Adt, LLC v. National Labor Relations Board

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
Nos. 22-1629 & 22-1483
ADT, LLC,
Petitioner/Cross-Respondent,
v.
NATIONAL LABOR R ELATIONS BOARD,
Respondent/Cross-Petitioner.
____________________
Petition for Review and Cross-Application for Enforcement of an
Order of the National Labor Relations Board.
Nos. 18-CA-264654, 18-CA-266951, 18-CA-270402.
____________________
A RGUED O CTOBER 24, 2022 — DECIDED D ECEMBER 2, 2022
____________________
Before HAMILTON , S T. EVE, and K IRSCH , Circuit Judges.
HAMILTON , Circuit Judge. This case presents a disappoint-
ing and transparent attempt by an employer to avoid its obli-
gations under the National Labor Relations Act, 29 U.S.C.
§ 151 et seq. Petitioner ADT combined a unionized office with
a non-union office and tried unilaterally to withdraw recog-
nition of the union based on a supposed decertification peti-
tion not signed by a single member of the bargaining unit. It’s
tempting to call the attempt unprecedented, but it is not. ADT

-- 1 of 31 --

2 Nos. 22-1629 & 22-1483
tried a nearly identical maneuver in 2008 in Kalamazoo, Mich-
igan. The National Labor Relations Board found unfair labor
practices then, and the Sixth Circuit enforced the Board’s or-
der. NLRB v. ADT Security Servs., Inc., 689 F.3d 628 (6th Cir.
2012). We agree with their reasoning in that case, and the find-
ings and decision of the Board in this case are supported by
substantial evidence. We deny ADT’s petition for review and
enforce the Board’s order.
I. Factual Background
Drawn from the administrative record, the following facts
accord with those found by the Administrative Law Judge
and adopted by the Board in ADT, LLC & International Broth-
erhood of Electrical Workers Local Union 364, 371 NLRB No. 67,
2022 WL 511012, at *1−6 (Feb. 17, 2022).
ADT installs and services security systems. Before 2020,
ADT had separate offices in Rockford, Illinois, and Madison,
Wisconsin. Since 1994 the Rockford employees have been rep-
resented by the International Brotherhood of Electrical Work-
ers Local 364. As certified, the Rockford bargaining unit en-
compassed “All full-time and regular part-time installers,
technicians and service personnel employed by [ADT] at its
510 LaFayette Avenue, Rockford, Illinois facility.” Over their
almost 30-year bargaining history, ADT and the union have
successfully negotiated eight or nine collective bargaining
agreements. The most recent agreement ran from September
1, 2017 to August 31, 2020. The employees who worked out of
the Madison office were not represented by a union.
In May 2019 ADT announced that it had decided to close
both the Rockford and Madison facilities and to combine the
operations in a new office in Janesville, Wisconsin. Rockford

-- 2 of 31 --

Nos. 22-1629 & 22-1483 3
employees were concerned about what the consolidation
would mean for their bargaining unit. They asked ADT man-
agement what would change. ADT was clear: other than the
new facility location, “nothing would change.” The Rockford
employees would “stay in the Union” and work the same ser-
vice area around Rockford that they had been covering for
decades.
And at first, nothing did change. A few months later,
though, ADT took an extraordinary step against the union. It
purported to withdraw recognition of the union for the Rock-
ford employees. ADT took this step based on a decertification
petition that had not been signed by any member of the certi-
fied bargaining unit, let alone the majority that would be re-
quired. ADT then unilaterally changed several terms and con-
ditions of the union members’ employment. When members
of the Rockford unit questioned these changes, management
told them they were no longer “in the Union,” that manage-
ment “had done it in other branches,” and that “it was all le-
gal.”
The Rockford unit employees did not take management’s
word on that score. The union filed unfair labor practice
charges against ADT with the National Labor Relations
Board. An Administrative Law Judge and the Board agreed
with the employees and the union that ADT had violated mul-
tiple sections of the National Labor Relations Act. ADT, LLC,
2022 WL 511012, at *1. The Board found that ADT had unlaw-
fully withdrawn recognition from the union, unlawfully
made unilateral changes to the Rockford unit employees’
terms and conditions of employment, and unlawfully interro-
gated and threatened a Rockford unit employee about his
support for the union. Id. Based in part on ADT’s history as “a

-- 3 of 31 --

4 Nos. 22-1629 & 22-1483
recidivist violator of the Act” and “its evident disdain” for the
rights of employees under the Act, the Board issued a broad
remedial order. Id. at *1–2. ADT has petitioned for judicial re-
view, and the Board has cross-petitioned for enforcement of
its order.
II. Legal Standards
A. Judicial Review of Board Decisions
“Our review of a Board decision is limited.” Constellation
Brands U.S. Operations, Inc. v. NLRB, 992 F.3d 642, 646 (7th Cir.
2021). “We look for whether substantial evidence supports the
Board’s factual findings and whether legal conclusions have
a reasonable basis in law.” Id.; 29 U.S.C. § 160(e) & (f). “These
standards are not demanding: a finding is supported by sub-
stantial evidence if ‘a reasonable mind might accept’ its
truth.” Id., quoting SCA Tissue N. Am. LLC v. NLRB, 371 F.3d
983, 988 (7th Cir. 2004). We “do not reweigh the evidence,”
and the “presence of contrary evidence does not compel us to
reverse the Board’s order.” Contemporary Cars, Inc. v. NLRB,
814 F.3d 859, 868–69 (7th Cir. 2016), citing NLRB v. KSM In-
dustries, Inc., 682 F.3d 537, 543–44 (7th Cir. 2012), and NLRB v.
Teamsters “General” Local Union No. 200, 723 F.3d 778, 783 (7th
Cir. 2013).
Our deferential review extends to questions of substantive
labor law. We will accept “the Board’s interpretations of the
law ‘unless they are irrational or inconsistent with the Act.’”
KSM Industries, 682 F.3d at 544, quoting Loparex LLC v. NLRB,
591 F.3d 540, 545 (7th Cir. 2009); NLRB v. GranCare, Inc., 170
F.3d 662, 666 (7th Cir. 1999) (en banc). “Where, as here, the
Board adopts the ALJ’s findings of fact and conclusions of
law, our review focuses on the ALJ’s order.” Constellation

-- 4 of 31 --

Nos. 22-1629 & 22-1483 5
Brands, 992 F.3d at 646. “The party challenging the Board’s
determination bears the burden of proof.” Id. We should add,
though, that even if we did not defer to the Board’s interpre-
tations of the law, we would agree with and enforce its order.
B. Withdrawal of Recognition
Under the National Labor Relations Act, employees “have
the right to self-organization, to form, join, or assist labor or-
ganizations, to bargain collectively through representatives of
their own choosing, and to engage in other concerted activi-
ties for the purpose of collective bargaining or other mutual
aid or protection.” 29 U.S.C. § 157. An employer is guilty of
unfair labor practices when it “refuse[s] to bargain collec-
tively with the representatives of [its] employees.” § 158(a)(5).
The only representatives with whom an employer may bar-
gain are those “designated or selected for the purposes of col-
lective bargaining by the majority of the employees in a unit
appropriate for such purposes.” § 159(a).
The central issue on the merits is whether changed circum-
stances, here the closing and consolidation of the Rockford
and Madison offices, call for a change in the bargaining unit.
There is also an issue about ADT’s decision to withdraw
recognition unilaterally, let alone on the basis of a decertifica-
tion petition not signed by a majority of the bargaining unit.
The Board explained in the nearly identical ADT case from
Kalamazoo that, where “the issue is whether an existing unit
remains appropriate in light of changed circumstances, the
Board gives significant weight to the parties’ history of bar-
gaining.” ADT Security Servs., Inc. & Local Union 131, Int’l Bhd.
of Electrical Workers, 355 NLRB No. 223, 355 NLRB 1388, 1388
(2010), enforced, NLRB v. ADT Security Servs., Inc., 689 F.3d
628 (6th Cir. 2012).

-- 5 of 31 --

6 Nos. 22-1629 & 22-1483
Consistent with the deference we show Board decisions,
we likewise pay heed to a “significant bargaining history” of
the kind that exists between ADT and Local 364 in Rockford.
Id. at 1396, quoting Canal Carting, Inc., 339 NLRB No. 121, 339
NLRB 969, 970 (2003); ADT Security Servs., 689 F.3d at 634
(noting “the Board’s authority and its expertise” to consider
whether changed circumstances “overcome the significance
of the bargaining history” and according weight to an “almost
twenty-nine-year bargaining history between” ADT and a un-
ion); see also KSM Industries, 682 F.3d at 543 (“Our review of
the Board’s decision is subject to a deferential standard.”). In
light of these legal standards, we turn to the more specific
facts and issues in this case, again giving deference to the
ALJ’s and Board’s factual findings.
III. ADT’s Unilateral Withdrawal of Recognition
ADT’s principal legal theory is that in combining the Rock-
ford and Madison offices, it changed the work of the two
groups of employees so substantially that it would be intoler-
able to keep them split for purposes of a bargaining unit. At
relevant times, there was one more Madison employee than
Rockford employees, so everyone expected that a majority
vote of the combined group, if that were the proper bargain-
ing unit, would reject union representation.
We start with ADT’s announcement that it was withdraw-
ing recognition of the union. We then consider in detail the
facts relevant to whether the Rockford employees continued
to be an appropriate bargaining unit, including the history of
bargaining between the union and the employer and the facts
about how the employees actually did their jobs.

-- 6 of 31 --

Nos. 22-1629 & 22-1483 7
A. The Withdrawal
In June 2020, after consolidation in Janesville, ADT Direc-
tor of Labor Relations James Nixdorf informed Local 364 that
“a majority of the ADT employees of the … Local 364 bargain-
ing unit in Janesville” had submitted to ADT a decertification
petition demanding that the company “withdraw recognition
of the Union immediately.” With the existing collective bar-
gaining agreement set to expire on August 31, 2020, ADT also
announced its intention to withdraw recognition of the Rock-
ford bargaining unit on that same date.
The decertification petition was in fact not signed by any
members of the existing Rockford bargaining unit. There was
no “Janesville” bargaining unit. As Local 364 explained to
ADT, all “Rockford bargaining unit members who were trans-
ferred to Janesville continue to want Local 364 to represent
them.” So Local 364 “expect[ed] ADT to continue to abide by
and to bargain in good faith over the collective bargaining
agreement for the Rockford bargaining unit.” Between July
and September, Local 364 sent ADT no fewer than seven re-
quests to bargain. ADT did not bother to respond.
In cases of supposed consolidation of union and non-un-
ion employees, the Board applies a strong presumption in fa-
vor of the status quo: such an “historic bargaining relation-
ship will not be disturbed absent compelling circumstances.”
ADT Security Servs., 355 NLRB at 1396, quoting Canal Carting,
339 NLRB at 970. As the party challenging the historical bar-
gaining unit’s continued propriety, ADT must show compel-
ling circumstances. Id. More specifically, in cases where a
group of unionized employees is combined with a group of
non-union employees, an employer that seeks to withdraw
recognition lawfully “must show that the Union no longer

-- 7 of 31 --

8 Nos. 22-1629 & 22-1483
enjoys a majority because the unit, which has been combined
with similar employees,” no longer has “a distinct identity
from the larger group of employees.” Dodge of Naperville, Inc.,
357 NLRB No. 183, 357 NLRB 2252, 2253 (2012), citing Ser-
ramonte Oldsmobile, Inc., 318 NLRB No. 6, 318 NLRB 80, 104
(1995), enforced in relevant part, Serramonte Oldsmobile, Inc. v.
NLRB, 86 F.3d 227 (D.C. Cir. 1996). This is “a heavy eviden-
tiary burden,” Banknote Corp. of America, 315 NLRB No. 155,
315 NLRB 1041, 1043 (1994), and ADT has not come close to
carrying it.
B. Compelling Circumstances?
“Typically,” where bargaining unit employees “work
side-by-side” with other employees and “have the same su-
pervision, terms and conditions of employment, uniforms,
work assignments, skill set, training, and job functions” as the
non-unit employees, the necessary “compelling circum-
stances” may exist to justify withdrawing recognition. Dodge
of Naperville, 357 NLRB at 2253.1
1 Although the Board regards these kinds of circumstances as “typi-
cally” supporting an employer’s withdrawal of recognition, where non-
managerial employees—some of whom are union and some of whom are
non-union—are “merged” at a single facility, a broader set of comparative
problems arises than in the run-of-the-mine case where a subset of em-
ployees in a larger non-union workforce seeks union recognition. Given
the Board’s broad discretion, which “reflect[s] Congress’ recognition ‘of
the need for flexibility in shaping the [bargaining] unit to the particular
case,’” the Board is best positioned to decide which facts matter most in
evaluating such complex consolidations. NLRB v. Action Automotive, Inc.,
469 U.S. 490, 494 (1985), quoting NLRB v. Hearst Publ’ns, Inc., 322 U.S. 111,
134 (1944) (emphasis added). Our deference to the Board on these factual
determinations is commensurate with both the Board’s discretion and its
expertise. See Consolidated Papers, Inc. v. NLRB, 670 F.2d 754, 757 (7th Cir.

-- 8 of 31 --

Nos. 22-1629 & 22-1483 9
Recall that when ADT announced the plan to combine the
two facilities, the Rockford employees asked what would
change, including with respect to the union. Management
told them nothing would change except that they would visit
a different facility once a week. That turned out to be true un-
til ADT tried to decertify the union.
In terms of bargaining history, Local 364 has represented
the Rockford bargaining unit in negotiations with ADT since
1994. Across nearly three decades of bargaining history, ADT
and Local 364 have successfully negotiated eight or nine col-
lective bargaining agreements. This history “weighs heavily
in favor of a finding that” the Rockford bargaining unit re-
mains “appropriate.” ADT Security Servs., 355 NLRB at 1396,
quoting Canal Carting, 339 NLRB at 970.
Turning to how the Rockford employees did their jobs,
they typically started their days at their homes and went
straight to their first service assignments, received by com-
puter or telephone. Those assignments were based on their
home addresses. When safety concerns or time constraints re-
quired more than one technician, a Rockford employee usu-
ally teamed up with another Rockford employee. But the
Rockford technicians mostly worked alone, spending the bulk
of their time covering service calls near Rockford in northern
Illinois. Occasionally they handled assignments in Iowa or
Wisconsin, usually just across the state line in Beloit. If they
ran into problems in the field, they would communicate with
their direct supervisor, Matt Ides. On Fridays they would stop
by the Rockford office for an hour or so to dispose of waste
1982) (“[T]he Board uses its expertise to determine the most appropriate
employee composition for a particular unit.”).

-- 9 of 31 --

10 Nos. 22-1629 & 22-1483
and replenish supplies and equipment. They would usually
talk with Ides there. For emergency and off-hours service ap-
pointments in the Rockford area, ADT maintained a list of
Rockford employees who would rotate serving as the “on-
call” technician for a week at a time.
Unlike the Rockford employees, the Madison employees
have never been represented by a union. But the Madison em-
ployees worked in essentially the same way as their Rockford
counterparts and reported to the same supervisor, Ides, who
split his time between Rockford and Madison. The Madison
technicians primarily handled service calls in Wisconsin, but
they occasionally ventured into northern Illinois. Like the
Rockford employees, the Madison employees had their own
“on-call” list of Madison technicians who would handle
emergency or off-hours calls in the Madison area.
After ADT announced the consolidation of the Rockford
and Madison offices in the new Janesville facility, the Rock-
ford employees and their union took their concerns to ADT
management. Local 364 Assistant Business Manager Larry
Rowlett discussed the impending move with ADT General
Manager Shawn Bell, who was Ides’ direct supervisor. Bell
told Rowlett that the relocation was motivated purely by eco-
nomics, that ADT would now have “one centralized location”
halfway between the Madison and Rockford facilities, which
would make “more economic sense.” Bell was clear, however,
that “everything would stay the same” for the Rockford bar-
gaining unit. The Rockford employees “would still cover the
same areas that they” had for decades, and the Madison em-
ployees “would continue to cover their area in Wisconsin that
they represent.” The Rockford unit would continue to work
under their collective bargaining agreement, “and everything

-- 10 of 31 --

Nos. 22-1629 & 22-1483 11
would be the same other than when they went to an office lo-
cation.”
Ides told the Rockford employees the same thing. He as-
sured them “that nothing would change,” and that “every-
thing would stay the same as far as the Union.” The geo-
graphic area the Rockford technicians serviced “would re-
main the same.” The Madison and Rockford employees
would “stay separated.” There would be a “Madison side”
and a “Rockford side,” and the Rockford side “would still
stay in the Union.” Since “nothing was going to change,” Lo-
cal 364 did not request “effects bargaining.”2
When the Janesville office opened in December 2019, very
little changed for the Rockford technicians. Day-to-day work-
ing conditions “remained the same.” They still started their
days at their homes. Through phones or computers, they re-
ceived their daily service assignments, which were still deter-
mined based on their home addresses. Generally alone in the
field, they continued to “perform the same kind of work,”
spending the vast majority of their time covering service calls
near Rockford. They still reported to Ides, the same supervi-
sor as before, communicating with him throughout the day.
2 “Effects bargaining” refers to bargaining over significant changes in
working conditions, which is required under 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5). See
First Nat’l Maint. Corp. v. NLRB, 452 U.S. 666, 681 (1981); Columbia Coll.
Chicago v. NLRB, 847 F.3d 547, 552 (7th Cir. 2017). An employer like ADT
must “give adequate notice to the Union” of impending changes for effects
bargaining to be possible “‘in a meaningful manner and at a meaningful
time.’” NLRB v. Emsing’s Supermarket, Inc., 872 F.2d 1279, 1286 (7th Cir.
1989), quoting First Nat’l Maint. Corp., 452 U.S. at 682. Here, because ADT
promised that there would be no changes, it did not give notice of antici-
pated changes, so the union naturally never requested effects bargaining.

-- 11 of 31 --

12 Nos. 22-1629 & 22-1483
On Fridays they stopped by the Janesville office for an hour
or so to dispose of waste and replenish supplies and equip-
ment. After those weekly appearances in Janesville, they al-
most always returned to their traditional service area around
Rockford to make service calls.
Much the same was true for the Madison employees. They
still dispatched from their homes, did the same work in the
same service area as before, continued to report to Ides, and
headed to Janesville on Tuesdays to pick up parts. After the
base for both groups of employees was relocated to Janesville,
ADT continued to maintain separate “on-call” lists, one for
the former Rockford employees and one for the former Mad-
ison employees.
Shortly after the Janesville office opened, ADT brought in
all of the technicians, both from Rockford and Madison, for a
training session on new products that lasted a couple of
hours. ADT followed that up with a 60-minute welcome
breakfast. In the words of one employee, it was “a pretty nice
breakfast.”
After those two introductory gatherings, the Rockford and
Madison groups rarely met. Along with technicians from Mil-
waukee, Minnesota, and Iowa, the Rockford and Madison
employees would attend weekly online training and adminis-
trative meetings. But the two groups visited Janesville on dif-
ferent days of the week to pick up supplies, and aside from
the occasional coincidental encounter when a Rockford and
Madison employee happened to be at the office at the same
time, they saw each other no more than they had before the
move to Janesville.

-- 12 of 31 --

Nos. 22-1629 & 22-1483 13
We agree with the Board that, since the withdrawal peti-
tion was not signed by any of the bargaining unit employees
formerly assigned to Rockford, the petition did not evince any
“erosion of support for the Union.” 2022 WL 511012, at *6.
Without more, the decertification petition could not justify
ADT’s withdrawal of recognition. See Serramonte Oldsmobile,
86 F.3d at 234 (rejecting employer’s reliance on a decertifica-
tion petition signed by employees who were outside “the
scope of the bargaining unit”). And to be clear, ADT has not
offered any precedent or other legal support for its reliance on
a supposed decertification petition not signed by any member
of the bargaining unit.
C. ADT’s Arguments
To defend its extraordinary attempt at decertification,
ADT argues that the Rockford bargaining unit is no longer
appropriate because the Rockford employees now lack “a dis-
tinct identity from the larger group of employees” assigned to
the Janesville office. See Dodge of Naperville, 357 NLRB at 2253.
ADT claims that all Janesville technicians have become “fully
integrated” with one another as they “work side-by-side” at
“the same facility, serving the same geographic areas, under
the same terms and conditions of employment.” They “share
a community of interest,” ADT says, because both unit and
non-unit employees “perform identical work, drive the same
trucks, use the same tools/equipment, wear the same uni-
forms and report to the same managers.”
This theory collapses on the factual record and the ALJ’s
and Board’s factual findings, summarized above. At the
threshold we can dispense with ADT’s common “terms and
conditions of employment” contention quite simply. The
Rockford and Madison employees now work under the same

-- 13 of 31 --

14 Nos. 22-1629 & 22-1483
terms and conditions of employment only because ADT uni-
laterally changed the Rockford bargaining unit’s terms and
conditions to match those of the other Janesville employees.
Absent those unilateral and illegal changes, the Rockford and
Madison employees would have different employment bene-
fits, wages, overtime pay, bonuses, and paid time off.
It is true that all technicians perform the same work with
the same tools while wearing the same uniforms, driving the
same trucks, and reporting to the same supervisor. The prob-
lem for ADT’s theory is that the same was also true before the
relocation to Janesville. Because the technicians “work out of
their homes, have no onsite supervision, and, in fact, do not
even see their supervisors on a daily basis,” like the Board,
“we do not accord the absence of separate supervision here
the weight it bears in other cases.” ADT Security Servs., 355
NLRB at 1389 n.2.
There is no evidence, and the ALJ and Board were cer-
tainly not required to find, that these distinct groups have be-
come “fully integrated” or otherwise “share a community of
interest.” The two groups of employees rarely see or talk with
each other. Aside from a single training session, weekly online
meetings, some random encounters at the Janesville office,
and a welcome breakfast, these employees almost never inter-
act. We do not doubt the testimony that it was “a pretty nice
breakfast,” but it would take a lot more than even a nice
breakfast to fully integrate these distinct groups.
This result could not surprise ADT. As we noted above,
the company has been here before, claiming unsuccessfully
that similarly superficial efforts at “integration” following a
consolidation of union and non-union facilities could over-
come a significant bargaining history. In 2008, ADT closed a

-- 14 of 31 --

Nos. 22-1629 & 22-1483 15
unionized facility in Kalamazoo, Michigan and reassigned the
union service technicians to a different branch in Wyoming,
Michigan. ADT Security Servs., 355 NLRB at 1388, enforced,
NLRB v. ADT Security Servs., Inc., 689 F.3d 628 (6th Cir. 2012).
Although the technicians continued to work in the same ser-
vice territory near Kalamazoo that they had for 29 years, ADT
withdrew recognition of their bargaining unit. ADT claimed
that the union employees had “integrated” with the non-un-
ion employees in Wyoming. Id.
The Board rejected ADT’s arguments for the same reasons
that the Board rejected them here. ADT could not show any
compelling circumstances needed to overcome the parties’ al-
most three decades of bargaining history. “Even after the clo-
sure of the Kalamazoo facility, the employees in the unit con-
tinued to perform the same work in the same distinct geo-
graphical area under largely unchanged terms and conditions
of employment.” Id. Likewise, as here, “both before and after
the closing” of the old facility, the employees never worked
“at the facility” but “in the field, reporting” to the office “only
to replenish their parts supply approximately once a week.”
Id. Rather, they would “work out of their homes,” with “no
onsite supervision,” keeping in touch with the same supervi-
sor as their Wyoming counterparts. Id. at 1389 n.2. And, as
here, ADT continued to maintain a “separate, dual ‘on call’
list” and “continued to separate” the Kalamazoo employees
from the Wyoming employees. Id. at 1388.
“Accordingly,” the Board found that the historical Kala-
mazoo bargaining unit “‘maintained its integrity’ following
the closure of the Kalamazoo facility and continued to be an
appropriate unit with which [ADT] was obligated to bar-
gain.” Id. at 1388–89. The Sixth Circuit enforced the Board’s

-- 15 of 31 --

16 Nos. 22-1629 & 22-1483
order, finding “substantial evidence to support the Board’s
factual conclusion that the Kalamazoo employees were not
functionally integrated into the Wyoming facility and re-
mained a distinct unit of servicemen.” ADT Security Servs.,
689 F.3d at 634.3
At the end of the day, ADT can hang its hat only on the
fact that all technicians are now “reporting to the same central
hub” in Janesville. But relocating a bargaining unit from one
facility to another does not alone create the compelling cir-
cumstances needed to justify withdrawal of recognition. See
Serramonte Oldsmobile, 86 F.3d at 234–35 (affirming Board’s
finding of unlawful withdrawal of recognition: “the Board
rightly concluded that the employer could not rely on an in-
significant change of work location to withdraw recogni-
tion”); Molded Acoustical Products, Inc. v. NLRB, 815 F.2d 934,
940–41 (3d Cir. 1987) (rejecting employer’s attempt to avoid
union certification based on transfer of operations from one
town to another).
Rather, “notwithstanding having been transferred to a
common facility,” the Rockford “bargaining unit employees”
themselves “possess a significant community of interests so
as to continue to retain [their] separate identity as an appro-
priate unit.” Fisher Broadcasting, Inc., 324 NLRB No. 39, 324
NLRB 256, 263 (1997). For the same reasons that the Sixth Cir-
cuit affirmed the Board’s findings against ADT in Kalamazoo,
we affirm the Board’s findings against ADT here. Substantial
3 The same ADT official, Director of Labor Relations James Nixdorf,
oversaw the attempted withdrawals of recognition of both the Kalamazoo
and Rockford bargaining units. See ADT Security Servs., 355 NLRB at 1393.

-- 16 of 31 --

Nos. 22-1629 & 22-1483 17
evidence supports the Board’s conclusion that ADT unlaw-
fully withdrew recognition of the Rockford bargaining unit.
IV. The Board’s New Definition of the Bargaining Unit
Unable to show that compelling circumstances made the
Rockford bargaining unit no longer appropriate, ADT attacks
the Board’s revised definition of the unit with hyperbolic rhet-
oric, calling it “nonsensical,” “arbitrary,” and “irrational.” We
disagree.
Whether a group of employees forms an appropriate bar-
gaining unit under § 159(b) “lies largely within the discretion
of the Board, whose decision, ‘if not final, is rarely to be dis-
turbed.’” South Prairie Constr. Co. v. Local No. 627, 425 U.S. 800,
805 (1976) (per curiam), quoting Packard Motor Car Co. v.
NLRB, 330 U.S. 485, 491 (1947); see also Dunbar Armored, Inc.
v. NLRB, 186 F.3d 844, 847 (7th Cir. 1999) (“Bargaining unit
determinations are firmly committed to the Board’s discre-
tion.”). This discretion reflects “Congress’ recognition of the
need for flexibility in shaping the bargaining unit to the par-
ticular case.” Overnite Transp. Co., 322 NLRB No. 122, 322
NLRB 723, 724 (1996), quoting NLRB v. Action Automotive, Inc.,
469 U.S. 490, 494 (1985) (cleaned up). And within this “power
and discretion” lies the authority to modify a “bargaining-
unit description” so that it will “more accurately describe” an
existing bargaining unit. ADT Security Servs., 689 F.3d at 636,
citing Comar, Inc., 339 NLRB No. 110, 339 NLRB 903, 904
(2003) (ordering employer to recognize and bargain with un-
ion representing relocated employees performing “work that
was formerly done” at a shuttered facility).
Before the Board’s order in this case, the Rockford bargain-
ing unit was defined by reference to the now closed Rockford

-- 17 of 31 --

18 Nos. 22-1629 & 22-1483
facility: “All full-time and regular part-time installers, techni-
cians and service personnel employed by [ADT] at its 510
LaFayette Avenue, Rockford, Illinois facility.” Because that fa-
cility no longer exists, the Board exercised its broad discretion
to redefine the bargaining unit according to both its current
and historical practical dimensions: “All full-time and regular
part-time installers, technicians and service personnel em-
ployed by [ADT] at its Janesville, Wisconsin facility who are
regularly assigned to work in the service territory of [ADT’s] former
Rockford, Illinois facility.” 2022 WL 511012, at *3 (emphasis
added).4
Contrary to ADT’s unsupported assertion that there is no
such “service territory,” the evidence shows that when they
were based out of Rockford, the Rockford bargaining unit
technicians would “spend the bulk of [their] workday” in
“the Rockford area” and “the surrounding smaller towns”
like Belvidere, DeKalb, Freeport, Janes, Machesney Park,
Rockton, Roscoe, and South Beloit. Most of the time they were
“within 20 miles of Rockford,” but sometimes they would
4 ADT argues as well that the Board’s new definition “improperly at-
tempts to gerrymander” the Rockford bargaining unit “back into exist-
ence.” The cases cited by ADT are inapposite because they did not involve
historical bargaining units. For example, in PCC Structurals, Inc., to ensure
that the bargaining unit was not “arbitrary, irrational, or ‘fractured’—that
is, composed of a gerrymandered grouping of employees whose interests
are insufficiently distinct from those of other employees,” the Board as-
sessed “whether the sought-after employees’ interests” were “sufficiently
distinct from those of employees excluded from the petitioned-for group.”
365 NLRB No. 160, 2017 WL 6507219, at *7 (2017) (emphasis added). Here,
the Rockford bargaining unit cannot be gerrymandered “back into exist-
ence” because it never ceased to exist outside of ADT’s unlawful with-
drawal of recognition. Regardless of ADT’s unlawful conduct, the Rock-
ford bargaining unit persisted.

-- 18 of 31 --

Nos. 22-1629 & 22-1483 19
work “out as far as” Galena, Rock Falls, or Savanna or cross
the state line into Wisconsin for a service call in Beloit. When
necessary, they might travel further into Wisconsin, taking
appointments in places like Fond du Lac, Fort Atkinson, Ja-
nesville, and even Madison itself. But it was “not often” that
they ventured so far from Rockford. And only on a “rare oc-
casion” would the Rockford technicians “cover the same
area” as the Madison technicians, who took appointments in
their own “normal work area” near Madison.
Just as ADT managers promised, after relocating to Ja-
nesville, the Rockford employees “still cover[ed] the same ar-
eas” that they always had. They did not travel to Wisconsin
any “more regularly than they did when the Rockford office
was open.” They did “more or less … what they have always
done in the past.” Even when they dropped by Janesville on
Fridays for supplies, the Rockford technicians went “back
into Illinois to do their job.” In short, the territory they work
has “remained the same.” As in Kalamazoo, the fact that the
Rockford technicians and the Madison technicians occasion-
ally cross paths or work in each other’s territories does not
diminish the fact that they spend the majority of their time
covering distinct service areas. See ADT Security Servs., 355
NLRB at 1397 (“Both before and after” the closing of the Kal-
amazoo branch, “Kalamazoo employees were sent to work
outside the Kalamazoo area and employees from other loca-
tions were sent to the Kalamazoo area when needed.").
The Board’s new definition for the Rockford bargaining
unit is therefore not arbitrary but a reasonable exercise of the
Board’s judgment. The definition’s reference to “the service
territory of [ADT’s] former Rockford, Illinois facility” is
grounded in the realities of the Rockford bargaining unit’s

-- 19 of 31 --

20 Nos. 22-1629 & 22-1483
daily work. It “reflects” the reality that the Rockford bargain-
ing unit employees are simply “no longer employed at the”
Rockford facility. ADT Security Servs., 689 F.3d at 636 (affirm-
ing Board modification of bargaining-unit definition where
ADT closed its Kalamazoo facility and then unlawfully with-
drew recognition of the bargaining unit formerly based in that
facility).
ADT argues that even if the Rockford service territory ex-
ists, the Board’s inclusion of all Janesville technicians “regu-
larly assigned” to that territory makes the new definition “so
vague and obtuse” as to be “unworkable” and “unenforcea-
ble.” ADT contends that all Janesville employees “regularly”
work in that area. As do technicians from Chicago. And the
former Rockford technicians regularly work “in states other
than Illinois, including Iowa, Wisconsin and Minnesota.” In
short, ADT challenges the usefulness of the word “regularly”
to define the bargaining unit going forward.
We are not persuaded that the Board’s definition will
prove unworkable or unenforceable. Rather than look to dic-
tionary definitions, as ADT suggests, the better course is to
look at the evidence before us to understand what “regularly”
means for this employer and its employees. For the bargaining
unit employees, it means spending the majority of their time
in Rockford and the surrounding areas. It means spending a
“minimal amount” of time outside of those areas. And it
means working in other areas only “on rare occasion.” As in
the Kalamazoo case, the Board’s definition “appropriately
flows from the evidence in the record.” ADT Security Servs.,
689 F.3d at 635–36 (rejecting ADT’s contention that Board’s
modified definition of bargaining unit was “impermissibly
vague”). If circumstances change and future problems arise,

-- 20 of 31 --

Nos. 22-1629 & 22-1483 21
ADT and Local 364 can address them through bargaining. But
in the case before us, there is nothing vague about the word
“regularly.” The Board’s decision to redefine the bargaining
unit was grounded in substantial evidence and was not an
abuse of its broad discretion.
V. Unilateral Changes to Terms & Conditions of Employment
ADT’s only defense of its unilateral changes to the bar-
gaining unit’s terms and conditions of employment fails as a
matter of logic. “Because ADT had lawfully withdrawn recog-
nition based on the Union’s lack of majority status,” ADT ar-
gues that it “cannot be found to have an obligation to bargain
with the Union over any of the changes that the Board erro-
neously deemed to be unlawful.”
We join the ALJ and the Board in rejecting the premise of
the argument. ADT’s withdrawal of recognition was not law-
ful, so its unilateral changes to the bargaining unit’s terms and
conditions of employment were also unlawful. See Serramonte
Oldsmobile, 86 F.3d at 235 (where employer unlawfully with-
draws recognition, “unilateral changes imposed … after the
withdrawal of recognition” are likewise unlawful); Texas Pet-
rochemicals Corp., 296 NLRB No. 136, 296 NLRB 1057, 1075
(1989) (“Because the withdrawal of recognition was illegal,
the unilateral changes were illegal.”), enforcement denied on
other grounds, Texas Petrochemicals Corp. v. NLRB, 923 F.2d
398 (5th Cir. 1991).
VI. Unlawful Coercion
An employer engages in unfair labor practices when it at-
tempts to “interfere with, restrain, or coerce employees in the
exercise of the rights guaranteed in section 157” of the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act. 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(1). Substantial

-- 21 of 31 --

22 Nos. 22-1629 & 22-1483
evidence also supports the Board’s finding that ADT manager
Ides coercively interrogated Rockford technician David An-
derson.
Soon after ADT withdrew recognition of the Rockford bar-
gaining unit, ADT managers Gary Talma and Matt Ides set up
individual meetings with the Rockford technicians. The man-
agers told them that they were no longer in the union and told
them how pay and other terms and conditions of employment
would change going forward. The Rockford technicians
would be paid higher hourly wages. Where they previously
had earned overtime for working more than eight hours per
day, now they would earn overtime only when they worked
more than forty hours per week. The existing leave policy,
which separately categorized vacation and sick leave allow-
ances, was being replaced by a single paid-time-off allowance.
Customer survey responses would now be considered in em-
ployee performance evaluations and would affect potential
pay increases. And the Rockford employees would now par-
ticipate in a bonus program.
In one of these individual meetings, employee David An-
derson asked Talma and Ides, “what do you mean we are not
in the Union anymore?” They told him (falsely) that there had
been “a decertification vote” and the union had been “voted
out.” When Anderson protested that he “never took part in
any vote,” the managers said that “it was done” just as ADT
“had done it in other branches and that it was all legal.”
A month later, Ides called Anderson and told him that he
“was doing very well” and had “received the highest bonus
out of the office.” Ides then asked Anderson if he was “aware
that if you guys go back to the Union that this will go away,
that you will not be part of the bonus program?” “ADT would

-- 22 of 31 --

Nos. 22-1629 & 22-1483 23
not do both,” so “if you are part of the Union, you can’t have
the bonus program.” Anderson replied that, “if we are part of
the Union, everything is up to negotiation.” Ides reiterated
that “ADT would not do both” and asked Anderson why he
“wanted to be in the Union”? The conversation ended when
Anderson rejoined, “why don’t you guys want the Union?”
In November, Ides and Anderson had another, similar
conversation in Ides’ office. Several other technicians, includ-
ing Danny Sissum, were present. Anderson knew he would
be receiving subpoena from the Board. He told Ides that he
would need to be blocked off the schedule when that hap-
pened. Ides responded by repeating what he had told Ander-
son over the phone in October: “if you guys go back to the
Union,” then the “bonus program will go away.” ADT was
“very firm on this” and would “not do both.”5
5 All of the record evidence relating to the two conversations between
Ides and Anderson comes from Anderson’s testimony. ADT did not offer
contrary evidence. Still, ADT attacks Anderson’s testimony about his sec-
ond conversation with Ides by pointing out that his account was not cor-
roborated by fellow technician Danny Sissum, who was also present. But
ADT chose not to question Sissum about that conversation at trial, and it
did not even call Ides to testify. Any failure to put Anderson’s testimony
in dispute falls squarely on ADT’s shoulders. ADT also questions Ander-
son’s credibility, calling him “an admittedly biased witness.” It’s not un-
usual for both union and management witnesses to be subject to bias in
labor disputes. Where, as here, the ALJ has observed the witness’s de-
meanor, the ALJ’s “credibility findings … are to be accorded exceptional
weight by a reviewing court.” NLRB v. Cutting, Inc., 701 F.2d 659, 663 (7th
Cir. 1983); see also Contemporary Cars, 814 F.3d at 869 (“[W]e give particu-
lar deference to the Board’s credibility determinations, which we will dis-
turb only in extraordinary circumstances, such as obvious incredibility or
clear bias.”). And where, as here, a party seeks to “discredit[] direct, un-
controverted testimony[,]” the testimony “must be internally

-- 23 of 31 --

24 Nos. 22-1629 & 22-1483
Whether Ides’ statements in these conversations
amounted to coercive interrogation in violation of the Act
“depends on the factual context in which the questioning”
took place. Multi-Ad Servs., Inc. v. NLRB, 255 F.3d 363, 372 (7th
Cir. 2001). We consider “the tone, duration, and purpose of
the questioning, whether it is repeated, how many workers
are involved, the setting, the authority of the person asking
the question, and whether the company otherwise had shown
hostility to the union.” Id; see also Parts Depot, Inc., 332 NLRB
No. 64, 332 NLRB 670, 673 (2000) (“To determine whether the
inquiry is coercive, the Board considers the following factors:
the background, the nature of the information sought, the
identity of the questioner, and the place and method of inter-
rogation.”).
Ides was the branch manager and Anderson’s direct su-
pervisor. See Boar’s Head Provisions Co., 370 NLRB No. 124,
2021 WL 1854735, at *4 (May 6, 2021) (finding coercive inter-
rogation where questioning was conducted by “direct super-
visors … reasonably tend[ing] to make the questioning that
much more threatening”) (emphasis in original); Intertape Pol-
ymer Corp., 360 NLRB No. 114, 360 NLRB 957, 958 (2014)
(same), enforced in relevant part, Intertape Polymer Corp. v.
NLRB, 801 F.3d 224, 231 (4th Cir. 2015); Parts Depot, 332 NLRB
at 673 (finding unlawful coercion where “the highest
contradictory or inherently improbable” to justify setting aside the credi-
bility findings of the ALJ and the Board. 701 F.2d at 665 (rejecting an ALJ’s
credibility findings where the ALJ’s adverse inferences were “contrary to
direct, positive testimony”). The ALJ and the Board found Anderson’s tes-
timony credible, 2022 WL 511012, at *1 n.1, and ADT has not pointed to
any internal contradictions or improbabilities that would cast doubt on
those findings.

-- 24 of 31 --

Nos. 22-1629 & 22-1483 25
management official at the facility” conducted the interroga-
tion), enforced, Parts Depot, Inc. v. NLRB, 24 F. App’x 1 (D.C.
Cir. 2001) (non-precedential).
In the first conversation, Ides asked Anderson why he
“wanted to be in the Union?” Such questioning alone can
amount to unlawful interrogation, for employers are “not free
to probe ‘directly or indirectly into an employee’s reason for
supporting the union.’” Beverly Cal. Corp. v. NLRB, 227 F.3d
817, 835 (7th Cir. 2000) (affirming Board’s finding of coercive
interrogation where labor consultant asked employees “about
what they thought a union would do”), quoting TRW-United
Greenfield Div. v. NLRB, 637 F.2d 410, 418 (5th Cir. 1981)
(cleaned up); see also Multi-Ad Servs., 255 F.3d at 372 (affirm-
ing Board’s finding of coercive interrogation where an em-
ployee was asked “why he would want to bring a union into
the company”).
In both conversations, Ides explicitly tied continued bo-
nuses to rejecting the union. Over the phone, Ides asked An-
derson if he was “aware that if you guys go back to the Union
that [the bonuses] will go away, that you will not be part of
the bonus program?” Then, in his office—where his authority
was enhanced—Ides repeated this threat in the presence of
other bargaining unit employees: “if you guys go back to the
Union,” then the “bonus program will go away.”
An employer threatening employees with lost “benefit[s]
and economic reprisal” for supporting a union is quintessen-
tial coercive interrogation. NLRB v. Marsh Supermarkets, Inc.,
327 F.2d 109, 111 (7th Cir. 1963) (affirming Board finding of
coercive interrogation where officials threatened that “if a un-
ion got in,” then “everything would be wiped clean”); see also
Boar’s Head Provisions, 2021 WL 1854735, at *1, *4 (agreeing

-- 25 of 31 --

26 Nos. 22-1629 & 22-1483
with ALJ that employer had violated Section 8(a)(1) by
“threatening employees with the loss of benefits,” including
bonuses, if the employees unionized); Lucky Cab Co., 360
NLRB No. 43, 360 NLRB 271, 271, 288 (2014) (same); Hudson
Moving & Storage Co., 322 NLRB No. 187, 322 NLRB 1028,
1028, 1033 (1997) (same where employer threatened to “dis-
continue its practice of giving Christmas bonuses” because of
employees’ union activities).
Adding to this already substantial evidence, Ides made
these statements “against a background of other unfair labor
practices.” Greenfield Die & Mfg. Corp., 327 NLRB No. 52, 327
NLRB 237, 237 (1998) (agreeing with ALJ that interrogations
against such a backdrop violate Section 8(a)(1)). Before both
of Ides’ conversations with Anderson, ADT had already un-
lawfully withdrawn recognition of Local 364 and unilaterally
changed the bargaining unit’s terms and conditions of em-
ployment. “Where the interrogation is accompanied by
threats or other violations of Section 8(a)(1), as this one was,
there can be no question as to the coercive effect of the in-
quiry.” Parts Depot, 332 NLRB at 673. In Multi-Ad Services we
found “more than enough evidence to sustain the Board’s
findings” of coercive interrogation where “company manag-
ers had [merely] expressed uneasiness over union activity.”
255 F.3d at 372. Here, ADT’s withdrawal of recognition and
unilateral changes to the terms and conditions of employment
make the evidence of unlawful coercion compelling.
VII. Remedies
Regarding the Board’s remedial orders, we respect the
Board’s “broad discretion to devise remedies that effectuate
the policies of the Act, subject only to limited judicial review.”
NLRB v. Intersweet, Inc., 125 F.3d 1064, 1067 (7th Cir. 1997),

-- 26 of 31 --

Nos. 22-1629 & 22-1483 27
quoting America’s Best Quality Coatings Corp. v. NLRB, 44 F.3d
516, 520 (7th Cir. 1995). “We therefore review the Board’s de-
cision with deference and will interfere only if the Board’s or-
der reflects an abuse of its discretion.” Id.
Here the Board found that ADT “demonstrated [a] pro-
clivity to violate the Act” and an “evident disdain for employ-
ees’” rights. 2022 WL 511012, at *2. Because the Board found
ADT to be “a recidivist violator of the Act” that “has commit-
ted multiple, serious unfair labor practices in this case,” the
Board agreed with the ALJ that a broad cease-and-desist order
was necessary and that ADT should “be required to read the
remedial notice to employees.” Id. We agree with the Board.
A broad order is warranted where, as here, “a respondent
is shown to have a proclivity to violate the Act or has engaged
in such egregious or widespread misconduct as to demon-
strate a general disregard for the employees’ fundamental
statutory rights.” Apex Linen Serv., Inc., 370 NLRB No. 75, 2021
WL 352062, at *1–2 (Jan. 29, 2021), quoting Hickmott Foods, 242
NLRB No. 177, 242 NLRB 1357, 1357 (1979) (Board broaden-
ing ALJ’s order where employer had been found guilty of un-
fair labor practices in three cases over three years); see also
Ozburn-Hessey Logistics, LLC, 366 NLRB No. 177, 2018
WL 4184225, at *1, *16–17 (Aug. 27, 2018) (Board enhancing
remedial order to include posting remedial notice for three
years after employer had been found to have engaged in un-
fair labor practices five times in nine years), enforced in rele-
vant part, Ozburn-Hessey Logistics, LLC v. NLRB, 803 F. App’x
876, 888–89 (6th Cir. 2020) (non-precedential); Latino Express,
Inc., 360 NLRB No. 112, 360 NLRB 911, 911, 927–28 (2014) (is-
suing broad remedial order where employer, whose

-- 27 of 31 --

28 Nos. 22-1629 & 22-1483
“proclivity to violate the Act” was “undeniable,” had violated
a narrower recent order).
As the Board recognized, ADT “has been found to have
committed unfair labor practices” in no fewer than seven
cases since 2015. 2022 WL 511012, at *2. Not including ADT’s
serious violations in this case, that’s seven times ADT has vi-
olated the Act in as many years. See Local Union 43 v. NLRB,
9 F.4th 63, 67 (2d Cir. 2021) (ADT unlawfully failed to bargain
before instituting unilateral changes to terms and conditions
of employment); ADT Security Servs., Inc., 2020 WL 7496119,
at *1 (NLRB Dec. 18, 2020) (ADT unlawfully refused to pro-
vide union with information), adopted, ADT Security Servs.,
Inc., 2021 WL 1815000, at *1 (NLRB Jan. 29, 2021); ADT, LLC,
369 NLRB No. 31, 2020 WL 996271, at *1 (Feb. 27, 2020) (ADT
unlawfully “bypassed the Union and dealt directly with” em-
ployees); ADT, LLC, 369 NLRB No. 23, 2020 WL 591740, at *1
(Feb. 5, 2020) (ADT unlawfully discharged employees who
“engaged in protected union activity”); ADT, LLC, 2019
WL 2501867, at *1 (NLRB June 17, 2019) (ADT unlawfully and
coercively interrogated employees regarding support for un-
ion, unlawfully solicited union decertification, unlawfully
withdrew recognition of union, unlawfully refused to bar-
gain, and unlawfully failed to abide by terms of collective bar-
gaining agreement), adopted, ADT, LLC, 2019 WL 3451539, at
*1 (NLRB July 29, 2019); ADT, LLC, 2018 WL 2263547 (NLRB
May 16, 2018) (ADT unlawfully closed a “facility without af-
fording the Union an opportunity to bargain regarding the ef-
fects of that decision” and unlawfully refused to provide un-
ion with information), adopted, ADT, LLC, 2018 WL 3091018,
at *1 (NLRB June 21, 2018); ADT, LLC, 363 NLRB No. 36,
363 NLRB 352, 352 (2015) (ADT unlawfully refused to provide
union with information).

-- 28 of 31 --

Nos. 22-1629 & 22-1483 29
Attempting to minimize this history, ADT contends that
the other cases dealt with “unrelated matters” and that “there
is no evidence of a ‘lengthy record of unfair labor practices’
relating to the employee group that is involved in this partic-
ular case.” Some of these prior cases addressed different vio-
lations than the ones ADT is guilty of in this case, and the
other cases involved different employee groups—from Iowa,
Maryland, New York, Virginia, and Washington. These dis-
tinctions are not controlling.
Recidivism under the National Labor Relations Act does
not necessarily depend on the employer’s particular viola-
tions or their locations. The Board sensibly accounts for the
“variety … of the violations committed” when assessing
whether an employer “has exhibited a proclivity to violate the
Act.” Control Servs., Inc., 314 NLRB No. 72, 314 NLRB 421, 421
(1994); see Shamrock Foods Co., 369 NLRB No. 5, 2020
WL 104401, at *1 & n.3 (Jan. 7, 2020) (ordering reading of re-
medial notice where employer had unlawfully restricted and
granted benefits and had previously been found guilty of
other violations of the Act), citing Shamrock Foods Co., 366
NLRB No. 117, 2018 WL 3109956, at *1 (June 22, 2018) (em-
ployer unlawfully discharged, threatened, and interrogated
employees, solicited complaints and grievances, surveilled
union activity, and promulgated unlawful rules), and Sham-
rock Foods Co., 366 NLRB No. 107, 2018 WL 3109951, at *1 (June
22, 2018) (employer unlawfully restricted employees’ break
schedule, and unlawfully supervised, counseled, and warned
an employee), both enforced, Shamrock Foods Co. v. NLRB, 779
F. App’x 752, 756 (D.C. Cir. 2019) (non-precedential); Latino
Express, 360 NLRB at 911, 927–28 (issuing broad remedial or-
der, including notice reading, where employer had unlaw-
fully withdrawn recognition and instituted unilateral changes

-- 29 of 31 --

30 Nos. 22-1629 & 22-1483
to terms and conditions of employment and had previously
been found guilty of other violations of the Act), citing Latino
Express, Inc., 358 NLRB No. 94, 358 NLRB 823, 823 (2012) (em-
ployer unlawfully discharged employees for supporting un-
ion and unlawfully granted wage increases during union or-
ganizing drive).
We are not aware of any corner of our law where treating
a wrongdoer as a recidivist depends upon repetition of the
same prohibited act. The first-time arsonist is no less recidivist
simply because he previously trafficked in stolen goods or ex-
tortion. The first-time bank robber is no less a recidivist be-
cause he had previously robbed convenience stores or ex-
torted small shops for protection money. Nor is a veteran
bank robber less a recidivist because his prior bank robberies
were in several other states. The same is true under the Na-
tional Labor Relations Act.
Further, even if the nature of prior violations were deci-
sive, ADT is a recidivist violator with respect to the specific
violations in this case. See Local Union 43, 9 F.4th at 67 (unilat-
eral changes); ADT, LLC, 2019 WL 2501867, at *1 (coercive in-
terrogation, withdrawal of recognition); ADT, LLC, 2018
WL 2263547, at *10 (closing a facility without effects bargain-
ing); ADT Security Servs., 355 NLRB at 1397–98 (withdrawal of
recognition, unilateral changes), enforced, ADT Security
Servs., 689 F.3d at 636.
ADT also argues that recidivism can be found only where
an employer has repeatedly violated the rights of the same em-
ployee group. Not only do we “lack authority to reach the
merits of this argument because [ADT] did not raise it before
the Board,” but this argument has no basis in law. See KSM
Industries, 682 F.3d at 544. If it did, we would call a “serial

-- 30 of 31 --

Nos. 22-1629 & 22-1483 31
killer” just a “killer.” Under the National Labor Relations Act,
an employer need not violate the rights of the same victim to
be a repeat offender. See Grinnell Fire Prot. Systems Co., 335
NLRB No. 40, 335 NLRB 473, 473 (2001) (imposing broad re-
medial order where employer was a “repeat offender” whose
prior violations spanned multiple facilities), enforced, NLRB
v. Grinnell Fire Prot. Systems Co., No. 01-9538, 2001
WL 34041228, at *1 (10th Cir. Dec. 6, 2001); Control Servs., 314
NLRB at 421, 432 (1994) (same).
Taking into account ADT’s substantial history of earlier vi-
olations of federal labor law, as well as its serious violations
of the National Labor Relations Act in this case, the Board
acted well within its “broad discretion to devise remedies that
effectuate the policies of the Act.” Intersweet, 125 F.3d at 1067,
quoting America’s Best Quality Coatings, 44 F.3d at 520.
For these reasons, we DENY ADT’s petition for judicial re-
view and GRANT the Board’s cross-application for enforce-
ment.

-- 31 of 31 --