Charlie Omar Coleman v. Brandon Kent

NOT RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
File Name: 25a0315n.06
No. 24-1737
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
CHARLIE OMAR COLEMAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
BRANDON KENT et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
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ON APPEAL FROM THE
UNITED STATES DISTRICT
COURT FOR THE WESTERN
DISTRICT OF MICHIGAN
OPINION
Before: MOORE, GRIFFIN, and KETHLEDGE, Circuit Judges.
KAREN NELSON MOORE, Circuit Judge. Charlie Coleman, a Michigan prisoner,
allegedly suffered racial slurs, an injured eye, and a threat of violence after he threatened to
exercise his First Amendment right to file a grievance. After suffering these abuses, Coleman
brought First Amendment retaliation and equal-protection claims against Correctional Officer
Brandon Kent.1 On initial screening, the district court sua sponte dismissed Coleman’s complaint
with prejudice for failure to state a claim.
For the reasons that follow, we AFFIRM IN PART and REVERSE IN PART the district
court’s decision, and REMAND for proceedings consistent with this decision.
1Coleman brought additional claims against additional Defendants, but he has abandoned those arguments
on appeal. Infra n.2. Thus, we affirm the judgment as it relates to those claims and Defendants.

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I. BACKGROUND
A. Factual Background
We recite the facts as alleged in the complaint. Savel v. MetroHealth Sys., 96 F.4th 932,
937 (6th Cir. 2024). Coleman is a state prisoner who was housed at all relevant times in the
Marquette Branch Prison (“MBP”) in the Michigan Department of Corrections (“MDOC”). R. 1
(Compl. ¶ 3) (Page ID #2).
On November 8, 2021, as Coleman was released from segregated housing, Defendant
Correctional Officer Kent stopped him. Id. ¶ 6 (Page ID #2). According to Coleman, it is MDOC
policy that, prior to returning from segregation, a prisoner and authorized staff must inspect the
prisoner’s cell to ensure it has not been damaged or otherwise tampered with. Id. ¶ 6 (Page ID
#3). After completing the inspection, both sign a “cell evaluation sheet” proving the inspection
occurred. Id. Kent demanded that Coleman accept a cell evaluation sheet without first inspecting
Coleman’s cell. Id. Coleman denied Kent’s demand. Id. Kent, in response, said to Coleman:
“You mother***ing n***er! Take this f***ing cell sheet before I send you back to seg!” Coleman
v. Kent, No. 2:23-cv-172, 2024 WL 3664569, at *2 (W.D. Mich. Aug. 6, 2024) (alterations in
original) (quoting R. 1 (Compl. ¶ 6) (Page ID #3)). Coleman threatened to file a grievance about
Kent’s derogatory language, and a third party escorted Coleman back to his cell. R. 1 (Compl.
¶ 6) (Page ID #3).
Almost four months later, on March 5, 2022, Kent delivered mail to Coleman’s cell. Id.
¶ 7 (Page ID #3). After Coleman received his mail, he placed the state envelope on his cell bars
for Kent to retrieve. Id. Kent did so and then walked away. Id. Shortly thereafter, Coleman “felt
a prick in his left eye.” Id. ¶ 8 (Page ID #3). Apparently, Kent had crumpled up the envelope and

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thrown it at Coleman. Id. ¶ 8 (Page ID #3–4). Kent then verbally harassed Coleman, which
prompted Coleman to threaten to file another grievance about Kent’s harassment. Id. ¶ 9 (Page ID
#4). Kent hurled another racial epithet at Coleman and threatened to attack him. Id. Coleman
reached through his cell bars and hit Kent in the face. Id. Coleman never received treatment for
his eye injury. Id. ¶ 13 (Page ID #5).
That same day, on March 5, 2022, Coleman complained to Defendant Captain Leach that
Kent had instigated the incident. Id. ¶ 12 (Page ID #4). To prove his point, Coleman asked Leach
to look at the camera footage. Id. Leach declined to investigate, and told Coleman he can “rot”
in segregation. Id. Coleman then threatened to file a grievance against Leach, which earned
Coleman yet more invectives. Id. ¶ 12 (Page ID #5).
Later that month, on March 29, 2022, Defendant Sergeant Allen interviewed Coleman
about the incident involving Kent. Id. ¶ 14 (Page ID #5). Allen accused Coleman of lying about
Kent initiating the incident. Id. Although Coleman insisted that the camera footage would prove
that Kent started the fight, Allen stated that he would never go against his colleague. Id. Leach
then denied Coleman’s grievance related to the Kent incident. Id. ¶ 15 (Page ID #6).
Ultimately, at Coleman’s misconduct hearing for assaulting Kent, the camera footage from
the incident showed that Kent instigated the conflict. Id. ¶ 16 (Page ID #6). Despite proof that
Kent instigated, Defendant Hearing Officer Mohrman found Coleman guilty of assault on staff.
Id.
B. District Court Proceedings
On September 5, 2023, Coleman filed a pro-se-prisoner complaint in the district court
against Kent, Allen, Leach, Mohrman, and unknown medical staff related to Coleman’s

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harassment, assault, misconduct hearing, and lack of medical care for his eye. Coleman, 2024 WL
3664569, at *1, *3. Coleman consented to a magistrate judge and participated in early mediation.
Id. at *1. After early mediation fell through, the magistrate judge conducted an initial review
pursuant to the Prison Litigation Reform Act. Id. The district court construed Coleman’s
complaint as raising the following, relevant2 claims: “First Amendment retaliation, . . . and
Fourteenth Amendment ‘racial discrimination’ claims against” Kent. Coleman, 2024 WL
3664569, at *3.
Regarding Coleman’s First Amendment retaliation claim, the district court found that
Coleman could not state a claim for relief because “threatening to ‘f*** [Plaintiff] up again’” does
not constitute an adverse action under circuit precedent. Id. at *5 (alterations in original) (quoting
R. 1 (Compl. ¶ 9) (Page ID #4)); see also id. at *5 (citing Smith v. Craven, 61 F. App’x 159, 162
(6th Cir. 2003); Spearman v. Williams, No. 22-1309, 2023 WL 7000971, at *4 (6th Cir. July 17,
2023); Hardy v. Adams, No. 16-2055, 2018 WL 3559190, at *3 (6th Cir. Apr. 13, 2018)).
Regarding Coleman’s equal-protection claim, the district court reached two points. First, it held
that Coleman’s allegations failed to state a claim for relief on his race-based claim because they
did not identify any comparators and were “wholly conclusory.” Id. at *10. Second, the district
court found that Coleman could not state a “class-of-one” equal-protection claim for the same
reasons as his race-based claim. Id. at *10–11.
2As Defendants point out, Coleman has raised no arguments on appeal related to any other claims against
any other Defendant. MDOC Br. at 9–12. Coleman has made no reply to this argument. Accordingly, we hold that
Coleman has abandoned his remaining claims, and we focus solely on the relevant claims brought against Kent. See
Ogbonna-McGruder v. Austin Peay State Univ., 91 F.4th 833, 843 (6th Cir. 2024).

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The district court dismissed Coleman’s claims with prejudice. Id. at *12; see also R. 14
(Judgment) (Page ID #76) (dismissing case with prejudice). Coleman timely appealed. R. 16
(Notice of Appeal) (Page ID #79).
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
“We review a district court’s decision to dismiss under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1915(e), 1915A, and
42 U.S.C.§ 1997e de novo.” Wershe v. Combs, 763 F.3d 500, 505 (6th Cir. 2014) (quoting Grinter
v. Knight, 532 F.3d 567, 571–72 (6th Cir. 2008)). “In determining whether a prisoner has failed
to state a claim, we construe his complaint in the light most favorable to him, accept his factual
allegations as true, and determine whether he can prove any set of facts that would entitle him to
relief.” Id. (quoting Harbin-Bey v. Rutter, 420 F.3d 571, 575 (6th Cir. 2005)).
III. ANALYSIS
For the reasons that follow, we reverse the district court’s decision dismissing Coleman’s
claims with prejudice. Before addressing the merits of that decision, we note that district courts
should not lightly dismiss pro-se complaints with prejudice and without leave to amend when the
plaintiff has “an arguable claim.” Brown v. Matauszak, 415 F. App’x 608, 614–15 (6th Cir. 2011)
(quoting Wolf v. Petrock, 382 F. App’x 674, 677 (10th Cir. 2010)). Pro-se plaintiffs should be
afforded the opportunity to amend prior to sua sponte dismissal, especially when, as is the case
here, the plaintiff’s claims are not patently frivolous. See, e.g., Luevano v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc.,
722 F.3d 1014, 1024 (7th Cir. 2013) (“These circuits have crafted a sensible rule: IFP applicants
whose complaints are dismissed pursuant to a section 1915 screening for failure to state a claim
should be granted leave to amend at least once in all cases in which Rule 15(a) would permit leave

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to amend.”); Brown v. Johnson, 387 F.3d 1344, 1348 (11th Cir. 2004); Salahuddin v. Cuomo, 861
F.2d 40, 42–43 (2d Cir. 1988).
A. First Amendment Retaliation
We reverse the district court’s decision to dismiss with prejudice Coleman’s First
Amendment retaliation claim.
A First Amendment retaliation claim “entails three elements: (1) the plaintiff engaged in
protected conduct; (2) an adverse action was taken against the plaintiff that would deter a person
of ordinary firmness from continuing to engage in that conduct; and (3) there is a causal connection
between elements one and two[.]” Bell v. Johnson, 308 F.3d 594, 602 (6th Cir. 2002) (quoting
Thaddeus-X v. Blatter, 175 F.3d 378, 394 (6th Cir. 1999) (en banc)). The parties dispute the second
element, whether Coleman has sufficiently alleged that Kent’s actions qualify as an adverse
action.3
We hold that Coleman has sufficiently alleged an adverse action for purposes of proceeding
past initial review under the PLRA. As the en banc court in Thaddeus-X explained, “while certain
threats or deprivations are so de minimis that they do not rise to the level of being constitutional
violations, this threshold is intended to weed out only inconsequential actions . . . .” 175 F.3d at
398. Therefore, “in most cases, the question of whether an alleged retaliatory action poses a
sufficient deterrent threat to be actionable will not be amenable to resolution as a matter of law.”
Bell, 308 F.3d at 603.
3Because MDOC does not dispute that Coleman’s allegations satisfy the first and third elements of his claim,
they have forfeited any argument on those elements.

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Based on Coleman’s allegations, and in light of the fact-intensive nature of the adverse-
action element, Coleman has sufficiently pleaded an adverse action. On November 8, 2021, Kent
used a racial slur against Coleman after Coleman attempted to exercise his rights under MDOC
policy. R. 1 (Compl. ¶ 6) (Page ID #2–3). Coleman then warned Kent that he would file a
grievance against Kent for “his vulgar and offensive speech,” and a different officer had to take
Coleman to his cell to prevent further escalation. Id. ¶ 6 (Page ID #6). Then, a few months later,
Kent provoked Coleman by throwing a piece of paper that injured Coleman’s left eye. Id. ¶¶ 8–9
(Page ID #3–4). When Coleman threatened to file a grievance, Kent said, “Do it, and I will f***
you up again, n***er.” See id. As other courts have recognized, this particularly odious slur
carries with it the weight of centuries of hate. See, e.g., Bennett v. Metro. Gov’t of Nashville &
Davidson Cnty., 977 F.3d 530, 543 & n.7 (6th Cir. 2020); Gates v. Bd. of Educ. of the City of
Chicago, 916 F.3d 631, 640 (7th Cir. 2019); Ayissi-Etoh v. Fannie Mae, 712 F.3d 572, 577 (D.C.
Cir. 2013) (per curiam). Kent allegedly used this word twice. On the second occasion, he injured
Coleman’s eye and threatened to harm him physically. Taken together, Coleman has alleged a
pattern of derogatory treatment, physical harm, and the threat of physical harm. These allegations
are sufficient at this stage to allege an adverse action. An inmate of ordinary firmness would be
deterred from exercising his or her First Amendment rights based on Kent’s history of confronting
Coleman and his direct threat of physical harm, so Coleman’s allegations are sufficient at this stage
to allege an adverse action.
The cases relied on by MDOC do not convince us otherwise. As we held in Walker v.
Baker, threats accompanied by “more” can constitute an adverse action for purposes of pleading
First Amendment retaliation. No. 23-1232, 2023 WL 6380124, at *4 (6th Cir. Sept. 27, 2023)

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(order). In Walker, a prisoner in Michigan custody filed a First Amendment retaliation claim based
on harassment he had received from a corrections officer. Id. at *1. The Walker plaintiff alleged
that, on two different days, a correction officer made lewd comments directed at the plaintiff. Id.
The plaintiff did not allege the comments escalated to physical harm, id., unlike how Coleman has
alleged here. Nor did the comments involve threats of violence, id., unlike how Coleman has
alleged here. Nor did the threats involve repeated use of an odious slur, id., unlike how Coleman
has alleged here. Yet Walker held that the plaintiff had stated a First Amendment retaliation claim.
Id. at *3–4. Because Coleman has alleged more, we see no reason to reach a different result.
MDOC’s reliance on Spearman v. Williams also does not persuade us to reach a different
result. No. 22-1309, 2023 WL 7000971 (6th Cir. July 17, 2023) (order). Spearman held in an
unpublished, nonbinding order that an isolated incident of a mere threat—coupled with spitting—
“does not amount to a constitutional violation.” Id. at *4. But, as we have already explained,
Coleman has alleged more. Coleman has alleged a pattern of escalation by Kent in response to
Coleman’s threats to file grievances against Kent. Kent’s allegedly racist remarks escalated to
physical harm and threats of physical violence. The nature of the threats and escalation alleged by
Coleman is unlike the isolated incident alleged in Spearman.
Similarly distinguishable is the unpublished order in Hardy v. Adams, No. 16-2055, 2018
WL 3559190 (6th Cir. Apr. 13, 2018) (order). In Hardy, the plaintiff alleged that he was told that
his life would be a “living hell” if he did not drop a lawsuit. Id. at *3. The panel held that the
mere threat, on its own, was too vague to constitute an adverse action. Id. Unlike the plaintiff in
Hardy, Coleman has alleged more than a mere threat. As Hardy notes, “a threat can constitute an

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adverse action if the threat is capable of deterring a person of ordinary firmness from engaging in
a protected conduct.” Id. We believe Coleman’s allegations satisfy this standard.
Taking Coleman’s allegations as true, we hold that he has stated a claim for First
Amendment retaliation for purposes of screening under the PLRA.
B. Equal Protection Claim
We hold that Coleman may proceed to service on his equal-protection claim.
“To state an equal protection claim, a plaintiff must adequately plead that the government
treated the plaintiff ‘disparately as compared to similarly situated persons and that such disparate
treatment either burdens a fundamental right, targets a suspect class, or has no rational basis.’”
Ctr. for Bio-Ethical Reform, Inc. v. Napolitano, 648 F.3d 365, 379 (6th Cir. 2011) (quoting Club
Italia Soccer & Sports Org., Inc. v. Charter Township of Shelby, 470 F.3d 286, 299 (6th Cir.
2006)).
As we have held on multiple occasions, a plaintiff need not allege that he or she “was
treated differently than similarly-situated members of the unprotected class” if the plaintiff has
alleged “direct evidence of discrimination.” See Umani v. Mich. Dep’t of Corr., 432 F. App’x 453,
460 (6th Cir. 2011) (per curiam) (citing Lautermilch v. Findlay City Sch., 314 F.3d 271, 275 (6th
Cir. 2003)); accord Davis v. Prison Health Servs., 679 F.3d 433, 439–40 (6th Cir. 2012). This is
especially true with a pro-se prisoner’s complaint, which “should not be dismissed sua sponte
because of failure to identify similarly situated prisoners.” Robinson v. Killips, No. 18-1485, 2019
WL 1931873, at *2 (6th Cir. Feb. 22, 2019) (order) (citing Davis, 679 F.3d at 439–40). Because
Coleman proceeds on a theory of direct evidence of discrimination—as evidenced by Kent’s
repeated use of a racial slur against Coleman—Coleman’s complaint is not inadequate for failing

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to allege that similarly situated inmates were treated differently. There is no question that repeated
use of the n-word is direct evidence of discriminatory animus. Accordingly, we reject MDOC’s
argument that we must affirm the district court’s decision because Coleman failed to allege any
comparators. MDOC Br. at 17–18.
Coleman argues that, properly framed, his equal-protection claim is that Kent threatened
and assaulted him because of Kent’s racial animus. Reply at 3. In other words, Coleman’s equal-
protection claim is that Kent’s repeated use of a racial slur is evidence that his threats and assaults
were motivated by racial animus. See id. Thus, the proper question is not whether use of a slur
alone rises to the level of an equal-protection claim. Rather, the proper inquiry is whether racially
discriminatory language “coupled with some additional harassment or constitutional violation”
qualifies as an equal-protection claim. Taylor v. City of Falmouth, 187 F. App’x 596, 601 (6th
Cir. 2006) (per curiam) (quoting King v. City of Eastpointe, 86 F. App’x 790, 814 (6th Cir. 2003)
(Moore, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part)).
Although no opinion from this circuit has formally adopted this position, Coleman urges
us to adopt the Fifth Circuit’s position as articulated in Johnson v. Johnson, 385 F.3d 503 (5th Cir.
2004). Coleman Br. at 10; see also Reply at 3. In Johnson, the Fifth Circuit held that allegations
that a plaintiff “was denied protection because of his [protected class]” could support an equal-
protection claim, where “the [discriminatory] comments are relevant because they tend to reveal
the defendants’ reasons for their actions in denying him safekeeping.” Johnson, 385 F.3d at 530.
Johnson similarly concludes that “inference-producing comparisons are unnecessary where the
§ 1983 plaintiff has direct evidence of discriminatory motive.” Id. at 531. For purposes of initial
review of Coleman’s claims under the PLRA, we adopt the Fifth Circuit’s position. Coleman

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proceeds on the theory that he was assaulted and threatened on the basis of his race. This,
according to Coleman, is the right way to frame his claims.
Based on this framework Coleman’s allegations are sufficient. Not only has Coleman
alleged an escalating pattern of derogatory verbal abuse, but also Kent allegedly injured Coleman’s
eye, threatened violence, and retaliated against Coleman for his exercise of his First Amendment
rights. Coleman’s complaint alleges that Kent “assault[ed] and batter[ed]” him and “used vulgar
racial comments” in violation of his Frist Amendment rights. R. 1 (Compl. ¶ 18) (Page ID #7–8).
An escalating pattern of abuse, coupled with physical harm and an alleged constitutional violation,
is sufficient in these circumstances. Coleman has alleged more than mere derogatory verbal abuse.
Nor is it dispositive that he did not include comparators in his complaint. Not only was Coleman’s
complaint drafted pro se and without leave to amend any apparent deficiencies, but also he
proceeds on a theory of direct proof of racial discrimination.
Accordingly, Coleman may proceed to service on his equal-protection claim as well as on
his First Amendment retaliation claim.
IV. CONCLUSION
For these reasons, we AFFIRM IN PART and REVERSE IN PART the order and
judgment of the district court and REMAND for proceedings consistent with this opinion.

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