ALEXANDER MILCHTEIN and ESTER RIVA MILCHTEIN v. Milwaukee County

In the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 21-2955
A LEXANDER MILCHTEIN and
E STER RIVA MILCHTEIN,
Plaintiffs-Appellants,
v.
MILWAUKEE COUNTY, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.
No. 19-CV-1834-JPS — J.P. Stadtmueller, Judge.
____________________
SUBMITTED∗ MAY 17, 2022 — D ECIDED A UGUST 2, 2022
____________________
Before SYKES, Chief Judge, and KIRSCH and JACKSON-
A KIWUMI , Circuit Judges.
∗ We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the
briefs and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and
oral argument would not significantly aid the court. FED . R. A PP.
P. 34(a)(2)(C).

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2 No. 21-2955
SYKES , Chief Judge. Alexander and Ester Riva Milchtein
live in Milwaukee, Wisconsin, and have 15 children. The
family has a long history of encounters with child-welfare
authorities. At different points over the last decade, three
daughters—C.M., S.M., and D.M.—were removed from the
Milchteins’ custody and placed in group homes and the
foster-care system. The Milchteins allege that these interven-
tions were unwarranted and hindered their ability to raise
their children in accordance with their Orthodox Jewish
faith.
We saw an earlier round of this dispute in Milchtein v.
Chisholm, 880 F.3d 895 (7th Cir. 2018), where the Milchteins
sought declaratory and injunctive relief with respect to the
custody of C.M. and S.M. We affirmed the dismissal of the
case as moot because the two daughters had reached the age
of majority, eliminating the possibility of meaningful pro-
spective relief. The Milchteins argued that the case remained
justiciable due to contemporaneously developing events
relating to a third child who was then still a minor; we
rejected the argument based on the abstention doctrine set
out in Younger v. Harris, 401 U.S. 37 (1971).
Now the Milchteins have sued again, this time seeking
money damages and adding claims regarding the custody of
D.M. The couple’s 100-page complaint names over 20 de-
fendants—among them Milwaukee County, several state
and county officials, a children’s hospital and some of its
employees, and a children’s group home—and asserts a glut
of constitutional claims. The bulk of the claims come under
42 U.S.C. § 1983 and include alleged violations of the rights
to familial integrity, free exercise of religion, and due pro-
cess of law. A final claim is asserted under 42 U.S.C.

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No. 21-2955 3
§ 1985(3) for an alleged conspiracy to deprive the Milchteins
of their constitutional rights.
The district judge dismissed the complaint for failure to
state a claim. For some claims he determined that the statute
of limitations barred recovery. For other claims he conclud-
ed that the complaint failed to allege conduct plausibly
exposing any defendant to liability. And yet other claims he
held foreclosed by absolute immunity. The judge reasoned
correctly across the board, so we affirm.
I. Background
Alexander and Ester Riva Milchtein describe themselves
as members of “a very strict Orthodox Jewish community in
Milwaukee.” Alexander is a rabbi and leads a local syna-
gogue. The Milchteins follow “detailed and specific” reli-
gious practices, including Sabbath rituals and strict dietary
restrictions, and they seek to raise their children in accord-
ance with their beliefs. They do so partly by home-schooling
or sending their children to private Jewish schools; public
schooling, they explain, is prohibited in their religious
tradition.
The Milchteins filed this lawsuit seeking money damages
and equitable relief for actions taken by the defendants with
respect to three of their daughters: C.M., S.M., and D.M. On
appeal the scope of the case has narrowed considerably. The
Milchteins no longer pursue claims for equitable relief,
which were dismissed in the district court based on our
reasoning in Milchtein, 880 F.3d 895. Nor do they advance
claims with respect to C.M., which were dismissed as un-
timely. As the case comes to us, only the claims for money
damages regarding the custody of S.M. and D.M. remain.

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4 No. 21-2955
We tailor our discussion accordingly. Even in its narrowed
form, the case involves lengthy factual allegations regarding
the involvement of child-welfare authorities in the custody
of S.M. and D.M. We recount the background as alleged in
the complaint, accepting the allegations as true and giving
the Milchteins the benefit of reasonable inferences. White v.
Keely, 814 F.3d 883, 887–88 (7th Cir. 2016). But of course we
do not vouch for anything in this chronology.
A. Events Relating to the Custody of S.M.
In September 2012 Lori Kornblum, an Assistant District
Attorney for Milwaukee County, received a report from one
of S.M.’s former teachers that S.M. was afraid to go home.
Kornblum relayed the report to officials at Milwaukee
County Child Protective Services and sought an order from
a state-court judge to remove the Milchteins’ children from
their care on grounds of suspected abuse and neglect.1 The
judge thought the proposed intervention unwarranted but
issued an order permitting Child Protective Services officials
to interview S.M. at the Milchteins’ home.
Two Child Protective Services social workers went to the
Milchteins’ home hoping to interview S.M. There they
learned that she was attending a boarding school in Illinois.
The social workers traveled to Illinois and interviewed S.M.,
and she allegedly told them that she was not in fact afraid to
return home. Child Protective Services then dropped the
investigation, but the social workers told S.M. that the
agency could help her if she returned to Milwaukee.
1 Despite its name, Milwaukee County Child Protective Services is an
arm of the State of Wisconsin, not Milwaukee County.

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No. 21-2955 5
A few months later in December 2012, S.M. took a bus
home to Milwaukee. Upon arriving she contacted one of the
social workers who had previously interviewed her and
explained that she was fearful to return home. Child Protec-
tive Services officials placed S.M. into foster care. Mean-
while, the state initiated protective-services proceedings on
behalf of S.M. on charges of parental neglect and abuse; a
trial was set for August 2013.
In April 2013 the court dismissed the parental neglect
charge but allowed the abuse charge to go forward. In
August, however, the state voluntarily dismissed the re-
maining charge, explaining that the chances of prevailing
did not justify the impact on the potential witnesses.
After learning that her protective-services case was dis-
missed, S.M. ran away from C.M.’s apartment, where she
had spent the night prior to a scheduled hearing in her case.
A week later she placed a call from a bus station to Sara
Waldschmidt, a case worker employed by Children’s Hospi-
tal and Health System, Inc. (The complaint does not explain
how S.M. knew Waldschmidt.) Waldschmidt referred the
matter to Child Protective Services. No agency official was
available to retrieve S.M., so David Blumberg (who had
previously fostered C.M.) picked her up from the bus sta-
tion. The Milchteins say that this occurred without a court
order. At Child Protective Service’s request, Blumberg and
his family agreed to foster her.
While staying with the Blumbergs, S.M. lived a lifestyle
incompatible with her parents’ beliefs and wishes. She
followed her own religious beliefs rather than theirs, she
attended public school, and she received guitar and driving
lessons. The Milchteins also claim that they were prohibited

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6 No. 21-2955
from attending or scheduling S.M.’s medical appointments
despite expressing a desire to do so. S.M.’s protective order
expired when she turned 18, and the Milchteins say that they
have never reunited with their daughter.
B. Events Relating to the Custody of D.M.
In 2016 D.M. attempted suicide while she was attending
a boarding school in Israel. After a stay in an Israeli hospital,
she returned to Milwaukee and lived with her parents. In
April 2017 she ran away from home after an argument with
her father. On April 5 a Milwaukee County court adjudicat-
ed D.M. a runaway and permitted her to stay for up to
20 days at Pathfinder’s Youth Shelter, a home for runaway
children, without the Milchteins’ consent.
While D.M. was staying at Pathfinder’s, Child Protective
Services and Milwaukee County’s Department of Health and
Human Services (“DHHS”) sought a court order to take
temporary physical custody of her because she was afraid to
return home. The order was issued, and on April 24 D.M.
was taken into custody by an official not named as a defend-
ant in this case. In July 2017 after several more hearings
regarding D.M.’s custody, the court ordered D.M. to be
placed at Bella’s Group Home because she was “habitually
truant from home” and living at home would be contrary to
her welfare.
At Bella’s Group Home, D.M. lived a lifestyle incon-
sistent with her parents’ beliefs and wishes. She used a cell
phone not provided by her parents, took a bus on the
Sabbath, and on one occasion attended a Christian church.
The Milchteins voiced their concerns about these activities to
the group home. In response Bella’s told Sara Woitel, a

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No. 21-2955 7
DHHS social worker assigned to D.M.’s case, that it did not
want to be contacted directly by the Milchteins. The group
home asked Woitel to convey this request to the Milchteins,
and she did so.
On July 26 Bella’s provided 30 days’ notice that it would
be removing D.M. from the group home, citing D.M.’s
behavioral problems and interference from her parents.
Woitel communicated the removal decision to the
Milchteins. Before the 30-day period elapsed, however,
Bella’s rescinded the removal decision. On September 12 the
group home again provided 30 days’ notice of removal, and
Woitel again communicated the removal decision. This time
Bella’s did not rescind the decision.
On October 2 an “off-the-record meeting” (as the com-
plaint describes it) was convened to discuss D.M.’s upcom-
ing removal from Bella’s. In attendance were the judge
assigned to D.M.’s case, D.M. and her lawyers, and the
Milchteins. According to the Milchteins, the upshot of the
meeting was that no judicial action was immediately neces-
sary regarding D.M.’s placement.
Despite that resolution, the next day Woitel sought an
emergency hearing concerning D.M.’s upcoming removal
from Bella’s before a different judge—one who had not been
involved in D.M.’s case. The October 3 hearing proceeded ex
parte because the Milchteins did not receive notice of it. The
Milchteins claim that Woitel made false statements at the
hearing regarding the family’s home situation and their
fitness to care for D.M. They also allege that Woitel made
similar false statements in work reports and that those
statements were included in documents she submitted as
evidence at the hearing.

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8 No. 21-2955
After hearing from Woitel and D.M.’s attorney, the new
judge “acted as an [i]ntake [w]orker” and took temporary
physical custody of D.M. The judge then ordered Child
Protective Services to provide for her placement outside the
Milchteins’ home. A follow-up hearing was scheduled for
the next day, October 4. The complaint does not say what
transpired at the follow-up hearing or whether the
Milchteins attended it.
Later that month, D.M. was again placed at Pathfinder’s
Youth Shelter. Mark Mertens, a DHHS administrator who at
times acted as D.M.’s guardian, signed a form consenting to
D.M.’s stay at the shelter. Kelly Pethke, another DHHS
administrator, authorized the release of D.M.’s medical and
educational records for the purpose of assisting any family
who might foster D.M. In November 2017 D.M. was placed
with a foster family, and in May 2018 she left the foster
family and returned to the Milchteins’ home.
C. Proceedings Below
On December 15, 2019, the Milchteins filed this suit seek-
ing damages for alleged violations of their constitutional
rights to familial integrity, free exercise of religion, and due
process of law. The defendants for these § 1983 claims
include: several Wisconsin state officials; Milwaukee County
and DHHS; DHHS officials Mertens, Pethke, and Woitel;
and Children’s Hospital and Health System, Inc., and some
of its employees, including Waldschmidt. The Milchteins
also allege an unlawful conspiracy between Woitel and
Bella’s Group Home to deprive them of their constitutional
rights in violation of § 1985(3).

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No. 21-2955 9
Across two orders, the judge dismissed all claims with
prejudice for failure to state a claim. He concluded that the
claims relating to the custody of S.M. were untimely because
the complaint’s allegations confirmed that they had accrued
prior to the six-year limitations period. He dismissed those
relating to the custody of D.M. on separate grounds: the
complaint either failed to plead any conduct that might
subject the defendants to liability or pleaded only conduct
for which the defendants were entitled to absolute immuni-
ty.
II. Discussion
We review the judge’s dismissal orders de novo. White,
814 F.3d at 887–88. To survive a motion to dismiss for failure
to state a claim, the Milchteins’ complaint must allege
“enough facts to state a claim to relief that is plausible on its
face.” Bell Atl. Corp. v. Twombly, 550 U.S. 544, 570 (2007). “A
claim has facial plausibility when the plaintiff pleads factual
content that allows the court to draw the reasonable infer-
ence that the defendant is liable for the misconduct alleged.”
Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009).
A. Claims Relating to the Custody of S.M.
The Supreme Court has held that the Fourteenth
Amendment’s Due Process Clause shields certain aspects of
the parent–child relationship from state interference. See, e.g.,
Meyer v. Nebraska, 262 U.S. 390, 399–400 (1923). This compo-
nent of substantive due process—sometimes called the right
to “familial integrity,” Sebesta v. Davis, 878 F.3d 226, 232 (7th
Cir. 2017), or “familial relations,” Doe v. Heck, 327 F.3d 492,
517 (7th Cir. 2003)—includes a parent’s interest in the “care,
custody, and management” of his children, Brokaw v. Mercer

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10 No. 21-2955
County, 235 F.3d 1000, 1018 (7th Cir. 2000) (quoting Santosky
v. Kramer, 455 U.S. 745, 753 (1982)). The Milchteins contend
that S.M.’s removal from their home deprived them of this
right.
The complaint also invokes a right to “familial associa-
tion” protected by the First Amendment (as incorporated
through the Fourteenth Amendment). This framing exhibits
a common confusion about the constitutional right to “asso-
ciation.” See Montgomery v. Stefaniak, 410 F.3d 933, 937 (7th
Cir. 2005). The Supreme Court has explained that the Consti-
tution protects “‘freedom of association’ in two distinct
senses”: “expressive association,” which concerns the ability
to associate for First Amendment activities, and “intimate
association,” which is a component of substantive due
process and concerns the right to “enter into and maintain
certain intimate human relationships.” Roberts v. U.S. Jaycees,
468 U.S. 609, 617–18 (1984). The Milchteins’ claims regarding
the custody and care of their daughters are better under-
stood under the rubric of substantive due process. See, e.g.,
Sebesta, 878 F.3d at 232–33. We note, however, that the
present analysis would be no different even if the complaint
could be read to concern the right to associate for expressive
purposes.
The judge dismissed as untimely all claims relating to the
custody of S.M. In § 1983 actions, state law provides the
applicable statute of limitations; specifically, we look to “the
statute of limitations for personal injury actions in the state
in which the alleged injury occurred.” Behav. Inst. of Ind., LLC
v. Hobart City of Common Council, 406 F.3d 926, 929 (7th Cir.
2005). We have long looked to Wisconsin’s six-year limita-

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No. 21-2955 11
tions period.2 WIS. STAT. § 893.53 (2015); Kennedy v.
Huibregtse, 831 F.3d 441, 442 (7th Cir. 2016). Accrual of a
§ 1983 claim—a matter governed by federal law—occurs
“when the plaintiff knows or should know that his or her
constitutional rights have been violated.” Kelly v. City of
Chicago, 4 F.3d 509, 511 (7th Cir. 1993) (quotation marks
omitted).
The Milchteins sued on December 15, 2019, so claims ac-
cruing prior to December 15, 2013, are untimely. A com-
plaint need not anticipate affirmative defenses like the
statute of limitations and will not be dismissed just because
it does not confirm its own timeliness. Indep. Tr. Corp. v.
Stewart Info. Servs. Corp., 665 F.3d 930, 935 (7th Cir. 2012).
Nevertheless, dismissal for untimeliness is proper when the
plaintiff’s allegations establish that the statute of limitations
bars recovery. See, e.g., Brooks v. Ross, 578 F.3d 574, 579 (7th
Cir. 2009).
The complaint clearly sets out the timeline of relevant
events. In December 2012 Child Protective Services officials
seized S.M. because she was afraid to go home. In August
2013 Sara Waldschmidt received a call from S.M., who had
run away a week earlier after learning that her protective-
services case had been dismissed. Waldschmidt reported the
call to Child Protective Services, leading to S.M.’s placement
with the Blumbergs (who are not defendants).
Waldschmidt’s referral is the last allegation against any
defendant relating to S.M.’s custody. The defendants main-
2 The statute was recently amended to provide a three-year limitations
period, see W IS. STAT. § 893.53 (2018), but here all agree that the older
version of the statute applies.

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12 No. 21-2955
tain that the Milchteins’ injury occurred—and thus any
claims accrued—by August 2013 at the latest, conclusively
establishing them as untimely.
The Milchteins do not dispute that they could have sued
by the time S.M. had been placed with the Blumbergs. They
instead argue that their complaint is saved by undated
allegations that plausibly occurred within the limitations
period and give rise to independent claims for relief. They
identify just one such allegation, however: at some unspeci-
fied time, the Milchteins “were denied” the chance to sched-
ule and attend S.M.’s medical appointments. This allegation
opts for the passive voice and fails to tell us which defendant
(if any) is responsible for denying the couple access to S.M.’s
appointments. The Milchteins’ briefs are likewise silent on
how the allegation might plausibly be understood to be
directed at a particular defendant or defendants. Because we
cannot pin the allegation on any defendant, it cannot state a
claim for relief.
In a final effort, the Milchteins argue that their claims are
timely by application of the continuing-violation doctrine, a
special accrual rule under which a claim accrues not just
once but repeatedly as a defendant continually wrongs a
plaintiff. See United States v. Midwest Generation, LLC,
720 F.3d 644, 646 (7th Cir. 2013); Heard v. Sheahan, 253 F.3d
316, 318 (7th Cir. 2001). As the Milchteins see it, a claim
accrued each day they were separated from S.M. and unable
to raise her in accordance with their beliefs. We decline to
consider whether the continuing-violation doctrine applies
here, however, because the couple failed to raise the argu-
ment below. Indeed, it was the judge who first raised the
issue—he speculated that the doctrine does not apply—in

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No. 21-2955 13
his order dismissing the claims. The argument is therefore
waived on appeal, Mahran v. Advoc. Christ Med. Ctr., 12 F.4th
708, 713 (7th Cir. 2021), and the judge properly dismissed as
untimely all claims relating to the custody of S.M.
B. Claims Relating to the Custody of D.M.
The remaining claims, which relate to the custody of
D.M., fall into three groups. First, there are § 1983 claims
against three DHHS officials for violations of the rights to
familial integrity, free exercise of religion, and due process
of law. Next, there are § 1983 claims against Milwaukee
County and DHHS flowing from their officials’ actions in
removing D.M. from the Milchteins’ home. And last, there is
a § 1985(3) claim against Bella’s Group Home and Sara
Woitel, a DHHS social worker, for unlawfully conspiring to
deprive the Milchteins of their constitutional rights.
1. Familial Integrity and Free Exercise of Religion
We begin with a subset of the claims against the three
DHHS officials. Mark Mertens was an administrator who at
times acted as D.M.’s guardian, Kelly Pethke was also an
administrator for the agency, and Sara Woitel was a social
worker assigned to D.M.’s case. The Milchteins claim that
the trio violated their right to familial integrity by causing
D.M.’s absence from their home.3 They also claim that the
3 Like the claims concerning the custody of S.M., those relating to the
custody of D.M. are best understood as invoking the component of
substantive due process that protects the right to familial relations, not
the First Amendment right to expressive association. But again the
analysis does not turn on how we frame the Milchteins’ claims. As we
explain, the complaint fails to state a claim relating to the custody of
D.M. because it either fails to allege any conduct plausibly exposing any
defendant to liability or alleges only conduct for which the defendants

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14 No. 21-2955
defendants violated their First Amendment right to free
exercise of religion (as incorporated through the Fourteenth
Amendment) by limiting their ability to raise D.M. in ac-
cordance with their religious beliefs and inculcate her with
religious instruction.
Critically here, § 1983 “creates a cause of action based on
personal liability and predicated upon fault.” Vance v. Peters,
97 F.3d 987, 991 (7th Cir. 1996) (quotation marks omitted). A
government official is liable only if he personally caused or
participated in a constitutional deprivation. Brokaw, 235 F.3d
at 1012; Vance, 97 F.3d at 991. Consequently, a claim will not
survive a motion to dismiss unless it “plead[s] that [a]
Government-official defendant, through the official’s own
individual actions, has violated the Constitution.” Iqbal,
556 U.S. at 676.
The Milchteins point to just two specific allegations that
they say subject either Mertens, Pethke, or Woitel to liability
for violations of their rights to familial integrity and free
exercise of religion. The first: after the October 3 hearing
concerning D.M.’s removal from Bella’s Group Home,
Pethke signed forms authorizing the release of D.M.’s medi-
cal and educational records. For example, an exhibit to the
complaint shows that Pethke authorized the release of
certain hospital records to Woitel for the purpose of assisting
any family that might foster D.M. The second: also after the
October 3 hearing, Mertens signed a form consenting to
D.M.’s placement at Pathfinder’s Youth Shelter.
are entitled to absolute immunity; those conclusions hold no matter
which theory of liability we consider.

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No. 21-2955 15
Neither allegation plausibly states a claim. We cannot
reasonably infer that Pethke violated the Milchteins’ right to
familial integrity or free exercise of religion just by authoriz-
ing the release of D.M.’s records. Likewise, we cannot rea-
sonably infer that Mertens’s approval of D.M.’s stay at a
youth shelter—when D.M. was not in her parents’ custody
and after a judge had ordered her continued placement
outside the home—effected a constitutional deprivation.
Lacking allegations of specific wrongful conduct, the
Milchteins contend that we can infer liability based solely on
the defendants’ official roles. Among the three we have two
DHHS administrators—one who acted as D.M.’s guardian—
and a DHHS social worker; at least one of them, the
Milchteins insist, must be responsible for violating their
constitutional rights. But the conclusion does not follow. No
matter how closely the three were involved in D.M.’s case,
other officials might be the cause of any constitutional
violation. As a case in point, the complaint identifies the
official who initially took D.M. into custody, and that person
is not even a named defendant. Moreover, the Milchteins’
theory doesn’t tell us who specifically is responsible—is it
Mertens or Pethke or Woitel?—and for what conduct. An
allegation that a group of defendants is liable “without any
details about who did what” does not state a claim for relief.
Bank of Am., N.A. v. Knight, 725 F.3d 815, 818 (7th Cir. 2013).
Finally, the Milchteins argue that Mertens is liable as a
supervisor of others who directly caused constitutional
violations. An official may be liable in a supervisory capacity
if he was “personally involved in [a] constitutional viola-
tion.” Gill v. City of Milwaukee, 850 F.3d 335, 344 (7th Cir.
2017). This might occur if a supervisor knowingly facilitates,

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16 No. 21-2955
approves, or condones constitutional violations carried out
by his subordinates. Matthews v. City of East St. Louis,
675 F.3d 703, 708 (7th Cir. 2012). But here the complaint
doesn’t tell us how Mertens’s subordinates committed any
constitutional violations. In fact, it does not even identify
any persons that Mertens supervised. The complaint fails to
state a claim against Mertens, Pethke, or Woitel for viola-
tions of the rights to familial integrity or free exercise of
religion.
2. Due Process of Law
A separate § 1983 claim against the DHHS officials con-
cerns just Woitel. She sought a court order for intervention
in D.M.’s case from one judge after another judge had
concluded that judicial intervention was unnecessary despite
her upcoming removal from Bella’s Group Home. An ex
parte hearing followed at which she allegedly misrepresent-
ed the Milchteins’ ability and willingness to care for D.M. As
a result the state court took custody of D.M. and ordered
Child Protective Services to find her a new placement out-
side the Milchteins’ home. The Milchteins contend that this
sequence of events violated their right to the due process of
law.
Woitel maintains that she is entitled to absolute immuni-
ty. In the district court, the judge agreed based on Millspaugh
v. County Department of Public Welfare, 937 F.2d 1172 (7th Cir.
1991). There, two mothers alleged that a social worker’s
actions with respect to their children violated their right to
the due process of law. Id. at 1174. The social worker had
taken custody of the children after applying for and obtain-
ing a court order to do so. Id. at 1173–74. She then failed to
notify the mothers of subsequent custody hearings (causing

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No. 21-2955 17
them to proceed ex parte), failed to furnish the court with
evidence favorable to their case, and continued to pursue the
litigation even after it was clear that they were entitled to
custody. Id. at 1174–75.
The Millspaugh social worker argued that she was enti-
tled to absolute or qualified immunity for her actions. We
observed that a social worker pursuing a child-custody case
acts like a prosecutor and witness, both of whom are entitled
to absolute immunity for their actions taken in court, includ-
ing in ex parte proceedings. Id. at 1175–76. Joining a growing
consensus among the federal courts, we extended the same
immunity to the defendant, holding that “social workers and
like public officials are entitled to absolute immunity in child
custody cases on account of testimony and other steps taken
to present the case for decision by the court.” Id. at 1176.
Qualified immunity shielded the acts of applying for physi-
cal custody and retrieving the children; these actions, we
reasoned, were more like those of a police officer applying
for a warrant and collecting evidence. Id.; see also Brokaw,
235 F.3d at 1014 n.10 (citing Millspaugh and drawing the
same distinction between acts covered by absolute immunity
versus qualified immunity); K.H. ex rel. Murphy v. Morgan,
914 F.2d 846, 853–54 (7th Cir. 1990).
Woitel argues that her in-court conduct falls on the
absolute-immunity side of the line delineated in Millspaugh.
The Milchteins do not argue otherwise, and they make no
effort to distinguish their case as it relates to Woitel’s pursuit
of the hearing, her presentation of testimony and evidence,
or her apparent failure to apprise them of the hearings. We
therefore conclude that Woitel is entitled to absolute immun-
ity for those actions.

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18 No. 21-2955
The Milchteins instead argue that absolute immunity
does not apply to Woitel’s “extrajudicial” statements that
“promulgat[ed] … falsehoods” and harmed them outside
the judicial process. The couple refers to statements that
Woitel made prior to the October 3 hearing regarding the
Milchteins’ fitness to care for D.M. As the Milchteins see it,
the fact that those statements eventually made their way into
court as evidence should not preclude recovery for out-of-
court harm. But the Milchteins fail to explain how harm
caused by the statements plausibly entitles them to relief,
whether under a due-process theory or any other. Indeed,
the argument sounds in defamation, which is not a constitu-
tional tort actionable under § 1983. Olivieri v. Rodriguez,
122 F.3d 406, 407–08 (7th Cir. 1997).
Woitel argues in the alternative that the claim is barred
by qualified immunity. Because her actions are protected by
absolute immunity, we do not reach the more limited im-
munity defense. The complaint fails to state a § 1983 claim
against any of the DHHS officials.
3. Claims Against the Municipal Entities
We move next to the § 1983 claims against the two mu-
nicipal entities, Milwaukee County and DHHS. As the
Supreme Court held in Monell v. Department of Social Services,
436 U.S. 658, 694 (1978), a municipal entity is not vicariously
liable for the constitutional torts of its employees. Instead, a
municipal entity may be liable only for “conduct that is
properly attributable to the municipality itself.” First Mid-
west Bank v. City of Chicago, 988 F.3d 978, 986 (7th Cir. 2021).
A municipal entity is liable under § 1983 only if a munic-
ipal “policy or custom” is the “moving force” behind a

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No. 21-2955 19
constitutional violation and if the municipal defendant can
be said to be culpable or at fault for the violation. See Bd. of
Cnty. Comm’rs v. Brown, 520 U.S. 397, 403–06 (1997) (quota-
tion marks omitted). The four elements of that formulation—
a municipal policy or custom, moving force causation,
municipal fault, and an underlying constitutional viola-
tion—must be “scrupulously applied” to avoid collapsing
municipal liability into the respondeat superior liability
forbidden in Monell. First Midwest Bank, 988 F.3d at 987. Here
it is enough to focus on just one of them: a municipal policy
or custom. As we frequently explain, a policy or custom
subjecting a municipality to liability may come in one of
three forms: “(1) an express municipal policy; (2) a wide-
spread, though unwritten, custom or practice; or (3) a deci-
sion by a municipal agent with final policymaking
authority.” Milestone v. City of Monroe, 665 F.3d 774, 780 (7th
Cir. 2011) (quotation marks omitted).
The Milchteins do not point to an express policy of
Milwaukee County or DHHS, nor do they purport to identi-
fy the decision of a final policymaker, so their case turns on
the identification of an unwritten but widespread practice.
An unwritten practice may subject a municipality to liability
only if it is “so entrenched and well-known as to carry the
force of policy.” Hahn v. Walsh, 762 F.3d 617, 640 (7th Cir.
2014) (quotation marks omitted). Providing “[b]oilerplate
allegations of a municipal policy,” Baxter ex rel. Baxter v. Vigo
Cnty. Sch. Corp., 26 F.3d 728, 736 (7th Cir. 1994) (quotation
marks omitted), or pointing to a few isolated incidents of
official action will not suffice to show the existence of such a
practice, see Thomas v. Cook Cnty. Sheriff’s Dep’t, 604 F.3d 293,
303 (7th Cir. 2010); Gable v. City of Chicago, 296 F.3d 531, 538
(7th Cir. 2002).

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20 No. 21-2955
The Milchteins contend that Milwaukee County and
DHHS had widespread practices of removing children from
their families without a court order and absent exigent
circumstances and of detaining such children for needlessly
long periods of time. Besides boilerplate recitations in the
complaint, however, they provide virtually no allegations to
support the existence of this policy. The Milchteins argue
that their allegations of official action with respect to their
three daughters are adequate to plead the existence of a
widespread practice. They are not. As noted, identifying just
a few instances of official action is usually insufficient to
show the existence of an entrenched practice with the force
of policy. What’s more, the Milchteins overstate their case by
a factor of three: the complaint implicates Milwaukee Coun-
ty and DHHS actors only with respect to the removal of
D.M., not C.M. and S.M. The claims against the municipali-
ties fail.
4. Conspiracy to Violate Constitutional Rights
The last claim comes under § 1985(3), which provides a
cause of action for persons who are victims of a conspiracy
to deprive them of the “equal protection of the laws” or
“equal privileges and immunities under the laws.” See
Bowman v. City of Franklin, 980 F.2d 1104, 1108–09, 1108 n.4
(7th Cir. 1992) (quotation marks omitted). A plaintiff bring-
ing a § 1985(3) claim must plead the following elements:
(1) a conspiracy; (2) for the purpose of depriv-
ing, either directly or indirectly, any person or
class of persons of the equal protection of the
laws, or of equal privileges and immunities
under the laws; and (3) an act in furtherance of
the conspiracy; (4) whereby a person is either

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No. 21-2955 21
injured in his person or property or deprived
of any right or privilege of a citizen of the
United States.
United Bhd. of Carpenters v. Scott, 463 U.S. 825, 828–29 (1983);
see also Majeske v. Fraternal Ord. of Police, 94 F.3d 307, 311 (7th
Cir. 1996). Additionally, the plaintiff must plead that the
conspiracy was motivated by “some racial, or perhaps
otherwise class-based, invidiously discriminatory animus.”4
Bowman, 980 F.2d at 1109 (quoting Griffin v. Breckenridge,
403 U.S. 88, 102 (1971)).
The alleged conspiracy centers on D.M.’s time at Bella’s
Group Home, where she was allowed to live a lifestyle
inconsistent with her parents’ beliefs. The Milchteins voiced
concerns to the group home, which then asked Woitel to tell
them not to contact it directly. The Milchteins contend that
these actions were part of a conspiracy intended to deprive
them of their constitutional right to familial integrity (which
we assume qualifies for protection under the statute) and
motivated by discriminatory animus toward their religion.
For at least two reasons, the Milchteins have failed to
state a claim under § 1985(3). The first reason concerns the
conspiracy element, which requires the couple to allege an
express or implied agreement among the defendants to
deprive them of their constitutional rights. Wilson v. Giesen,
4 For conspiracies among only private actors, a plaintiff must also allege
that the conspiracy was “‘aimed at interfering with rights’ that are
‘protected against private, as well as official, encroachment’” (such as
Thirteenth Amendment rights). Bray v. Alexandria Women’s Health Clinic,
506 U.S. 263, 268 (1993) (quoting United Bhd. of Carpenters v. Scott,
463 U.S. 825, 833 (1983)). This requirement does not apply here, where
the Milchteins allege the involvement of a government official.

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22 No. 21-2955
956 F.2d 738, 744 (7th Cir. 1992). Here the complaint tells us
only that Bella’s asked Woitel to tell the Milchteins not to
contact it directly. This allegation alone does not plausibly
support an inference that Bella’s and Woitel had agreed to
deprive the couple of any constitutional right.
The second reason concerns the discriminatory animus
requirement, which the Milchteins must support with
specific allegations suggesting the existence of such a moti-
vation. Briscoe v. LaHue, 663 F.2d 713, 723 (7th Cir. 1981). As
we understand the Milchteins’ argument, they ask us to infer
animus toward their religion because Bella’s allowed D.M. to
take part in activities inconsistent with her parents’ religious
beliefs. We have said that religious classifications likely
qualify for protection under § 1985(3). See Brokaw, 235 F.3d at
1024; Murphy v. Mount Carmel High Sch., 543 F.2d 1189, 1192
n.1 (7th Cir. 1976). But even if Bella’s facilitated D.M.’s
behavior, that alone does not support an inference that it did
so out of animus toward the Milchteins’ beliefs.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district
court is A FFIRMED .

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