United States of America v. Antonio D. Crawford

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted December 2, 2022*
Decided December 12, 2022
By the Court:
No. 22-2194
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
ANTONIO D. CRAWFORD,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Central District of Illinois.
No. 13-10048
James E. Shadid,
Judge.
O R D E R
Antonio Crawford, who now goes by “Asia,” appeals the denial of her motion
for compassionate release from federal prison based on violence, especially rape, that
she fears as a transgender woman in an all-male, maximum-security prison. 18 U.S.C.
§ 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). Without addressing whether this was an extraordinary and
compelling reason, the district court concluded that the sentencing factors in 18 U.S.C.
§ 3553(a) did not support release because of Crawford’s recent and serious criminal
history. Because the district court did not abuse its discretion, we affirm.
In 2011, at age 21, Crawford was convicted in state and federal court of charges
related to a bank robbery and attempted bank robbery, both armed, and began serving
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

-- 1 of 3 --

No. 22-2194 Page 2
concurrent federal and state sentences in an Illinois state prison. At the time of the
robberies, she was on parole for a prior adult conviction for burglary and had juvenile
convictions for receiving or possessing stolen property, criminal damage to property
(three times), burglary (four times), residential burglary, vehicular burglary, theft,
battery, and unlawful possession of a firearm. While serving her sentences at the Hill
Correctional Center in Galesburg, Illinois, she mailed three threatening letters to the
Clerk of the United States District Court for the District of Maine in Portland. In those
letters, she (then still identifying as a man) invoked her membership in the Vice Lords
gang and threatened to assassinate judges and prosecutors if an unnamed “Brother”
received a long prison sentence, and to rape the prosecutor in charge of that case. In
response, the U.S. Marshals interviewed Crawford and she repeated the threats.
Crawford later pleaded guilty in the Central District of Illinois to mailing threatening
communications in violation of 18 U.S.C. § 876(c). The court sentenced her to 70 months’
imprisonment, the low end of the guidelines range, and we dismissed her appeal as
frivolous under Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). United States v. Crawford, 665 F.
App'x 539 (7th Cir. 2016).
Last year, about three years before her projected federal release date in 2024,
Crawford moved for compassionate release. She asserted that the danger she faces as a
transgender woman in an all-male prison—the United States Penitentiary in Tucson,
Arizona—is an extraordinary and compelling reason for a sentence reduction under
§ 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). She also argued that her “clear” record since 2012 and her
participation in a traumatic stress and resilience group supported her release. The
district court denied the motion without deciding whether she presented an
extraordinary and compelling circumstance, concluding that discretionary sentencing
did not support release. The court recounted the threatening conduct that led to her
conviction, outlined her criminal history from the age of 12, and explained: “Given the
Defendant’s serious and violent conduct, a release would not be appropriate after
considering the § 3553 factors.” Crawford appeals, and we review the denial of her
motion for abuse of discretion. United States v. Sarno, 37 F.4th 1249, 1253 (7th Cir. 2022).
Crawford again asserts that the risk of violence she believes she faces in prison
merits her release, but the district court did not err by declining to decide whether this
was an extraordinary and compelling reason under the statute. A court may deny a
prisoner’s compassionate-release motion based on the § 3553(a) factors even if it does
not consider whether the defendant has an extraordinary and compelling reason for
release. 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A); see Sarno, 37 F.4th at 1253.

-- 2 of 3 --

No. 22-2194 Page 3
Regarding the § 3553 factors, Crawford contends that the district court should
have considered her rehabilitation since her last offense and the fact that her past
convictions occurred before she was 25 years old, when the human brain fully develops.
She waived the latter argument, however, because she did not mention her age at the
time of her past convictions as a relevant factor in the district court, and she cannot raise
it for the first time on appeal. See United States v. McDonald, 981 F.3d 579, 581 (7th Cir.
2020). Further, the court did not abuse its discretion by not addressing Crawford’s
assertion that she has been rehabilitated. The court was not obligated to address every
issue, Sarno, 37 F.4th at 1253–54, and here, Crawford simply stated in her amended
motion that “she has had clear conduct since June of 2012” and “has completed the
Traumatic Stress & Resilience Group … and received a certificate.” The court did not
acknowledge these assertions, but it assessed Crawford’s individual circumstances,
such as the facts underlying her convictions, and provided at least “one good reason”
for its decision. United States v. Rucker, 27 F.4th 560, 563 (7th Cir. 2022); see United States
v. Sanders, 992 F.3d 583, 588–89 (7th Cir. 2021).
Further, we would be remiss not to note that, despite having a record “clear” of
disciplinary infractions in prison, in November 2012 Crawford sent the threats that led
to her conviction in this case from prison, and she now threatens “vengeance” if her
appeal does not succeed. We would not fault the district judge for doubting her
declaration of rehabilitation, as we do.
Relatedly, because we have noted at least one threat in Crawford’s brief—that
not being let out of prison early will cause her “to have a vengeance upon [her] release
to the ‘so-called’ Justice system and society”—we caution Crawford that further threats
in her legal filings may result in sanctions.
AFFIRMED

-- 3 of 3 --