In re: Len Salas v. Max Salas

RECOMMENDED FOR PUBLICATION
Pursuant to Sixth Circuit I.O.P. 32.1(b)
File Name: 25a0328p.06
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE SIXTH CIRCUIT
IN RE: LEN SALAS,
Debtor.
___________________________________________
NICOLAAS BREKELMANS and GAIL GREGORY
BREKELMANS, Co-Personal Representatives of the
Estate of Nina Brekelmans; MICHAEL MCLOUGHLIN,
JR. and MARTHA JOHNSON, Co-Personal
Representatives of the Estate of Michael Patrick
McLoughlin,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
MAX SALAS,
Defendant-Appellee.
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No. 24-5998
Appeal from the United States District Court for the Middle District of Tennessee at Nashville;
No. 3:23-cv-00987—Aleta Arthur Trauger, District Judge.
_________________
United State Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Tennessee at Nashville;
Nos. 3:18-bk-02662; 3:20-ap-90027—Nancy B. King, Bankruptcy Judge.
Argued: October 22, 2025
Decided and Filed: December 3, 2025
Before: COLE, KETHLEDGE, and NALBANDIAN, Circuit Judges.
_________________
COUNSEL
ARGUED: Philip J. McNutt, LAW OFFICE OF PHILIP J. MCNUTT, PLLC, Reston, Virginia,
for Appellants. Phillip G. Young, Jr., THOMPSON BURTON PLLC, Franklin, Tennessee, for
Appellee. ON BRIEF: Philip J. McNutt, LAW OFFICE OF PHILIP J. MCNUTT, PLLC,
Reston, Virginia, Taylor A. Cates, BURCH, PORTER & JOHNSON, PLLC, Memphis,
>

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No. 24-5998 In re Salas Page 2
Tennessee, for Appellants. Phillip G. Young, Jr., THOMPSON BURTON PLLC, Franklin,
Tennessee, for Appellee.
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OPINION
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COLE, Circuit Judge. After the bankruptcy court denied plaintiffs’ motion for summary
judgment and granted partial summary judgment to Max Salas, plaintiffs obtained leave to
pursue an interlocutory appeal in the district court. The district court affirmed and remanded the
matter to the bankruptcy court for further proceedings. It did not certify the issue for appeal or
the order as final. For their part, plaintiffs did not seek certification to this court. Because we
lack jurisdiction, we must dismiss the appeal.
I.
In 2015, a property fire in Washington, D.C. tragically killed two tenants. The tenants’
parents (plaintiffs) sued both the record owner, Len Salas, and his father and the property
manager, Max Salas, for wrongful death in D.C. trial court. A jury awarded plaintiffs
multimillion-dollar verdicts, holding Len and Max jointly and severally liable. Max and Len
thereafter filed for bankruptcy in the Bankruptcy Court for the District of Columbia and the
Bankruptcy Court for the Middle District of Tennessee respectively.
In Max’s bankruptcy proceeding, the D.C. Bankruptcy Court concluded that Max was
entitled to the unlimited homestead exemption over the property, finding he possessed both the
legal and beneficial interests in the property. This prompted the trustee in Len’s bankruptcy case
to sell his estate’s interest in the trustee’s avoidance and recovery rights as they relate to the
property under 11 U.S.C. §§ 544 through 553. Those provisions of the Bankruptcy Code allow a
trustee to unwind certain prepetition property transfers and recover the transferred property for
the benefit of the bankruptcy estate. At auction, plaintiffs purchased the estate’s interest in the
avoidance and recovery actions.
Under Federal Rule of Bankruptcy Procedure 7001(a), an avoidance action must be
brought as an adversary proceeding commenced by filing a complaint. To commence their

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No. 24-5998 In re Salas Page 3
avoidance action, plaintiffs thus filed a complaint against Max, seeking to avoid transfers and
recover property. Eventually, plaintiffs sought summary judgment. Max countered with his own
cross-motion for summary judgment. The bankruptcy court denied plaintiffs’ motion for
summary judgment on all counts and granted Max’s motion for summary judgment as to only the
fraudulent conveyance claims.
Plaintiffs moved the district court for leave to pursue an interlocutory appeal, and the
district court, finding all three 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b) requirements were met, granted their request.
After considering the merits, the district court affirmed the bankruptcy court’s judgment and
remanded the matter to the bankruptcy court for further proceedings. The district court did not
certify the issue for appeal or designate the order as final. Plaintiffs timely appealed, but the
parties did not seek to certify the appeal before this court.
II.
We must first consider our jurisdiction. Although neither party has questioned our
jurisdiction over this appeal, we have a duty to assure ourselves of our jurisdiction in every case
and “may raise the issue sua sponte.” Answers in Genesis of Kentucky, Inc. v. Creation
Ministries Int’l, Ltd., 556 F.3d 459, 465 (6th Cir. 2009). There are different paths that establish
jurisdiction depending on whether the order being appealed is final or interlocutory, but neither
path leads to jurisdiction here.
A.
Courts of appeals have jurisdiction to hear appeals from final judgments. In the
bankruptcy context, both 28 U.S.C. § 1291 and 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(1) provide courts of appeals
with jurisdiction over certain final decisions. Neither statute provides us with jurisdiction over
this appeal.
Section 1291 grants jurisdiction for appeals from all “final decisions of the district courts
acting in any capacity.” Connecticut Nat. Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253 (1992) (citation
modified). A final decision “ends the litigation on the merits and leaves nothing for the court to
do but execute the judgment.” Page Plus of Atlanta, Inc. v. Owl Wireless, LLC, 733 F.3d 658,

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No. 24-5998 In re Salas Page 4
659 (6th Cir. 2013) (quoting Catlin v. United States, 324 U.S. 229, 233 (1945)). Hence, “[a]
‘final decision’ within the meaning of § 1291 is normally limited to an order that resolves the
entire case.” Ritzen Grp., Inc. v. Jackson Masonry, LLC, 589 U.S. 35, 38 (2020).
Plaintiffs assert that this court has jurisdiction over this appeal under § 1291. We
disagree. The district court’s order did not end the litigation on the merits or resolve the entire
case. After affirming the bankruptcy court’s partial grant and partial denial of summary
judgment, the district court remanded the case to the bankruptcy court for further proceedings.
Several claims remain, and the bankruptcy court must resolve these claims on their merits. The
order, therefore, is not final within the meaning of § 1291.
Alternatively, § 158(d)(1) confers courts of appeals with jurisdiction over appeals from
“all final decisions, judgments, orders, and decrees” entered by district courts and bankruptcy
appellate panels acting as bankruptcy appellate courts under §§ 158(a) and (b) respectively.
Responding to the distinctive nature of bankruptcy proceedings, Congress adopted this relaxed
finality rule in bankruptcy cases to make “orders in bankruptcy cases immediately appealable if
they finally dispose of discrete disputes within the larger bankruptcy case.” Ritzen Grp., 589
U.S. at 39 (citation modified). This “rule derives from the understanding that bankruptcy cases
are aggregations of individual disputes, many of which could be entire cases on their own.” In re
Wohleber, 833 F. App’x 634, 638 (6th Cir. 2020) (citation modified).
Thus, “orders finally resolving discrete disputes in a bankruptcy case—such as adversary
proceedings—may qualify as immediately appealable final orders even though the overall
bankruptcy case is ongoing.” Id. The district court’s order is no such order as it did not
conclusively resolve plaintiffs’ adversary proceeding. Rather, it affirmed the bankruptcy court’s
partial grant and partial denial of summary judgment and remanded the case to the bankruptcy
court for further proceedings.
Further, for the purposes of § 158(d)(1), a district court order remanding a case to a
bankruptcy court is not a final order unless the remand is one “of a ministerial character.”
Settembre v. Fid. & Guar. Life Ins. Co., 552 F.3d 438, 442 (6th Cir. 2009). Where, as here, a

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No. 24-5998 In re Salas Page 5
case may proceed to trial on the remaining claims, there are more than ministerial proceedings
remaining.
The order therefore is not final under § 1291 or § 158(d)(1).
B.
Courts of appeals also have jurisdiction over appeals from interlocutory orders that are
certified and accepted pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1292, 28 U.S.C. § 158(d)(2), or Federal Rule of
Civil Procedure 54(b). None of these provisions, however, confer jurisdiction over this appeal.
Section 1292 permits courts of appeals to hear appeals from “[i]nterlocutory orders of the
district courts” in certain cases. Under this provision, a district court may certify for immediate
appeal an interlocutory order that “involves a controlling question of law as to which there is
substantial ground for difference of opinion” when “an immediate appeal from the order may
materially advance the ultimate termination of the litigation[.]” 28 U.S.C. § 1292(b). In a
bankruptcy proceeding, a party who appeals an order to a district court and loses can seek
certification to a court of appeals under this statute. Once such a certification occurs, a party has
ten days after the entry of the order to apply for an appeal, and then, the court of appeals has
discretion to accept the certification and appeal. See id.
Alternatively, § 158(d)(2) provides another mechanism for interlocutory appeals in the
bankruptcy context. This provision permits certification when any of these factors are present:
(1) the order “involves a question of law as to which there is no controlling decision . . . or
involves a matter of public importance”; (2) the order “involves a question of law requiring
resolution of conflicting decisions”; or (3) an immediate appeal “may materially advance” the
case. Id. at § 158(d)(2)(A). Under this statute, a bankruptcy court, a district court, or the parties
acting jointly may certify a bankruptcy court’s order to a court of appeals, which then has
discretion to hear the matter. Id. at § 158(d)(2)(A); In re Lindsey, 726 F.3d 857, 858 (6th Cir.
2013); see Bullard v. Blue Hills Bank, 575 U.S. 496, 508 (2015).
Finally, Rule 54(b) permits district courts to direct the entry of a final judgment as to one
or more claims in a multiclaim case. Under this rule, a district court may “certify as ‘final’ for

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No. 24-5998 In re Salas Page 6
§ 158(d)(1) and § 1291 purposes the resolution of a claim or the entry of judgment for or against
a party.” In re Lindsey, 726 F.3d at 860. Rule 54(b) certification is a two-step process. First, the
district court must “expressly determine[] that there is no just reason for delay.” Fed. R. Civ. P.
54(b). Second, the district court must expressly “direct entry of a final judgment as to one or
more, but fewer than all, claims or parties” in a case. Id.
Although these provisions allow a party to appeal certain interlocutory orders, they all
require certification. Here, plaintiffs moved the district court for leave to pursue an interlocutory
appeal under § 1292(b) in the district court, and the district court granted that motion. But after
the district court affirmed the bankruptcy court’s order and remanded the case to the bankruptcy
court for further proceedings, plaintiffs did not seek certification to appeal to this court. For its
part, the district court did not certify the appeal, nor did it enter a final judgment under Rule 54.
Accordingly, there was neither any request for nor grant of certification under § 1292(b),
§ 158(d)(2), or Rule 54(b).
We therefore lack discretion to accept the appeal.
III.
For these reasons, we dismiss the appeal for lack of jurisdiction.

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