. Grand may
open the door whenever he wishes. Until then, it is not for us to permit “litigation by
hypothetical” when local authorities stand ready to provide whatever clarity or permission the
claimant needs. Warshak, 532 F.3d at 529.
Grand returns to the cease-and-desist letter as a ground for distinguishing Miles Christi.
He notes that, in Miles Christi, local rules suspended enforcement of zoning rules during an
appeal to the zoning board. See 629 F.3d at 542. Because University Heights lacks a similar
suspension process during an appeal, he reasons, he cannot delay enforcement of the City’s
policy during an appeal and thus will suffer greater hardship from the denial of judicial review.
But that distinction highlights the difference between the letter he received and the ticket issued
in Miles Christi. The letter is not an enforcement action, and the City may not enforce it. During
a proceeding before the Planning Commission or Board of Zoning Appeals, in other words, the
letter would not impose a hardship. Grand needs no relief from a document that does not harm
him. Murphy, 402 F.3d at 349 (“[T]he cease and desist order did not inflict an immediate
injury.”).

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As a final riposte, Grand urges us to conclude that the City’s zoning rules chill First
Amendment expression. Potential infringement of free-speech rights no doubt deserves weight
in the hardship analysis. See, e.g., Mahmoud v. Taylor, 145 S. Ct. 2332, 2358 (2025); Driehaus,
573 U.S. at 168. Yet it is specific objective harm, not “subjective ‘chill,’” that counts. Laird v.
Tatum, 408 U.S. 1, 14–15 (1972). For that reason, we “look at each case to determine the
consequences of staying our hand.” Miles Christi, 629 F.3d at 540. Grand admits, as an initial
matter, that he has convened a minyan on the Sabbath at least once after the end of the Planning
Commission meetings. That does not sound like chill. See Laird, 408 U.S. at 14 n.7. Grand, at
all events, still holds the keys to resolving any uncertainty about the zoning policy. Having
chosen not to obtain a final decision, indeed any enforceable decision, about the application of
the zoning rules to his home, he is the author of any chilling effect on his First Amendment
interests, not the City.
Grand and the United States as amicus curiae argue that, even if the finality imperative
applies to as-applied claims, it does not apply to facial challenges to zoning ordinances. We
agree. Facial challenges assert that “no set of circumstances exists under which” the challenged
enactment or action would be lawful. United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S. 739, 745 (1987).
Waiting for the government to “reach[] a final decision regarding the application of the
regulations,” Williamson Cnty., 473 U.S. at 538, does not make sense if the regulations are
unlawful no matter how the government applies them, see Opulent Life Church v. City of Holly
Springs, 697 F.3d 279, 287 (5th Cir. 2012). A zoning policy that permitted special use requests
only by people of one faith, as an example, would be facially unconstitutional and could be
challenged with, or without, a final decision by the relevant agency. In that setting, the claim is
“generally ripe the moment the challenged regulation or ordinance is passed.” Suitum, 520 U.S.
at 736 n.10; accord Yee v. City of Escondido, 503 U.S. 519, 532–35 (1992); Keystone
Bituminous Coal Ass’n v. DeBenedictis, 480 U.S. 470, 494 (1987).
While Grand’s facial claims do not have a finality problem, they fail for two independent
reasons. For one, Grand forfeited these claims, as the district court correctly held. Parties forfeit
arguments at the summary judgment stage by failing to adequately address them in response to a
motion for summary judgment. Bennett v. Hurley Med. Ctr., 86 F.4th 314, 324 (6th Cir. 2023).

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That is what happened. When the parties cross-moved for summary judgment, Grand failed to
provide any sustained argument in support of his facial arguments. He instead simply asserted,
sporadically and without development, that the ordinance is unlawful on its face. Those
conclusory references do not preserve his claims for appeal.
For another reason, any such claim fails as a matter of law. Facial challenges require a
showing that the challenged action would violate the law under any set of circumstances.
Salerno, 481 U.S. at 745. These kinds of claims face an “uphill battle” in the land-use setting.
Keystone Bituminous, 480 U.S. at 494. This case shows why. To prevail, Grand would have to
show that the city’s zoning policy—requiring permission for a place of religious assembly—
could never be lawfully applied in any context. See Bucklew v. Precythe, 587 U.S. 119, 138
(2019); Yee, 503 U.S. at 532–35. He cannot make that showing, and he has not even tried.
Surely, as one obvious example, the City could prohibit a 3,000 person worship hall from being
placed in a residential part of University Heights. See Mount Elliott Cemetery Ass’n v. City of
Troy, 171 F.3d 398, 405 (6th Cir. 1999). “[A] church has no constitutional right to be free from
reasonable zoning regulations nor does a church have a constitutional right to build its house of
worship where it pleases.” Grace United Methodist Church v. City of Cheyenne, 451 F.3d 643,
652 (10th Cir. 2006). This example suffices to show that Grand cannot meet the Salerno
standard.
III.
The district court correctly dismissed Grand’s Fourth Amendment and FACE Act claims
on the merits.
Fourth Amendment. Grand argues that the City violated his Fourth Amendment rights by
sending a housing inspector into his home without a warrant. The Fourth Amendment provides,
in relevant part, that “[t]he right of the people to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and
effects, against unreasonable searches and seizures, shall not be violated.” U.S. Const., amend.
IV. Home inspections are “searches” within the meaning of the guarantee. Camara v. Mun. Ct.
of City & Cnty. of S.F., 387 U.S. 523, 528 (1967). And the Fourth Amendment ordinarily

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prohibits warrantless searches of a home. See, e.g., Lange v. California, 594 U.S. 295, 298
(2021).
Consent, however, creates an exception to the ordinary rule. Schneckloth v. Bustamonte,
412 U.S. 218, 219 (1973). That consent, moreover, need not come from the property owner
himself. See, e.g., United States v. Ayoub, 498 F.3d 532, 537 (6th Cir. 2007). So long as the
consenting party had “apparent or actual authority over the premises,” the consent is valid.
United States v. Sheckles, 996 F.3d 330, 346 (6th Cir. 2021).
In this instance, Grand’s wife gave the inspector permission to search the house. Nothing
about their exchange would lead an officer to think Grand’s wife lacked authority over the house.
Her consent forecloses her husband’s argument.
FACE Act. Grand contends that the City violated the Freedom of Access to Clinic
Entrances Act by ordering police officers to drive by his home and by asking his neighbors to
file reports if they saw people congregating at his house. The FACE Act creates civil remedies
against “[w]hoever . . . by force or threat of force or by physical obstruction . . . interferes with or
attempts to . . . interfere with any person lawfully exercising or seeking to exercise the First
Amendment right of religious freedom at a place of religious worship.” 18 U.S.C. § 248(a)(2).
We interpret the phrase “threat of force” as referring to a serious expression of intent to inflict
bodily harm. Cf. United States v. Doggart, 906 F.3d 506, 510 (6th Cir. 2018) (interpreting
statutes with similar language).
The district court held that the City’s actions do not constitute “force,” “threat of force,”
or “physical obstruction” within the meaning of the Act. 18 U.S.C § 248(a)(2). Grand’s reply
brief, and only his reply brief, suggests that Brennan’s statement at the second Commission
hearing amounted to a “threat of force.” 18 U.S.C. § 248(a)(2). To start (and to repeat),
arguments made for the first time in a reply brief are forfeited. Sanborn v. Parker, 629 F.3d 554,
579 (6th Cir. 2010). To finish, Grand’s argument would fail even if he had properly raised it.
Brennan’s only threat was to ticket Grand for violating the housing code. Few among us enjoy
receiving a code citation. But Brennan’s reference to “appropriate remedies in court,” R.83-1 at
247, does not remotely express “intent to inflict bodily harm.” Planned Parenthood of

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Columbia/Willamette, Inc. v. Am. Coal. of Life Activists, 290 F.3d 1058, 1077 (9th Cir. 2002) (en
banc).
Dismissal with prejudice. Grand objects to the district court’s dismissal of his unripe
claims with prejudice. He articulates a perfectly sound legal argument but misconceives the
situation. Federal courts indeed dismiss cases for lack of ripeness without prejudice. Peters v.
Fair, 427 F.3d 1035, 1038 (6th Cir. 2005). And that is precisely what the district court did.
Supplemental jurisdiction. Grand contends that the district court erred by declining
supplemental jurisdiction over his Ohio Public Records Act claim. We review this argument for
abuse of discretion. Landefeld v. Marion Gen. Hosp., Inc., 994 F.2d 1178, 1182 (6th Cir. 1993).
“[A] federal court that has dismissed a plaintiff’s federal-law claims should not ordinarily reach
the plaintiff’s state-law claims.” Moon v. Harrison Piping Supply, 465 F.3d 719, 728 (6th Cir.
2006); see 28 U.S.C. § 1367(c)(3). That is just what happened. No abuse of discretion occurred.
We affirm.

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