Iwona Portalatin v. Blatt , Hasenmiller , Leibsker & Moore , LLC

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
Nos. 16‐1578 & 17‐3335
IWONA P ORTALATIN,
Plaintiff‐Appellee,
v.
BLATT , HASENMILLER , LEIBSKER & MOORE , LLC,
Defendant‐Appellant.
____________________
Appeals from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 1:14‐cv‐08271 — Matthew F. Kennelly, Judge.
____________________
SUBMITTED MARCH 29, 2018 — D ECIDED A UGUST 13, 2018
____________________
Before BAUER , FLAUM, and MANION, Circuit Judges.
MANION, Circuit Judge. Iwona Portalatin allegedly owed
$1,330.75 in consumer debt. In October 2013 the law firm of
Blatt, Hasenmiller, Leibsker & Moore, LLC (“Blatt”) on
behalf of its client Midland Funding, LLC (“Midland”) filed
a debt‐collection suit against Portalatin in downtown
Chicago at the Richard J. Daley Center Courthouse, which
serves the Circuit Court of Cook County’s First Municipal
District. Our then‐governing precedent interpreting the Fair

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2 Nos. 16‐1578 & 17‐3335
Debt Collection Practices Act (“FDCPA”) allowed Blatt to file
suit against Portalatin in that forum even though at the time
of filing she lived in the Fourth Municipal District, served by
the Maywood Courthouse.
But in July 2014, we overruled our precedent and held
the FDCPA requires debt collectors to file suits in the
smallest venue‐relevant geographic unit where the debtor
signed the contract or resides at commencement of suit.
Suesz v. Med‐1 Solutions, 757 F.3d 636, 638 (7th Cir. 2014). This
meant Blatt should have filed Midland’s suit in the Fourth
Municipal District where Portalatin lived. Blatt quickly
complied with Suesz, but because we made our ruling
retroactive, Blatt’s earlier filing was frozen in place for
purposes of FDCPA liability. As a result, Portalatin sued Blatt
and Midland for violating the FDCPA, and she sued
Midland for violating the Illinois Consumer Fraud and
Deceptive Business Practices Act (“ICFA”).
Eventually, Portalatin settled with Midland and expressly
abandoned all claims against Blatt except her claim for
FDCPA statutory damages. Blatt moved for relief on various
grounds, including an argument that Portalatin’s settlement
with Midland mooted her claim for FDCPA statutory
damages against Blatt. The district court denied these
motions. The jury awarded Portalatin $200 in statutory
damages against Blatt. For this achievement, the court
awarded Portalatin $69,393.75 in attorney’s fees and $772.95
in costs against Blatt. Blatt appeals. We conclude the
settlement with Midland mooted Portalatin’s claim for
FDCPA statutory damages against Blatt. As a result, the
district court should have dismissed her claim, and she is not
entitled to attorney’s fees or costs from Blatt.

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Nos. 16‐1578 & 17‐3335 3
I. Background
The FDCPA requires a debt collector in the circumstances
relevant here to bring a legal action “only in the judicial
district or similar legal entity” where the debtor signed the
contract or resides at commencement of the action. 15 U.S.C.
§ 1692i(a)(2). In 1996, we interpreted “judicial district” to
mean (in Illinois) a Circuit Court, and not its municipal
subdivisions. Newsom v. Friedman, 76 F.3d 813, 818–19 (7th
Cir. 1996), overruled by Suesz, 757 F.3d 636. In particular, we
held the Circuit Court of Cook County, and not its municipal
subdivisions, was a “judicial district.” Id. This meant a debt
collector could file suit in downtown Chicago so long as the
debtor resided anywhere in Cook County at commencement
of the action.
In October 2013, Midland, through Blatt, filed an action
against Iwona Portalatin in the Circuit Court of Cook
County’s First Municipal District (in downtown Chicago) to
recover credit card debt. Portalatin lived in the Fourth
Municipal District at filing. There is no dispute that both
Midland and Blatt are debt collectors under the FDCPA. In
April 2014, the state court entered default judgment for
Midland for $1,330.75.
But in July 2014, we overruled Newsom and held “judicial
district or similar legal entity” in § 1692i means “the smallest
geographic area that is relevant for determining venue in the
court system in which the case is filed,” and we made that
holding retroactive. Suesz, 757 F.3d at 638, 649–50. Blatt
claims it “changed the venues for filing collection actions”
and “was conforming to this Court’s new interpretation of
the FDCPA’s venue provision the day after the Suesz decision

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4 Nos. 16‐1578 & 17‐3335
came down.” (Appellant’s Br., No. 17‐3335 at 15–17.)
Portalatin does not dispute this claim.
In October 2014, Portalatin sued Blatt and Midland in
federal court. She claimed they violated the FDCPA by suing
her in the wrong forum, and she sought statutory damages,1
actual damages, costs, and attorney’s fees from them under
the FDCPA. She also claimed Midland violated the ICFA,
and she sought actual damages, punitive damages, costs,
and attorney’s fees from Midland under the ICFA. Portalatin
and Midland settled for $5,000 plus release of the underlying
debt of $1,330.75.2 The settlement agreement did not
apportion any of the settlement funds to any particular
claims, although it did say each party bears its own costs
and attorney’s fees. In August 2015, the district court entered
summary judgment for Portalatin on Blatt’s affirmative
defense, concluding Blatt was not entitled to the bona fide
error defense in 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(c).
In September 2015, Portalatin expressly abandoned her
claim for actual damages against Blatt; her attorney stated in
open court that they were only seeking statutory damages.
Blatt moved for dismissal, arguing the settlement with
Midland mooted Portalatin’s claims against Blatt under the
single‐satisfaction rule. In November 2015, the district court
denied that motion. So Portalatin and Blatt went to trial later
1 The FDCPA calls them “additional damages.” 15 U.S.C. §
1692k(a)(2)(A). We use “statutory damages” and “additional damages”
interchangeably.
2 Portalatin notified the district court on July 27, 2015, that she and
Midland settled all claims between them and were completing the
documentation.

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Nos. 16‐1578 & 17‐3335 5
that month solely for statutory damages. Portalatin asked for
$1,000, the maximum statutory damages. The jury awarded
her $200. Blatt then moved to alter or amend the judgment
pursuant to Rule 59(e) or to grant relief from the judgment
pursuant to Rule 60(b)(5) on the grounds that the award for
statutory damages must be set off or deemed satisfied by
Portalatin’s settlement with Midland. The district court
denied that motion as well.
In July 2017, we held that a debt collector who violated
the FDCPA cannot avoid liability on the ground it relied on
Newsom as controlling precedent. Oliva v. Blatt, Hasenmiller,
Leibsker & Moore, 864 F.3d 492, 494 (7th Cir. 2017), cert. denied,
138 S. Ct. 1283 (2018). We confined the bona fide error safe
harbor provided by § 1692k(c) to factual and clerical errors,
and excluded legal errors. Id. at 499. We noted that although
defendant had no safe‐harbor defense, plaintiff’s damages
might still be limited by the statute: “[I]n determining
damages for a violation where the safe harbor is not
available, the court ‘shall consider, among other relevant
factors … the extent to which such noncompliance was
intentional.’” Id. at 500.
In October 2017, the district court awarded Portalatin
$69,393.75 in attorney’s fees and $772.95 in costs against
Blatt, because she prevailed by winning $200 at trial.
Blatt pursues two appeals, consolidated before us. It
challenges the statutory‐damages award, arguing Portalatin
received all possible compensation through her settlement
with Midland, thus mooting her action against Blatt.
Alternatively, it argues it is entitled to a setoff based on the
settlement agreement. Blatt also challenges the award of
attorney’s fees and costs, arguing it falls with the mootness

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6 Nos. 16‐1578 & 17‐3335
of the statutory‐damages claim. Blatt also argues the district
court failed to consider the most critical factor in calculating
the award: Portalatin’s level of success. Blatt claims the
district court punished it for choosing to defend. Blatt also
argues the district court failed to consider Blatt’s good faith
as a mitigating factor in setting the fee award.
II. Discussion
A. Mootness
1. Analysis
Blatt appeals from the denials of his motion to dismiss
and his post‐trial motion. 3 We review a legal issue pertaining
to denial of a motion to dismiss de novo. We review denial of
a motion to alter or amend a judgment, and denial of a
motion for relief from judgment, 4 for abuse of discretion. Of
course, a manifest error of law or fact can be an abuse of
discretion. In particular, the issue of “[w]hether a case has
been rendered moot is a question of law that we review de
novo.” Fed’n of Advert. Indus. Reps. v. City of Chi., 326 F.3d 924,
928–29 (7th Cir. 2003) (citation omitted).
Blatt argued in its motion to dismiss that the settlement
with Midland satisfied Portalatin’s claim against Blatt,
3 “[T]he general rule is that rulings on interlocutory orders are
encompassed within a subsequent final judgment and may be reviewed
as part of that judgment … .” Sere v. Bd. Trs. Univ. Ill., 852 F.2d 285, 288
(7th Cir. 1988).
4 “The only question raised in a Rule 60(b) appeal is whether the trial
court abused its discretion by refusing to grant the extraordinary relief
recognized in that rule … .” Gleason v. Jansen, 888 F.3d 847, 851–52 (7th
Cir. 2018).

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Nos. 16‐1578 & 17‐3335 7
rendering that claim moot or, alternatively, entitling Blatt to
a setoff. Blatt noted the terms of the settlement expressly
resolved all claims, which the agreement defined broadly.
The district court denied the motion to dismiss, reasoning it
did not need to decide whether two recoveries of statutory
damages—one from each Defendant—were possible
“because there were plenty of actual damages and attorneys’
fees … that would be greater than the amount that was paid
in settlement by Midland. And so when you’re trying to
figure out how this is best allocated and whether it moots
the rest of the case, I don’t think it does … .” (Trans. Hearing
Nov. 23, 2015, App. 014.)
Blatt echoed its arguments in its post‐trial motion, where
it maintained entitlement to a setoff or the benefit of
satisfaction due to the settlement. The district court denied
the post‐trial motion because Portalatin sought various
forms of recovery from Midland which she did not seek
from Blatt at trial. For example, Portalatin pursued claims
against Midland for FDCPA actual damages, ICFA actual
damages, and ICFA punitive damages. But Portalatin never
pursued ICFA claims against Blatt, and before trial Portalatin
expressly abandoned all claims against Blatt except her claim
for FDCPA statutory damages. So, reasoned the district
court, even if the FDCPA permits only one recovery of
statutory damages from multiple defendants, Portalatin’s
settlement with Midland “is reasonably attributable to other
types of relief, some of which she did not seek against Blatt
(actual and punitive damages under the ICFA).” Portalatin v.
Blatt, Hasenmiller, Leibsker & Moore, No. 14‐CV‐8271, 2016 WL
693208, at *3 (N.D. Ill. Feb. 20, 2016). The district court
concluded the settlement with Midland and the $200

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8 Nos. 16‐1578 & 17‐3335
judgment against Blatt were not double recoveries, and no
setoff was required.
We disagree. The court erred by not dismissing the
statutory‐damages claim as moot. Federal courts have only
limited jurisdiction. U.S. Const. art. III, § 2, cl. 1. “Under
Article III of the Constitution, the judicial power of the
United States extends only to cases and controversies.” Wis.
Right to Life v. Schober, 366 F.3d 485, 488 (7 th Cir. 2004).
Jurisdiction requires “an actual controversy … at all stages of
review, not merely at the time the complaint is filed.”
Campbell‐Ewald Co. v. Gomez, 136 S. Ct. 663, 669 (2016)
(internal quotation marks omitted). “If an intervening
circumstance deprives the plaintiff of a personal stake in the
outcome of the lawsuit, at any point during the litigation, the
action can no longer proceed and must be dismissed as
moot.” Genesis Healthcare Corp. v. Symczyk, 569 U.S. 66, 72
(2013). A settlement may moot a case. See Wegscheid v. Local
Union 2911, 117 F.3d 986, 991 (7th Cir. 1997) (“The case
became moot when the settlement of the count … gave the
plaintiffs all the relief they sought … .”). Moreover, “the
prospect of an award of attorneys’ fees does not create a
justiciable controversy if nothing else is at stake in the
litigation.” Crabill v. Trans Union, LLC, 259 F.3d 662, 666 (7th
Cir. 2001). The party asserting mootness generally bears the
burden of persuasion. Wis. Right to Life, 366 F.3d at 491.
Generally, a plaintiff is only entitled to a single recovery
for a single injury, regardless of how many defendants could
be liable for that single injury, or how many different
theories of recovery could apply to that single injury. See
Swanigan v. City of Chi., 881 F.3d 577, 582 (7th Cir. 2018)
(“Federal common law prevents § 1983 plaintiffs from

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Nos. 16‐1578 & 17‐3335 9
recovering twice for the same injury.”); Janusz v. City of Chi.,
832 F.3d 770, 774 (7th Cir. 2016) (“Janusz has brought claims
under both federal and Illinois law, and in both jurisdictions,
a tort victim can obtain only one recovery for his harm, no
matter how many tortfeasors inflicted it.”) (internal
quotation marks and brackets omitted); Duran v. Town of
Cicero, Ill., 653 F.3d 632, 640 (7th Cir. 2011) (“[D]amages are
not assessed by defendant or by claim but for an injury.”)
(internal quotation marks omitted); Thornton v. Garcini, 928
N.E.2d 804, 811 (Ill. 2010) (“A plaintiff may … receive only
one full compensation for his or her injuries, and double
recovery for the same injury is not allowed.”). Once a
plaintiff settles with one defendant for the full relief
available for a single, indivisible injury, the plaintiff
generally cannot pursue a claim for the same injury against a
different defendant; the settlement renders such a claim
moot.
Portalatin does not dispute that her suit arises out of a
single violation of the FDCPA: filing a debt‐collection suit in
the wrong courthouse. Nor does she dispute that her
claimed harm—having to defend herself in the wrong
courthouse—is indivisible between the two Defendants. Nor
does she dispute that the two Defendants acted in concert at
all relevant times. Neither acted independently of the other.
Blatt filed and maintained the debt‐collection suit in the
wrong courthouse on behalf of Midland. Portalatin does not
allege Blatt took any ultra vires actions. Rather, she admits
“plaintiff’s claims stem from the same conduct” and
“plaintiff’s claims arise from a single, indivisible act.”
(Appellee’s Br., No. 16‐1578 at 6, 10.)

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10 Nos. 16‐1578 & 17‐3335
When a plaintiff wants to settle with one defendant but
maintain a claim against another defendant, one possibility
is for the plaintiff to allocate all the funds in such a way as to
maximize recovery against the non‐settling defendant, if this
is possible in good faith. See Johnson v. Belleville Radiologists,
Ltd., 581 N.E.2d 750, 755 (Ill. App. Ct. 1991). But here,
Portalatin did not allocate the settlement funds (other than to
say each party bears its own costs and attorney’s fees). When
she settled with Midland, she agreed to dismiss all her
claims against Midland in exchange for $5,000, and Midland
agreed to release Portalatin from all claims related to the
underlying debt. She failed to allocate any particular funds
to any particular claims. Indeed, far from allocating, the
settlement agreement says it encompasses and resolves all
claims arising out of the facts alleged in or capable of being
alleged in this federal action. Therefore, Blatt is relieved of
the burden of proving which funds satisfy which claims. See
Patton v. Carbondale Clinic, S.C., 641 N.E.2d 427, 433 (Ill. 1994)
(“[W]here a plaintiff recovers for several injuries in a
previous lawsuit and fails to apportion damages
accordingly, a subsequent defendant should not bear the
burden of proving what portion of the plaintiff’s previous
settlement should be set‐off or be denied a setoff.”); U.S.
Indus. v. Touche Ross & Co., 854 F.2d 1223, 1262 (10th Cir.
1988) (“[A]ny ambiguity in the agreements as to the proper
allocations of the settlement amounts was due solely to the
failure of USI and the settling defendants to clearly articulate
the injury each specific allocation was intended to
compensate. To hold that, as a result of that ambiguity, the
defendants would not be entitled to credit for any of the
settlement amounts would be to reward USI for constructing
an ambiguous settlement agreement.”), overruled on other

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Nos. 16‐1578 & 17‐3335 11
grounds as recognized by Anixter v. Home‐Stake Prod. Co., 77
F.3d 1215, 1231 (10th Cir. 1996). A settling plaintiff, after all,
is generally in a better position than a non‐settling defendant
to ensure a settlement agreement properly allocates funds.
Under Illinois law, absent express allocation, “[w]here a
promise on one side is supported by several promises on the
other, the single promise will provide consideration for all
the promises.” Wodziak v. Kash, 663 N.E.2d 138, 148 (Ill. App.
Ct. 1996) (citing Patton, 641 N.E.2d at 434). Therefore,
Portalatin’s claim for FDCPA additional damages—which is
capped at $1,000 as discussed below—is fully covered by the
settlement funds of $5,000. The district court erred by
attributing the funds to other claims to the exclusion of
FDCPA additional damages.5
5 Portalatin made a glancing reference to Illinois’ Joint Tortfeasor
Contribution Act (“JTCA”) without developing argument for its direct or
analogous application. Therefore, this argument is forfeited. In any
event, the JTCA provides that a release given in good faith to one person
liable in tort does not discharge another tortfeasor from liability for the
same injury unless the terms of the release say so, but the release
“reduces the recovery on any claim against the others to the extent of
any amount stated in the release or the covenant, or in the amount of the
consideration actually paid for it, whichever is greater.” 740 ILCS
100/2(c); see Donovan v. Robbins, 752 F.2d 1170, 1178 (7th Cir. 1985) (Even
if there is no right of contribution, “[s]ince a plaintiff’s total recovery,
from all the tortfeasors together, is not allowed to exceed his total
damages, the amount that the nonsettling defendants will have to pay
will be smaller, the larger the settlement is.”) (internal citations omitted);
Wodziak, 663 N.E.2d at 147–48 (allowing reduction of award by amount
received in prior settlement, under the JTCA); Patton, 641 N.E.2d at 434
(“Where a promise on one side is supported by several promises on the
other, the single promise will provide consideration for all promises.”).

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12 Nos. 16‐1578 & 17‐3335
2. Separate awards of additional damages?
Still, Portalatin’s claim for FDCPA additional damages
from Blatt could potentially survive mootness despite the
lack of allocation in the settlement agreement if separate
awards of additional damages each capped at $1,000 are
recoverable from each Defendant based on a single incident
and a single, indivisible injury. There is no precedent in this
circuit directly on point. We start with the FDCPA’s plain
language:
(a) Amount of damages
Except as otherwise provided by this section,
any debt collector who fails to comply with
any provision of this subchapter with respect
to any person is liable to such person in an
amount equal to the sum of—
(1) any actual damage sustained by such
person as a result of such failure;
(2)(A) in the case of any action by an
individual, such additional damages as the
court may allow, but not exceeding $1,000 … .
15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a).
The word “action” limits the additional damages,
capping them at $1,000 per action, not per violation and not
per defendant. See Harper v. Better Bus. Servs., Inc., 961 F.2d
1561, 1563 (11th Cir. 1992) (“Because Congress instead chose
to write that additional damages would be limited to $1,000
per ‘action,’ we agree with the district court that ‘the plain
language of section 1692k(a)(2)(A) provides for maximum
statutory damages of $1,000.’”); Smith v. Greystone All., LLC,

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Nos. 16‐1578 & 17‐3335 13
772 F.3d 448, 449 (7th Cir. 2014) (“Statutory damages are
subject to a cap of $1,000 per suit, 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(2)(A),
no matter how many violations of the Act a given debt
collector commits.”).
Also, the actual‐damages provision mirrors the
additional‐damages (also known as “statutory damages”)
provision. There is no doubt actual damages for the same
single, indivisible injury are not multiplied by the number of
defendants. This tends to suggest the additional damages
provided in the parallel clause also are not multiplied by the
number of defendants.
Moreover, we construe statutes in derogation of the
common law strictly and narrowly. Haven v. Polska, 215 F.3d
727, 731 (7th Cir. 2000). A statute may abrogate common law
by clear and express terms. United States v. Texas, 507 U.S.
529, 534 (1993) (“In order to abrogate a common‐law
principle, the statute must ‘speak directly’ to the question
addressed by the common law.”). Here, the availability of
additional damages is clearly a creature of statute, but the
statute, construed strictly and narrowly, provides no clear,
express basis to extend additional damages beyond the
common‐law single‐recovery rule. See Swanigan, 881 F.3d at
582; Janusz, 832 F.3d at 774.
Congress could have said a plaintiff may recover
additional damages on a “per defendant” basis, but it did
not. For example, in the Freedom of Access to Clinic
Entrances Act (“FACE”) Congress said any person aggrieved
by a violation of FACE could elect “to recover, in lieu of
actual damages, an award of statutory damages in the
amount of $5,000 per violation.” 18 U.S.C. § 248(c)(1)(B). But
Congress also said that in a civil action brought by the

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14 Nos. 16‐1578 & 17‐3335
Attorney General under FACE the court “may also assess a
civil penalty against each respondent” up to certain amounts.
18 U.S.C. § 248(c)(2)(B) (emphasis added). Courts have
recognized this linguistic distinction and refused to allow
FACE statutory damages on a per‐defendant basis. See
United States v. Gregg, 226 F.3d 253, 258 (3d Cir. 2000);
Milwaukee Women’s Med. Servs., Inc. v. Brock, 2 F. Supp. 2d
1172, 1178 (E.D. Wisc. 1998).
Therefore, we conclude FDCPA additional damages are
not multiplied by the number of defendants where the
plaintiff suffered an indivisible harm caused by defendants
who did not violate the FDCPA independently of each
other. 6 This comports with our precedent. See Oliva, 864 F.3d
6 Portalatin heavily relies on Strasters v. Weinstein & Riley, P.S., No. CV‐
10‐3070, 2011 WL 3320583 (E.D. Wash. Aug. 2, 2011), to support her
argument that she is entitled to separate statutory‐damages awards from
each Defendant. Strasters in turn relied on Overcash v. United Abstract
Grp., Inc., 549 F. Supp. 2d 193, 196 (N.D.N.Y. 2008) and Jones v. Invest.
Retrievers, LLC, No. 3:10‐CV‐1714, 2011 WL 1565851 (M.D. Pa. Apr. 25,
2011). These three cases allowed recovery of additional damages on a
per‐defendant basis on the ground that “the FDCPA’s statutory damages
are ‘cast not in terms of the plaintiff’s recovery, but in terms of the
defendant’s liability.’” Strasters, 2011 WL 3320583 at *3 (quoting Overcash,
549 F. Supp. 2d at 197). Overcash explains the textual analysis ostensibly
supporting this conclusion: “The statute provides, in part, that ‘any debt
collector … is liable’ for additional damages not to exceed $1,000.”
Overcash, 549 F. Supp. 2d at 196. But this quote shows the blind spot in
the analysis. The phrase “any debt collector … is liable” in § 1692k(a)
applies equally to the “actual damage” provision in § 1692k(a)(1) as it
does to the “additional damages” provision in § 1692k(a)(2)(A). Overcash
leapfrogs over the “actual damage” provision. But as we already noted,
there is no dispute that actual damages are not recoverable on a per‐
defendant basis. Moreover, Overcash involved multiple defendants

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Nos. 16‐1578 & 17‐3335 15
at 498 (“Remedies include actual damages, statutory
damages up to $1000 per violation, and attorney fees.”);
Smith, 772 F.3d at 449 (“Statutory damages are subject to a
cap of $1,000 per suit … no matter how many violations of
the Act a given debt collector commits.”). This conclusion
also comports with those of our sister circuits. See Goodmann
v. People’s Bank, 209 Fed.Appx. 111, 114 (3d Cir. 2006) (“We
agree with Appellees that 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(2)(A) is best
read as limiting statutory damages to $1,000 per successful
court action.”); Peter v. GC Servs., L.P., 310 F.3d 344, 352 n.5
(5th Cir. 2002) (“[D]amages for violation of the FDCPA in §
1692k are limited to actual damages, plus maximum
statutory damages of $1000 per action, not per
violation … .”); Wright v. Fin. Serv. of Norwalk, Inc., 22 F.3d
647, 651 (6th Cir. 1994) (“Congress intended to limit ‘other
damages’ to $1,000 per proceeding, not to $1,000 per
violation.”); Harper, 961 F.2d at 1563 (“[T]he plain language
of section 1692k(a)(2)(A) provides for maximum statutory
damages of $1,000.”) (internal quotation marks omitted). 7
separately attempting to collect a debt, and each violating the FDCPA
multiple times. Therefore, these cases do not help Portalatin.
7 Our conclusion also comports with the reasoning of numerous district
courts. See Green v. Monarch Recovery Mgmt., No. 1:13‐CV‐418, 2013 WL
5203809, at *2 (S.D. Ind. Sept. 16, 2013) (“the maximum statutory
damages for this suit is $1,000 total, not per defendant”); Martinez v.
Scott, No. H‐10‐1619, 2011 WL 3566970, at *5 (S.D. Tex. Aug. 12, 2011)
(“While individual plaintiffs can each recover $1,000 in statutory
damages for FDCPA violations, they cannot recover this amount from
each defendant.”); Morgan v. Acct. Collection Tech., LLC, No. 05‐CV‐2131,
2006 WL 2597865, at *3 (S.D.N.Y. Sept. 6, 2006) (“[S]ection 1692k(a)(2)(A)
creates a ceiling that limits the damages an individual plaintiff can
receive per proceeding, not per defendant.”); Dowling v. Kucker Kraus &

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16 Nos. 16‐1578 & 17‐3335
As Portalatin was only entitled to one recovery of FDCPA
additional damages capped at $1,000 for her indivisible
injury, her settlement with Midland mooted this claim
against Blatt, and the district court should have dismissed
it. 8
B. Attorney’s fees and costs
The district court concluded Portalatin was a prevailing
party—and therefore entitled to an award of attorney’s fees
and costs under 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3)—because she won
summary judgment on the issue of liability and won an
award of $200 in statutory damages. But when she settled
with Midland, her claim against Blatt for statutory damages
became moot, and the district court should have dismissed
it. She prevailed at trial, but she should not have reached
trial. Therefore, Portalatin is not entitled to an award of
attorney’s fees or costs against Blatt. 9 10
Bruh, LLP, No. 99‐CIV‐11958, 2005 WL 1337442, at *3–4 (S.D.N.Y. June 5,
2005).
8 We note there are other grounds, rooted in the plain language of the
settlement agreement, on which Blatt might have prevailed in these
consolidated appeals. But because the settlement agreement is under seal
at Midland’s request, and because Blatt did not develop these other
grounds on appeal, we will not discuss them. All references to the
settlement agreement in this opinion stem from the parties’ appellate
briefs, which are in the public record, and which no one asked us to
strike or seal.
9 Blatt devotes a section of its initial brief in the fee appeal (No. 17‐3335)
to the argument that the fee award must be vacated because Portalatin’s
settlement with Midland mooted the case against Blatt. In her response
brief in the fee appeal, Portalatin puzzles why Blatt “rehashes”
arguments, and Portalatin purports to incorporate her additional‐

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Nos. 16‐1578 & 17‐3335 17
III. Conclusion
We REVERSE the district court’s denials of Blatt’s
motions regarding mootness.11 The settlement with Midland
rendered Portalatin’s claim for statutory damages against
Blatt moot, and as a result Portalatin is not entitled to awards
of statutory damages, attorney’s fees, or costs against Blatt.
We VACATE the judgments against Blatt and REMAND for
further proceedings consistent with this opinion.
damages response brief (No. 16‐1578). But Portalatin does not directly or
fully respond to Blatt’s argument that the mootness of the claim for
additional damages means she is not entitled to an award of attorney’s
fees or costs, and she therefore forfeited any pertinent arguments.
10 Section 1692k(b)(1) requires a court to consider the following factors in
determining the amount of liability: “the frequency and persistence of
noncompliance by the debt collector, the nature of such noncompliance,
and the extent to which such noncompliance was intentional.” 15 U.S.C.
§ 1692k(b)(1); Oliva, 864 F.3d at 500. Given the isolated and minimal
nature of the noncompliance by Blatt with respect to Portalatin, given
Blatt’s lack of intent to violate the FDCPA, and given Blatt’s quick
correction after Suesz, the court might have been within its discretion in
awarding attorney’s fees and costs to Blatt under § 1692k(a)(3) if the
court concluded Portalatin’s claim against Blatt was “in bad faith and for
the purpose of harassment,” particularly when she persisted in her claim
after settling with Midland, even though Blatt is not entitled to the bona
fide error defense in § 1692k(c) under Oliva.
11 We have sympathy for the district judge. He sagaciously tried to
encourage the parties to resolve this case, but they would not agree. As a
result, this unique case generated further attorney’s fees and costs, and
imposed on limited judicial resources, without ultimately benefitting the
debtor, which was supposed to have been the FDCPA’s goal.

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