United States of America v. Scott Bodley

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted November 2, 2020*
Decided November 4, 2020
Before
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge
MICHAEL S. KANNE, Circuit Judge
DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judge
No. 20-2144
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
SCOTT BODLEY,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United
States District Court for the
Western District of Wiscon-
sin.
No. 13-cr-52-bbc
Barbara B. Crabb, Judge.
Order
In March 2020, while confined in a federal prison, Scott Bodley asked the district
court for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. §3582(c)(1)(A)(i). The judge denied that
motion, which Bodley renewed six weeks later. The judge denied that second motion
because she believed that Bodley had by then (June 2020) been transferred to a halfway
* The appellee was not served with process in the district court and has not participated in the appeal.
After examining appellant’s brief and the record, we have concluded that oral argument is unnecessary.
See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); Cir. R. 34(f).

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No. 20-2144 Page 2
house, rendering his request moot. The record on appeal shows that this did not occur
until August 14, when Bodley began his term of supervised release in a halfway house
in Wisconsin because he could not find local housing on his own.
Bodley contends on appeal that the judge should have granted his original or re-
newed motion under §3582(c)(1)(A)(i). That motion can no longer be granted because
Bodley is not in prison. (We need not consider other potential obstacles to the award of
that relief.) But the district judge was wrong to say in June that Bodley’s request is
“moot.” It would not have been moot even had Bodley then been in a halfway house, as
the judge believed. Bodley still wants relief, but of a different kind: he wants the court
to permit him to serve his supervised release in Louisiana, where he says that housing
and a job await, rather than in Wisconsin, where the terms of his supervised release re-
quire him to stay. A judge could provide that relief, so the case is not moot even though
§3582(c)(1)(A)(i) is no longer the appropriate grant of authority.
A federal judge may change the terms of a felon’s supervised release at any time. 18
U.S.C. §3583(e)(2). Bodley’s failure to cite the appropriate statute does not disable him
from seeking judicial aid. Because the district court retains authority to grant Bodley a
change in the location of his supervision—or to end the supervised release altogether,
as Bodley also requests—we vacate the order dismissing the case as moot and remand
for consideration on the merits.
VACATED AND REMANDED

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