United States of America v. STYLES TAYLOR and KEON THOMAS

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
Nos. 17‐2986 and 17‐3145
U NITED STATES OF A MERICA ,
Plaintiff‐Appellee,
v.
S TYLES T AYLOR and
KEON T HOMAS ,
Defendants‐Appellants.
____________________
Appeals from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Indiana, Hammond Division.
No. 2:01‐cr‐00073‐JTM‐PRC — James T. Moody, Judge.
____________________
A RGUED SEPTEMBER 18, 2018 — D ECIDED OCTOBER 31, 2018
____________________
Before SYKES , BARRETT, and ST . EVE , Circuit Judges.
ST . EVE , Circuit Judge. This is a case of one tragedy beget‐
ting another. Styles Taylor and Keon Thomas grew up as no
child should: abandoned by their fathers, abused by their
mothers, and beset by poverty. With little, they, unfortu‐
nately, turned to crime. As young adults they robbed a local
gun shop, and in the process Taylor shot and killed the shop’s
owner—a 73‐year‐old, near‐deaf World War II veteran and

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2 Nos. 17‐2986 and 17‐3145
grandfather. Taylor and Thomas were charged with multiple
offenses, including felony murder. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c), (j).
Their case is now before us for a fifth time. In this appeal,
Taylor and Thomas challenge their respective life sentences as
substantively unreasonable in light of mitigating factors, most
notably, their troubled upbringings. The facts of this case are
indeed difficult, but the law is clear. Where, as here, a district
judge thoroughly examines and rejects the defendant’s miti‐
gation arguments in issuing a within‐guidelines sentence, we
presume that the sentence is reasonable. Taylor and Thomas
have not rebutted that presumption, so we affirm.
I.
Taylor and Thomas were raised in Hammond, Indiana.
They sold drugs together but did not make enough money to
get ahead, causing them to escalate their crime. On the morn‐
ing of March 20, 2000, the pair left a birthday party at Taylor’s
home. When they returned, they shared with some of their
friends and relatives that they had just committed a robbery
and that Taylor had “hit a lick.”
The two had robbed a gun shop, Firearms Unlimited. Dur‐
ing the armed robbery, Taylor held the shop’s owner, Frank
Freund, at gun point. Some testimony suggested that Taylor
believed he saw Freund reach for a gun, causing Taylor to
shoot Freund. Other facts made that testimony implausible:
forensic evidence showed that Freund was chewing a sand‐
wich at the time Taylor shot him. Either way, Freund was hit
twice, once in the neck and once in the face. Evidence indi‐
cated that Taylor and Thomas made out with numerous fire‐
arms, which they later sold on the streets. Some of the weap‐
ons made their way to Chicago; others were never found.

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Nos. 17‐2986 and 17‐3145 3
A grand jury returned an indictment against Taylor and
Thomas in April 2001 and a superseding indictment in Octo‐
ber 2003. The superseding indictment charged: Hobbs Act
conspiracy, 18 U.S.C. § 1951; Hobbs Act robbery, id.; and mur‐
der during a robbery, 18 U.S.C. §§ 924(c), (j). It further charged
Taylor and Thomas with felony possession of a firearm, 18
U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(a)(2).
A jury convicted Taylor and Thomas on all counts in Sep‐
tember 2004. The government initially requested the death
penalty, but, after the jury rejected it for Taylor, the govern‐
ment dropped the request for Thomas. The district judge sen‐
tenced Taylor and Thomas to life in prison on the felony‐mur‐
der count and lengthy sentences on the remaining counts.
Taylor and Thomas appealed. We twice ordered an eviden‐
tiary hearing and supplemental proceedings on whether the
government’s peremptory challenges during voir dire vio‐
lated Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79 (1986). United States v. Tay‐
lor, 509 F.3d 839 (7th Cir. 2007); United States v. Taylor, 277
F. App’x 610 (7th Cir. 2008). In United States v. Taylor, 636 F.3d
901 (7th Cir. 2011), we ordered a new trial.
The second trial began in May 2012, and again a jury con‐
victed Taylor and Thomas on all counts. The district judge, a
different one than the judge who previously presided over the
case, also imposed life sentences. Taylor and Thomas again
appealed. In United States v. Taylor, 794 F.3d 705 (7th Cir.
2015), we held (and the government agreed) that the district
court procedurally erred by failing to explain its reasons for
rejecting Taylor’s and Thomas’s substantial mitigation argu‐
ments. We therefore ordered resentencing.

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4 Nos. 17‐2986 and 17‐3145
II.
The district judge resentenced Taylor and Thomas in Sep‐
tember 2017. The U.S. Sentencing Guidelines recommended a
life sentence for both men because of their felony‐murder con‐
victions. See U.S.S.G. § 2A1.1(a). Both men also had height‐
ened criminal histories due to previous convictions.
At sentencing, Taylor requested a below‐guidelines sen‐
tence of 30 years in prison. He argued, as he had at the previ‐
ous sentencing, that his horrific upbringing and youth at the
time of the offense merited leniency under Section 3553(a)’s
factors. See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). Taylor was born to a single
mother who did not want him. She tried to kill him in utero
by drinking heavily, abusing drugs, and even taking quinine
capsules. Taylor survived, but he was born three months
premature weighing only three and half pounds. His life still
mattered little to his mother. She repeatedly abandoned him
for stretches of time, and, when she was around, abused him.
She beat him with belts, cords, and broomsticks to discipline
him; she fed him alcohol and blew marijuana smoke in his
face to pacify him; and she called him foul names to demean
him. Her home, where Taylor usually lived, was a local site
for gambling, prostitution, and drug consumption. When his
mother was away, Taylor frequently lived with his aunt. She,
too, beat and neglected him. Taylor did have two role mod‐
els—a different aunt and his grandmother—but they both
died of cancer in Taylor’s teenage years.
Taylor was on the streets early. As a toddler, local men
used him as a pawn in their burglaries. As a middle‐schooler,
he learned how to gamble, commit crimes, and deal drugs. He
entered the social‐services system at age 11, where profession‐
als observed his emotional, social, and sleep abnormalities.

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Nos. 17‐2986 and 17‐3145 5
He was diagnosed at age 13 with an IQ of 71. Unable to keep
up at school, Taylor began to accumulate a criminal record: at
age 11, he was convicted of burglary; at 16, he was convicted
of armed robbery; and at 18, he was convicted of possession
of drugs. At age 19, he committed the armed robbery with
Thomas and killed Freund.
Taylor also highlighted at his resentencing the efforts he
has made at reform since incarceration. In prison, Taylor com‐
pleted hundreds of educational programs, achieved his GED,
and has become a better father to his children. A retesting of
his IQ put it at 92, which an expert attributed in part to the
structure of prison. Taylor further cited statistics showing that
most homicide defendants serve less‐than‐life sentences, and
he submitted that he posed a low risk of recidivism given the
age at which he would exit prison even with a 30‐year sen‐
tence.
At Thomas’s sentencing, he too requested a below‐guide‐
lines sentence of 30 years. Like Taylor, he argued that his trou‐
bled childhood and familial disfunction warranted less than
life in prison. As an expert report submitted by Thomas
showed, his family history was rife with alcohol and drug
abuse. Thomas’s mother was no exception. She became preg‐
nant with Thomas at age 18 but continued to use drugs and
alcohol often. After Thomas’s birth, his mother struggled to
raise him and, later, his younger sister. Thomas’s mother
never held steady employment and struggled with a crack‐
cocaine addiction. She also suffered frequent abuse from the
men she dated. Thomas saw his mother beaten with a ham‐
mer, chased with a knife, and threatened with a pistol.
Thomas and his sister suffered abuse of their own, most often
at the hands of their mother. Thomas’s home, like Taylor’s,

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6 Nos. 17‐2986 and 17‐3145
was no place for a child, often overrun with partygoers using
illegal drugs and consuming alcohol in excess.
Thomas’s father was not around during his childhood. He
moved to Minnesota when Thomas was young. Thomas vis‐
ited occasionally, but those visits often went poorly with
Thomas witnessing his father abuse drugs, alcohol, and
women in front of him.
Thomas also faced loss. When Thomas was age 13, his fa‐
ther’s girlfriend stabbed his father to death. Less than a year
later, one of Thomas’s closest friends died, potentially the re‐
sult of an overdose. The decedent’s sister, another one of
Thomas’s closest friends, was murdered by her boyfriend not
long after. Thomas struggled after these deaths, isolating him‐
self and attempting to deal with mental‐health issues. But he
never received proper treatment. He later lost two more
friends to violent deaths. Thomas also struggled in school. As
a teenager, he turned to the streets, drugs, and alcohol. He
smoked marijuana daily, drank often, and carried a gun. At
age 19, he went to prison for felony robbery. He had misde‐
meanors at ages 18 and 19 for battery and resisting law en‐
forcement.
Thomas resubmitted an earlier expert report, which
opined that he suffered from dysthymic disorder (a form of
depression, essentially) and substance dependence. The same
expert created a table comparing Thomas’s biographical, de‐
velopmental, and psychological data to predictors of youth
violence identified by the Department of Justice. Thomas
demonstrated 23 out of the 27 factors, including childhood
maltreatment, academic failure, poverty, and exposure to vi‐
olence and racial prejudice.

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Nos. 17‐2986 and 17‐3145 7
In addition to citing his disadvantaged youth at resentenc‐
ing, Thomas pointed to a few other materially mitigating
facts. First, he was not the shooter; Taylor was. Second,
Thomas had a purportedly strong record while in federal
prison, including the completion of 69 educational courses in
parenting, life skills, and cognitive thinking. Third, despite
his general absence, he had a good relationship with his son,
who has gone on to marry and enlist in the military. At resen‐
tencing, Thomas expressed remorse. He also contended, as
Taylor did, that the average homicide defendant does not
serve life in prison and that he was not a candidate for recidi‐
vism given how old he would be when he completed his
prison term, which would be lengthy in any event.
The district judge again imposed a life sentence on both
Taylor and Thomas for the felony‐murder count, plus lengthy,
consecutive sentences for the remaining counts. For Taylor,
the judge called the crime “a senseless, thoughtless” and “cal‐
lous[ ]” killing. The district judge also rejected Taylor’s argu‐
ment—that after a 30‐year sentence, he would no longer be a
danger to society—because of Taylor’s already recidivist and
criminal history.
The district judge then described at length Taylor’s “hor‐
rific upbringing.” He explained, however, that this case came
down to “personal choice” and Taylor’s decision to kill
Freund. The district judge considered, but gave little weight
to, Taylor’s previous low IQ score. He reasoned that Taylor’s
intelligence was not tested near the time of the crime and that
he did not think Taylor’s intelligence so abnormal that Taylor
could have not appreciated the consequences of his conduct.
The district judge further addressed a letter Taylor wrote to
the judge. In it, Taylor said that he hoped to get past this

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8 Nos. 17‐2986 and 17‐3145
“unfortunate life changing situation” and hoped to see “some
type of light at the end of this dark tunnel.” According to the
district judge, this reflected a lack of acceptance and personal
responsibility.
For Thomas, the district judge provided similar reasoning.
He emphasized the heinousness of the offense and killing. He
accounted for Thomas’s awful childhood, but noted, again,
that Thomas had made the decision to partake in a violent
robbery knowing the possible consequences. As the district
judge put it:
No child should experience with [sic] Mr. Thomas
did in growing up. No person should have to strug‐
gle with such mental health issues or substance de‐
pendence, and yet the experience is all too common.
But despite these terrible circumstances, most peo‐
ple with these characteristics do not end up in first‐
degree murders … . [B]ased on my personal obser‐
vations and my 35‐plus years of sitting on this bench,
I can say that one important factor that separates
those who end up criminals from those who do not
is choice, personal choice … . I have carefully con‐
sidered Mr. Thomas’s very harsh upbringing and
mental health struggles, but I have also carefully
considered his decision making.
The district judge rejected the reliance on average‐sentencing
data as unpersuasive. He further noted a concern for protect‐
ing the public from Thomas given his criminal history.
III.
Taylor and Thomas appeal their life sentences. They do not
contend that the district judge procedurally erred by failing
to consider any of their mitigating arguments under Section

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Nos. 17‐2986 and 17‐3145 9
3553(a). They instead argue that, even after the district judge’s
full consideration, the decision to impose life sentences was
substantively unreasonable.
This argument is a steep uphill climb for any defendant to
make. Section 3553(a) provides a template: it instructs sen‐
tencing judges to consider several factors, including the na‐
ture and circumstances of the offense, the history and charac‐
teristics of the defendant, the need to afford specific and gen‐
eral deterrence, and potentially unwarranted sentencing dis‐
parities. 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). But it leaves to the sentencing
judge’s discretion how to fill in that template based on the
facts and circumstances of a particular case and a particular
defendant. United States v. Lewis, 842 F.3d 467, 477 (7th Cir.
2016). For that reason, our review is for an abuse of discretion.
United States v. Thompson, 864 F.3d 837, 841 (7th Cir. 2017). A
sentencing judge’s weighing of Section 3553(a)’s factors
“must fall within the bounds of reason, but those bounds are
wide.” United States v. Cunningham, 883 F.3d 690, 702 (7th Cir.
2018) (quotations and modifications omitted).
Where, as here, a sentence falls within the properly calcu‐
lated guidelines range, our review is even more deferential:
we presume that the sentence is reasonable. United States v.
Faulkner, 885 F.3d 488, 498 (7th Cir. 2018). This rule holds even
when the guidelines range is life in prison. United States v.
Tanner, 628 F.3d 890, 908 (7th Cir. 2010). To keep the presump‐
tion of reasonableness, a sentencing judge “need provide only
a justification for its sentence adequate to allow for meaning‐
ful appellate review and to promote the perception of fair sen‐
tencing.” United States v. Horton, 770 F.3d 582, 585 (7th Cir.
2014) (per curiam). A defendant bears the burden to rebut the
presumption of reasonableness, which he may only do by

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10 Nos. 17‐2986 and 17‐3145
showing that the sentence does not comport with Section
3553(a)’s factors. United States v. Solomon, 892 F.3d 273, 278
(7th Cir. 2018).
Taylor and Thomas have not carried that burden. The dis‐
trict judge considered, weighed, and applied the relevant Sec‐
tion 3553(a) factors. He evaluated the history and characteris‐
tics of Taylor and Thomas, which he thought cut both ways—
they faced traumatic upbringings and likely experienced
mental‐health problems, but they, unlike many who endure
similar suffering, made the decision to turn to violent crime.
The district judge evaluated the nature and circumstances of
the offense, which he found to be a callous and heartless kill‐
ing of an innocent elderly man. And he considered the need
for both specific and general deterrence. He concluded that
Taylor and Thomas had repeatedly shown a propensity for
crime that he did not think would extinguish with age, and
the community needed to know that fatal crimes would be
severely punished. The district judge also considered and re‐
jected Taylor and Thomas’s arguments about the need to
avoid sentencing disparities, concluding that the averages
they cited were unavailing and did not account for the specif‐
ics of their crime. Indeed, as Taylor and Thomas recognized at
their sentencings, the district judge considered each of their
arguments. The life sentences he imposed accounted for the
choices Taylor and Thomas made, the severity of their crime,
and the need for deterrence.
On appeal, Taylor and Thomas rehash arguments made to,
and rejected by, the district judge. They recount their up‐
bringings and explain how the trauma they faced in their
formative years led them to crime. We have no doubt about
the validity of those arguments, and, if the district judge had

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Nos. 17‐2986 and 17‐3145 11
failed to account for them, Taylor and Thomas may be entitled
to a resentencing. But he did, thoroughly, and we do not sit to
substitute our judgment with that of the sentencing judge.
E.g., United States v. Warner, 792 F.3d 847, 856 (7th Cir. 2015).
Taylor and Thomas also recite the arguments they made be‐
low about, for example, their growth in prison and the need
to avoid unwarranted sentencing disparities. It is enough to
say, again, that the district judge fully considered those argu‐
ments, and concluded that they did not outweigh the choice
Taylor and Thomas made to engage in violent crime and take
another life.
Ordering a defendant to spend the remainder of his life in
prison, either actually or effectively, is not a punishment that
sentencing judges should mete out “lightly.” United States v.
Volpendesto, 746 F.3d 273, 299 (7th Cir. 2014) (quoting United
States v. Wurzinger, 467 F.3d 649, 652 (7th Cir. 2006)). The sen‐
tencing decisions here, however, reflect careful evaluations of
the facts and circumstances. We have no grounds to reverse.
The district court’s judgments are therefore AFFIRMED.

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