Kong Sok v. KILOLO KIJAKAZI, Acting Commissioner of Social Security

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Argued November 18, 2022
Decided December 5, 2022
Before
MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge
THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge
JOHN Z. LEE, Circuit Judge
No. 21-3039
KONG SOK,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
KILOLO KIJAKAZI,
Acting Commissioner of Social Security,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Western District of
Wisconsin.
No. 20-cv-489-wmc
William M. Conley,
Judge.
O R D E R
Kong Sok, who suffers from physical and mental impairments, raises a narrow
issue in his appeal of the denial of his application for Social Security disability benefits.
He argues that the administrative law judge failed—at the fifth and final step of the
disability analysis under 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4)—to assess the reliability of the
vocational expert’s testimony regarding estimates of the numbers of jobs suitable for
him in the national economy. But because the expert’s explanation on this point was
sufficient, we affirm.
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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In 2016, Sok, then 48, applied for disability benefits, alleging several impairments
stemming from a recent car accident, including head trauma, depression, anxiety,
chronic headache, and back pain. Before the accident, Sok worked as a machine
operator.
After the Social Security Administration denied Sok’s application initially and on
reconsideration, he appeared at a hearing before an ALJ in July 2019. Sok testified that
because of the accident, he had trouble walking, suffered from muscle cramping, and
had “headaches all the time.”
The ALJ denied Sok’s application, concluding that he was not disabled within
the meaning of the Social Security Act. At step one of the five-step disability analysis
described in 20 C.F.R. § 416.920(a)(4), the ALJ determined that Sok had not worked
since he applied for benefits. At steps two and three, the ALJ determined that Sok had
several severe impairments, but none presumptively established that he was disabled.
At step four, the ALJ determined that Sok could not do any prior relevant work, but he
had the capacity to perform light work with certain physical limitations.
The ALJ then proceeded to step five, the only inquiry at issue in this appeal. At
this step, the agency bears the burden of demonstrating the existence of significant
numbers of jobs in the national economy that someone with the claimant’s abilities and
limitations can perform. See 20 C.F.R. § 416.960(c)(2); Ruenger v. Kijakazi, 23 F.4th 760,
761 (7th Cir. 2022). The agency must approximate the number of job openings at a given
time, whether vacant or filled, and without regard to the location of the work, the
claimant’s likelihood of being hired, economic conditions, or an employer’s hiring
practices. See 42 U.S.C. § 423(d)(2)(A); 20 C.F.R. § 416.966(a), (c). To determine the
number of jobs available for a claimant, the ALJ typically relies on the testimony of a
vocational expert, a person who is experienced in job placement and, normally, holds
an advanced degree in vocational rehabilitation or psychology.
VEs consult various resources to determine job-number estimates. See Chavez v.
Berryhill, 895 F.3d 962, 964–66 (7th Cir. 2018) (describing the resources used by VEs).
One of the most common starting points is the Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT),
which describes the duties and requirements of specific occupations. The DOT does not,
however, estimate how many jobs exist in the national economy for each occupation.
For job-number estimates, VEs tend to rely on the Department of Labor’s Standard
Occupational Classification (SOC) system. The SOC has job-number estimates for broad
categories of jobs, each of which encompasses several DOT occupations. Thus, the VE’s

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task is to estimate the portion of jobs in an SOC category that corresponds to the
particular DOT occupation the claimant can perform.
At the hearing before the ALJ, the VE in this case, Thomas Gusloff, testified
about the number of jobs available to someone like Sok: 200,000 “cleaner,
housekeeping” jobs, 100,000 “[c]afeteria attendant” jobs, and 30,000 “[l]inen grader or
sorter” jobs. When examined by Sok’s attorney, Gusloff explained that he began with
the SOC estimate for each category encompassing a DOT occupation that Sok could
perform, and then estimated the number of jobs available to Sok based on his
“knowledge of the labor market [from] over 30 years of job placement.” Gusloff also
noted that the jobs he selected were “well reflected in the national economy.” Sok’s
counsel objected to the reliability of these estimates.
At step five of his decision denying benefits, the ALJ credited Gusloff’s testimony
and overruled counsel’s objection. As relevant for this appeal, the ALJ determined that
Gusloff’s experience and expertise made his job-number estimates reliable:
The vocational expert has professional knowledge and experience in job
placement and … the undersigned has determined that the vocational
expert’s testimony is consistent with the information contained in the
Dictionary of Occupational Titles (DOT). To the extent the testimony of the
vocational expert addressed limitations that were not contemplated by the
DOT, he clarified that his testimony on these topics was based on his
substantial experience in job placement and does not conflict with
testimony contained in the DOT. Moreover, the job numbers he provided
are supported by his knowledge of the labor markets, over thirty years of
job placement and the jobs he cited are readily available in the national
economy.
After the ALJ denied Sok’s application, the Appeals Council denied Sok’s request
for review.
The district court, noting the “straightforward job classifications” at issue here,
upheld the Commissioner’s determination that the job-estimate numbers were
sufficiently reliable. The court, like the ALJ, emphasized that Gusloff drew on his strong
credentials and extensive knowledge of the labor market, and he took care to select jobs
that are well-represented in the national economy. Acknowledging that Gusloff could

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have explained his methodology more clearly, the court concluded that his testimony
met the deferential substantial-evidence standard.
On appeal we ask whether substantial evidence supports the ALJ’s conclusion
that there are significant numbers of jobs in the national economy that Sok could
perform. See 42 U.S.C. § 405(g) (requiring Commissioner’s findings to be sustained if
supported by substantial evidence). The “threshold for … evidentiary sufficiency is not
high,” and requires only that “a reasonable mind might accept [the evidence] as
adequate to support a conclusion.” Biestek v. Berryhill, 139 S. Ct. 1148, 1154 (2019). This is
not an “overly exacting standard” given “the difficulty, if not impossibility, of acquiring
the data necessary” to produce a precise job-number count. Chavez, 895 F.3d at 968. We
have suggested that a VE could support his approximation by “drawing on knowledge
of labor market conditions and occupational trends, gleaned from reviewing relevant
data sources or from placing workers in jobs.” Id. at 970.
Sok argues on appeal that Gusloff’s testimony was vague and that his
methodology was unreliable. Although we agree with the district court that Gusloff
could have more clearly articulated his method, his explanation of his process—first,
referencing information found in the DOT and SOC, and second, drawing on his
knowledge of the labor market—was sufficient for the agency to meet its modest
evidentiary burden. As for the reliability of Gusloff’s estimates, Sok cannot credibly
argue that jobs such as cafeteria attendant or housekeeper do not “exist in significant
numbers in the national economy.” See 20 C.F.R. § 416.960(c)(2). Sok cites recent cases in
which we remanded because of unreliable VE methodology, see Ruenger v. Kijakazi, 23
F.4th 760 (7th Cir. 2022); Brace v. Saul, 970 F.3d 818 (7th Cir. 2020), but we analyze
reliability on a case-by-case basis. Biestek, 139 S. Ct. at 1157. And because the jobs at
issue here are commonly found in the national economy, the ALJ reasonably concluded
that Gusloff could rely on his significant relevant experience to produce reliable
estimates.
AFFIRMED

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