Robert Maday v. Randy Pfister

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted June 14, 2018*
Decided June 14, 2018
Before
DIANE P. WOOD, Chief Judge
JOEL M. FLAUM, Circuit Judge
DIANE S. SYKES, Circuit Judge
No. 18‐1401
ROBERT MADAY,
Petitioner‐Appellant,
v.
RANDY PFISTER,
Respondent‐Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois,
Eastern Division.
No. 17 C 7808
Virginia M. Kendall,
Judge.
O R D E R
Robert Maday is serving concurrent Illinois and federal sentences in an Illinois
prison. He petitioned under 28 U.S.C. § 2241 to be transferred to a federal prison, and
the district judge denied Maday’s petition. The judge reasoned that he has no right to
transfer to a federal prison now. We agree and affirm the judgment.
* The respondent was not involved in the district‐court proceedings and is not
participating in this appeal. We have agreed to decide this case without oral argument
because the briefs and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral
argument would not significantly aid the court. See FED. R. A PP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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No. 18‐1401 Page 2
Maday’s convictions have an intricate procedural history. In 2009 he pleaded
guilty in federal court to committing several bank robberies. United States v. Maday,
799 F.3d 776, 777 (7th Cir. 2015). Before federal sentencing, Maday was due to be
sentenced in state court for other robberies. While in transit to the state court, he
escaped and committed various state and federal offenses, including a carjacking. Id.
Maday eventually was captured, and, after the delayed state hearing was carried out, he
received a 13‐year sentence. Id. Then Maday pleaded guilty in state court to the
carjacking and received a consecutive 30‐year sentence. Id. Next were Maday’s federal
sentencing hearings: one before Judge Gettleman for the original bank robberies, and
one before Chief Judge Castillo for new federal convictions stemming from Maday’s
escape. Id. at 777–78. Maday is serving a 32‐year sentence imposed by Chief Judge
Castillo that runs concurrently with his state sentences and a 5‐year sentence imposed
by Judge Gettleman that runs consecutively to his other sentences. Id. at 779–80;
United States v. Maday, No. 1:08‐cr‐01075 (N.D. Ill.).
Maday was housed in a federal facility while his federal proceedings were
ongoing. Once those ended in 2016, federal authorities transferred him to the Illinois
Department of Corrections. The U.S. Marshals, Maday says, told him that this transfer
would be temporary. When Maday questioned Illinois officials about his continued stay
in state prison, they explained that he could be housed in state or federal prison because
of his concurrent sentences. They added that federal authorities had placed him in a
state facility and that when his state sentence ended he “will be picked up by the federal
government.” Maday filed this section 2241 petition in an effort to return to federal
prison now. The district judge dismissed it, concluding that the federal Bureau of
Prisons permissibly designated Maday to serve his federal sentence in an Illinois prison.
Maday argues here that he should not be detained in a state prison because the
federal government has “primary jurisdiction” over him. Maday is referring to the rule
that an inmate’s federal sentence generally does not begin until he is in the federal
government’s primary custody. See 18 U.S.C. § 3585(a); Pope v. Perdue, 889 F.3d 410,
No. 16‐4217, at 8 (7th Cir. 2018). But the primary‐custody doctrine does not restrict
where a federal inmate serves his sentence, only when that sentence begins.
Cf. Romandine v. United States, 206 F.3d 731, 738 (7th Cir. 2000) (observing that Attorney
General may designate state prison as the place of federal confinement so that federal
sentence begins there, even if district judge did not impose a concurrent sentence). So
that doctrine does not require Illinois authorities to transfer Maday to a federal prison.
Maday next argues that his state placement is unlawful because Chief Judge
Castillo “ordered that [Maday] remain in federal custody” and “that he not be

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No. 18‐1401 Page 3
transferred to” the Illinois Department of Corrections. This argument has three flaws.
First, Maday may not bring this type of challenge to custody under section 2241, which
covers only challenges “to being in custody, [not] to the location in which one is in
custody.” Pischke v. Litscher, 178 F.3d 497, 499–500 (7th Cir. 1999). Second, even if we
ignored Maday’s invocation of section 2241, he must lose on the merits because a
transfer to a state prison does not by itself violate a constitutionally protected liberty
interest. See Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 245–48 (1983). Third, Maday overstates
the significance of the judge’s statement that he would “remand Mr. Maday to federal
custody” after sentencing. Placement in federal “custody” does not require physical
placement in a federal facility. See 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b); Olim, 461 U.S. at 246–47; Pope,
889 F.3d 410, No. 16‐4217, at 8–12. And even if the judge had designated a federal
facility for Maday, the Bureau, which has plenary authority over placement decisions,
would not be bound by that specification. See 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b) (sentencing judge’s
order “shall have no binding effect on the authority of the Bureau … to determine or
change the place of imprisonment of that person”); Tapia, 564 U.S. at 331 (“A sentencing
court can recommend that the BOP place an offender in a particular facility … . But
decisionmaking authority rests with the BOP.”).
Finally we have considered whether Maday may now argue that, when he is
transferred to a federal prison after his state sentence ends, federal authorities might not
credit him with the time that he served in state prison. That claim is not ripe. Maday
does not assert that the Bureau has committed to treating his concurrent federal
sentences as consecutive and detaining him longer than authorized. And as we have
just explained, the Bureau has the authority to place Maday in a state facility while he is
technically in federal custody, serving a federal sentence. See 18 U.S.C. § 3621(b).
AFFIRMED

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