Fkfj, Inc. v. Village of Worth

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 20-2396
FKFJ, INC., et al.,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
VILLAGE OF WORTH , et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 18 C 2828 — Jorge Alonso, Judge.
____________________
A RGUED A PRIL 14, 2021 — D ECIDED A UGUST 26, 2021
____________________
Before MANION, SCUDDER , and KIRSCH , Circuit Judges.
MANION, Circuit Judge. Isam Samara and Muwafak Rizek
formed FKFJ, Inc.1 to operate Saraya Restaurant & Banquet
and Zaman Café in Worth, Illinois. Mary Werner was Village
President at the time, and she decided to run for reelection the
1 For simplicity, the plaintiffs-appellants are collectively referred to as
“FKFJ.”

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2 No. 20-2396
year Saraya opened. FKFJ supported Werner’s political oppo-
nent in the election.
Around the same time, FKFJ had various disputes with the
Village of Worth. Based on these clashes, FKFJ filed this § 1983
action alleging First Amendment, equal protection, and due
process violations. The district court granted summary judg-
ment for the defendants. On appeal, FKFJ argues the court
erred by ignoring genuine disputes of material fact and by
making credibility determinations. While our review of the
record reveals various factual disputes, none are genuine and
material. We affirm.
I. Background
In June 2016, Samara and Rizek formed FKFJ, Inc., and
Saraya Restaurant opened a month later. The restaurant was
located at 7011 W. 111th Street in Worth, Illinois. FKFJ leased
the property from Samara’s brother, Husam,2 for $6,000 a
month. Beside Saraya to the west, at 7013 W. 111th Street,
FKFJ operated a hookah lounge called Zaman Café.
Meanwhile, Werner was Village President. 3 Her term was
set to expire in April 2017, so she began circulating petitions
for reelection in September 2016, a couple months after Saraya
opened. That same September, Randy Keller, Werner’s politi-
cal opponent, asked FKFJ to support his campaign for Village
President. FKFJ agreed and held campaign events at Saraya
2 The record contains multiple spellings of Samara’s brother’s name.
We, like the district court, use the one that appears most often.
3 The titles “Village President” and “Mayor” are interchangeable. See
65 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/3.1-15-10.

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No. 20-2396 3
from October 2016 through March 2017. Werner eventually
beat Keller in the election.
As for the parties’ relationship with one another, Samara
first met Werner in 2011 but started to interact with her more
around January 2013. Until September 2016, Samara and Wer-
ner had a business relationship which he described as “al-
ways very friendly.” Werner and Rizek also knew each other
“on a professional level” but were not friends. According to
Rizek, Werner became “[v]ery hostile” in January 2017. Rizek
described Werner as “very aggressive” with him and Samara.
He also stated Werner’s attitude changed “[a]s soon as we
started supporting Randy Keller.”
FKFJ alleges four basic problems with the Village which it
argues stem from its political support of Keller.
1. Delayed Parking Lot Project
The area around Saraya and Zaman Café did not have suf-
ficient parking. 4 International Realty owned the 7015 lot, the
property next to Zaman Café on its west side. The 7015 lot had
a single-family home on it and was residentially zoned.
In August 2016, FKFJ and International entered into an
oral agreement to allow FKFJ’s customers to park in the space
behind the home on the 7015 lot. FKFJ planned to purchase
4 On brief, FKFJ argues this fact was not asserted by either party. How-
ever, Samara directly stated in his deposition that “the whole area on
111th is in desperate need of parking. … there is not enough parking in
that whole area.” Dkt. 151-1 at 27, lines 14–16. Rizek also stated “parking
was always an issue on that street.” Dkt. 151-2 at 41, lines 3–4.

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4 No. 20-2396
the home5 once the residents moved out (which was set for
October 2016) and convert the entire lot into a parking lot. Ac-
cording to FKFJ, Werner encouraged demolition of the home
on the 7015 lot in September 2016.6
In order to convert the 7015 lot into a parking lot, FKFJ
needed to obtain a demolition permit from Cook County.
FKFJ also needed a special use permit from the Village of
Worth since the property was residentially zoned. That pro-
cess required FKFJ to apply to the Real Estate Development
Board7 (“REDB”) which would make a recommendation to
the Village Board of Trustees. The Village Board was to make
the ultimate decision on whether to issue the permit.
FKFJ, rather than International, paid for the construction
of the parking lot.
a. Demolition permit
In order to obtain the demolition permit, FKFJ separately
needed a permit from the Illinois Department of Transporta-
tion (“IDOT”) to shut off the water and sewer connections be-
cause there was a water line across the street on state property
that needed to be shut off. By August or September 2016, the
Village had not received any paperwork from Cook County
or IDOT. By August 2016, Rizek started coming to Village Hall
5 According to Rizek, International obtained title to the house after the
tenants moved out, but in any event, the agreement between International
and FKFJ was to make the entire lot into a parking lot.
6 FKFJ contests whether the idea to demolish the home was initially
Samara’s or Werner’s. Rizek stated Werner encouraged demolition of the
home. Any dispute of fact on this matter is immaterial.
7 REDB is composed of appointed commissioners who are unpaid vol-
unteers.

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No. 20-2396 5
more frequently about demolishing the house. He was told he
needed to contact Cook County and obtain a demolition per-
mit first, and a permit from IDOT, before the Village could get
involved.
In October 2016, FKFJ applied for the demolition permit.
Shortly thereafter, Rizek called Lori Zetterberg, who was an
independent contractor for International at the time, and told
her she needed to handle the permits because he was having
issues with the Mayor. According to Zetterberg, “it was no se-
cret that [Rizek] and the mayor did not like each other.”
According to Samara, Werner made it difficult to obtain
the permit by reaching out to Cook County about the water
lines. 8 According to Werner, Rizek caused the delays in ob-
taining the necessary permit from IDOT. She claimed the Vil-
lage assisted by contacting IDOT to try to get the permits ex-
pedited. The process to get IDOT to mark the water line took
ninety days.
In January 2017, Samara noticed Werner’s tone toward
him changed. She was not as friendly and would talk to him
“in a mean way on the phone.” Werner complained that the
demolition permit application was not complete and FKFJ
had not paid all required fees. She also complained to Samara
about Rizek.
8 Samara’s testimony on the matter is vague and fails to specify what
Werner did that caused a delay. Rather, his testimony is conclusory, stat-
ing that “from [his] perspective,” she made the process difficult. Similarly,
Rizek testified Werner “made our life a miserable hell, in order to knock
the rest of the building down.” His vague testimony also fails to delineate
any actions Werner took.

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6 No. 20-2396
In March 2017, FKFJ obtained the necessary demolition
permit and the house on the 7015 lot was torn down.
b. Special use permit
In April or May 2017, FKFJ submitted its application for a
special use permit, including a check for fees. The first check
for fees was for an incorrect amount. A few weeks later, FKFJ
submitted a check for the correct amount ($2,500), but the
check bounced. 9 In May 2017, FKFJ submitted another check
for fees, and it cleared. However, the special use permit appli-
cation was still incomplete because FKFJ had not submitted a
site plan. (The REDB could not hold a hearing without the site
plan.) 10
A separate but related issue concerned FKFJ’s need to re-
quest a variance. The Village had specific requirements for
parking lots (such as the number of feet deep for a parking
stall) with which FKFJ could not comply. Although obtaining
a variance was separate from the special use permit, the REDB
hearing would address everything at once. FKFJ was unsure
how to fill out the form for requesting a variance, so Werner
assisted in filling out the necessary paperwork.
9 On brief, FKFJ argues the check for the fees did not bounce, but it
does not point to contrary evidence. See Dkt. 151-7 at 138–39.
10 Additionally, FKFJ complains the Village made the process of get-
ting a special use application difficult for Phillip Riley Architects, the com-
pany FKFJ hired to ensure the design of the parking lot complied with the
municipal code. But Samara’s testimony is entirely speculative. See Dkt.
151-1 at 83, lines 6–22 (explaining that when the architect submitted draw-
ings, a trustee would complain and speculating the complaints resulted
from Werner pushing him to complain, “or we assume that she did”).

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No. 20-2396 7
In June or July 2017, FKFJ submitted a site plan. After the
requisite paperwork had been submitted, the Village required
a minimum of 15 days’ notice in the newspaper and notice to
be posted on the property.
In August 2017, REDB held a hearing in which it expressed
concern with FKFJ’s site plan. Specifically, REDB was con-
cerned about the depth of the parking spaces, rainwater run-
off pouring across the sidewalk, space to make a three-point
turn, among other concerns. REDB voted to continue the
meeting. At the following meeting in the beginning of Sep-
tember, REDB recommended approval.
In late October or November 2017, the Village Board ap-
proved the special use permit. All six trustees voted yes.
2. Ticketing
In March 2017, right after FKFJ demolished the house on
the 7015 lot, it filled the lot with gravel. Gravel did not comply
with the Worth ordinance on parking-lot construction. Ac-
cording to Rizek, three-fourths of the lot already contained
gravel, so FKFJ wanted gravel for the part of the lot where the
house had been. The record contains conflicting evidence on
FKFJ’s initial knowledge gravel was non-compliant with the
Worth ordinance. Rizek, on behalf of FKFJ, testified the Vil-
lage told FKFJ to use gravel. He also stated FKFJ did not know
the lot was not in compliance. According to Werner, gravel
was first dumped in the parking lot in front of Zaman Café
when the Superintendent of Public Works instructed Rizek
not to spread the gravel because it is the wrong type of rock
per Village ordinance. She stated FKFJ spread the gravel any-
way and the Village immediately informed FKFJ the parking
lot was illegal and no one could park there.

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8 No. 20-2396
In any event, assuming FKFJ did not know the gravel was
non-compliant when it was spread, it is clear FKFJ eventually
found out the parking lot violated the Worth ordinance. The
lot also had not received a special use permit. In April 2017,
FKFJ blocked off the parking lot with cones, garbage cans, and
yellow ribbons to prevent people from parking there, but peo-
ple started parking there anyway. Worth police officers tick-
eted the owners of the vehicles directly. The vehicle owners
appeared in administrative hearings to dispute the tickets and
argued they were valeted to the lot. FKFJ claims (and we ac-
cept as true at this juncture) it never valeted anyone to the
gravel lot.
At a Village board meeting, Police Chief Mark Micetich
learned FKFJ’s new parking lot had not received proper per-
mits, but cars were parked there continually. On May 30, 2017,
Micetich issued a memorandum instructing other police offic-
ers that there was to be no parking in the 7015 lot. The memo
directed officers to ticket Saraya, since vehicle owners com-
plained they had not personally parked in the lot. The memo
required tickets to be hand-delivered to a Saraya manager.
According to Micetich, no one directed the memo. He had is-
sued similar memoranda in the past. Micetich had never is-
sued citations under the municipal code sections used for the
tickets to FKFJ to any other business or individuals.
Before May 2017, FKFJ did not have any issues with the
Village regarding parking tickets. However over the next few
months, dozens of tickets were issued, some of which FKFJ
claims were issued for vehicles in the vicinity of the restau-
rant, not just on the 7015 lot. A police officer would drop the
tickets off at Saraya’s reception desk.

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No. 20-2396 9
FKFJ raised the ticketing issue to the Village, stating that
people parked their own cars in the lot. Micetich approached
Village counsel about the issue. In October 2017, counsel ad-
vised Micetich to issue a memo directing police officers to
write six tickets for each car on the 7015 lot—three tickets to
Saraya and three to the property owner, International. On Oc-
tober 18, 2017, following counsel’s advice, Micetich issued an
updated memo directing each entity be issued three tickets:
one for Saraya not having the required license, one for not
complying with the requirements for operation of parking
lots, and one for not having a special use permit.11 FKFJ re-
ceived hundreds of tickets in total. After the parking lot was
completed to code, the tickets stopped being issued.
In December 2017, FKFJ put a fence around the parking
lot. The special use permit had been approved by that point,
but the parking lot was not completed until July or August of
2018. 12
11 The relevant code sections are § 3-17-2 (requiring a license for main-
taining and operating a parking lot), § 3-17-4-C (specifying the require-
ments for surfaces of parking lots), and § 5-6A-3 (special uses).
12 FKFJ also complains about this delay. It claims that an asphalter it
was working with backed out of asphalting the 7015 lot because the Vil-
lage was making the project difficult. There is no evidence from which a
jury could find the Village actually made the project difficult, though. Sa-
mara’s deposition testimony states the asphalter felt the process would be
“sticky, lengthy, [and] ugly” because a Village official told the asphalter
what he needed to do, such as how many feet to dig out. Dkt. 151-1 at 121,
lines 1–20. This is not enough for a jury to find the Village made the project
difficult.

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10 No. 20-2396
At a hearing on February 19, 2018, the Village voluntarily
dismissed all tickets against Saraya since it was not the owner
of the property.
3. Arrest for Bounced Check
On March 30, 2017, Rizek purchased limestone rock from
Schroeder Materials to landscape Saraya. The next day,
Schroeder attempted to deposit Rizek’s check, but it bounced.
Schroeder tried again on April 3, 2017, and it bounced a sec-
ond time.13 Schroeder contacted Rizek about the bounced
check.
On May 17, 2017, Village police investigated the matter.
An officer spoke with Schroeder and Rizek to determine what
had happened. The record contains factual disputes about
what happened next. According to the May 17th police report,
Rizek said he would pay Schroeder on May 22, 2017. The of-
ficer returned to Schroeder, told the business Rizek would
drop off payment on May 22nd, and instructed Schroeder to
contact the police if Rizek did not pay on that date. According
to Rizek, he had been informed about the bounced check and
told Schroeder he would pay after it sent him documentation
the check was returned due to insufficient funds. On May
17th, Rizek informed the officer he knew about the bounced
check and intended to pay.
Schroeder contacted the Village police sometime before
May 23rd because it had not been paid. On May 23rd, Officer
Luburich arrested Rizek at Saraya Restaurant for deceptive
practices. According to the officer, Rizek offered to pay, so he
13 The parties dispute the number of times the check bounced, but any
dispute of fact is immaterial. For present purposes, we state the facts in
FKFJ’s favor.

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No. 20-2396 11
was released. According to Rizek, he was forced to pay. Rizek
claims the restaurant manager took out Rizek’s debit card,
and the police officer called and made the payment to
Schroeder. The payment cleared and the matter was dropped.
Police Chief Micetich called Werner after the fact to tell her
about police involvement in the dispute between Rizek and
Schroeder.14
4. Business License
The business licenses for Saraya and Zaman Café were set
to expire on December 31, 2017. Before they could be re-
newed, Husam, the owner of the 7011 lot, leased the building
to another business. The following events led to the new lease
and failure of Saraya’s business.
In September 2017, Husam approached Werner about
$250,000 in unpaid rent that FKFJ owed. 15 He stated that so
much was owed that he was unable to pay his property tax
and expressed concern he would lose the building. If Husam
could not pay, the building was to be sold by December 1st.
He told Werner he needed a new tenant otherwise he would
lose the building. Werner knew a man named Thaer Jbara
wanted to open a hookah lounge in Worth. She told Jbara to
14 FKFJ also maintains that Werner threatened to prosecute Rizek un-
less FKFJ paid a cameraman it hired to install security cameras on its prop-
erty. But it is undisputed FKFJ had received services from the cameraman
and had not paid, presumably due to a bad check, at the time Werner
called about the issue. Dkt. 151-1 at 68, lines 1–15. The incident occurred
after FKFJ had already written a bad check to Schroeder Materials. And
the dispute is not fleshed out in the record or with argument. Conse-
quently, the incident has no effect on our analysis.
15 FKFJ admitted having difficulty paying rent in 2016. Dkt. 151-1 at
108.

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12 No. 20-2396
contact Husam. Husam decided to lease to Jbara. Jbara’s lease
term was to begin on December 31, 2017.
In October and November 2017, Husam and Jbara went
through the process of applying for and obtaining a license to
operate a retail tobacco business at 7011.
In December, FKFJ tried to renew Saraya’s business li-
cense. The Village would not accept the application. Werner
explained FKFJ was denied the opportunity to apply for a
business license renewal because the Village had already is-
sued a retail tobacco license to someone else at 7011 W. 111th
Street. The Village could not issue a license to operate a res-
taurant and a retail tobacco license to the same building at the
same time. Saraya closed down in December 2017.
FKFJ also sought to renew Zaman Café’s business license.
The Village was unable to renew the license because it had
been conditioned on access to Saraya’s valet parking. Without
access to Saraya’s parking, Zaman had insufficient parking,
since the 7015 lot had not been completed. (Although the
Board had approved the special use permit in the fall of 2017,
the parking lot was not completed until July or August 2018.)
The new business at 7011 would not be opening immediately
due to remodeling, so the Village gave FKFJ four months lee-
way on the renewal of Zaman Café’s business license. Zaman
Café could operate while 7011 was under construction. How-
ever, the 7015 parking lot was still not completed when Jbara’s
business on the 7011 lot opened. Consequently, Zaman’s li-
cense was rescinded. The café closed in May 2018. After the
7015 lot was completed, the Village renewed Zaman’s busi-
ness license and it reopened.

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No. 20-2396 13
FKFJ filed this lawsuit asserting claims under 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983 and various state law claims. The district court granted
the defendants’ motion for summary judgment on the § 1983
claims and declined to exercise supplemental jurisdiction
over the state law claims.
On appeal, FKFJ raises only three of the federal claims at
issue below: First Amendment, equal protection, 16 and due
process.17 It sues Werner, in her individual capacity, and the
Village. 18
II. Discussion
A. Standard of Review
This Court reviews the district court’s grant of summary
judgment de novo, viewing the facts in the light most favorable
to FKFJ, the non-moving party. 19 Weaver v. Champion Petfoods
16 International Realty was a plaintiff with respect to the equal protec-
tion claim, but it settled and stipulated to dismissal.
17 FKFJ’s brief makes perfunctory mention of its Fourth Amendment
claim but does not legitimately raise this claim on appeal.
18 Although Micetich was a defendant, FKFJ does not raise any of its
claims against him on appeal. FKFJ also sued certain Village police offic-
ers, but the district court dismissed those claims since the officers were not
identified by name in the complaint, nor were they served with process.
19 FKFJ argues the district court did not view all the facts in the light
most favorable to it. To the extent that was the case, the court can hardly
be faulted when FKFJ provided it with incorrect record citations. We re-
mind counsel to exercise care when submitting briefs and memoranda to
the court. Unfortunately, its appellate brief is ridden with typographical
errors and record citations mostly consist of citations to the district court’s
order and its own memoranda below, rather than the summary judgment
record.

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14 No. 20-2396
USA Inc., 3 F.4th 927, 934 (7th Cir. 2021). Summary judgment
is proper when there is no genuine dispute of material fact,
and the moving party is entitled to judgment as a matter of
law. Id. A dispute of fact is “genuine” if “the evidence is such
that a reasonable jury could return a verdict for the nonmov-
ing party.” Dunn v. Menard, Inc., 880 F.3d 899, 905 (7th Cir.
2018) (quoting Anderson v. Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248
(1986)). A dispute of fact is material if the fact “might affect
the outcome of the suit under the governing law.” Anderson,
477 U.S. at 248. Thus, “the mere existence of some alleged fac-
tual dispute between the parties will not defeat an otherwise
properly supported motion for summary judgment; the re-
quirement is that there be no genuine issue of material fact.” Id.
at 247–48.
“In conducting our review, we ‘may not make credibility
determinations, weigh the evidence, or decide which infer-
ences to draw from the facts; these are jobs for a factfinder.’”
Bishop v. Air Line Pilots Ass’n Int’l, 5 F.4th 684, 693 (7th Cir.
2021) (quoting Johnson v. Rimmer, 936 F.3d 695, 705–06 (7th
Cir. 2019)). While we consider reasonable inferences in favor
of FKFJ, we need not draw “every conceivable inference,” in
its favor. Id. (quoting United States v. Luce, 873 F.3d 999, 1005
(7th Cir. 2017)). A party “must present more than mere spec-
ulation or conjecture to defeat a summary judgment motion.”
Weaver, 3 F.4th at 936 (quoting Liu v. T&H Mach., Inc., 191 F.3d
790, 796 (7th Cir. 1999)). “When the non-moving party fails to
establish ‘the existence of an element essential to that party’s
case, and on which that party will bear the burden of proof at
trial,’ Rule 56(c) mandates entry of summary judgment
against that party because ‘a complete failure of proof con-
cerning an essential element of the nonmoving party’s case
necessarily renders all other facts immaterial.’” Massey v.

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No. 20-2396 15
Johnson, 457 F.3d 711, 716 (7th Cir. 2006) (quoting Celotex Corp.
v. Catrett, 477 U.S. 317, 322 (1986)).
B. First Amendment Claim
FKFJ first argues Werner and the Village retaliated against
it for its political support of Keller, in violation of the First
Amendment. In order to prevail on its First Amendment re-
taliation claim, FKFJ must show (1) it engaged in a protected
First Amendment activity; (2) it “suffered a deprivation that
would likely deter First Amendment activity in the future”;
and (3) causation—specifically, “the First Amendment activ-
ity was ‘at least a motivating factor’ in the Defendants’ deci-
sion to take the retaliatory action.” Douglas v. Reeves, 964 F.3d
643, 646 (7th Cir. 2020) (quoting Bridges v. Gilbert, 557 F.3d 541,
546 (7th Cir. 2009)). The parties agree that FKFJ’s hosting cam-
paign events for Keller is a protected First Amendment activ-
ity. They dispute the second and third elements.
The second element, requiring a deprivation that would
likely deter future First Amendment activity, is an objective
test. We ask “whether the alleged conduct by the defendants
would likely deter a person of ordinary firmness from contin-
uing to engage in protected activity.” Douglas, 964 F.3d at 646
(quoting Surita v. Hyde, 665 F.3d 860, 878 (7th Cir. 2011)). Gen-
erally, the severity of retaliatory conduct is a fact question,
“but when the asserted injury is truly minimal, we can resolve
the issue as a matter of law.” Id. at 647.
The parties’ briefing implies the deprivation must be an
independent constitutional violation, but the law merely re-
quires some negative consequence (deprivation) with a
chilling effect on First Amendment activity. See, e.g., id. at 647–
48 (finding Douglas’s alleged deprivations—refusal to return

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16 No. 20-2396
him to his original prison cell, provision of an inadequate re-
placement position for his job as a wheelchairs pusher—were
inadequate to deter a prisoner of ordinary firmness); see also
Massey, 457 F.3d at 716 (“Government retaliation tends to chill
an individual’s exercise of his First Amendment rights ….”).
In any event, we need not reach the second element because
it is clear FKFJ failed to satisfy the third element—causation.
See Friend v. Valley View Cmty. Unit Sch. Dist. 365U, 789 F.3d
707, 712 (7th Cir. 2015) (explaining each element must be sat-
isfied to survive summary judgment); see also Lavite v. Dun-
stan, 932 F.3d 1020, 1031 (7th Cir. 2019) (refraining from de-
ciding the first prong because “Lavite cannot satisfy the cau-
sation element of his First Amendment retaliation claim”).
Causation may be proven through direct or circumstantial
evidence. Kidwell v. Eisenhauer, 679 F.3d 957, 965 (7th Cir.
2012). FKFJ need not show but-for causation, but only that the
protected activity is a motivating factor in the defendants’
conduct. Massey, 457 F.3d at 717. However, the protected ac-
tivity and adverse action cannot be completely unrelated. Kid-
well, 679 F.3d at 966.
Since the record lacks direct evidence of causation, FKFJ
seeks to establish the causation element through circumstan-
tial evidence. To establish causation through circumstantial
evidence, a plaintiff may present evidence of “suspicious tim-
ing, ambiguous oral or written statements, or behavior to-
wards or comments directed at other [persons] in the pro-
tected group.” Id. (quoting Long v. Tchrs.’ Ret. Sys. of Ill., 585
F.3d 344, 350 (7th Cir. 2009)).
When viewed in the light most favorable to FKFJ, there is
evidence Werner had some sort of animus against Rizek and
Samara. Based on that animus, a factfinder could infer Werner

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No. 20-2396 17
also possessed ill-will toward their business. For example,
Rizek described Werner as “[v]ery hostile” in January 2017.
Zetterberg described Rizek and Werner not liking one an-
other. Rizek and Samara both testified Werner’s attitude to-
ward them changed. However, the problem is not FKFJ’s fail-
ure to adduce evidence of Werner’s animus; it is the failure to
provide any link between FKFJ’s support of Keller and any
adverse action taken by Werner. Instead, FKFJ fails to show
Werner’s animus is based on the protected activity and that
Werner acted in retaliation based on that animus. The only
genuine evidence FKFJ presents to show animus is based on
the protected activity is suspicious timing. But that argument
fails.
We have noted that “suspicious timing will ‘rarely be suf-
ficient in and of itself to create a triable issue.’” Id. (quoting
Culver v. Gorman & Co., 416 F.3d 540, 546 (7th Cir. 2005)). In
order for suspicious timing to save a claim from summary
judgment by raising an inference of causation, FKFJ must
show the adverse action “follows close on the heels of pro-
tected expression” and “the person who decided to impose
the adverse action knew of the protected conduct.” Id. (quot-
ing Lalvani v. Cook Cnty., 269 F.3d 785, 790 (7th Cir. 2001)).
“Close on the heels” is usually no more than a few days. Id.
An inference of causation based on suspicious timing is inap-
propriate when there is a “significant intervening event” sep-
arating the protected activity and deprivation. Id. at 967.
Through testimony, FKFJ has shown that after it sup-
ported Keller, Werner’s once friendly attitude changed. But
notably, its brief is silent on whether Werner even knew FKFJ
supported Keller. So, at oral argument, we asked the parties
what the summary judgment record reflected regarding

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18 No. 20-2396
Werner’s knowledge of FKFJ’s political support of Keller in
the April 2017 election. Notably, neither party could answer
the question. Without evidence Werner even knew about
FKFJ’s protected activity, how can a jury possibly find the ac-
tivity was a motivating factor in her conduct? This lack of ev-
idence is fatal to FKFJ’s claim, regardless of the level of ab-
straction with which we view the case in its entirety.
But even if there were evidence Werner knew about FKFJ’s
support of Keller, the alleged retaliatory conduct did not oc-
cur “close on the heels” of FKFJ’s protected activity.
FKFJ held campaign events at Saraya from October 2016
through March 2017. FKFJ argues in the fall of 2016, it had
issues with Werner that slowed its ability to obtain a demoli-
tion permit. The record contains evidence FKFJ thought Wer-
ner was slowing down the process, despite the fact that the
demolition permit had to be obtained from Cook County ra-
ther than the Village, but FKFJ does not provide any evidence
on what Werner did to slow down the process. For example,
Samara stated that in his opinion, Werner slowed down the
process because she told Cook County about the water lines
on state property that needed to be shut off. But FKFJ does not
dispute that it needed a permit from IDOT to shut off the wa-
ter and sewer connections before it could obtain a demolition
permit from the county. Consequently, there is no evidence to
support that Werner caused a delay during or shortly after
FKFJ’s protected activity. During the final month FKFJ sup-
ported Keller, March 2017, FKFJ obtained the necessary per-
mit and was able to knock the house down.
Neither did the further alleged retaliatory conduct occur
“close on the heels” of FKFJ’s protected activity. FKFJ’s last
campaign events were held in March 2017. It is undisputed

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No. 20-2396 19
that its application for a special use permit was not complete
until June or July 2017 when it submitted a site plan. Thus any
alleged delays Werner caused in FKFJ’s obtaining a special
use permit had to have occurred after June or July 2017. A de-
lay of two or three months between any protected activity and
adverse action is far from sufficient to raise an inference of re-
taliation. Kidwell, 679 F.3d at 966. Further, the record reflects,
and FKFJ has not adduced any evidence to contradict, that
Werner assisted with paperwork needed for FKFJ to request a
variance. The variance issue needed to be handled before the
REDB would hold a hearing on FKFJ’s special use permit. So
it appears Werner actually helped accelerate the process.
The ticketing issue suffers from the same fatal delay. The
parties do not dispute that before May 2017, when Micetich
issued his memorandum directing officers to ticket Saraya for
violations on the 7015 lot, FKFJ did not have any issues with
the Village regarding parking tickets. The result is a delay of
at least a month between the protected activity and depriva-
tion. Delay aside, the record also lacks evidence Werner di-
rected the ticketing. Without Werner’s involvement, there is
no evidence the ticketing resulted from FKFJ’s political activ-
ity.
Rizek’s arrest for the bounced check to Schroeder occurred
on May 23, 2017, a delay of nearly two months. Besides the
timeliness bar, the record reflects Werner did not even find
out about the arrest until after it happened. Consequently,
there is no evidence of a causal connection.
Finally, the business license renewal issue presents the
greatest time-lapse between the protected activity and depri-
vation. Werner and Husam spoke about obtaining a new ten-
ant for the 7011 lot where Saraya operated in September 2017.

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20 No. 20-2396
That conversation occurred approximately six months after
the protected conduct. FKFJ believes Werner tried to convince
Husam to rent to another business to force the sale of its res-
taurant. While it is clear from Rizek’s and Samara’s testimony
that they believe Werner is the reason they went out of busi-
ness and she intentionally tried to drive them out of town,
they have failed to present evidence to support their beliefs.20
Because FKFJ has failed to present evidence of causation,
summary judgment was proper on its First Amendment
claim.
C. Equal Protection Claim
FKFJ next argues it was irrationally singled out in viola-
tion of the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause.
“The Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment,
ratified to help protect the equality that had been won in the
Civil War, is most familiar as a guard against state and local
government discrimination on the basis of race, national
origin, sex, and other class-based distinctions.” Geinosky v.
City of Chicago, 675 F.3d 743, 747 (7th Cir. 2012). The Equal
Protection Clause requires a “rational reason” for disparate
treatment of those who are similarly situated. Engquist v. Or-
egon Dept. of Agric., 553 U.S. 591, 602 (2008). The clause also
protects persons “against purely arbitrary government classi-
fications, even when a classification consists of singling out
just one person for different treatment for arbitrary and
20 Also, Zaman Café, one of the two businesses FKFJ was formed to
operate, reopened once the 7015 lot was completed. So, it appears perhaps
FKFJ was not completely driven out of town.

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No. 20-2396 21
irrational purposes.” Geinosky, 675 F.3d at 747. This is a “class-
of-one” claim.21
Class-of-one claimants carry a heavy burden. See Woodruff
v. Mason, 542 F.3d 545, 554 (7th Cir. 2008). To support its class-
of-one claim, FKFJ must show it was “intentionally treated
differently from others similarly situated and that there is no
rational basis for the difference in treatment.” Geinosky, 675
F.3d at 747 (quoting Engquist, 553 U.S. at 601); see generally Vil-
lage of Willowbrook v. Olech, 528 U.S. 562, 564 (2000) (seminal
case).
To satisfy the “similarly situated” element, FKFJ and its
comparators must be “prima facie identical in all relevant re-
spects or directly comparable … in all material respects.” D.S.
v. E. Porter Cnty. Sch. Corp., 799 F.3d 793, 799 (7th Cir. 2015)
(alteration in original) (quoting United States v. Moore, 543
F.3d 891, 896 (7th Cir. 2008)). Whether entities are similarly
situated is a factual question, but summary judgment is none-
theless proper when no reasonable factfinder could find the
requirement is met. Id. at 799–80.
Under the rational basis standard, “a class-of-one plaintiff
must, to prevail, negative any reasonably conceivable state of
facts that could provide a rational basis for the classification.”
Miller v. City of Monona, 784 F.3d 1113, 1121 (7th Cir. 2015)
(quoting Scherr v. City of Chicago, 757 F.3d 593, 598 (7th Cir.
2014)). Otherwise stated, we have held “[t]he rational-basis
requirement sets the legal bar low and simply requires ‘a ra-
tional relationship between the disparity of treatment and
21 Rizek and Samara originally raised claims for discrimination based
on race and religion, but they abandoned these arguments below and on
appeal. Only the class-of-one claim persists.

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22 No. 20-2396
some legitimate governmental purpose.’” D.B. ex rel. Kurtis v.
Kopp, 725 F.3d 681, 686 (7th Cir. 2013) (quoting Srail v. Village
of Lisle, 588 F.3d 940, 946 (7th Cir. 2009)).
While the two main prongs of a class-of-one claim are
clearly established, it is worth noting that much ink has been
spilled over the multiplicity of tests in this Circuit for the re-
quirements of a class-of-one claim. See Brunson v. Murray, 843
F.3d 698, 706 (7th Cir. 2016) (explaining the Circuit’s three
possible tests for a class-of-one claim); D.B. ex rel. Kurtis, 725
F.3d at 685; Del Marcelle v. Brown Cnty. Corp., 680 F.3d 887 (7th
Cir. 2012) (en banc) (per curiam); Srail, 588 F.3d at 944; Smith
v. City of Chicago, 457 F.3d 643, 652 (7th Cir. 2006) (recognizing
the uncertain role of subjective motivation); RJB Props., Inc. v.
Bd. of Educ., 468 F.3d 1005, 1009 n.2 (7th Cir. 2006) (“The Court
has noted that a ‘class of one’ equal protection claim may also
require a plaintiff to prove one additional element: that the
State acted with an illegitimate animus.”); Racine Charter One,
Inc. v. Racine Unified Sch. Dist., 424 F.3d 677, 683–84 (7th Cir.
2005) (explaining two lines of cases). The disagreement cen-
ters on the role of animus in class-of-one-claims. We need not
resolve this conflict since FKFJ cannot satisfy the other ele-
ments of its claim. See Chicago Studio Rental, Inc., v. Ill. Dept. of
Com., 940 F.3d 971, 980 (7th Cir. 2019).
On appeal, FKFJ has failed to present any meaningful ar-
gument on the first prong of the test. Regarding the ticketing
issue, FKFJ merely states, “There was evidence in the record
of multiple similarly situated businesses with gravel lots
never being cited.” Appellant’s Br. at 14. FKFJ fails to state
what entities were similarly situated or how they were

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No. 20-2396 23
similarly situated. 22 Similarly, a page later it addresses Mi-
cetich’s memorandum on ticketing, arguing “no such memo
exists for any of the number of other lots that violate the same
municipal code, and in fact, no other citations have been given
to owners of such lots.” Appellant’s Br. at 15. But “evidence
of similarity requires specificity.” Srail, 588 F.3d at 946. This
argument is insufficient. See Puffer v. Allstate Ins. Co., 675 F.3d
709, 718 (7th Cir. 2012).
Generally, we have required class-of-one claimants to
strictly comply with presenting evidence of a similarly situ-
ated entity at the summary judgment stage. Monarch Beverage
Co., Inc. v. Cook, 861 F.3d 678, 682 (7th Cir. 2017) (“In litigation
of that type [class-of-one claims], if the plaintiff can’t identify
a similarly situated person or group for comparison purposes,
it’s normally unnecessary to take the analysis any further; the
claim simply fails.”); e.g. Paramount Media Grp., Inc. v. Village
of Bellwood, 929 F.3d 914, 920 (7th Cir. 2019) (disposing of a
class-of-one claim on the sole basis the entities were not simi-
larly situated). However, as FKFJ points out, we have over-
looked failure to strictly comply with the similarly situated
element in a very limited number of class-of-one cases where
animus is readily apparent. See Swanson v. City of Chetek, 719
F.3d 780, 784 (7th Cir. 2013). But none of the cases FKFJ cites
is applicable here.
For example, in Geinosky v. City of Chicago, we found
Geinosky properly pled a class-of-one claim when he gener-
ally asserted he was intentionally treated differently than oth-
ers who were similarly situated, without identifying or
22 Nor does it cite the record after making these assertions. See gener-
ally Fed. R. App. P. 28(a)(8)(A).

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24 No. 20-2396
describing any such persons. 675 F.3d at 748. In that case,
Geinosky received twenty-four parking tickets over a four-
teen-month period. Id. at 745. The tickets were clearly “bo-
gus,” since some were inconsistent with others he received
simultaneously by mail. Some tickets implied that Geinosky’s
vehicle was in two places at once or committed two separate
violations that would be impossible to commit simultane-
ously. The tickets against him were eventually dismissed, but
not before Geinosky complained to the police unit’s supervi-
sors, complained to the police department’s Internal Affairs
Division, spoke with the Chicago Tribune, and appeared in
court seven times. Id.
We found that “requiring Geinosky to name a similarly sit-
uated person who did not receive twenty-four bogus parking
tickets in 2007 and 2008 would not help distinguish between
ordinary wrongful acts and deliberately discriminatory deni-
als of equal protection.” Id. at 748. We also noted that the re-
quirement would be simple to satisfy in that case, anyway. Id.
There was no “rational and proper purpose” for Geinosky to
have been ticketed. Id. at 749. We described the case as “unu-
sual” and reversed dismissal of the claim. Id.
This case is not like Geinosky. In the first place, that case
occurred at a distinguishable procedural stage—the plead-
ings. In this case, FKFJ’s claim was dismissed at summary
judgment. Unlike summary judgment, we have consistently
held a plaintiff need not identify a similarly situated entity in
its complaint. Id. at 748 n.3; Miller, 784 F.3d at 1120; Capra v.
Cook County Bd. of Rev., 733 F.3d 705, 717 (7th Cir. 2013). Fur-
ther, Geinosky was not a typical case. Geinosky was targeted
out of hostility and for no other reason. But here, there is un-
disputed evidence of a rational basis for each action the

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No. 20-2396 25
Village took (this same analysis explains why FKFJ cannot sat-
isfy the second element of its class-of-one claim, but we ad-
dress that issue momentarily).
In fact, the presence of a rational basis in this case is what
distinguishes it from all the cases FKFJ cites for the proposi-
tion it does not need to show evidence of a similarly situated
entity. See Miller, 784 F.3d at 1120 (explaining the lack of com-
parator is not fatal “when plaintiffs were able to exclude ra-
tional explanations for why local officials targeted them”). But
because of the presence of a rational basis for the Village’s ac-
tions, this is a classic case in which evidence of a similarly sit-
uated entity is needed “[t]o achieve clarity.” Swanson, 719 F.3d
at 784. That brings us to the final issue on FKFJ’s equal pro-
tection claim: FKFJ cannot survive summary judgment be-
cause the Village had a rational basis for its actions.
FKFJ focuses the brunt of its argument on the ticketing is-
sue. But it is undisputed the gravel lot did not comply with
the Worth ordinance on parking-lot construction. FKFJ may
have a valid point regarding ticketing for use of gravel: a jury
could believe Rizek’s testimony the Village told FKFJ to use
gravel. If this were the only evidence, perhaps it could show
there was a lack of a rational basis for the ticketing because
the Village told FKFJ to use that type of material and then
punished it for doing so.23 However, FKFJ did not start receiv-
ing tickets until May 2017 by which point it is clear FKFJ knew
the lot was non-compliant, since it blocked off the parking lot
in April 2017. Further, gravel issue aside, there was a rational
23 Even if this were the case, though, the record lacks evidence Werner
directed the ticketing, so she cannot be responsible for it under § 1983.
FKFJ only sued Werner, not Micetich, on this claim.

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26 No. 20-2396
basis to issue tickets considering FKFJ had still not obtained a
special use permit for the lot, and apparently had not ob-
tained the proper license for maintaining and operating a
parking lot pursuant to § 3-17-2 of the Village Code. (Indeed,
it presents no evidence or argument to the contrary.) Because
the parking lot was not completed until July or August 2018,
and cars were parked in the lot before then, there was a ra-
tional basis for the ticketing. 24
FKFJ focuses on the fact it did not own the 7015 lot and the
tickets issued to it were ultimately dismissed for that reason.
But these facts do not alter the outcome. It is clear FKFJ was
at the forefront of converting the lot into a parking lot, includ-
ing the fact it paid for construction of the lot. FKFJ, rather than
the property owner International, was to use the lot in service
of its restaurant. Perhaps dismissal of the tickets shows the
Village did not act perfectly. But considering FKFJ’s day-to-
day control over the lot and intended use of the lot for its res-
taurant, we can hardly say the ticketing was irrational.
Next, FKFJ raises passing arguments in its brief, stating
Rizek’s arrest and the failure to renew its business licenses are
also equal protection violations. 25 Regarding the former, it
was rational for Village police to arrest Rizek because police
had reason to believe, whether properly or improperly, he
24 FKFJ also claims some tickets were issued to it for vehicles in the
vicinity of the restaurant, not just on the 7015 lot. The evidence was intro-
duced in the form of a few cursory remarks in FKFJ’s depositions. The
record lacks sufficient detail about any such tickets for a jury to find for
FKFJ on the issue. At most, it is a mere scintilla of evidence.
25 In its complaint, FKFJ also raised the delay of the special use permit
as an equal protection violation, but it did not make that argument to the
district court.

-- 26 of 30 --

No. 20-2396 27
engaged in deceptive practices. 26 Considering the check
bounced at the end of March and beginning of April 2017, and
Schroeder still had not been paid by the end of May 2017, the
arrest was rational. Regarding the latter argument, it was ra-
tional not to renew Saraya’s business license because it could
not operate at the location stated in the application, since
26 The relevant Illinois statute on deceptive practices pertaining to bad
checks states:
A person commits a deceptive practice when:
(1) With intent to obtain control over property or to pay for prop-
erty, labor or services of another, … he or she issues or delivers a
check or other order upon a real or fictitious depository for the
payment of money, knowing that it will not be paid by the depos-
itory. The trier of fact may infer that the defendant knows that the
check or other order will not be paid by the depository and that
the defendant has acted with intent to defraud when the defend-
ant fails to have sufficient funds or credit with the depository
when the check or other order is issued or delivered, or when such
check or other order is presented for payment and dishonored on
each of 2 occasions at least 7 days apart. … .
(2) He or she issues or delivers a check or other order upon a real
or fictitious depository in an amount exceeding $150 in payment
of an amount owed on any credit transaction for property, labor
or services, or in payment of the entire amount owed on any credit
transaction for property, labor or services, knowing that it will not
be paid by the depository, and thereafter fails to provide funds or
credit with the depository in the face amount of the check or order
within 7 days of receiving actual notice from the depository or
payee of the dishonor of the check or order.
720 Ill. Comp. Stat. 5/17-1. It is also worth noting that the district court
found there was probable cause for the arrest when considering
Rizek’s Fourth Amendment claim. The Fourth Amendment claim is
not at issue on appeal. But to act based on probable cause certainly is
rational.

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28 No. 20-2396
Husam decided to lease the premises to Jbara. Jbara already
had been issued a retail tobacco license for the building in
which Saraya sought to operate, starting after the expiration
of Saraya’s license. Likewise, it was rational for the Village not
to renew Zaman Café’s business license since it did not have
sufficient parking.
In sum, since FKFJ has not presented sufficient appellate
argument about any similarly situated entities and cannot sat-
isfy the rational basis prong of a class-of-one equal protection
claim, summary judgment for the Village was proper.
D. Due Process Claim
As a preliminary matter, FKFJ’s brief makes both substan-
tive and procedural due process arguments. However, sub-
stantive due process was never raised below, so we address
only the procedural due process claim. Russian Media Grp.,
LLC v. Cable Am., Inc., 598 F.3d 302, 308 (7th Cir. 2010) (“In
civil litigation, issues not presented to the district court are
normally forfeited on appeal.”).
The Fourteenth Amendment disallows “any State [from]
depriv[ing] any person of life, liberty, or property, without
due process of law.” U.S. Const. amend. XIV, § 1. The Due
Process Clause provides for procedural protections, such as
notice and an opportunity to be heard, when the government
deprives citizens of life, liberty, or property. Lavite, 932 F.3d
at 1032. In order to make out a due process violation, FKFJ
must first show it has a protected liberty or property interest
with which the government has interfered. Ky. Dept. of Corr.
v. Thompson, 490 U.S. 454, 460 (1989). Once established, we
consider whether the procedures utilized satisfy the Consti-
tution. Id.

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No. 20-2396 29
The precise contours of FKFJ’s procedural due process ar-
gument are obscure. The district court found FKFJ had not es-
tablished a protected property interest in the renewal of its
business licenses. We agree FKFJ cannot satisfy the prelimi-
nary requirement of a protected property interest. “‘To have
a property interest in a benefit, a person clearly must have
more than an abstract need or desire’ and ‘more than a unilat-
eral expectation of it. He must, instead, have a legitimate
claim of entitlement to it.’” Town of Castle Rock v. Gonzales, 545
U.S. 748, 756 (2005) (quoting Bd. of Regents of State Colls. v.
Roth, 408 U.S. 564, 577 (1972)). Entitlements are created by an
independent source, not the Constitution. Id.
Assuming FKFJ is arguing the failure to renew its business
license is a denial of due process, it is clear from the Village
Code’s chapter on business licenses and permits that FKFJ did
not have a protected entitlement. The Supreme Court has rec-
ognized “that a benefit is not a protected entitlement if gov-
ernment officials may grant or deny it in their discretion.” Id.
The code grants such discretion here.
The code only allows licenses to be granted for a period of
up to a year, with every license expiring on December 31 after
the date it was issued. Village of Worth Code § 3-1-6(A). The
relevant provision on renewal provides that “each license may
be renewed upon proper application and payment of the re-
quired fee … . The Clerk is authorized to approve and execute
license renewals upon determining that this chapter’s stand-
ards and criteria have been met.” § 3-1-6(C) (emphasis
added).
While FKFJ is correct that government licenses can be a
form of property entitlement in some cases, it has not shown
that it had a protected entitlement to renewal of its license here.
The code leaves the Village discretion to renew licenses by

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30 No. 20-2396
providing they “may” be renewed upon proper application
and payment of the requisite fee. The code gives the clerk au-
thority to approve applications for renewals, rather than man-
dating that the clerk approve and execute renewals when the
requisite criteria is met. Thus, FKFJ had a mere unilateral ex-
pectation its license would be renewed, and we need not con-
sider what process is due.
To the extent FKFJ alleges it was deprived of the process
of applying for renewal, since the Village refused to even ac-
cept its application, its claim nonetheless fails. Process alone
is not a protected interest subject to due process protections.
See Lavite, 932 F.3d at 1033 (“Process is not an end in itself. Its
constitutional purpose is to protect a substantive interest to
which the individual has a legitimate claim of entitlement.”
(quoting Olim v. Wakinekona, 461 U.S. 238, 250 (1983))). Ac-
cordingly, summary judgment was proper.
E. Municipal Liability
FKFJ raises each of its three § 1983 claims against the Vil-
lage in addition to Werner in her individual capacity. But
since we find there is a failure of evidence on each of its three
constitutional claims, its claim of municipal liability neces-
sarily fails. D.S., 799 F.3d at 800.
III. Conclusion
While this case is a tapestry of colorful factual threads,
“[s]heer complexity is not enough to stave off summary judg-
ment.” Barbera v. Pearson Educ., Inc., 906 F.3d 621, 631 (7th Cir.
2018). Whatever occurred between FKFJ and the Village, FKFJ
has failed to present sufficient evidence from which a jury
could find the disputes are of constitutional import. Accord-
ingly, we AFFIRM.

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