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08-1879•United States of America v. AMIR HOSSEINI and HOSSEIN OBAEI
08-1879Court of Appeals for the Seventh CircuitJun 6, 2012
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
June 6, 2012
Before
DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge
JOHN DANIEL TINDER, Circuit Judge
DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge
Nos. 08‐1879 & 08‐1880
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff‐Appellee,
v.
AMIR HOSSEINI and HOSSEIN OBAEI,
Defendants‐Appellants.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 05 CR 254
Milton I. Shadur,
Judge.
O R D E R
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED that the opinion dated May 7, 2012, shall be amended as
follows:
The last paragraph on page 6 and the following, full paragraph on page 7 are
amended to read:
This argument about the meaning of “proceeds” in the money‐laundering
statute is new on appeal. To preserve a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, a
defendant must move for a judgment of acquittal in the trial court. United States v.
Tavarez, 626 F.3d 902, 906 (7th Cir. 2010). Both defendants did so here; they moved
for judgment of acquittal under Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure
at the close of the government’s case, and they renewed their motions at the close of
evidence and again after the verdict. But they never raised the “proceeds” issue;
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Nos. 08‐1879 & 08‐1880 Page 2
instead, their Rule 29 motions identified other grounds for acquittal. For example,
they argued that selling cars to drug dealers was not evidence of a RICO enterprise
or a RICO or money‐laundering conspiracy. Obaei also argued that the evidence was
insufficient to find him guilty of aiding and abetting a drug conspiracy.
As a general matter, and unlike its analogue in the Federal Rules of Civil
Procedure, Rule 29 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure does not require
specificity when moving for a judgment of acquittal. Compare FED. R. CRIM . P. 29
with FED. R. CIV. P. 50(a)(2) (motions for judgment as a matter of law “must specify
the judgment sought and the law and facts that entitle the movant to the judgment”).
But we have held that a defendant’s choice to raise specific arguments and omit
others in a Rule 29 motion has consequences on appeal. We have held that when a
defendant challenges the sufficiency of the evidence by motion for judgment of
acquittal and makes specific arguments in support of that motion, any arguments
omitted are thereby forfeited. See United States v. Groves, 470 F.3d 311, 324 (7th Cir.
2006) (citing United States v. Moore, 363 F.3d 631, 637 (7th Cir. 2004) (“[W]hen . . . a
[Rule 29] motion raises specific arguments, any claims not presented in the motion
are waived.”), vacated on other grounds sub nom. Young v. United States, 543 U.S. 1100
(2005)). We might alternatively construe the “proceeds” argument as a claim of
instructional error. But neither defendant raised the definition of “proceeds” as a
ground of objection to the jury instructions.
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