United States of America v. Paul Schlieve

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted May 30, 2019 *
Decided June 6, 2019 ‡
Before
DIANE P. WOOD, Chief Judge
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge
ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge
No. 18-3391
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
PAUL SCHLIEVE,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Western District of
Wisconsin.
No. 18-cr-53-wmc
William M. Conley,
Judge.
O R D E R
Paul Schlieve was convicted in the Eastern District of Texas of several charges
related to his involvement in a drug conspiracy. After he was released from prison, he
moved to the Western District of Wisconsin, and the district court there took over his
supervision. In the middle of a dispute with his probation officer about the need to
* We have agreed to decide this case without oral argument because the briefs
and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would
not significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
‡ This order was amended pursuant to this court’s order of July 3, 2019.
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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verify his employment history, Schlieve moved to terminate his supervised release. The
district court denied his motion, and we affirm.
While on supervision, Schlieve was required to “work regularly at a lawful
occupation” and to “provide the probation officer with access to any requested financial
information for purposes of monitoring … his efforts to obtain and maintain lawful
employment.” In 2018, Schlieve’s probation officer asked him for documents showing
that he had been engaged in legitimate employment since his release. Schlieve (a former
professor of statistics and software developer) had represented that he was employed
by a software company he founded before his criminal conviction, Katunigan. In its
current iteration, Schlieve reported, Katunigan contracted with a Cayman Islands-based
company to provide “litigation support” (Schlieve had learned legal skills in prison)
and “whatever services they require,” including identifying business-development
opportunities. The company paid Katunigan a monthly “draw,” and Schlieve said he
lived in company housing and drove a company car.
Schlieve told his probation officer that he could not provide “a detailed
description of the case work I am doing because I am not permitted to divulge that to
anyone.” He added that he could provide only limited documents (a W-2 and tax return
for 2016 and bank statements) because of confidentiality concerns. The officer deemed
his explanation and his documents insufficient and expressed concern that Schlieve was
not engaged in legitimate employment. In response, Schlieve told the officer that he was
“reorganizing” his employment; he would continue doing the same work but as a
salaried employee at a law firm in Belleville, Illinois, beginning in March 2018.
Schlieve, through counsel, then moved to terminate his remaining term of
supervised release based on his “truly unique and remarkable” progress. The
government opposed Schlieve’s motion because he had not provided probation with
enough details for it to confirm whether Schlieve had maintained employment before
March 2018 and, if so, whether it was above board.
At the hearing on Schlieve’s motion, his lawyer argued that Schlieve had
complied with his supervision even though he had an honest disagreement over the
financial documents requested by the probation office. The judge explained that he
would not consider ending Schlieve’s supervision until he complied with the probation
office’s reasonable request for information. In response to the concern that the motion
was “premature,” Schlieve’s attorney noted that Schlieve could have moved to
terminate his supervised release after one year; the judge responded, “I would have

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No. 18-3391 Page 3
denied it.” The court then explained that he was denying Schlieve’s motion because he
did not have enough information to confirm that Schlieve was eligible for relief—i.e.,
that he had been complying with the terms of his supervision:
I’m denying [Schlieve’s motion] because it’s premature. It has nothing to
do with whether or not he was employed during this period or not; it has
to do with his failure to provide reasonably requested information from
the probation officer who’s assigned to supervise him. And I’m not going
to make a decision about early termination … until the probation office
has a better understanding as to what he’s been doing for the last three
years.
Schlieve now appeals. We review the denial of a motion for early termination of
supervised release for an abuse of discretion. See United States v. Lowe, 632 F.3d 996, 997
(7th Cir. 2011). A court abuses its discretion when it “commits a serious error of
judgment, such as the failure to consider an essential factor.” Id. at 997–98.
Schlieve argues that the district court erroneously deemed his motion
“premature.” He interprets the district judge’s statement that he would have denied the
same motion at the one-year mark as an arbitrary refusal to consider early-termination
motions until the end date draws closer. A district court may release a defendant from a
term of supervision after one year, see 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(1), and we have held that a
district court abuses its discretion by refusing to entertain a motion for early
termination before the last year of supervision. See Lowe, 632 F.3d at 998–99. Here,
however, we do not interpret the district court’s order as Schlieve does. Rather, as the
judge explained, Schlieve filed his motion before he provided the information required
to demonstrate that he had complied with the terms of his supervision. Indeed, the
district court stated at least four times that it would not consider the merits of the
motion “until” Schlieve complied with the probation office’s requests, and twice that
Schlieve could request termination when the dispute over documents was over. The
record therefore does not permit Schlieve’s inference that the judge simply wanted him
to serve more of his term before seeking early termination.
Schlieve also argues that the district court abused its discretion by not addressing
the factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) before denying his motion. A district court should give
“some indication” that it considered the factors in § 3553(a) when assessing a motion for
early termination of supervised release. Lowe, 632 F.3d at 998. But that presupposes that
the court considers the motion on the merits. Here, the district court was clear that it

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would not even consider early termination until the probation office had the
information needed to verify Schlieve’s compliance with the terms of supervision. The
court said it was unable to make any judgment on the record before it, and so it had no
occasion to consider the § 3553(a) factors. Thus, the court’s reliance on Schlieve’s failure
to demonstrate his compliance with the terms of his “conditional liberty,” United States
v. McIntosh, 630 F.3d 699, 703 (7th Cir. 2011), was not an abuse of discretion.
AFFIRMED

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