United States of America v. Chad E. Marmion

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 17‐2151
U NITED STATES OF A MERICA ,
Plaintiff‐Appellee,
v.
C HAD E. M ARMION,
Defendant‐Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Central District of Illinois.
No. 13‐10035‐004 — Sara Darrow, Judge.
____________________
A RGUED FEBRUARY 27, 2018 — D ECIDED MARCH 15, 2018
____________________
Before WOOD, Chief Judge, and BAUER and BARRETT ,
Circuit Judges.
P ER C URIAM. Chad Marmion asserts procedural challeng‐
es to the 35‐month prison sentence he received after he vio‐
lated his supervised release. Because the district judge con‐
sidered the relevant policy statements and explained her
reasoning, we affirm the judgment.

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2 No. 17‐2151
A federal grand jury charged Marmion and three code‐
fendants with conspiracy to manufacture methampheta‐
mine. They each pleaded guilty, and Marmion’s codefend‐
ants received lengthy sentences (63 months, 144 months, and
168 months), while Marmion received relative leniency.
He had faced a statutory minimum of at least 120 months’
imprisonment and a guidelines range of 121 to 151 months. 1
But because Marmion provided substantial assistance to the
government and successfully completed the district court’s
Pretrial Alternatives to Detention Initiative, Chief Judge
Shadid sentenced him to just 174 days’ time served and 10
years’ supervised release.
Two and a half years later, Marmion’s probation officer
petitioned to revoke his supervised release. The petition al‐
leged that Marmion had been charged in state court with
possessing methamphetamine, had failed a recent drug test,
and had admitted recent use of methamphetamine.
The case was reassigned to Judge Darrow, who held a
revocation hearing. At the hearing, the government with‐
drew the allegation that Marmion had been charged with
possession of methamphetamine. Marmion then admitted
that he had used methamphetamine ten times within the
previous six months while on supervised release. Based on
this Grade B violation and Marmion’s criminal history cate‐
gory of III, the judge calculated a maximum term of 60
months’ imprisonment, with a recommended range of 8 to
1 The government filed a notice under 21 U.S.C. § 851 to increase
Marmionʹs mandatory minimum to 240 months. Marmion challenged the
enhancement, but his challenge was never resolved, so the district court
referred to the 120‐month minimum at sentencing and during the revo‐
cation proceedings.

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No. 17‐2151 3
14 months. Both sides concurred with the judge’s recitation
of the relevant policy statements and declined to introduce
evidence in aggravation or mitigation. The government
asked the judge to impose a 36‐month sentence, and Marmi‐
on asked for a sentence of around 8 months.
Judge Darrow sentenced Marmion to 35 months’ impris‐
onment with no additional supervised release. In explaining
her choice of sentence, the judge twice referenced a policy
statement that advises that upon revocation “an upward de‐
parture may be warranted” if the defendant’s “original sen‐
tence was the result of a downward departure,” U.S.S.G.
§ 7B1.4 cmt. n.4. The judge concluded that although a 60‐
month sentence would be reasonable in this case, 35 months
was “sufficient, but not greater than necessary” to promote
respect for the law, to avoid a disparity with the sentences of
Marmion’s codefendants, and to provide graduated pun‐
ishment for Marmion’s recurring violations of the law.
In this court, Marmion first asserts that “the district court
did not consider the guideline range during its sentencing
analysis.” This assertion is patently false because the judge
correctly calculated the advisory range and opined—
consistent with the suggestion in application note 4 to sec‐
tion 7B1.4 of the Sentencing Guidelines—that the sentence
should account for the downward variance that Marmion
received at his initial sentencing. Thus, there is no basis for
Marmion’s contention that the judge did not use the policy
statement range as the “benchmark” of her sentencing anal‐
ysis.
Marmion also faults the district judge for comparing his
sentence to the substantial sentences received by his code‐
fendants. As Marmion sees it, his codefendants were not

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4 No. 17‐2151
similarly situated with him because they did not participate
in the Pretrial Alternatives to Detention Initiative. He asserts
that the judge instead should have compared his sentence to
“defendants whose supervised release was revoked for one
positive drug test in two years.”
Marmion’s argument is wrong for at least three reasons.
First, Marmion forfeited it by not raising it during the revo‐
cation proceedings. See United States v. Oliver, 873 F.3d 601,
607 (7th Cir. 2017). Second, Marmion’s original sentence was
less than five percent of the statutory minimum, which dis‐
tinguishes him from his codefendants and most defendants
facing revocation. Finally, the judge necessarily considered
the need to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities when
she properly reviewed the relevant policy statements. See
Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 54 (2007); United States v.
Snyder, 635 F.3d 956, 961 (7th Cir. 2011).
AFFIRMED

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