H.p., a minor, by and through her father, W.P. v. Naperville Community Unit School District 203

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 18‐2272
H.P., a minor, by and through
her father, W.P.,
Plaintiff‐Appellant,
v.
NAPERVILLE C OMMUNITY U NIT
S CHOOL D ISTRICT #203,
Defendant‐Appellee.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 17‐cv‐5377 — Jeffrey T. Gilbert, Magistrate Judge.
____________________
A RGUED NOVEMBER 8, 2018 — D ECIDED D ECEMBER 11, 2018
____________________
Before FLAUM, MANION, and ST . EVE , Circuit Judges.
ST . EVE , Circuit Judge. The plaintiff H.P., a minor, through
her father W.P., claims that the defendant Naperville Com‐
munity Unit School District #203 violated H.P.’s rights under
the Americans with Disabilities Act and the Rehabilitation Act
by disallowing H.P. from completing high school in District

-- 1 of 6 --

2 No. 18‐2272
#203 after she moved to another school district. In the case be‐
low, the district court granted summary judgment to the Dis‐
trict and denied it to H.P. We affirm.
I. Background
The defendant Naperville Community Unit School Dis‐
trict #203 (the District) is an Illinois public school district. One
of the schools that the District operates is Naperville Central
High School (NCHS), where the plaintiff H.P. attended her
freshman, sophomore, and junior years of high school. In
2006, during her junior year, H.P.’s mother committed suicide
and H.P. moved from her mother’s home in Naperville, Illi‐
nois, which is part of the District, to her father’s home in Lisle,
Illinois, which is not part of the District. H.P. nonetheless
completed her junior year at NCHS because the District did
not immediately learn of H.P.’s change in residency.
Before the 2017‐18 school year began, however, the District
learned that H.P. no longer lived in the District. This hap‐
pened when H.P.’s father asked the District to allow H.P. to
attend her senior year at NCHS, instead of Downers Grove
North High School (DGNHS), which is part of the district en‐
compassing Lisle.
The District denied W.P.’s request because H.P. lived out‐
side of its boundaries. Under the District’s residency policy,
“[a] student must establish residency within the School Dis‐
trict boundaries in order to attend a School District School,”
with some exceptions not pertinent here. W.P. thereafter
asked the District to waive its residency requirement to allow
H.P. to attend NCHS as an accommodation for certain
claimed disabilities under the Americans with Disabilities Act

-- 2 of 6 --

No. 18‐2272 3
(ADA), and the Rehabilitation Act, including anxiety, depres‐
sion, sleep disturbances, and seizures. The District again de‐
nied the request and in September 2017, H.P. enrolled in
DGNHS, where H.P. appeared increasingly despondent over
attending the new school but ultimately graduated.
On July 21, 2017, H.P., through her father W.P., filed this
action against the District, asserting claims for disparate im‐
pact and disparate treatment under Title II of the ADA and
Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act. 1 The district court dis‐
missed H.P.’s disparate impact claim, but allowed her failure
to accommodate claim to proceed. Thereafter, the district
court granted the District’s motion for summary judgment
and denied H.P.’s cross‐motion for summary judgment and
accordingly entered judgment for the District. The court rea‐
soned that H.P. could not show causation, i.e., that but‐for her
alleged disability, she would have been able to obtain her re‐
quested accommodation—attending school in the District.
II. Discussion
H.P. appeals the district court’s grant of summary judg‐
ment for the District and related denial of summary judgment
for her. We begin, however, with the District’s motion to dis‐
miss this appeal as moot on the basis that H.P. graduated
from high school after filing this action. Mootness is a juris‐
dictional defect that may arise at any time. United States v.
Sanchez‐Gomez, 138 S. Ct. 1532, 1537 (2018). A “case becomes
1 H.P. also sought a preliminary injunction requiring the District to
enroll her in NCHS for the 2017‐18 academic year, and declaratory relief
on an unrelated state law claim. The district court dismissed these counts
and H.P. does not appeal the district court’s dismissal of these claims nor
did H.P. file an amended complaint.

-- 3 of 6 --

4 No. 18‐2272
moot when a court’s decision can no longer affect the rights
of litigants in the case before them and simply would be ‘an
opinion advising what the law would be upon a hypothetical
state of facts.’” Brown v. Bartholomew Consol. Sch. Corp., 442
F.3d 588, 596 (7th Cir. 2006) (citation omitted).
We agree that H.P.’s request for injunctive relief—namely,
that the court order the District to enroll H.P. at NCHS for her
senior year—is moot. Id. at 596; see also Ostby v. Manhattan Sch.
Dist. No. 114, 851 F.3d 677, 681–82, 687 (7th Cir. 2017). H.P.
conceded this point at oral argument but contends that her
request for compensatory damages is not moot, despite the
case law suggesting that compensatory damages are only
available for intentional discrimination, which H.P. does not
allege. E.g., CTL ex rel. Trebatoski v. Ashland Sch. Dist., 743 F.3d
524, 528 n.4 (7th Cir. 2014); accord Strominger v. Brock, 592 F.
App’x 508, 511 (7th Cir. 2014). We need not resolve this ques‐
tion, however, because H.P.’s underlying claims fail.
Turning to the merits, “[w]e review a grant of summary
judgment de novo, construing the facts and making reasonable
inferences in favor of the nonmovant.” Horton v. Pobjecky, 883
F.3d 941, 948 (7th Cir. 2018). Summary judgment is appropri‐
ate only “if the movant shows that there is no genuine dispute
as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment
as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a); see also Celotex Corp.
v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322–23 (1986).
H.P.’s claims at issue arise under the ADA and the Reha‐
bilitation Act, both of which “prohibit discrimination against
the disabled.” Trebatoski, 743 F.3d at 528. Under Title II of the
ADA, “no qualified individual with a disability shall, by rea‐
son of such disability, be excluded from participation in or be
denied the benefits of the services, programs, or activities of a

-- 4 of 6 --

No. 18‐2272 5
public entity, or be subjected to discrimination by any such
entity.” 42 U.S.C. § 12132. Section 504 of the Rehabilitation Act
similarly provides that “[n]o otherwise qualified individual
with a disability … shall, solely by reason of her or his disa‐
bility, be excluded from the participation in, be denied the
benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any pro‐
gram or activity receiving Federal financial assistance.” 29
U.S.C. § 794(a). Given the similarities between the statutes, we
apply the same analysis to a plaintiff’s claim under either one.
A.H. ex rel. Holzmueller v. Ill. High Sch. Ass’n, 881 F.3d 587, 592
(7th Cir. 2018) (hereinafter, “A.H.”) (citations omitted).
Regardless of a plaintiff’s theory of liability, “[w]e have
consistently held that the statutory language in both the Re‐
habilitation Act and the ADA requires proof of causation.” Id.
at 592–93 (citing Wis. Cmty. Servs., Inc. v. City of Milwaukee, 465
F.3d 737, 752 (7th Cir. 2006) (en banc)). As we explained in
A.H., “both statutes prohibit discrimination against individu‐
als ‘by reason of’ the disability, or ‘on the basis of’ the disabil‐
ity,” and this “language requires [the plaintiff] to prove ‘that,
‘but for’ his disability, he would have been able to access the
services or benefits desired.’” A.H., 881 F.3d at 593 (citation
omitted).
Our analysis begins and ends with the causation require‐
ment. As the record makes clear, it is undisputed that the Dis‐
trict disallowed H.P. from attending NCHS precisely because
of its residency policy, and not because of H.P.’s alleged dis‐
ability. The residency policy on its face treats identical non‐
residents the same. Indeed, the only reason H.P. could not at‐
tend NCHS is because she resided outside the District—a fact
unrelated to her disability. In A.H., for example, we rejected a

-- 5 of 6 --

6 No. 18‐2272
claim that an athletic association should create special divi‐
sions for disabled runners at its championship because the
plaintiff could not show that he would have been qualified if
he were not disabled. A.H., 881 F.3d at 592–93; see also Wis.
Cmty. Servs., Inc., 465 F.3d at 754–55 (rejecting claim based on
denial of zoning permit where city would have denied a per‐
mit to similar entities serving non‐disabled persons). Alt‐
hough we are sympathetic to H.P.’s unfortunate situation, her
claims under the ADA and Rehabilitation Act fail for want of
causation and the grant of summary judgment to the District
was proper.
III. Conclusion
We DISMISS the appeal as to H.P.’s claims for equitable
relief and otherwise AFFIRM the judgment of the district
court.

-- 6 of 6 --