United States of America v. Donald S. Harden

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 17‐1270
U NITED STATES OF A MERICA ,
Plaintiff‐Appellee,
v.
D ONALD S. HARDEN,
Defendant‐Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Eastern District of Wisconsin.
No. 1:16‐cr‐00035 — William C. Griesbach, Chief Judge.
____________________
A RGUED MAY 16, 2018 — D ECIDED J UNE 20, 2018
____________________
Before FLAUM, SYKES , and HAMILTON, Circuit Judges.
FLAUM, Circuit Judge. A jury convicted defendant‐appel‐
lant Donald S. Harden of conspiring to distribute heroin, the
use of which resulted in the death of Fred Schnettler. Harden
was sentenced to life in prison under 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(B).
That provision imposes sentencing enhancements if the de‐
fendant commits a drug offense and “death or serious bodily
injury results from the use of such substance.” On appeal,
Harden argues that the prosecution failed to present sufficient

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2 No. 17‐1270
evidence to establish beyond a reasonable doubt that his her‐
oin caused Schnettler’s death. Relatedly, Harden contends
that the district court failed to adequately instruct the jury on
causation. Harden also claims that the district court erred by
excluding testimony about an alternative heroin source and
denying his motion for a mistrial after inadmissible evidence
entered the jury room. Finally, Harden maintains that the
prosecution misstated evidence during closing argument. For
the reasons below, we affirm.
I. Background
At 9:39 AM on September 5, 2014, Fred Schnettler, a
twenty‐five‐year‐old male, was found dead in his bedroom at
his parents’ home in Neenah, Wisconsin. When the sheriff’s
deputy arrived on the scene, he found Schnettler’s father per‐
forming CPR and observed a needle and spoon on the floor
just below Schnettler’s bed. The deputy believed that Schnet‐
tler had been dead for quite some time because his body was
cold to the touch and rigor mortis had set in.
Donald Harden was subsequently charged with distrib‐
uting the heroin that resulted in Schnettler’s death. At trial,
the prosecution’s case focused on Schnettler’s purchase of 0.1
grams of heroin from Kyle Peterson the night before Schnet‐
tler was found dead. Peterson testified that he purchased the
heroin from Brandi Kniebes‐Larsen, who in turn testified that
she received the heroin from Harden.
At trial, the government and defense presented competing
timelines regarding the heroin delivery. The government tried
to establish that Harden’s heroin reached Schnettler between
7:30 PM–8:00 PM on September 4, 2014 and that Schnettler
overdosed on that heroin shortly after 10:00 PM. By contrast,

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No. 17‐1270 3
the defense sought to show that Schnettler received and used
Harden’s heroin by 5:00 PM, did not get high from it, and ulti‐
mately overdosed from heroin or morphine that he obtained
from another source later in the evening. The following is a
summary of the evidence presented at trial and other relevant
events.
A. Autopsy Report
Dr. Kristinza Giese, an associate medical examiner with
the Fond Du Lac County Medical Examiner’s office, per‐
formed an autopsy on Schnettler. She determined that his
death was caused by acute heroin intoxication. Dr. Giese’s
opinion was based on the presence of a needle puncture mark
on Schnettler’s left arm, heavy lungs, cerebral edema (brain
swelling), and the presence of a heroin metabolite in his urine
called 6‐monoacetylmorphine (“6‐MAM”). Dr. Giese ex‐
plained that, when injected into the bloodstream, heroin me‐
tabolizes into 6‐MAM and morphine. She testified that no
drug other than heroin produces 6‐MAM. She further ex‐
plained that 6‐MAM remains in the blood for seven to forty
minutes, depending on the potency of the drug, but can re‐
main in the urine for several hours. According to the toxicol‐
ogy report, Schnettler’s urine contained 1.2 micrograms per
milliliter of 6‐MAM and more than 4 micrograms of mor‐
phine. Schnettler’s blood did not contain 6‐MAM but did
have 0.38 micrograms of morphine.
On cross‐examination, Harden’s counsel asked Dr. Giese
whether, if someone used heroin at 5:00 and was seen to be
alert at 8:00, she would expect them to die from that single
dosage at 10:00. Giese responded that she “would be a little
surprised” and “wouldn’t expect it to be that long.” She testi‐
fied that she would expect someone to die “within minutes”

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4 No. 17‐1270
or “within some hours” after injecting heroin, depending on
the potency of the drug. Harden’s counsel also asked Dr.
Giese whether Schnettler’s toxicology report was consistent
with heroin use at 5:00 and a morphine overdose at 10:00. Dr.
Giese responded that Schnettler’s blood “would have proba‐
bly a higher level of morphine,” but she would still expect to
see 6‐MAM in the urine based on the earlier dosage of heroin.
B. Kyle Peterson’s Testimony
Peterson testified that he sold heroin to Schnettler on Sep‐
tember 3 and 4, 2014. On the afternoon of September 3, 2014,
Peterson sold “a pinch,” or approximately 0.1 grams of her‐
oin, to Schnettler. When asked about the source of that heroin,
Peterson testified that it was not from Kniebes‐Larsen, but ra‐
ther “came from another friend.” Peterson also noted that the
heroin “was of a different color and quality … more of a yel‐
lowish color” than the heroin he sold to Schnettler on Septem‐
ber 4th.
Peterson further testified that he also sold 0.1 grams of her‐
oin to Schnettler on September 4th “[a]round dusk … between
7:00 and 8:00.” He stated that this heroin was “dark gray in
color.” When asked whether the dark gray color was signifi‐
cant to him, Peterson testified that the heroin “was the same
color as” and part of the same batch that Peterson himself
overdosed on the following morning—the same morning that
Schnettler was found dead. Peterson further testified that this
heroin came from Kniebes‐Larsen, whom Peterson met
through his friend Joe Rooney. Peterson said that the only her‐
oin he had in his possession on September 4th was the heroin
he purchased from Kniebes‐Larsen, and that he was certain
that the heroin he gave to Schnettler that day came from her.

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No. 17‐1270 5
Peterson also elaborated upon the timeline of events on
September 4th. According to Peterson, he purchased 0.5
grams of heroin from Kniebes‐Larsen sometime between
2:00 PM and 4:00 PM. After receiving the heroin from Kniebes‐
Larsen, he did not immediately deliver it to Schnettler. In‐
stead, he waited a few hours because his “first priority” was
to use the heroin himself. Peterson testified that he went to his
friend Alex Shottner’s (“Shotty’s”) house in Appleton after he
received the heroin, and while there, used the heroin. Peter‐
son stated that he spent thirty or forty minutes at Shotty’s
house while his friends—including his girlfriend at the time,
Alesia Nettekoven—sat outside in a car. He was “pretty sure”
he did not deliver the heroin to Schnettler until after he left
Shotty’s house. Peterson further testified that he delivered
drugs to someone else, Dillon, after he left Shotty’s house, and
before he delivered the heroin to Schnettler. According to Pe‐
terson, he only delivered drugs to Schnettler one time on Sep‐
tember 4th, and that delivery occurred sometime between
7:00 PM–8:00 PM, but definitely not past 8:00 PM.
On cross‐examination, Peterson admitted he might have
purchased the heroin from Kniebes‐Larsen as late as 5:00 PM,
instead of between 2:00 PM–4:00 PM as he initially testified.
Harden’s trial counsel questioned Peterson about his incon‐
sistent prior statements to police. Specifically, Harden’s coun‐
sel pointed out that, on September 5, Peterson told police that
he purchased the heroin from Kniebes‐Larsen at 5:00 PM and
went immediately to Schnettler’s house to deliver it before go‐
ing to Shotty’s house. Peterson acknowledged that he “might
have told them that.” Later, Harden’s counsel played an au‐
dio recording of Peterson’s September 5th interview with po‐
lice, in which Peterson said that he went immediately to
Schnettler’s house to deliver the drugs before going to

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6 No. 17‐1270
Shotty’s house. Harden’s counsel asked Peterson whether he
might be confusing his later delivery to Dillon with his earlier
delivery to Schnettler, especially since he was high, but Peter‐
son testified that he was not confusing the two deliveries.
C. Text Message and Phone Call Log
Next, defense counsel introduced a log showing the text
messages and phone calls between Peterson and Schnettler on
September 4, 2014. The sequence of Schnettler and Peterson’s
communications were as follows:
5:09 PM Schnettler: “It short for sure cus I
thought last nights was small and this
is way smaller also last nights was
better”
5:14 PM Peterson: “Yeah ik a couple other ones
were too, Im grabnimg more of last‐
night quality as we speaj”
5:15 PM Schnettler: “Yeh dude I’ve almost
done all of it and I’m not even high”
5:21 PM Peterson: “Oh wow. I’m sorry man. I
got some thing for you bud.”
5:22 PM Schnettler: “How bout drop me an‐
other one off tonight”
5:24 PM Peterson: “That’s what I’m saying”
5:26 PM Schnettler: “Ima shower quick then
I’ll call yah”
5:39 PM Peterson: “Ight just grabbed that grey
shit from lastnight so I got you”

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No. 17‐1270 7
5:45 PM Schnettler: “Can u come this way
quick”
5:58 PM Peterson: “Yeah I can before I head to
appleton”
5:59 PM Schnettler: “Eta”
6:17 PM [Schnettler calls Peterson]
6:18 PM [Schnettler calls Peterson]
6:42 PM [Peterson calls Schnettler]
7:01 PM Schnettler: “Were the fuck are you”
7:04 PM [Schnettler calls Peterson]
7:04 PM Schnettler: “Hello”
7:09 PM [Schnettler calls Peterson]
7:38 PM Schnettler: “U on ur way”
7:39 PM Peterson: “Yessir”
7:40 PM Schnettler: “Eta”
7:41 PM Schnettler: “?”
7:42 PM [Schnettler calls Peterson]
8:40 PM [Schnettler calls Peterson]
8:53 PM [Schnettler calls Peterson]
After that, there are no further text messages or phone
calls between Schnettler and Peterson. Between 9:00 PM and
approximately 10:30 PM, Schnettler texted friends asking
whether they were watching the Packers game, texted his
mother, and posted on Facebook. At approximately 10:20 PM,
Schnettler sent a final text message saying that he was going
to bed.

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8 No. 17‐1270
Peterson agreed that these text messages suggest Schnet‐
tler received a batch of heroin from Peterson earlier in the day
on September 4th and was comparing it to the September 3rd
delivery. Peterson also testified that Schnettler’s text messages
and repeated calls toward the end of the night were consistent
with “someone who was basically blowing up [his] phone try‐
ing to see when [he was] going to come for a follow‐up deliv‐
ery.” Nevertheless, Peterson insisted that he only delivered to
Schnettler once on September 4th sometime between 7:00 PM
and 8:00 PM.
D. Alesia Nettekoven’s Testimony
Alesia Nettekoven testified that she was with Peterson
during his deliveries to Schnettler on September 3rd and 4th.
Nettekoven confirmed that after they purchased heroin from
Kniebes‐Larsen on September 4th, they went to Shotty’s
house and she waited in the car for thirty or forty minutes
while Peterson was inside. Nettekoven testified that the Sep‐
tember 4th delivery to Schnettler occurred at approximately
7:30 PM, when “[i]t was just getting dark.” She further stated
that she was certain that the heroin delivered to Schnettler on
September 4th was from Kniebes‐Larsen because they “didn’t
pick up from anyone else” that day.
On cross‐examination, defense counsel presented
Nettekoven with a text message she sent to Peterson at
7:27 PM in which she said: “Come out or we’re leaving.” De‐
fense counsel also pointed to a text from Nettekoven to Peter‐
son at 7:37 PM in which she said: “Get … outside
right … now.” When asked whether these texts were incon‐
sistent with a 7:30 PM delivery to Schnettler, Nettekoven in‐
sisted that the delivery occurred when it was just getting

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No. 17‐1270 9
dark. Defense counsel then asked Nettekoven about prior in‐
consistent statements she made to the police on September 5,
2014. In response, Nettekoven testified that she was lying
back then and admitted that she can be “a pretty convincing
liar.”
E. Brandi Kniebes‐Larsen’s Testimony
Kniebes‐Larsen testified that she met Harden through her
ex‐boyfriend David Nelson. Beginning in the spring of 2014,
Harden would front approximately ten grams of heroin per
week to Nelson, who would then sell the heroin to others to
pay Harden back. Nelson sold some of the heroin to Kniebes‐
Larsen, who was addicted to heroin. When Nelson moved in
with Kniebes‐Larsen, Harden began delivering the heroin to
Kniebes‐Larsen’s home. Kniebes‐Larsen lived with her niece,
Stephanie Miller, who was also a heroin addict.
In August 2014, while Nelson was in county jail, Nelson
arranged for Kniebes‐Larsen to fill in for him as Harden’s her‐
oin dealer. On several occasions, Harden fronted Kniebes‐
Larsen with heroin to sell, but Kniebes‐Larsen would often
use the heroin herself rather than sell it. She testified that the
heroin she received varied in color—sometimes it was “more
of a charcoal gray,” and other times “it was a very pale, almost
beige color.” For example, she testified that she purchased six
grams that were “a beige‐ish cream white in color” and later
eleven grams that were “[a] charcoal gray with … some
lighter speckles in it.”
According to Kniebes‐Larsen, she sold 1.5 grams of the
beige heroin to Rooney on September 3 and Peterson was pre‐
sent for the sale. Then, on September 4, Kniebes‐Larsen drove
with Miller and Miller’s three children from her home in

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10 No. 17‐1270
Neenah, Wisconsin to a Walgreens in Waupun, Wisconsin to
purchase eleven grams of the charcoal gray heroin from
Harden. Kniebes‐Larsen testified that they arrived at the
Walgreens at approximately 3:00 PM, but that it could have
been later because they got lost on the way there. She testified
that she parked a couple spots away from Harden’s burgundy
Chevy Suburban in the Walgreens parking lot. Miller and her
children went into the Walgreens while Kniebes‐Larsen got
into Harden’s car.
The government showed Kniebes‐Larsen a surveillance
photograph of the Walgreens parking lot, which Kniebes‐
Larsen testified was “a fair and accurate depiction” of the
scene. The photograph had three different time stamps on it:
16:00, 16:04 and 17:00. Because no one authenticated the time
stamps, the court only allowed the government to admit the
photograph into evidence if it redacted the time stamps. The
government did not do so, and the photograph was not ad‐
mitted into evidence.
After the exchange, they drove back to Kniebes‐Larsen’s
house in Neenah. During the drive back home, Kniebes‐
Larsen texted Rooney to make arrangements to supply him
with heroin. She testified that “it was very late [but] not late
at night” when they got back to Kniebes‐Larsen’s house.
When they arrived, Kniebes‐Larsen went inside and made up
two syringes of the heroin she got from Harden at
Walgreens—one for herself and one for Miller. Meanwhile,
Miller went to go pick up Nelson’s son. After injecting her
shot, Kniebes‐Larsen prepared a package of 1.5 grams of her‐
oin—1 gram for Rooney and 0.5 grams for Peterson. She then
drove approximately two miles to Rooney’s house. Upon ar‐
riving, Rooney and Peterson got into Kniebes‐Larsen’s car

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No. 17‐1270 11
and she sold them the heroin. Kniebes‐Larsen testified that
this transaction occurred between 5:00 PM and 6:00 PM.
The government asked Kniebes‐Larsen whether Harden
said anything to her about the heroin at the time she received
it from him. The following exchange occurred:
Kniebes‐Larsen: “Not at Walgreens. There was
a time before that he had
made a statement about the
quality of the heroin that I
was—that I had, that [indis‐
cernible].”
Prosecutor: “And in this earlier statement
to you about the quality of the
heroin he was providing to
you, what was his state‐
ment?”
Kniebes‐Larsen: “That I needed to be very
careful because apparently
there were bodies on this her‐
oin.”
After Schnettler was found dead, Kniebes‐Larsen was ar‐
rested. At the police station, Kniebes‐Larsen swallowed 1.5
grams of the heroin she received from Harden at Walgreens.
Kniebes‐Larsen said the heroin was not potent to her and that
she had previously described it as “junk.” She spoke with po‐
lice detectives, but she testified that the interview was “a little
fuzzy” because she was “dope sick” and “starting to go
through heroin withdrawals.” She told detectives that the
transaction with Rooney and Peterson occurred “after 5:00
sometime.”

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12 No. 17‐1270
Kniebes‐Larsen pled guilty to conspiracy to distribute
more than 100 grams of heroin and agreed to cooperate with
the government and testify against Harden. In exchange, the
government agreed that she would not be charged with caus‐
ing Schnettler’s death.
F. Controlled Buy From Harden
Nelson was taken into custody at the same time as
Kniebes‐Larsen on September 5, 2014. He agreed to become a
confidential informant and to make controlled buys from
Harden. At trial, the government played an audio recording
of a phone call Nelson made to Harden on September 10, 2014
to arrange payment of Kniebes‐Larsen’s drug debt and to set
up a controlled buy. Nelson eventually purchased heroin
from Harden and gave the drugs to the Winnebago County
Sheriff’s Department.
G. Harden’s Arrest
On September 15, 2014, Winnebago County authorities
searched the Watertown apartment Harden used as his stash
house. They found three packages of heroin, a digital scale,
and other drugs. Around the same time as the search, Harden
was arrested during a traffic stop.
H. Jury Instructions
Harden was charged with conspiracy to distribute con‐
trolled substances in violation of 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1). The
jury instructions included two special verdict questions:
(1) “whether the United States has established, beyond a rea‐
sonable doubt, that Frederick J. Schnettler died as a result of
the use of a controlled substance, to wit: heroin, distributed
by the defendant”; and (2) “whether the conspiracy involved

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No. 17‐1270 13
100 grams or more of a mixture and substance containing her‐
oin.”
With respect to the first special verdict question, the jury
instructions said:
The United States does not have the burden of
establishing that the defendant intended that
death resulted from the distribution or the use
of the controlled substance. Nor does the United
States have the burden of establishing that the
defendant knew, or should have known, that
death would result from the distribution of the
controlled substance by the defendant.
I. Testimony About Alternative Heroin Source
Defense counsel sought to have Schnettler’s friend and
former roommate testify that: (1) four strangers came to their
apartment a month prior to Schnettler’s death; and (2) shortly
thereafter he witnessed Schnettler experience a non‐fatal drug
overdose in the shower. During a pretrial motion in limine
hearing, defense counsel explained that this testimony was
relevant “to present potential other sources of drugs other
than what the Government’s presenting in its case in chief.”
At that time, the district judge stated that “the fact that
[Schnettler] had this alternative source” was relevant to
Harden’s defense, but that the overdose did not seem to be
relevant and might even be prejudicial. The district judge ex‐
cluded the testimony, but said it could be introduced at trial
if defense counsel provided a reason why the prior overdose
was relevant.
On the second day of trial, the district court revisited the
issue. Defense counsel explained that the sole basis for the

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14 No. 17‐1270
Schnettler’s friend’s belief that Schnettler had overdosed on
heroin was the fact that he found Schnettler collapsed in the
shower with a hypodermic needle next to him. Because the
incident occurred a month before Schnettler’s death and the
witness was not qualified to make a judgment about a heroin
overdose, the government argued that the testimony was
“misleading” and “irrelevant.” Again, the court reiterated
that evidence of alternative sources of heroin was relevant,
“even [if] the timeliness makes it less relevant.”
Later during the trial, Harden’s defense counsel clarified
that, in fact, the witness had not seen a hypodermic needle in
the shower. The court subsequently ruled that, without evi‐
dence that the collapse was related to drug use, testimony
about the incident was not relevant.
Defense counsel then sought to have the same witness
“testify that Fred had spoken to him about a source he had”
for heroin in Milwaukee. The government objected that the
statement was hearsay. In response, defense counsel argued
that it satisfied the exception for statements against interest
because Schnettler was unavailable and the statement was re‐
liable, as Schnettler’s “best friend” would “have no reason to
be lying.” The district court excluded the testimony on rele‐
vance grounds and because it did not satisfy an exception to
the hearsay rule.
J. Motion for Mistrial
Approximately two hours after the jury began its deliber‐
ations, it was discovered that Exhibit 8—the Walgreens sur‐
veillance photo with the unauthenticated time stamps—had
been sent into the jury room. When the court clerk went to

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No. 17‐1270 15
retrieve the photo, a juror asked the clerk why the court
wanted it back. The clerk said: “I can’t comment on that.”
Harden moved for a mistrial, but the motion was denied.
The district judge questioned whether the photograph was
material, noting that it was “a little bit in the weeds” and that
he was “not sure that it carries anywhere near the weight
[Harden’s counsel] place[d] on it.”
About an hour and a half later, the jury sent the court the
following question: “Can we factor in other possibilities not
presented?” Harden’s trial counsel said: “I think the clear an‐
swer is yes.” The court told the parties it was inclined to an‐
swer the jury’s question in the affirmative and point them to
Pattern Instruction 2.02, which allows jurors to use their com‐
mon sense in weighing the evidence and make reasonable in‐
ferences based on the evidence. The court then asked
Harden’s trial counsel whether he had any objection.
Harden’s trial counsel agreed that such an instruction “would
be appropriate.”
K. Conviction and Sentencing
The jury convicted Harden of conspiracy to distribute 100
grams or more of heroin, resulting in death, pursuant to 21
U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 841(b)(1)(B) and 846. Because of the
“death results” enhancement in § 841(b), Harden was sen‐
tenced to life in prison.
II. Discussion
On appeal, Harden argues that: (1) the evidence presented
at trial was insufficient to prove that the heroin he distributed
caused Schnettler’s death; (2) the district court failed to ade‐
quately instruct the jury on but‐for and proximate causation;
(3) the district court erred by excluding Schnettler’s friend’s

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16 No. 17‐1270
testimony regarding an alternative source of heroin; (4) the
district court abused its discretion by denying Harden’s mo‐
tion for a mistrial; and (5) the prosecution misstated evidence
during closing argument, necessitating a new trial.
A. There Was Sufficient Evidence Regarding Causation
“When reviewing a challenge to the sufficiency of the evi‐
dence, ‘we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution and ask whether any rational trier of fact could
have found the essential elements of the crime beyond a rea‐
sonable doubt.’” United States v. Moshiri, 858 F.3d 1077, 1081
(7th Cir. 2017) (quoting United States v. Salinas, 763 F.3d 869,
877 (7th Cir. 2014)). “We do not reweigh the evidence nor
judge the credibility of witnesses.” Id. at 1082. “If there is a
reasonable basis in the record for the verdict, it must stand.”
Id. To the extent such a challenge raises questions of law, we
review them de novo. See United States v. Stott, 245 F.3d 890,
904 (7th Cir. 2001).
In this case, the government was required to prove beyond
a reasonable doubt that: (1) Harden conspired to distribute
100 grams or more of heroin; and (2) “death or serious bodily
injury result[ed] from the use of such substance.” 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(b)(1)(B); see Burrage v. United States, 134 S. Ct. 881, 887
(2014) (noting that the “death results” enhancement of § 841
“is an element that must be submitted to the jury and found
beyond a reasonable doubt”). Harden does not dispute that
the government presented sufficient evidence to convict him
of the first element. Instead, his challenge focuses solely on
the “death results” enhancement. Specifically, Harden argues
that the government did not present sufficient evidence at
trial to prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the heroin he

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No. 17‐1270 17
distributed was the but‐for and proximate cause of Schnet‐
tler’s death.
1. But‐For Causation
In Burrage, the Supreme Court interpreted the phrase “re‐
sults from” in § 841(b) to require “but‐for causation”—i.e.,
that the death would not have occurred but for the defend‐
ant’s drug‐dealing. 134 S. Ct. at 887–89. In that case, the victim
died of “mixed drug intoxication” after using several differ‐
ent kinds of drugs, including heroin that he purchased from
the defendant. Id. at 885–86. Medical experts concluded that
heroin was a “contributing factor” in the victim’s death be‐
cause it “interacted with the other drugs to cause ‘respiratory
and/or central nervous system depression.’” Id. at 885. How‐
ever, the experts could not say whether the victim would have
lived had he not taken the heroin. Id. at 886. The district court
gave a jury instruction requiring the government to prove
that the heroin distributed by the defendant was a “contrib‐
uting cause” of the death, and the defendant was convicted.
Id. The Supreme Court held that, “at least where use of the
drug distributed by the defendant is not an independently
sufficient cause of the victim’s death …, a defendant cannot
be liable under the penalty enhancement provision of 21
U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C) unless such use is a but‐for cause of the
death.” Id. at 892. The Court reasoned that this but‐for causa‐
tion requirement is consistent with the “ordinary meaning” of
the phrase “results from” and is “one of the traditional back‐
ground principles ‘against which Congress legislate[s].’” Id.
at 887, 889 (alteration in original) (quoting Univ. of Tex. Sw.
Med. Ctr. v. Nassar, 570 U.S. 338, 347 (2013)).
Here, the government presented sufficient evidence for a
rational trier of fact to conclude beyond a reasonable doubt

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18 No. 17‐1270
that the heroin distributed by Harden was the but‐for cause
of Schnettler’s death. First, unlike Burrage, this is not a mixed
toxicity case. Rather, Dr. Giese opined that Schnettler died
from acute heroin intoxication. And, although Harden ques‐
tions whether the heroin was potent enough to kill Schnettler,
Peterson testified that he overdosed on the same heroin the
following morning, which suggests that it was.
In addition, the prosecution presented testimony from
several witnesses to establish the source of the heroin that
caused Schnettler’s death. Kniebes‐Larsen testified that
Harden was her sole source of heroin. Peterson also testified
that the only heroin he had in his possession on September
4th was the heroin he purchased from Kniebes‐Larsen, and
that he was certain that the heroin he gave to Schnettler that
day was the same heroin he received from Kniebes‐Larsen.
Likewise, Nettekoven testified that she was certain that the
heroin delivered to Schnettler on September 4th was from
Kniebes‐Larsen because they “didn’t pick up from anyone
else” on that day.
The government’s timeline evidence further suggests that
Harden’s heroin caused Schnettler’s death. Kniebes‐Larsen
testified that Harden gave her charcoal gray heroin on the af‐
ternoon of September 4th, which she sold to Rooney and Pe‐
terson between 5:00 PM and 6:00 PM. In turn, Peterson testified
that he delivered Harden’s heroin to Schnettler between ap‐
proximately 7:00 PM and 8:00 PM. Nettekoven similarly testi‐
fied that it was approximately 7:30 PM and “just getting dark.”
Schnettler’s frantic texts and phone calls to Peterson between
5:59 PM and 7:38 PM arguably point to a similar delivery time.
For example, at 7:38 PM, Schnettler texted to ask Peterson
whether he was on his way. At 7:39 PM, Peterson responded:

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No. 17‐1270 19
“Yessir.” At 7:40 PM, Schnettler texted Peterson to ask for his
“Eta.” Because this was the final text message between
Schnettler and Peterson, one could reasonably infer that Pe‐
terson delivered the heroin to Schnettler around that time. If
Schnettler received Harden’s heroin around 8:00 PM, an over‐
dose sometime after 10:30 PM is entirely consistent with Dr.
Giese’s testimony that someone could die “within some
hours” after injecting heroin. In light of this evidence, a jury
could conclude beyond a reasonable doubt that the heroin
distributed by Harden was the but‐for cause of Schnettler’s
death.
Admittedly, a rational trier of fact could have reached the
opposite conclusion. In particular, one could infer from the
text messages and phone calls between Schnettler and Peter‐
son that: (1) Peterson delivered heroin to Schnettler on Sep‐
tember 4th at or before 5:00 PM; (2) Schnettler had used most
of the heroin by shortly after 5:00 PM and was not high be‐
cause the heroin was of poor quality; (3) Peterson was plan‐
ning to do a follow‐up delivery of Harden’s gray heroin to
Schnettler later that night; and (4) Peterson never made the
promised follow‐up delivery. Indeed, during his cross‐exam‐
ination, Peterson admitted that Schnettler’s repeated calls
during the 8:00 PM hour were consistent with “someone who
was basically blowing up [his] phone trying to see when [he
was] going to come for a follow‐up delivery.” If Schnettler
had used almost all of Harden’s heroin by 5:00 PM and never
received a second delivery later that night, Dr. Giese testified
that she “would be a little surprised” if Schnettler died from
that single dosage at 10:00 PM. In addition, there is at least
some evidence that Harden’s heroin was not potent enough
to kill Schnettler. For example, Peterson says that he only de‐
livered 0.1 grams to Schnettler on September 4th, and

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20 No. 17‐1270
Kniebes‐Larsen testified that she ingested 1.5 grams of the
same heroin on September 5th on the way to the police station
with no ill effect. Finally, Harden’s trial counsel severely un‐
dermined the credibility of the government’s key witnesses—
namely Peterson and Nettekoven—on cross‐examination.
Nevertheless, our task at this stage is not to “reweigh the
evidence” or “judge the credibility of witnesses.” Moshiri, 858
F.3d at 1082. Rather, we must “view the evidence in the light
most favorable to the prosecution.” Id. at 1081 (quoting Sa‐
linas, 763 F.3d at 877). When viewed in that light, a finding of
but‐for causation has a reasonable basis in the record.
2. Proximate Causation
Harden argues that the “death results” enhancement in
§ 841(b) also requires proof of proximate causation—i.e., that
Schnettler’s death was a reasonably foreseeable result of
Harden’s drug dealing.
However, every federal court of appeals to address this is‐
sue has reached the opposite conclusion. See United States v.
Burkholder, 816 F.3d 607, 618 (10th Cir. 2016); United States v.
Webb, 655 F.3d 1238, 1250 (11th Cir. 2011); United States v. De
La Cruz, 514 F.3d 121, 137 (1st Cir. 2008); United States v. Hou‐
ston, 406 F.3d 1121, 1124–25 (9th Cir. 2005); United States v. Car‐
bajal, 290 F.3d 277, 284 (5th Cir. 2002); United States v. McIntosh,
236 F.3d 968, 972 (8th Cir. 2001), abrogated on other grounds by
Burrage, 134 S. Ct. 881; United States v. Robinson, 167 F.3d 824,
832 (3d Cir. 1999); United States v. Patterson, 38 F.3d 139, 145
(4th Cir. 1994).

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No. 17‐1270 21
Although we have not yet squarely decided the issue,1 we
find our sister circuits’ holdings persuasive for two reasons.
First, the statutory language does not require proof of proxi‐
mate cause. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b). Again, the sentencing en‐
hancement is triggered if “death or serious bodily injury re‐
sults from the use of such substance.” Id. (emphasis added).
The use of the phrase “results from” is “noteworthy” because
“[r]esulting in death and causing death are not equivalents.”
Burkholder, 816 F.3d at 614 (alteration in original) (internal
quotation marks omitted). A statute that uses the word
“cause” is more readily understood to incorporate the com‐
mon law requirement of proximate cause, but a statute that
uses the term “results from” does not carry the same implica‐
tion. See id. The absence of proximate‐cause language in
§ 841(b) is especially “telling” because there are “numerous
instances in which Congress explicitly included proximate‐
cause language in statutory penalty enhancements.” Id. at 615
(citing other statutory provisions); see also Patterson, 38 F.3d at
145 n.7 (citing 21 U.S.C. § 848(m)(4)). Therefore, “Congress
clearly knew how to add a proximate‐cause requirement in
criminal penalty‐enhancement statutes when it wished to do
so.” Burkholder, 816 F.3d at 615.
Second, due to the extremely hazardous nature of drug
distribution, a policy of strict liability when death occurs fits
1 We discussed this issue—and seemed to agree with the majority of cir‐
cuits—in United States v. Hatfield, 591 F.3d 945, 950 (7th Cir. 2010). How‐
ever, the dispositive question in that case was whether a trial court should
further define the phrase “results from” for the jury. Id. at 947. Moreover,
the defendants in that case “[did] not challenge the interpretation of the
statute as imposing strict liability on them for death or injury to recipients
of their drugs.” Id. at 951. Therefore, Hatfield’s discussion of proximate
cause was dicta.

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22 No. 17‐1270
the statutory language and its evident purpose. Just as tort
law imposes strict liability when inherently dangerous activ‐
ities result in negative consequences, this criminal statute
treats death as categorically foreseeable, regardless of
whether this particular defendant foresaw or should have
foreseen such a result.
Harden argues that the other circuits’ precedents are no
longer good law after the Supreme Court’s decision in Bur‐
rage. We disagree. Although the Burrage Court granted certio‐
rari on the proximate cause question, the Court did not reach
that issue because it reversed the defendant’s conviction on
the ground that the government had not established but‐for
causation. 134 S. Ct. at 892. Indeed, the Court “expressly de‐
clined to decide whether the phrase [‘results from’] also em‐
bodies a proximate‐cause requirement.” Burkholder, 816 F.3d
at 618–19 (citing Burrage, 134 S. Ct. at 887). Moreover, even af‐
ter Burrage, two federal courts of appeals have held that there
is no requirement to prove proximate cause. See United States
v. Alvarado, 816 F.3d 242, 249 (4th Cir. 2016) (holding that the
Fourth Circuit’s pre‐Burrage precedent “remains good law on
this issue”); Burkholder, 816 F.3d at 618–19 (addressing the is‐
sue as a matter of first impression). In short, “Burrage does not
answer the question we face in this appeal—let alone resolve
it in [Harden’s] favor.” Burkholder, 816 F.3d at 619. Rather, Bur‐
rage left the unanimous holdings from federal courts of ap‐
peals on this issue intact.
In any event, our pre‐Burrage precedent is consistent with
the common law principles that the Supreme Court reiterated
in Burrage. The Burrage Court said that, “[w]hen a crime re‐
quires ‘not merely conduct but also a specified result of con‐
duct,’ a defendant generally may not be convicted unless his

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No. 17‐1270 23
conduct is ‘both (1) the actual cause, and (2) the “legal” cause
(often cause the “proximate cause”) of the result.’” 134 S. Ct.
at 887 (quoting 1 W. LaFave, Substantive Criminal Law
§ 6.4(a), at 464–66 (2d ed. 2003)). Although Congress legislates
with this background common law principle in mind, it may
abrogate it by “‘speak[ing] directly’ to the question addressed
by the common law.” United States v. Texas, 507 U.S. 529, 534
(1993) (quoting Mobil Oil Corp. v. Higginbotham, 436 U.S. 618,
625 (1978)). Thus, if “a statutory purpose to the contrary is ev‐
ident,” the default common law principles do not apply. Id.
(quoting Astoria Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass’n v. Solimino, 501 U.S. 104,
108 (1991)). Here, as the Tenth Circuit held post‐Burrage,
“Congress has unambiguously expressed a desire to deviate
from background common‐law principles, [and] we must
give effect to this intent.” Burkholder, 816 F.3d at 621.
Additionally, Harden argues that principles of co‐con‐
spirator liability compel a proximate cause requirement in
this context. In Pinkerton v. United States, the Supreme Court
held that a defendant may only be held liable for a co‐con‐
spirator’s criminal act if it was reasonably foreseeable. 328
U.S. 640, 647–48 (1946). Thus, when a defendant is charged
with conspiracy to distribute narcotics, the district court must
sentence him commensurate with: (1) the quantity of drugs he
was “personally responsible for,” and (2) the quantity of
drugs dealt by co‐conspirators to the extent it was reasonably
foreseeable. United States v. Cruse, 805 F.3d 795, 817 (7th Cir.
2015). However, in this case Harden does not claim that he
was sentenced based on a co‐conspirator’s unforeseeable
criminal act. Instead, he contends that the consequence of his
own criminal act—Schnettler’s death—was not reasonably
foreseeable. Therefore, the issue presented simply does not
implicate Pinkerton’s limitations on co‐conspirator liability.

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24 No. 17‐1270
In sum, the “death results” enhancement in § 841(b) does
not require proof that the death was reasonably foreseeable.
As a result, we need not address whether the government pre‐
sented sufficient evidence of proximate cause.
B. Harden Waived his Challenge to the Jury Instruc‐
tions
Next, Harden argues that the district court erred by failing
to properly instruct the jury regarding but‐for and proximate
causation. However, Harden waived this argument by ap‐
proving the jury instruction in the district court.
“We have repeatedly held that approval of a jury instruc‐
tion in the district court extinguishes any right to appellate
review of the instruction.” United States v. Johnson, 874 F.3d
990, 1000 (7th Cir. 2017) (quoting United States v. Trudeau, 812
F.3d 578, 589 (7th Cir. 2016)). At the same time, we have hesi‐
tated to infer intentional waiver where “defense counsel ap‐
proves jury instructions in a ‘rote call‐and‐response colloquy
with the district judge’” or gives “blanket approvals” for the
jury instructions as a whole. Id. (quoting United States v. Na‐
tale, 719 F.3d 719, 731 (7th Cir. 2013)).
Here, Harden approved the specific causation instruction
that he now challenges on appeal. On the second day of trial,
the district judge asked whether defense counsel had re‐
viewed the jury instructions and whether those instructions
“look[ed] reasonable.” Defense counsel responded that he
“reviewed them and they seemed reasonable” and that he
“[didn’t] have a particular battle over anything.” The follow‐
ing morning, the district judge asked the parties whether they
had a chance to review the verdict form. The government re‐
plied, “there’s one change that probably needs to be made and

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No. 17‐1270 25
that’s did the death of Frederick J. Schnettler result from his
use of heroin, I think that probably needs to be tied to Mr.
Harden somehow.” The court agreed, and proposed the fol‐
lowing language regarding causation for the verdict form:
“Did the death of Frederick Schnettler result from the use of
heroin provided by the Defendant, Donald S. Harden?” The
district judge asked both parties whether that change would
be “satisfactory,” and Harden’s counsel responded in the af‐
firmative, “[p]rovided … what you’re going to be reading
says ‘distributed’ by Donald S. Harden.” Shortly thereafter,
the district judge asked whether “[a]nything else … needs to
be changed or any additional instructions … are necessary.”
Harden’s counsel responded in the negative. Thus, Harden
clearly waived his challenge to the jury instruction regarding
causation.
C. The District Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion by
Excluding Testimony About an Alternative Heroin
Source
Harden next contends that the district court erred by ex‐
cluding testimony from Schnettler’s friend that Schnettler told
him he had another heroin source in Milwaukee. We generally
review evidentiary errors for an abuse of discretion. United
States v. Phillips, 596 F.3d 414, 416 (7th Cir. 2010). “[W]e find
an abuse of discretion only when no reasonable person could
agree with the district court.” Jenkins v. Chrysler Motors Corp.,
316 F.3d 663, 664 (7th Cir. 2002). 2
2 Contrary to the government’s assertion, Harden’s offer of proof was ad‐
equate under Federal Rule of Evidence 103(a)(2). “[A]n offer of proof gen‐
erally should state a ground for admissibility, inform the court and oppos‐
ing counsel what the proponent expected to prove by the excluded evi‐
dence and demonstrate the significance of the excluded testimony.” United

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26 No. 17‐1270
The district court offered two rationales for excluding the
friend’s testimony. First, the district court said that the rele‐
vance of this statement was “so low” as to render it inadmis‐
sible. The court reasoned that addicts frequently have other
sources of heroin and “no one is claiming that Mr. Harden is
the only source of heroin in the Appleton area or in Wiscon‐
sin.” Second, the district court ruled that Schnettler’s alleged
statement was hearsay and did not satisfy the hearsay excep‐
tion for statements against interest because it was made to his
friend, not a police officer.
Even assuming the proffered testimony satisfied the state‐
ment against interest exception, the court did not abuse its
discretion by excluding the testimony. “Rule 401 defines rele‐
vant evidence as evidence having ‘any tendency to make a
fact more or less probable than it would be without the evi‐
dence’ and where ‘the fact is of consequence in determining
the action.’” United States v. Boros, 668 F.3d 901, 907 (7th Cir.
2012) (quoting Fed. R. Evid. 401). This is a “low threshold.”
Tennard v. Dretke, 542 U.S. 274, 285 (2004). Thus, even testi‐
mony that has “only minimal relevance” satisfies Rule 401.
Boros, 668 F.3d at 907. Here, by stating that the relevance of the
proffered statement was “so low,” the district court implicitly
States v. Peak, 856 F.2d 825, 832 (7th Cir. 1988). Here, Harden’s offer of proof
described both the substance of the proposed testimony (that Schnettler
told his friend that he had an alternative heroin source in Milwaukee) and
the grounds for its admissibility (the hearsay exception for statements
against interest). Given the district court’s prior discussions regarding this
witness’s testimony during the motion in limine hearing and the second
day of trial, the significance of the proffered testimony was apparent to
both the court and the government.

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No. 17‐1270 27
acknowledged that it had at least some, albeit limited, rele‐
vance to Harden’s defense.
However, by holding that the proffered statement was
nevertheless inadmissible, the court was presumably relying
on Rule 403. Even if testimony is relevant under Rule 401, a
district court may “exclude relevant evidence if its probative
value is substantially outweighed by a danger of … unfair
prejudice, confusing the issues, misleading the jury, undue
delay, wasting of time, or needlessly presenting cumulative
evidence.” Id. at 909 (alteration in original) (quoting Fed. R.
Evid. 403). Although the district court did not explicitly cite
these concerns, “[w]e may affirm on any ground supported
by the record.” Boyd v. Ill. State Police, 384 F.3d 888, 897 (7th
Cir. 2004). Because the district judge had just ruled to exclude
testimony regarding the shower incident, Schnettler’s friend
would now only be testifying that Schnettler told him at some
unspecified point in time that he had a heroin source in Mil‐
waukee. The district judge could have reasonably concluded
that the low probative value of this statement was substan‐
tially outweighed by a danger of confusing the jury and wast‐
ing time. Accordingly, the district court did not abuse its dis‐
cretion by excluding it.
Moreover, assuming arguendo that the district court
abused its discretion, we will not reverse the evidentiary rul‐
ing if the error was harmless. A court’s erroneous exclusion of
evidence is harmless “[o]nly if we are convinced that the error
did not influence the jury or had a very slight effect, and can
so say with fair assurance.” United States v. Nagib, 56 F.3d 798,
805 (7th Cir. 1995) (alteration in original) (quoting United
States v. Zapata, 871 F.2d 616, 622 (7th Cir. 1989), abrogated on
other grounds by United States v. Gomez, 763 F.3d 845 (7th Cir.

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28 No. 17‐1270
2014)). Here, the admission of the excluded testimony would
have had only a very slight effect, if any, on the jury. We do
not know when Schnettler told his friend that he had an uni‐
dentified heroin source in Milwaukee. Absent additional evi‐
dence that Schnettler had purchased heroin from that source
in the days leading up to his death, the statement had very
little probative value. On the other side of the scale, the pros‐
ecution presented significant evidence from which the jury
could reasonably infer that Harden’s heroin caused Schnet‐
tler’s death.
D. The District Court Did Not Abuse its Discretion by
Denying Harden’s Motion for a Mistrial
Next, Harden maintains that the district court erred by
denying his motion for a mistrial with respect to the
Walgreens surveillance photograph that was improperly
given to the jury during deliberations.
“[J]ury consideration of facts not introduced in evidence
denies a defendant’s Sixth Amendment rights to confronta‐
tion, cross‐examination and assistance of counsel with respect
to the extraneous evidence.” United States v. Bruscino, 662 F.2d
450, 458 (7th Cir. 1981). However, “a new trial is not automat‐
ically required whenever a jury is exposed to material not
properly in evidence.” United States v. Sababu, 891 F.2d 1308,
1333 (7th Cir. 1989). Rather, “[a] defendant is only entitled to
a new trial if there is a reasonable possibility that the evidence
had a prejudicial effect upon the jury’s verdict.” United States
v. Berry, 92 F.3d 597, 600 (7th Cir. 1996). This inquiry is highly
fact‐specific, and “[t]he district court judge is always in a bet‐
ter position than appellate judges to assess the probable reac‐
tions of jurors in a case over which that district judge has pre‐
sided.” United States v. Van Eyl, 468 F.3d 428, 436 (7th Cir.

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No. 17‐1270 29
2006). For that reason, “[w]e review a denial of a mistrial for
an abuse of discretion with an extra helping of deference.”
United States v. Lawrence, 788 F.3d 234, 243 (7th Cir. 2015). We
“‘must affirm unless we have a strong conviction that the dis‐
trict court erred,’ and the error committed was not harmless.”
Id. (quoting United States v. Vargas, 689 F.3d 867, 873 (7th Cir.
2012)).
Here, the district court did not abuse its discretion by
denying Harden’s motion for a mistrial based on the jury’s ex‐
posure to the Walgreens surveillance photograph. The district
judge questioned whether the photograph played any role in
the jury’s deliberations and said “[his] own view is this is a
little bit in the weeds.” The court pointed out that the photo‐
graph had three different time stamps (16:00, 16:04, and 17:00)
and no date. As a result, it was unclear whether jurors would
recognize the import of the photograph with respect to the
competing timelines presented at trial. Moreover, the photo‐
graph does not even show that the parking lot is outside of a
Walgreens, so the jury might not have connected the photo‐
graph to Kniebes‐Larsen’s testimony about the Waupun ex‐
change. In addition, even assuming the jury relied on the lat‐
est time stamp of 17:00, the district judge was “not sure that it
carrie[d] anywhere near the weight [defense counsel] place[d]
on it.” The district judge was in the best position to assess the
potential prejudice of the photograph. Because his ruling was
reasonable and we are not left with a strong conviction of er‐
ror, we must affirm.3
3 To the extent Harden argues that the district court erroneously answered
the jury’s subsequent question about whether it could factor in other pos‐
sibilities, that argument is waived. Defense counsel explicitly approved
the court’s response to the jury’s question, stating “the clear answer is yes.”

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30 No. 17‐1270
E. The Prosecution’s Misstatements of Evidence During
Closing Argument Do Not Warrant Reversal
Lastly, Harden argues that the prosecution misstated two
pieces of evidence during closing argument, necessitating a
new trial.
“Misstatements of evidence during closing argument can
be improper, but it is rarely reversible error.” United States v.
Mullins, 800 F.3d 866, 872 (7th Cir. 2015) (citations omitted).
To determine whether a prosecutor’s misstatement of evi‐
dence requires reversal, we consider: “(1) the nature and seri‐
ousness of the alleged misconduct; (2) whether the defense in‐
vited the prosecutor’s statements; (3) whether the jury instruc‐
tions adequately addressed the matter; (4) whether the de‐
fense had an opportunity to respond to the improper remarks;
and (5) the weight of the evidence against the defendant.”
United States v. Klemis, 859 F.3d 436, 442 (7th Cir. 2017). Be‐
cause Harden did not object to either of these statements in
the district court, we review for plain error. See id. at 441. Un‐
der that standard, “[r]eversal is warranted only if we find an
obvious (i.e., ‘plain’) error that affected the outcome of the
trial and seriously affected the fairness, integrity, or public
reputation of the judicial proceedings.” Id. “The challenged
remarks cannot be plain error unless [the defendant] probably
would have been acquitted if the prosecutor had not made
them.” Id.
After the court proposed answering in the affirmative and referring the
jury to Pattern Instruction 2.02, defense counsel said that “would be ap‐
propriate.” In doing so, he waived any challenge to the court’s response to
the jury question.

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No. 17‐1270 31
Neither alleged misstatement warrants reversal in this
case. Here is the prosecution’s first alleged misstatement in its
entirety:
You also should recall that [Kniebes‐Larsen] tes‐
tified when she was given this heroin by Mr.
Harden–and this is important when you read
the jury instructions, is you need to look at what
the Defendant said to others and what his ac‐
tions were. But he was especially callous when
he told Ms. Kniebes‐Larsen, again paraphras‐
ing, be careful, this shit has overdoses. So he
knew this was going on, at least according to
Ms. Kniebes‐Larsen’s testimony. But was that a
warning to her to say, hey, cool it? Did he–he
still gave it to her. She still gave it to other peo‐
ple because that’s how it works right? You need
to make the money, you need to use your stuff,
you need to keep this conspiracy and this busi‐
ness going. And unfortunately no one hesitated
to say, there’s overdoses on this, why are we
continuing to distribute it down the chain, ulti‐
mately ending up with Fred Schnettler.
Harden claims that this misstates the evidence because
Kniebes‐Larsen testified that Harden warned her that a previ‐
ous batch of heroin had “bodies on” it, not the batch of heroin
she received on September 4, 2014.
The relevant factors weigh against reversal. First, the al‐
leged misconduct was not serious. Indeed, it is unclear
whether the prosecutor’s statement even misconstrues
Kniebes‐Larsen’s testimony. Harden narrowly interprets the
prosecutor’s statement to refer only to the September 4, 2014

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32 No. 17‐1270
batch. However, the statement can also be seen as generally
calling the jury’s attention to Harden’s callousness by pointing
out that Harden continued to distribute heroin even after he
warned Kniebes‐Larsen that it had caused overdoses. Second,
the court instructed the jury that “[t]he lawyer’s statements
and arguments are not evidence. If what a lawyer said is dif‐
ferent from the evidence as you remember it, the evidence is
what counts.” This curative jury instruction further weighs
against reversal. Third, because this alleged misstatement was
made during the prosecution’s main closing argument,
Harden’s defense counsel had an opportunity to respond to it
in his own closing argument but did not. Finally, the prosecu‐
tion was not required to prove that Schnettler’s death was rea‐
sonably foreseeable, so the statement would not have affected
the outcome of the trial. Given the weight of the evidence
against Harden, we cannot conclude that Harden probably
would have been acquitted absent the alleged misstatement.
Harden also claims that the prosecutor misstated evidence
when he told the jury that Harden distributed the heroin
Schnettler received on September 3 and 4, 2014. Specifically,
the prosecutor said: “If there’s delivery on the 3rd and there’s
delivery on the 4th, and it’s all coming from Mr. Harden
through those individuals, why does it matter what time it
took place?” The government concedes that this statement
conflicted with Peterson’s testimony that the heroin he gave
Schnettler on September 3rd came from a different source.
Again, though, the relevant factors counsel against reversal.
First, the misstatement was not serious and certainly would
not have affected the outcome of the trial. The government’s
case focused on Peterson’s delivery of Harden’s heroin to
Schnettler on September 4th, and the defense never suggested

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No. 17‐1270 33
that Schnettler overdosed on the September 3rd heroin. In‐
stead, the defense claimed that Schnettler died as a result of
heroin or morphine he obtained later in the evening on the
4th. Because all of the critical events occurred on September
4, 2014, the prosecution’s misstatement regarding the source
of the September 3rd delivery was insignificant. Admittedly,
the defense did not have an opportunity to respond to this
misstatement, which was made during the prosecution’s re‐
buttal closing argument. Nevertheless, the curative jury in‐
struction mitigates any prejudice and weighs against reversal.
So, too, does the vast weight of the evidence that Harden’s
heroin caused Schnettler’s death.
III. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, we A FFIRM the judgment of the
district court.

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