Diane Runkel v. CITY OF SPRINGFIELD and JAMES O. LANGFELDER

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 21-2418
D IANE R UNKEL ,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
C ITY OF SPRINGFIELD and J AMES O. LANGFELDER ,
Defendants-Appellees.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Central District of Illinois.
No. 3:18-cv-03206-SEM-TSH — Sue E. Myerscough, Judge.
____________________
A RGUED J ANUARY 21, 2022 — D ECIDED OCTOBER 18, 2022
____________________
Before HAMILTON and KIRSCH, Circuit Judges.*
HAMILTON, Circuit Judge. Plaintiff Diane Runkel worked as
the assistant purchasing agent for the Springfield, Illinois city
government under the supervision of the purchasing agent.
In early 2018, when the purchasing agent announced that he
* Circuit Judge Kanne heard argument but died on June 16, 2022. He
did not participate in the decision of this case, which is being resolved
under 28 U.S.C. § 46(d) by a quorum of the panel.

-- 1 of 19 --

2 No. 21-2418
planned to leave the position, Runkel asked to be considered
for promotion to the top job in the office. Runkel, who is
white, later found out that she had not been selected and that
the City instead promoted a black candidate, Kassandra Wil-
kin, who had been working under Runkel’s supervision. As
an apparent consolation prize, Runkel was offered a substan-
tial $5,000 per year raise in salary. When told she did not re-
ceive the promotion, however, Runkel became upset, told a
city official that she believed the hiring was discriminatory,
and caused a disturbance in the office. Runkel later filed a
charge of race discrimination with the U.S. Equal Employ-
ment Opportunity Commission (EEOC). The account of her
reaction to the decision is disputed, but after telling the City
she planned to file the charge, Runkel was disciplined and the
promised raise was revoked. Soon after that, she retired.
Runkel has sued the City and Mayor James Langfelder (to-
gether, the City) claiming that they refused to promote her
based on her race and retaliated against her for reporting this
potential discrimination in violation of Title VII of the Civil
Rights Act of 1964, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-2(a)(1) & 2000e-3(a),
and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment. The City moved for summary judgment, and the dis-
trict court granted the motion on both claims.
Runkel appeals, arguing that she presents genuine issues
of material fact on her discrimination and retaliation claims
that preclude summary judgment. We agree. The City has
told two incompatible stories about both how and why Wil-
kin was chosen for promotion and Runkel was not. One of
those versions even relies explicitly upon race as a factor in
the decision. Regarding Runkel’s retaliation claim, the City’s
explanation for disciplining Runkel and taking away the

-- 2 of 19 --

No. 21-2418 3
promised raise also raises genuine questions. Her emotional
and disruptive response to the denial of the promotion could
easily warrant some level of discipline, but giving Runkel the
benefit of conflicts in the evidence and reasonable inferences
from it, a reasonable jury could find that the City’s stated non-
discriminatory justifications for the promotion decision are
pretextual and that the City retaliated against Runkel for
claiming racial discrimination. We reverse the district court’s
grant of summary judgment.1
I. Factual and Procedural Background
In Springfield, the position of purchasing agent is estab-
lished in the municipal code itself. The purchasing agent must
be “appointed by the director of budget and management
1 It is not clear that the purchasing agent position Runkel sought is
actually a position protected from discrimination under Title VII. The def-
inition of an “employee” covered by Title VII excludes “any person elected
to public office in any State or political subdivision of any State by the
qualified voters thereof, … or an appointee on the policy making level or
an immediate adviser with respect to the exercise of the constitutional or
legal powers of the office.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e(f). In denying a motion to
dismiss on this issue, the district court found here that the purchasing
agent is not a policy-making appointee because the position is filled by
appointment by a non-elected official, the City’s director of the Office of
Budget and Management. But the appointed purchasing agent must also
be approved by the mayor and city council. Springfield, Ill., Code § 38.11
(1995). In addition, Mayor Langfelder testified in his deposition that he,
not the director of the Office of Budget and Management, appointed Wil-
kin as purchasing agent. The requirement for approval by elected officials
under city ordinance and the mayor’s action in appointing the purchasing
agent himself tend to indicate that the position may be exempt from pro-
tection under Title VII. The City has not renewed this argument on appeal
as an alternative ground for affirmance, however, and we do not consider
it further here.

-- 3 of 19 --

4 No. 21-2418
with the approval of the mayor and the advice and consent of
the city council.” Springfield, Ill., Code § 38.11. The purchas-
ing agent is a senior city official and is responsible for prepar-
ing and administering the City’s contracts and for promulgat-
ing rules and regulations governing the City’s procurement
of supplies, services, and construction. The purchasing agent
heads an office and supervises the assistant purchasing agent
and one or more buyers.
Plaintiff Runkel began working for the City when she
joined the Office of Budget and Management as a clerk in
2007. She was promoted to the position of buyer in 2008. In
that role, she facilitated technical aspects of the purchasing of-
fice, including handling documents, sharing information, and
entering data. Runkel continued as a buyer until she was pro-
moted to the assistant purchasing agent in 2015. The assistant
purchasing agent helps the purchasing agent in preparing
specifications for goods and services, administers city con-
tracts, and communicates purchasing requirements with
other city departments. The assistant purchasing agent also
acts as purchasing agent in that official’s absence.
Wilkin, the person promoted to purchasing agent in 2018,
began working for the Springfield Office of Public Utilities in
2005. In 2015, she joined the Office of Budget and Manage-
ment as a buyer and worked in the office under Runkel’s su-
pervision. Wilkin remained in that role until she was offered
the post of purchasing agent during the events that gave rise
to this litigation.
In February 2018, Purchasing Agent Sandy Robinson an-
nounced that he was leaving his position. Runkel told Robin-
son and Director of the Office of Budget and Management
William McCarty that she was interested in the role. But

-- 4 of 19 --

No. 21-2418 5
Mayor Langfelder personally chose to appoint Wilkin to the
position.
There is some debate over just what happened after
Runkel learned she would not be promoted, but it is clear that
she became very upset. After meeting with the mayor to dis-
cuss Wilkin’s appointment, Runkel spoke on the phone with
McCarty. Runkel made several remarks that McCarty later
termed “disappointing.” The City eventually disciplined her
for saying “offensive or profane” things during this conversa-
tion.
In particular, Runkel told McCarty that she believed that
Wilkin had been hired because of her race, and she made sev-
eral personal remarks about Wilkin. After overhearing part of
the conversation, Wilkin stepped into the office to ask Runkel
to be quiet. Runkel loudly told Wilkin to get out. The City’s
director of human resources eventually came to speak with
Runkel and suggested that she take the rest of the day off.
Runkel went home that afternoon. For the next month, she
was in and out of work on a combination of FMLA leave, ad-
ministrative leave, and suspension.
Runkel retained counsel and notified the City that she was
considering filing a charge of race discrimination with the
EEOC. She filed her charge with the EEOC on April 5, 2018.
The next day, the City asked Runkel to sign a Last Chance
Agreement for her conduct on March 1 upon learning she
would not receive the promotion. The agreement rescinded
the pay raise that Runkel had been offered at that time. The
agreement also would have made it easier to terminate her for
future infractions. Runkel signed the agreement but retired
from her position with the City on April 17. In August 2018,

-- 5 of 19 --

6 No. 21-2418
Runkel filed this suit against the City and Mayor Langfelder
claiming racial discrimination in employment and retaliation.
II. Analysis
We review de novo the district court’s grant of summary
judgment, giving Runkel as the non-moving party the benefit
of conflicting evidence and any favorable inferences that
might be reasonably drawn from the evidence. Logan v. City
of Chicago, 4 F.4th 529, 536 (7th Cir. 2021). Summary judgment
is proper when “the movant shows that there is no genuine
dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to
judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a). A dispute
of fact is genuine “if the evidence is such that a reasonable
jury could return a verdict for the nonmoving party.” Lord v.
Beahm, 952 F.3d 902, 903 (7th Cir. 2020), quoting Anderson v.
Liberty Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 248 (1986). The substantive
law of the dispute determines which facts are material. Id.
A plaintiff may offer direct and/or circumstantial evidence
of discrimination, and “all evidence belongs in a single pile
and must be evaluated as a whole.” Igasaki v. Illinois Dep’t of
Financial and Professional Regulation, 988 F.3d 948, 957 (7th Cir.
2021), quoting Ortiz v. Werner Enterprises, Inc., 834 F.3d 760,
766 (7th Cir. 2016). The conflicting evidence in this case high-
light the court’s limited role when considering a motion for
summary judgment:
On summary judgment a court may not make
credibility determinations, weigh the evidence,
or decide which inferences to draw from the
facts; these are jobs for a factfinder. Rather, the
court has one task and one task only: to decide,
based on the evidence of record, whether there

-- 6 of 19 --

No. 21-2418 7
is any material dispute of fact that requires a
trial. Summary judgment is not appropriate if
the evidence is such that a reasonable jury could
return a verdict for the nonmoving party. We
must look therefore at the evidence as a jury
might, construing the record in the light most
favorable to the nonmovant and avoiding the
temptation to decide which party’s version of
the facts is more likely true. As we have said
many times, summary judgment cannot be used
to resolve swearing contests between litigants.
Johnson v. Advocate Health & Hospitals Corp., 892 F.3d 887, 893
(7th Cir. 2018) (reversing summary judgment). We “do not
weigh conflicting evidence, resolve swearing contests, deter-
mine credibility, or ponder which party’s version of the facts
is most likely to be true.” Stewart v. Wexford Health Sources,
Inc., 14 F.4th 757, 760 (7th Cir. 2021). We consider first
Runkel’s claim of discrimination in the promotion decision
and then her retaliation claim.
A. Discrimination on the Basis of Race
Under Title VII of the Civil Rights Act of 1964, it is unlaw-
ful for employers to “fail or refuse to hire or to discharge any
individual, or otherwise to discriminate against any individ-
ual with respect to his compensation, terms, conditions, or
privileges of employment, because of such individual’s race,
color, religion, sex, or national origin.” 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-
2(a)(1). Runkel claims that the City violated § 2000e-2(a)(1) by
denying her the promotion because she is white.
Runkel argues that she offered sufficient evidence to over-
come summary judgment based on both the old “direct”

-- 7 of 19 --

8 No. 21-2418
method of proof and under the McDonnell Douglas burden-
shifting framework. After issuing opinions for several dec-
ades distinguishing between direct and indirect methods of
proving employment discrimination, our decision in Ortiz v.
Werner Enterprises rejected the distinction between direct and
indirect evidence and the corresponding methods of proof.
834 F.3d at 765 (“Accordingly, we hold that district courts
must stop separating ‘direct’ from ‘indirect’ evidence and
proceeding as if they were subject to different legal stand-
ards.”). We tried to simplify the analysis, saying that we and
district courts should consider all available evidence and,
when deciding a motion for summary judgment, should ask
whether a reasonable jury could find that the relevant deci-
sion was motivated in part by an unlawful criterion. Id. After
Ortiz, however, one way to make that showing remains the
framework for circumstantial evidence of discrimination
adopted by the Supreme Court in McDonnell Douglas Corp. v.
Green, 411 U.S. 792 (1973), as adapted to a wide variety of dis-
crimination cases. See Reives v. Illinois State Police, 29 F.4th 887,
892 (7th Cir. 2022); Johnson, 892 F.3d at 894.
Runkel, who is white, makes a claim of “reverse discrimi-
nation.” Title VII protects people of all races, including white
people, from race discrimination. McDonald v. Santa Fe Trail
Transportation Co., 427 U.S. 273, 280 (1976). “Because it is the
unusual employer who discriminates against majority em-
ployees,” however, we have modified the first element of a
prima facie claim under the McDonnell Douglas framework for
reverse discrimination claims. Mlynczak v. Bodman, 442 F.3d
1050, 1057 (7th Cir. 2006), quoting Gore v. Indiana Univ., 416
F.3d 590, 592 (7th Cir. 2005).

-- 8 of 19 --

No. 21-2418 9
Applying that framework here, avoiding summary judg-
ment requires Runkel to offer evidence that (i) the City had
“reason or inclination to discriminate invidiously” against
white people, or there were “fishy” circumstances, Gore, 416
F.3d at 592, quoting Phelan v. City of Chicago, 347 F.3d 679, 684
(7th Cir. 2003); (ii) she was qualified for the position; (iii) she
was rejected for the position; and (iv) the position was given
to a person outside her protected class who was similarly or
less qualified than she was. See Logan, 4 F.4th at 536. If she
makes her prima facie case, the burden shifts to the City to
provide a legitimate, non-discriminatory reason for the deci-
sion not to promote Runkel. Id.
After the City offered such a reason, the burden shifted
back to Runkel to submit evidence that the City’s explanation
is a pretext. Id. at 536–37. Runkel need not present evidence
that race was the sole cause or even a but-for cause of the
City’s decision not to promote her. “Race discrimination
claims under Title VII simply require that race be a ‘motivat-
ing factor in the defendant’s challenged employment deci-
sion.’” Lewis v. Indiana Wesleyan Univ., 36 F.4th 755, 759 (7th
Cir. 2022), quoting Comcast Corp. v. National Ass’n of African
American-Owned Media, 140 S. Ct. 1009, 1017 (2020).2
2 Runkel also claims that the City and mayor’s race discrimination vi-
olated the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment to the
U.S. Constitution, and she seeks relief under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. This appeal
presents no relevant difference between the statutory and constitutional
prohibitions, so our discussion of her Title VII claims applies equally to
her equal protection claim. See McReynolds v. Merrill Lynch & Co., 694 F.3d
873, 885 (7th Cir. 2012); see also Barnes v. Board of Trustees of the Univ. of
Illinois, 946 F.3d 384, 389 (7th Cir. 2020) (“The legal standard for analyzing
racial discrimination claims under Title VII and § 1983 is the same.”).

-- 9 of 19 --

10 No. 21-2418
For the first element, Runkel has offered evidence that the
City had “reason or inclination to discriminate invidiously”
against her as a white person, Gore, 416 F.3d at 592, quoting
Phelan, 347 F.3d at 684. She offers evidence that the mayor
chose Wilkin at least partly because he wanted to appoint a
black person as purchasing agent for political and/or policy
reasons. In an interview, the mayor later specifically cited his
hiring of a black woman (Wilkin) to the position of purchas-
ing agent as an example of how his administration was “mov-
ing toward reflecting the city’s demographics.” The prior pur-
chasing agent, Sandy Robinson, had been the only black per-
son among the fifteen senior city officials who reported di-
rectly to the mayor. When Robinson announced he planned
to resign, Mayor Langfelder testified, he sought to replace
him first by offering the position to one Darryl Harris, who is
also black, and when Harris declined, the mayor decided to
offer the position to Wilkin.
One detail is particularly telling on this issue, or at least a
jury might reasonably find it to be telling. There is evidence
that Wilkin’s resume was not emailed to Mayor Langfelder
until after he had already offered her the role. Along with the
other evidence, this detail might support a reasonable jury’s
inference that the mayor was more interested in Wilkin’s race
than in her (substantial) qualifications. See Gore, 416 F.3d at
592, quoting Phelan, 347 F.3d at 684.
The second element requires Runkel to offer evidence that
she was qualified to serve as the purchasing agent. Logan, 4
F.4th at 536. She offers evidence that McCarty, the director of
the Office of Budget and Management, was planning to have
her promoted to purchasing agent in an acting capacity if the
hiring process became prolonged. Runkel also claims that

-- 10 of 19 --

No. 21-2418 11
when she served as assistant purchasing agent, she repeatedly
managed the duties of the office when the prior purchasing
agents were absent. The job descriptions for the positions also
indicate significant overlap. The purchasing agent and assis-
tant purchasing agent were both responsible for administer-
ing City contracts, preparing and reviewing specifications for
materials and services, and developing and maintaining reli-
able sources of supplies and services. Runkel has presented
enough evidence for a reasonable jury to find that she was
qualified to serve as purchasing agent.
For the third element, Runkel must offer evidence that she
was actually rejected for the position. Logan, 4 F.4th at 536. The
situation here is not as clear as in other cases because the City
did not formally invite or entertain applications for the posi-
tion of purchasing agent. Nevertheless, Runkel testified that
she told the outgoing purchasing agent and McCarty, who
technically would make the appointment, subject to approval
from the mayor and city council, that she was interested in the
position. She also asked repeatedly for updates on the selec-
tion process. McCarty told the mayor of Runkel’s interest in
the position. A reasonable jury could find that she sought and
was rejected for the position. She can meet the third element
of a prima facie case.
For the fourth element, Runkel must show that the City
chose to promote someone of a different race who was simi-
larly or less qualified. Logan, 4 F.4th at 536. The City ordinance
states that the official selecting the purchasing agent “shall
give due consideration to the experience and ability required
for the proper and effective discharge of the duties of the of-
fice.” Springfield, Ill., Code § 38.11. This is too vague to

-- 11 of 19 --

12 No. 21-2418
provide much guidance about appropriate qualifications, so
we turn to Runkel and Wilkin’s resumes.
Runkel had worked in purchasing for about eight years
longer than Wilkin, and at a more senior level. On the other
hand, Wilkin had experience in the City’s electric utility com-
pany, and she had attained higher levels of education than
Runkel had. The City argues that experience as the assistant
purchasing agent has not been a prerequisite for appointment
as purchasing agent in the past. We assume that is true, but
that is not the same as saying that a reasonable jury would
have to conclude that Wilkin was better qualified. A reason-
able jury could find that the two were at least similarly quali-
fied. For purposes of summary judgment, Runkel has sup-
ported a prima facie case for racial discrimination in the pro-
motion decision, shifting the burden to the City to explain its
decision.
So what has the City said about why Wilkin was selected?
An important part of the evidence here is the City’s response
to Runkel’s EEOC charge, for it conflicts with other evidence
on several key points. (The record includes an attorney’s draft
response to the EEOC charge. The City has not offered a later
version or tried to disavow the draft, and Runkel is certainly
entitled to rely upon it in any event.) The City tried to explain
to the EEOC the process by which Wilkin was promoted to
purchasing agent. In this account, the City claimed that an un-
named decision-maker had compared Wilkin and Runkel and
had selected Wilkin because: (i) she was better-educated; (ii)
she had more seniority; (iii) she had displayed greater profes-
sionalism on the job; and (iv) Runkel misbehaved after learn-
ing of Wilkin’s appointment. At least the first three of these
are non-discriminatory explanations for Wilkin’s hiring,

-- 12 of 19 --

No. 21-2418 13
sufficient to shift the burden back to Runkel at the third step
of the McDonnell Douglas burden-shifting method.
Runkel thus needed to offer evidence that these reasons
are pretextual, meaning false, allowing an inference that the
City’s true intent was discriminatory. See St. Mary’s Honor
Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. 502, 511 (1993) (“The factfinder’s dis-
belief of the reasons put forward by the defendant (particu-
larly if disbelief is accompanied by a suspicion of mendacity)
may, together with the elements of the prima facie case, suf-
fice to show intentional discrimination. Thus, rejection of the
defendant’s proffered reasons will permit the trier of fact to
infer the ultimate fact of intentional discrimination….”); see
also Joll v. Valparaiso Community Schools, 953 F.3d 923, 932 (7th
Cir. 2020) (“Employment discrimination law has long recog-
nized that an employer’s dishonest explanation of a decision
can support an inference that its real reason was unlawful.”);
Hasham v. California State Bd. of Equalization, 200 F.3d 1035,
1045 (7th Cir. 2000) (“Pretext does not require that plausible
facts presented by the defendant not be true, only that they
not be the reason for the employment decision.”).3
3 Some of our opinions have been phrased in ways that suggest that a
showing of pretext requires a plaintiff to show the employer’s non-dis-
criminatory reason was dishonest, and also to show that the employer’s
true reason was discriminatory. E.g., Logan, 4 F.4th at 537 (“[I]n order to
show pretext, Logan must ‘show that (1) the employer’s non-discrimina-
tory reason was dishonest and (2) the employer’s true reason was based
on a discriminatory intent.’”), quoting Stockwell v. City of Harvey, 597 F.3d
895, 901 (7th Cir. 2010); Hobbs v. City of Chicago, 573 F.3d 454, 462 (7th Cir.
2009) (“Our recent Title VII cases explain that a plaintiff demonstrates pre-
text by showing the employer's proffered nondiscriminatory reason is a
lie and the real reason is based on discriminatory intent.”). This language
should not be interpreted to suggest that a plaintiff must show both

-- 13 of 19 --

14 No. 21-2418
Runkel has offered such evidence. The City’s fourth stated
reason for promoting Wilkin instead of Runkel is, on its face,
an after-the-fact rationalization of the City’s hiring decision.
Given the direction of time’s arrow, Runkel’s later actions
upon learning she would not be promoted could not possibly
have been a reason for the City’s earlier decision not to pro-
mote her.
As for the other stated reasons, and equally troubling for
the defense, the mayor testified that he made the decision to
promote Wilkin without ever comparing her to Runkel:
Q. I mean, I think you said just a while ago, you
never even considered [Runkel] for the position
[of purchasing agent], right?
A. Correct.
Based on this evidence that the City never even made the
claimed comparison between the two, a reasonable jury could
also find that the first three of the City’s claimed justifications
for promoting Wilkin were dishonest, not reflecting the actual
facts. A jury could thus reasonably find that all four of the jus-
tifications provided by the City were dishonest, permitting an
inference of unlawful motive.
Next, the City has also claimed that the substantive reason
it hired Wilkin was because the mayor “was impressed” with
her qualifications for the position. Mayor Langfelder testified
that he wanted to hire Wilkin because he appreciated her
pretext and some additional evidence of discrimination to permit the in-
ference of unlawful intent. If it were interpreted that way, it would be cir-
cular and would conflict with St. Mary’s Honor Center v. Hicks, 509 U.S. at
511.

-- 14 of 19 --

No. 21-2418 15
work ethic, and he knew that she had obtained a master’s de-
gree while working for the City. The mayor added that when
he chose Wilkin, he was considering centralizing the purchas-
ing services across different components of city government,
and he believed her experience at the municipal utility com-
pany’s billing department would be valuable in her new role.
At the time of her appointment, Wilkin worked as a buyer in
the office overseen by the purchasing agent, and the mayor
believed that she “understood both the utility and the [Office
of Budget and Management] side of things.” Now, if this ver-
sion of events were the only version, we would tend to agree
that a reasonable jury could not find racial discrimination.
Wilkin was clearly qualified for the role, and neither Title VII
nor any other source of applicable law required the City to go
through a formal, competitive civil-service-style selection
process.
As discussed above, however, Runkel has presented evi-
dence that flatly contradicts that benign version of the deci-
sion, in terms of both process and substance. Runkel has of-
fered quite direct evidence that the City’s decision was moti-
vated at least partly by race. Mayor Langfelder also testified
that he did not compare Wilkin to other candidates for the
role. That testimony contradicted the City’s explanation of the
hiring decision in response to Runkel’s EEOC charge. Add all
of Runkel’s evidence together and the City’s different stories
for the hiring appear inconsistent as to both the procedure
used (was there a comparison of candidates or not?) and the
substantive reasons for the hiring (was race part of the deci-
sion?). In addition to some direct evidence of race being a fac-
tor, the inconsistencies in the evidence permit the inference
that the City’s non-discriminatory explanations for promot-
ing Wilkin are dishonest, in turn allowing a reasonable jury to

-- 15 of 19 --

16 No. 21-2418
infer the City’s true purpose was intentional racial discrimi-
nation. E.g., Joll, 953 F.3d at 932. We must therefore reverse
summary judgment on Runkel’s race discrimination claims
under 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2(a)(1) and the Equal Protection
Clause.
B. Retaliation
Runkel also claims that the City retaliated against her for
complaining of racial discrimination to the EEOC by rescind-
ing her promised raise and placing her on the Last Chance
Agreement. Title VII prohibits employers from retaliating
against an employee because she “has made a charge, testi-
fied, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investiga-
tion” of racial discrimination. 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-3(a). The issue
is whether, construing the evidence in Runkel’s favor and giv-
ing her the benefit of reasonable inferences, a reasonable jury
could find that (i) she engaged in activity protected under Ti-
tle VII; (ii) she suffered an adverse employment action; and
(iii) her protected activity and the adverse action(s) were caus-
ally connected. Rozumalski v. W.F. Baird & Assocs., 937 F.3d
919, 924 (7th Cir. 2019).
Through counsel, Runkel told Mayor Langfelder on
March 22, 2018 that she was considering filing a charge of race
discrimination with the EEOC, and her lawyer attached the
proposed charge. Runkel actually filed a charge on April 5,
2018. These actions qualify as protected activity under Title
VII. See Poullard v. McDonald, 829 F.3d 844, 856 (7th Cir. 2016).
Runkel claims she suffered an adverse employment action a
few days later when the City placed her on the Last Chance
Agreement that both rescinded her $5,000 raise and made it
easier for the City to fire her. We agree. Runkel has evidence
to satisfy the first two elements of a retaliation claim. The

-- 16 of 19 --

No. 21-2418 17
disputed question is whether her evidence would allow a rea-
sonable jury to find that a retaliatory motive caused the ad-
verse action(s). See Igasaki, 988 F.3d at 959.
Runkel offers evidence that the City’s true concern about
her behavior on March 1 was that she complained of race dis-
crimination. The Last Chance Agreement states: “Due to the
unprofessional and unbecoming conduct, as well as the bel-
ligerent manner in which she treated a co-worker, the offer of
a pay increase discussed on March 1, 2018 is rescinded.” At
first glance, that sounds like a perfectly legitimate rationale
for disciplinary action, and it seems clear that her reaction was
unprofessional to at least some degree. But was such a strong
response independent of any retaliatory motive?
The City has no written documentation for Runkel’s offen-
sive conduct other than McCarty’s vague recollection of
events sent in an email to Director of Human Resources James
Kuizin on April 18, 2018, the day after Runkel retired:
I don’t recall the specifics of the entire conversa-
tion other than to say I mostly listened and that
there were two things she said that stuck with
me because I felt they were inappropriate to say,
even given the circumstances. While I don’t re-
member the exact words spoken, one comment
or set of comments were directed at [Wilkin’s]
ethnicity. Basically, her contention was that the
only reason [Wilkin] got the job is because she was
“black.”
She also made accusations [of a personal nature
about Wilkin]. It was during these comments
that she suddenly started yelling at someone to

-- 17 of 19 --

18 No. 21-2418
“get out of my office” multiple times. She then
said she would call me back, which did not oc-
cur. I found out later that [Wilkin] and someone
else had come back into the Purchasing office at
some point and had overheard [Runkel’s] com-
ments, which prompted her to enter [Runkel’s]
office. (Emphases added.)
McCarty’s testimony corroborates this earlier written ac-
count.
Giving Runkel the benefit of reasonable inferences from
the evidence, McCarty’s written recollection from 2018 would
tend to support a finding that one of the reasons the City took
disciplinary action against Runkel, including rescinding the
promised raise, was because she accused the City of choosing
the new purchasing agent based on race. The City provides
no evidence that conclusively rebuts that interpretation. Wil-
kin and her unnamed companion who overheard Runkel on
March 1 were not deposed, and other city officials were not
present when the conduct occurred. Even if a jury might have
to conclude that some degree of discipline would have been
justified under the circumstances, the severity of the actual
discipline is relevant here.
The McCarty evidence does not stand alone. Even worse
for the City’s defense is evidence specific to rescinding the
promised pay raise. Mayor Langfelder—the only official who
actually had the authority to rescind Runkel’s promised pay
raise—testified that he did not recall why he rescinded the
raise or even that he did so. Director Kuizin testified that the ba-
sis for the City’s decision to discipline Runkel on March 26
was a statement provided by Ramona Metzger about Runkel’s
conduct on March 1. When asked whether Metzger put her

-- 18 of 19 --

No. 21-2418 19
statement in writing, Kuizin stated “I believe so.” But Metzger
was not deposed, and there is no statement of hers in evi-
dence.
Runkel has offered evidence that would allow a reasona-
ble jury to find that the City retaliated against her for her pro-
tected activity claiming what she believed was race discrimi-
nation, and the City’s evidence does not conclusively fore-
close such a finding.
To be clear, we are not deciding the ultimate merits of
Runkel’s claims for discrimination or retaliation. The City
chose to move for summary judgment, and only on certain
issues. That choice requires us to give Runkel the benefit of
conflicts in the evidence and favorable inferences. When we
do so, it is clear that the City’s reasons for its actions must be
decided by a jury, not on summary judgment. The judgment
of the district court is REVERSED and the case is
REMANDED for further proceedings consistent with this
opinion.

-- 19 of 19 --