Marvin L. Matthews v. Antonio Chambers

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted May 24, 2021 *
Decided May 24, 2021
Before
DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge
MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge
THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge
No. 20-1358
MARVIN L. MATTHEWS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
ANTONIO CHAMBERS, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois,
Eastern Division.
No. 1:19-cv-07519
Rebecca R. Pallmeyer,
Chief Judge.
O R D E R
Marvin Matthews, an Illinois citizen, sued an Illinois agency and two state
officials in state court for collecting the same child-support obligation twice. Dissatisfied
with the state-court proceedings, Matthews also sued them in federal district court,
which dismissed the suit for lack of jurisdiction. Because Matthews does not allege a
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. FED. R. A PP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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No. 20-1358 Page 2
substantial federal question, the district court correctly dismissed the suit, and we
affirm.
According to Matthews, the defendants “fraudulent[ly]” subjected him to the
“duplication of withholding of child support payments.” In 2017, he says, a case
manager at the Illinois Department of Health Care and Family Services and an assistant
attorney general imposed a lien on his bank account for uncollected child-support
payments. But, Matthews continues, the Department and these state employees had
already compelled his former employer to withhold the same support payments from
his wages. The case manager and attorney “duplicat[ed]” the “withholding of child
support payments” in a “discriminatory manner.” He sought to resolve the problem in
state court, where the status of those proceedings is unclear.
Matthews then turned to federal court, where the case was dismissed. He
initially raised three claims. Two were against the state officials in their personal
capacities—one purportedly under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for violating his right to equal
protection (by duplicative withholding “based upon” his race) and another for violating
the Illinois Constitution. The third claim, against the Department, alleged a violation of
Illinois law. At a hearing, the district judge asked Matthews to clarify his allegations.
Reading from his complaint, the judge asked him if he faced “discrimination,” and in
response he explained that he bases his federal suit on dissatisfaction with the pace of
the state court in correcting his alleged double payments. In later dismissing the suit,
the district court ruled that, “[a]lthough he has characterized this case as a claim of race
discrimination, Mr. Matthews made clear in court that his real challenge is to errors
made by an agency of the State of Illinois.” The court ruled that his remedy for the
perceived sluggishness of the state trial court lies in the state appellate court with a
petition for a writ of mandamus, rather than an invocation of federal jurisdiction. In
response to Matthews’s motion for reconsideration, the court added that it lacked
jurisdiction based on the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. See D.C. Ct. of Appeals v. Feldman, 460
U.S. 462 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Tr. Co., 263 U.S. 413 (1923).
On appeal, Matthews challenges the application of Rooker-Feldman, and the
defendants correctly concede that the reliance on Rooker-Feldman was misplaced. This
doctrine is “confined to . . . cases brought by state-court losers . . . inviting district court
review and rejection of [state-court] judgments.” Exxon Mobil Corp. v. Saudi Basic Indus.
Corp., 544 U.S. 280, 284 (2005); see Sykes v. Cook Cnty. Circuit Ct. Prob. Div., 837 F.3d 736,
741 (7th Cir. 2016). Matthews does not ask us to reject the original decision to institute
child-support payments or any adverse ruling in his state-court suit contesting the

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No. 20-1358 Page 3
duplicative withholding. To the contrary, he told the district court that he filed this suit
because, in his view, the state court had not yet ruled.
Nonetheless, dismissal for lack of jurisdiction was proper. The parties are not of
diverse citizenship, and the only possible federal question is a § 1983 claim—against the
two state employees in their personal capacity—based on race discrimination. But no
substantial race claim is present. In the district court, Matthews clarified that his real
complaint is that the state court has been slow to resolve his charges of double billing.
The district court rightly dismissed the suit against the two officers because, “in the
absence of diversity of citizenship, it is essential to jurisdiction that a substantial federal
question should be presented.” Hagans v. Lavine, 415 U.S. 528, 537 (1974) (quoting
Ex parte Poresky, 290 U.S. 30, 31–32 (1933)). Without a substantial question about race
discrimination against the two officers, the case presents no federal question, just a
question of “fraudulent” double billing, a state-law matter.
Matthews responds that the district court erred by inquiring into the nature of
his suit and the query unfairly surprised him. But a court can and should question
jurisdiction, and it may dismiss a suit for lack of jurisdiction if, as here, the plaintiff is
heard beforehand. Evergreen Square of Cudahy v. Wis. Hous. & Econ. Dev. Auth., 776 F.3d
463, 465 (7th Cir. 2015). True, we have prohibited district judges from using off-the-
record, ex parte, telephonic discussions with pro se litigants to extract evidentiary
concessions. See Henderson v. Wilcoxen, 802 F.3d 930, 931 (7th Cir. 2015). But the district
court’s discussion was on the record (which we have reviewed), in person, and not ex
parte, and it merely sought clarification of his complaint, not evidence, a practice that
we permit when screening pro se detainee complaints. See id. at 932. We see no reason
to prohibit a similar practice here, so Matthews cannot argue unfair surprise.
With the federal claim gone, the district court rightly dismissed the suit.
Matthews does not insist that any potential amendments to his complaint would have
saved it, so leave to amend was not necessary. Hukic v. Aurora Loan Servs., 588 F.3d 420,
432 (7th Cir. 2009). And the district court properly dismissed the remaining claims
because Matthews based them on state law. Once a district court has dismissed federal
claims on the pleadings, it properly relinquishes supplemental jurisdiction over any
remaining state-law claims. Sharp Elecs. Corp. v. Metro. Life Ins., 578 F.3d 505, 514
(7th Cir. 2009).
This resolution obviates any need to explore the defendants’ invocation of other
defenses, such as the domestic-relations exception to federal jurisdiction. Also, we have
considered Matthews’s other arguments, but none warrants further discussion.

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No. 20-1358 Page 4
AFFIRMED

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