Admassu Regassa v. Emily Cimino

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted April 10, 2019*
Decided April 11, 2019
Before
AMY C. BARRETT, Circuit Judge
MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge
MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge
No. 18-2917
ADMASSU REGASSA,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
EMILY CIMINO, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Illinois.
No. 17-cv-999-JPG
J. Phil Gilbert,
Judge.
O R D E R
Admassu Regassa, formerly a federal prisoner in Illinois, sued prison officials
under Bivens v. Six Unknown Named Agents of Federal Bureau of Narcotics, 403 U.S. 388
(1971), raising unrelated allegations about due process, access to the courts, and cruel
and unusual punishment. After giving Regassa three chances to submit a legally
adequate complaint, the district court dismissed his operative complaint at screening,
* The defendants were not served with process in the district court and are not
participating in this appeal. We have agreed to decide this case without oral argument
because the brief and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral
argument would not significantly aid the court. F ED. R. APP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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No. 18-2917 Page 2
see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A. Because Regassa’s factual allegations do not state a valid claim,
we affirm.
The procedural history is straightforward. The district court dismissed the first
complaint because Regassa improperly joined 116 defendants in an 87-page complaint
that was not a “short and plain claim for relief,” as required under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 8. After giving Regassa a chance to amend, the court dismissed Regassa’s
next attempt—a 94-page amended complaint against 88 defendants. Echoing our
concerns in George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605 (7th Cir. 2007) (forbidding plaintiffs from
joining unrelated claims against different defendants in one suit), the court dismissed
this “kitchen sink” complaint that included “largely unrelated claims.” Finally, Regassa
filed his operative complaint. Running 52 pages, it alleges that 61 defendants from the
United States Penitentiary in Marion, Illinois, conspired against him in three ways. First,
some defendants violated his right to due process by prohibiting him from calling a
witness at a disciplinary hearing, by subjecting him to email, phone, and segregation
restrictions based on false incident reports, and by denying his grievances. Second,
some defendants allegedly denied him access to the courts by refusing to send his legal
mail and give him a medical evaluation. Third, other defendants violated the Eighth
Amendment by calling him a “pervert” and gossiping about him. The court dismissed
this complaint, ruling that it did not state a claim upon which relief could be granted.
On appeal, Regassa first contends that the court “totally ignored” his claim that
the defendants conspired to deny him due process at a disciplinary hearing by not
letting him call a witness. An “inmate facing disciplinary proceedings should be
allowed to call all witnesses … when permitting him to do so will not be unduly
hazardous to institutional safety or correctional goals.” Wolff v. McDonnell, 418 U.S. 539,
566 (1974). But the witness must be material. See Piggie v. Cotton, 342 F.3d 660, 666
(7th Cir. 2003). Regassa’s claim fails because, despite receiving multiple chances from
the district court, he does not allege materiality: he has not said what this unidentified
witness’s testimony would have been, nor how it would have helped him. See id. at 678.
And he has not alleged any procedural shortcoming in the hearings that led to his email,
phone, and segregation restrictions. See Wilkinson v. Austin, 545 U.S. 209, 224–25 (2005);
Lagerstrom v. Kingston, 463 F.3d 621, 624–25 (7th Cir. 2006). Regassa also argues that
prison officials denied him due process by rejecting his grievances. But he alleges that
they reviewed his grievances, which was their job, not a constitutional violation.
See Owens v. Hinsley, 635 F.3d 950, 953 (7th Cir. 2011); Burks v. Raemisch, 555 F.3d 592,
595 (7th Cir. 2009). Because Regassa’s conspiracy claims were based on allegations that

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No. 18-2917 Page 3
do not state any violation of due process, these claims were correctly dismissed.
See Archer v. Chisholm, 870 F.3d 603, 620 (7th Cir. 2017).
The district court also rightly dismissed the remaining claims. Regassa maintains
that prison officials denied him access to the courts by interfering with his legal mail
and his receipt of a medical evaluation. But the court properly dismissed this claim
because he has not alleged, as he must, that he lost the opportunity to pursue a valid
legal claim in court as a result of this interference. See Lewis v. Casey, 518 U.S. 343, 351
(1996); Armstrong v. Daily, 786 F.3d 529, 553 (7th Cir. 2015). Nor did the court err in
dismissing Regassa’s Eighth Amendment claim against officials who called him a
“pervert” and gossiped about him. Such actions do not constitute cruel and unusual
punishment. See Dobbey v. Ill. Dep't of Corr., 574 F.3d 443, 446 (7th Cir. 2009).
AFFIRMED

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