21-1132 | Omnilex

Full text

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 21-1132
JERMARI C. DORSEY ,
ě-Appellant,
v.
JOHN VARGA, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Western Division.
No. 20-cv-50030 — Iain D. Johnston, Judge.
____________________
A RGUED O CTOBER 24, 2022 — DECIDED D ECEMBER 15, 2022
____________________
Before HAMILTON , S T. EVE, and K IRSCH , Circuit Judges.
ST. EVE, Circuit Judge. ȱ ¢ȱ ěȱ ȱ serious
back injury while incarcerated. He alleges that his ěȱȱ
seek medical treatment were met with resistance from correc-
ȱĜ, a nurse, and a doctor. Instead of being treated
for back pain, Dorsey was prescribed psychiatric medications
without his knowledge or consent. Dorsey ęȱsuit, seeking
redress for Eighth Amendment and due process violations.
The district court screened his complaint as required by

-- 1 of 23 --

2 No. 21-1132
28 U.S.C. § 1915A and determined that Dorsey had improp-
erly joined unrelated claims in a single lawsuit. The court
struck the complaint and denied Dorsey’s motion to appoint
counselǰȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱęȱȱȱȱ
ȱȱȱȱǯȱ¢ȱĴȱȱ¢ȱ
with the court’s instructions but to no avail. After deeming
three amended complaints unsatisfactory, the district court
dismissed the case. This appeal followed, and we appointed
counsel to represent Dorsey. 1
Resolving joinder issues and deciding whether to recruit
counsel are issues left to the district court’s sound discretion,
but the court must exercise that discretion within the bounds
set by statute and caselaw. In handling this case, the district
court went outside those bounds in some respects. Therefore,
we Ĝ the judgment in part, reverse in part, and remand
for further proceedings.
I. Background
A. Factual Background
We take the factual allegations in Dorsey’s third amended
complaint as true at the screening stage. Gomez v. Randle, 680
F.3d 859, 864 (7th Cir. 2012). Dorsey was unrepresented before
ȱȱǰȱȱ ȱȱȱęȱ¢ǯȱShaw v.
Kemper, 52 F.4th 331, 334 (7th Cir. 2022).
1. Dorsey’s Back Injury
Dorsey is an Illinois state prisoner. The washing machines
in the prison ȱȱĴȱȱǲȱ ȱȱȱ
buckets, which inmates must empty manually. On January 31,
1 We thank Olaniyi Solebo for his service to his client and this court.

-- 2 of 23 --

No. 21-1132 3
2018, Dorsey was emptying a bucket when he felt a pop in his
lower back and felt pain shoot down his leg. He informed Mr.
ǰȱȱȱĜcer, about his injury and asked for per-
mission to see a nurse. Julius told Dorsey to “go lay down”
and that “it was probably a sprain.” Dorsey took ibuprofen
and lay down for two hours, but his pain worsened. He in-
ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ĵȱ orse and again re-
quested permission to seek medical care. Julius responded
that he “didn’t care how much pain [Dorsey] was in,” told
¢ȱȱȃȱȱȱě,” and threatened to write Dorsey up.
Dorsey went back to his cell but was unable to sleep.
The next morning, Dorsey could barely move. He asked
his cellmate to bring him a form so he could request medical
care. Dorsey detailed the circumstances of his injury and his
¢ǰȱȱȱȱĴȱȱȱȱ¢Ȃȱ
behalf. Days passed, and Dorsey received no medical treat-
ment.
2. The Appointment with Nurse Doe
On February 6, six days after his injury, Dorsey was called
to the healthcare unit. A registered nurse ȱęȱȱ ȱ
Doe examined him. Dorsey rated his pain as a 12 on a 1–10
scale. The nurse tested Dorsey’s range of motion and asked
him to sit, which he refused to do because standing up after-
ward would be too painful. The nurse stated that she “did not
care how much pain [Dorsey] was in” and refused to put in a
request for him to see a doctor. She stated that protocol was
for Dorsey to request another appointment after at least two
days, then a third appointment at least two days after the sec-
ond—only then could Dorsey see a doctor. She gave Dorsey
an 18-pack of ibuprofen and sent him back to his cell.

-- 3 of 23 --

4 No. 21-1132
The nurse’s progress notes indicate that she did not take
Dorsey’s injury as seriously as Dorsey did. Although she re-
ported that he “presents as not being able to fully bend for-
ward or side to side,” that he is “unable to sit [be]cause [it is]
ĜȱȱȱǰȄȱȱȱȱ¡ȱȃȱȱȱ
with movement” when bending, she noted no gait disturb-
ance, “[s]welling, redness, bruising, tenderness to touch, lim-
itation to movement,” numbness, or tingling. She also sug-
gested that Dorsey was exaggerating his symptoms, writing
that she “viewed [Dorsey] ambulate up [the] hall” without
Ĝ¢ǰȱȱ ȱȱȱȱ ȱǰȱȱȃȱ
moaning [and] groaning when he knew he was being ob-
served.” Dorsey characterizes this as a false statement that
“could cause others who read her report not to take [him] se-
riously.”
3. The Prescriptions
Dorsey left his February 6 appointment under the impres-
sion that he would have to request medical appointments two
more times before a doctor would see him. But that same day,
unbeknownst to Dorsey, Dr. Doyle—whom Dorsey describes
as a “[p]sych [d]octor”—wrote him three prescriptions. The
prescriptions were for an anti-anxiety medication, an anti-
convulsant, and an anti-depressant, which Dorsey calls
“[p]sych [m]eds.” Dorsey insists that he did not consent to
take these medications and that he had not seen Dr. Doyle or
any other psych doctor except for routine intake.
To Dorsey’s surprise, on February 8, two days after his ap-
pointment with the nurse, he was told over the intercom to
“report to medline,” the window from which inmates receive
medications. Because Dorsey was still in pain, he asked a cor-
ȱ Ĝȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǯȱ ȱ Ĝȱ ǰȱ ȱ

-- 4 of 23 --

No. 21-1132 5
Dorsey walked. Dorsey took the four pills he received at med-
line, believing they were for his back injury. But the pills ex-
acerbated his symptoms rather than relieved them. Within 10
minutes, Dorsey began feeling dizzy and lightheaded, and his
pain did not subside.
The next morning, February 9, Dorsey was called back to
medline, but he was in too much pain to walk. He relayed that
ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ĝȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ
ǯȱȱĜȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱ
him with a disciplinary write-up for refusing to report to
ǯȱ¢ȱęȱȱȱ ȱȱǲȱȱ¢ȱ
could not walk that far. Dorsey did not visit medline that
ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ĵȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ :
Dorsey was called to medline, he asked for a ride, ȱĜ
refused to call him one, and ȱĜȱthreatened him with a
write-up. Dorsey asked ȱȱȱȱȱĜ, Lieu-
tenant Andrews. Dorsey explained that he “was not refusing
but that [he] had hurt [his] back and the medication they were
giving [him] was not helping with the pain.” Lt. Andrews ar-
ranged for a ride to medline, where Dorsey again received
four pills he believed were for his back pain.
When Dorsey returned to his cell, Lt. Andrews stated that
the nurse on duty had said that Dorsey was taking psych
meds. Lt. Andrews added that Dorsey would receive no more
rides to medline. Dorsey objected, stating that he had never
seen a psych doctor and that if he had been prescribed psych
meds, “it was bogus and illegal.” Lt. Andrews replied that
“the nurse said [the pills] were mandatory” and that if Dorsey
did not take them, then he “would get tickets and would
eventually be put in segregation.” Dorsey explained the

-- 5 of 23 --

6 No. 21-1132
ȱ ěȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ȱ ǯȱ Ȭ
drews was unmoved.
ȱȱ¡ȱȱ¢ǰȱȱĜȱ¢ȱ
disciplined Dorsey for failing to take his pills. In total, Dorsey
received four disciplinary tickets for failing to visit medline.
Dorsey’s prescriptions were discontinued on February 13, one
week after ¢ȱ ȱęȱǯ
B. Procedural Background
After exhausting his administrative remedies, Dorsey ę
this lawsuit on January 21, 2020. His complaint spanned 46
pages, includȱĴ, and asserted three claims un-
der 42 U.S.C. § 1983 against 12 defendants. Two claims al-
leged Eighth Amendment violations based on the poorly
ȱ ȱȱȱȱěȱȱ
a serious medical condition, his back injury. The third alleged
a due process violation, that Dorsey was prescribed medica-
tions without his consent. Along with his complaint, Dorsey
moved for the district court to appoint counsel for him.
The district court 2 screened the complaint pursuant to 28
U.S.C. § 1915A. That section, part of the Prison Litigation Re-
form Act of 1995 (the “PLRA”), requires the court to review
suits ęȱby prisoners against “a governmental entity or of-
ęȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱ¢Ȅȱȱȱ
are served with process, § 1915A(a), and to “identify cogniza-
ble claims or dismiss the complaint, or any portion of the com-
plaint, if the complaint—(1) is frivolous, malicious, or fails to
ȱȱȱȱ ȱȱ¢ȱȱǲȱ (2) seeks
2 Dorsey’s case was initially assigned to Chief Judge Pallmeyer. It was
reassigned to Judge Johnston on September 29, 2020.

-- 6 of 23 --

No. 21-1132 7
monetary relief from a defendant who is immune from such
relief.” § 1915A(b).
On June 15, 2020, the court found that joinder was im-
proper and held that the case could not proceed because
“[t]he claims that [Dorsey] seeks to raise in this lawsuit in-
volve separate conduct by separate sets of Defendants, and
the claims are legally and factually distinct from each other.”
The court gave Dorsey advice about how to replead his case,
struck the complaint, denied his motion to recruit counsel,
ȱȱ¢ȱȱęȱȱȱǯ
Dorsey accepted that invitation ȱęȱȱę amended
complaint ȱę¢ȱȱȱȱǯȱThe
complaint now totaled 17 pages, named six defendants, and
asserted a single claim, based on an “8th Amendment Viola-
ȱǻȱ ěȱȱȱǼǯȄ The district
ȱ ȱ¢Ȃȱ ěȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ȭ
plaint and to address the misjoinder issue, but it found that
“he still makes allegations about several distinct aspects of his
ęȱ ȱ ȱ ǯȄȱȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ
one claim, the court construed Dorsey’s allegations as raising
both an Eighth Amendment claim and a due process claim.
These claims, the court held, were still too distinct to be joined
in a single case. On August 7, 2020, the court struck his com-
plaintǰȱȱ¢ȱȱȱęȱȱȱȱǰȱ
and warned that failing “to submit a second amended com-
plaint in accordance with the principles set forth in this order
… will result in dismissal of this lawsuit.”
Dorsey’s second amended complaint was largely identical
ȱȱęȱȱǰȱ¡ȱȱȱȱęȱȬ
fendants instead of six. He acknowledged the similarities, ex-
plaining that he could not do research because the law library

-- 7 of 23 --

8 No. 21-1132
was closed due to the COVID-19 pandemic and that he was
“having a hard time understanding” how to amend his com-
plaint. Again, he moved for the court to appoint counsel. On
October 8, 2020, the court struck Dorsey’s complaint and de-
nied his motion to recruit counsel for the third time. Despite
the prior admonishment that Dorsey’s second amended com-
plaint would be his last, the court gave him one more chance
to amend his complaint. ¢ȱęȱȱȱȱȬ
plaint on November 30, 2020, which is the operative com-
plaint for purposes of this appeal. This complaint was virtu-
ally identical to the second amended complaint. On January
5, 2021, the court struck the complaint, writing that “the case
ȱȱ ȱȱȱȱěȂȱȱȱ
comply with the prior orders of this Court. All pending mo-
tions are terminated as moot. Final judgment shall enter. Case
closed.” Dorsey appealed. 3
C. Dorsey’s Claims
Dorsey’s third amended complaint names ęȱǱ
Lt. Andrews, Nurse Doe, Dr. Doyle, Julius, and Wexford
Health Sources, Inc., the entity that provides medical services
at the prison. Although Dorsey pleaded only one claim, the
district court correctly recognized that his complaint contains
two: ȱȱȱȱȱȱěȱ
to a serious medical condition, his back injury, and a due
3 Although a dismissal without prejudice is not ordinarily an appeal-
ȱęȱǰȱthe dismissal here ȱęȱbecause the court charac-
£ȱȱȱęȱȱȱthe two-year ȱȱę a § 1983 action in
Illinois had expired, which prevents ¢ȱȱęȱȱȱȱȱ
subsequent lawsuit. See Towne v. DonnellyǰȱŚŚȱǯŚȱŜŜŜǰȱŜŝŖȱǻŝȱǯȱŘŖŘŘǼǲȱ
Lee v. Cook County, 635 F.3d 969, 972 (7th Cir. 2011). We therefore have ap-
pellate jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291.

-- 8 of 23 --

No. 21-1132 9
process claim for prescribing Dorsey psychiatric medications
without his consent. But because Dorsey believes his com-
plaint presents a single claim, he does not specify to which
defendants each claim applies.
As we read the complaint, the Eighth Amendment claim
pertains to all four individual defendants. Dorsey alleges that
Julius and Lt. Andrews hindered his ĴȱȱȱȬ
ical care for his back injury and that Nurse Doe disregarded
his condition. It is less clear whether this claim implicates Dr.
Doyle, but liberally construing the complaint, we conclude
that it does. Dr. Doyle wrote the prescriptions on the same
day that Nurse Doe examined Dorsey, so Dr. Doyle may have
been aware of Dorsey’s back injury at that time. Further,
Dorsey alleges that the prescriptions exacerbated his back in-
jury. Dorsey’s second claim, for a due process violation, im-
plicates Nurse Doe and Dr. Doyle, who evaluated Dorsey
medically and, in the case of Dr. Doyle, prescribed the medi-
cations. We cannot discern, however, whether either or both
claims implicate Wexford because the complaint contains just
one sentence about Wexford: “Wexford is the private
Healthcare provider and is responsible for the Protocol, Poli-
ȱȱȱȱȱȱěȱȱDoctors.”
We need not resolve the complaint’s ambiguity regarding
Wexford. Even liberally construed, this single sentence is in-
Ĝȱȱ“plead some facts that suggest a right to relief that
is beyond the speculative level.” Smith v. Dart, 803 F.3d 304,
309 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting Atkins v. City of Chicago, 631 F.3d
823, 832 (7th Cir. 2011)). To succeed on a § 1983 claim against
a private corporation acting under color of state law, a plain-
ěȱȱ ȱa corporate custom or practice so widespread
ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ĝnt to state a Monell claim if the

-- 9 of 23 --

10 No. 21-1132
defendant were a municipal government. See Howell v. Wex-
ford Health Sources, Inc., 987 F.3d 647, 652–54 (7th Cir. 2021)
(citing ȱǯȱȱ¢ǯȱěȂȱȂ, 604 F.3d 293, 303
ǻŝȱǯȱŘŖŗŖǼǼǲȱsee also Monell v. DȂȱȱǯȱǯ, 436 U.S.
658, 690–91 (1978). Dorsey alleges that Wexford sets the med-
ical policies at the prison, but he fails to allege how he was
injured by those policies, as opposed to “one or a few rogue
employees.” Howell, 987 F.3d at 654. The district court thus
did not err by dismissing claims against Wexford. See 28
U.S.C. § 1915A(b)(1) (instructing district courts to screen cases
for “fail[ing] to state a claim upon which relief may be
ȄǼǲȱcf. Perez v. Fenoglio, 792 F.3d 768, 783 (7th Cir. 2015)
ǻȱȱȱěȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȬ
plead a complaint).
We Ĝȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ any claims against Wexford.
Subsequent references to “the defendants” in this opinion re-
fer only to the individual defendants.
II. Issues on Appeal
Dorsey makes three arguments on appeal: (1) joinder was
properǲ (2) the district court abused its discretion when it dis-
missed his case for failure to comply with its ordersǲȱ (3)
the district court abused its discretion when it denied his mo-
tions to appoint counsel. ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ęȱ
two points but not the third.
A. Permissive Joinder
Dorsey argues that the district court erred by holding that
his claims were misjoined. Dorsey believes that his claims sat-
isfy Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 20(a)(2), which permits a
ěȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȃǻǼȱ¢ȱȱ
to relief is asserted against them jointly, severally, or in the

-- 10 of 23 --

No. 21-1132 11
alternative with respect to or arising out of the same transac-
tion, occǰȱȱȱȱȱȱǲȱȱ
(B) any question of law or fact common to all defendants will
arise in the action.”
We review a district court’s refusal to join parties under
Rule 20 for abuse of discretion. Thompson v. Boggs, 33 F.3d 847,
857–58 (7th Cir. 1994). A district court may, in its discretion,
deny joinder even if the Rule 20(a)(2) requirements are met.
ȱȱȂȱǯȱ, 888 F.3d 854, 863 (7th Cir. 2018)
(listing prejudice, expense, and delay as reasons to deny oth-
erwise-proper joinder). But one way a district court can abuse
ȱȱȱ¢ȱĴȱȱȱȱ ǯȱLukaszczyk v.
Cook County, 47 F.4th 587, 598 (7th Cir. 2022).
The district court’s orders denying joinder indicate that
the court believed that Dorsey’s claims did not satisfy the re-
quirements of Rule 20(a)(2). Tȱęȱ stated:
ȱȱȱěȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ
involve separate conduct by separate sets of Defend-
ants, and the claims are legally and factually distinct from
ȱǯȱǰȱěȱmay not use this single case
as a vehicle to litigate all three of his unrelated claims
ǳǯȱěȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱȱ
this lawsuit before the court will make any determina-
tion concerning the merits of any of his claims.
(emphases added). The other orders read similarly. The sec-
ond endorsed the reasons given in the prior order, then elab-
orated how Dorsey could amend his complaint to comply
with Rule 20(a)(2)’s joinder requirements. After the case was
transferred, the court issued its third order, which adopted
the reasoning from the second order to support its conclusion

-- 11 of 23 --

12 No. 21-1132
ȱȃěȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȬ
lated Defendants in a single lawsuit.” Because none of the or-
ders striking Dorsey’s complaint stated that the court would
use its discretion to require Dorsey’s claims to proceed sepa-
rately even if Rule 20(a)(2) allowed joinder, we conclude that
the district court believed that Rule 20(a)(2) precluded join-
der.
Our inquiry, therefore, is whether the district court cor-
rectly applied Rule 20(a)(2) to Dorsey’s allegations. The con-
struction of Rule 20—like other Federal Rules of Civil Proce-
dure—is a question of law that we review de novo. See Mother
& Father v. Cassidy, 338 F.3d 704, 708 (7th Cir. 2003) (holding
that the construction of Rule 41 is a question of law). 4
1. Same Transaction or Occurrence
Dorsey’s claims satisfy the ę requirement for permis-
sive joinder, namely, that the claims against all defendants
“aris[e] out of the same transaction, occurrence, or series of
transactions or occurrences.” Fed R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2)(A). Both
of his claims relate to the following series of events that oc-
curred over a two-week period: Dorsey’s back injury, his at-
tempts to receive medical treatment, his appointment with
4 The four other circuits to have addressed this question in preceden-
tial opinions have also concluded, expressly or impliedly, that whether
Rule 20 permits parties to be joined is a question of law. See Harnage v.
Lightner, 916 F.3d 138, 140 n.2 (2d Cir. 2019) (“We … review a district
court’s sua sponte dismissal under § 1915A for failure to comply with Rules
8 and 20 de novo.ȄǼǲȱRush v. Sports Chalet, Inc., 779 F.3d 973, 974 (9th Cir.
2015) (“We review de novo the district court’s holding that the codefend-
ants were improperly joined under Rule 20(a)(2)ǯȄǼǲȱSwan v. Ray, 293 F.3d
1252, 1253 (11th Cir. 2002) (per curiam) (implicitly applying de novo re-
ǼǲȱWatson v. Blankinship, 20 F.3d 383, 389–90 (10th Cir. 1994) (same).

-- 12 of 23 --

No. 21-1132 13
Nurse Doe, the prescriptions Dr. Doyle wrote for him, and his
Ě with ȱ Ĝ about taking those pre-
scribed medications. When liberally construed, Dorsey’s com-
plaint plausibly alleges that the prescriptions relate to his
back injury. Dr. Doyle wrote the prescriptions on the same
¢ȱ¢ȱȱȱę¢ǰȱȱNurse Doe’s comments
that Dorsey was lying about or exaggerating his pain may
ȱĚed Dr. Doyle’s conclusion that Dorsey should be
prescribed psychiatric medications. ȱȱęes
Rule 20(a)(2)(A).
2. Common Question of Law or Fact
Dorsey’s claims also satisfy the second requirement, that
at least one “question of law or fact common to all defendants
will arise.” Fed R. Civ. P. 20(a)(2)(B). As discussed above, con-
struing the complaint liberally, we understand Dorsey to
bring his Eighth Amendment claim against all four defend-
ants. ȱȱȱȱěȱȱ“show that ‘(1) he had
an objectively serious medical need (2) to which the defend-
ȱ ȱ¢ȱěǯȂȄȱBrown v. Osmundson, 38
ǯŚȱ śŚśǰȱ śśŖȱ ǻŝȱ ǯȱ ŘŖŘŘǼȱ ǻȱ ȱ ĴǼȱ
(quoting Dean v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 18 F.4th 214, 241
(7th Cir. 2021)). Proving that his injury constituted an objec-
tively serious medical need and that each defendant was de-
¢ȱěȱȱȱ ȱ¢ȱȱȱȱ
of the condition of Dorsey’s back pain. This common question
of fact ęȱȱŘŖǻǼǻŘǼǻǼǯȱ
* * *
Dorsey’s claims meet both requirements of Rule 20(a)(2),
so joinder is legally permissible. The district court’s contrary

-- 13 of 23 --

14 No. 21-1132
conclusion was an error of law and therefore was an abuse of
discretion.
B. Dismissal for Failure to Comply
Dorsey next argues that the district court erred by dismiss-
ing his case for misjoinder because dismissal for misjoinder is
inappropriate under Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 21,
which provides that “[m]isjoinder of parties is not a ground
for dismissing an action. On motion or on its own, the court
may at any time, on just terms, add or drop a party. The court
may also sever any claim against a party.” But the district
court did not dismiss Dorsey’s case for misjoinder. Rather, it
dismissed for failure to comply with its orders to cure what it
considered misjoinder in Dorsey’s complaint. A district court
has the inherent power to manage its docket, which includes
the power to dismiss a case for “failure to comply with valid
orders,” a category of dismissal for failure to prosecute.
Thomas v. Wardell, 951 F.3d 854, 862 (7th Cir. 2020) (citation
ĴǼǯȱThe question, therefore, is not whether dismissal is
an appropriate remedy for misjoinder but whether dismissing
the case for failure to comply with court orders was an abuse
of discretion.
We hold that the dismissal was an abuse of discretion in
this case. While a district court has the inherent power to dis-
miss for failure to comply with its orders, Dorsey’s third
amended complaint properly joined the defendants, as ex-
plained above. Thus, the order requiring Dorsey to replead
his complaint was invalid because a district court cannot or-
ȱȱěȱ correct misjoinder when joinder is, in fact,
proper.

-- 14 of 23 --

No. 21-1132 15
We do not mean to suggest that a district court’s error of
law deprives it of all power to dismiss a case for failure to
prosecute. A court may still dismiss for failure to prosecute
when, for example, a party repeatedly fails to meet deadlines
or engages in other “contumacious conduct.” Id.ǲȱsee also, e.g.,
Krivak v. Home Depot U.S.A., Inc., 2 F.4th 601, 606 (7th Cir.
2021ǼȱǻĜȱȱȱȱȱȱ ȱȱ
ěȂȱĴ¢ȱȃȱ¢ȱǰȄȱȃǽ ǾȱȱȬ
¢ȱȱȱȱĴ importance on court orders,”
ȱȱȱȂȱȃȱȱęȱ Ȅ that dismis-
sal would followǼǲȱ Cartwright v. Silver Cross Hosp., 962 F.3d
933, 936 (7th Cir. 2020) (holding that “the judge had ample
grounds to dismiss” based on conduct including “skipp[ing]
ȱȱȄȱȱȃęǽǾȱ£ȱȱȱ
that violated local rules and the court’s standing orders”). Our
holding is a narrow one. A district court abuses its discretion
when its sole reason for dismissing a case is failure to comply
ȱȱȱȱ ȱȱȱĴȱȱ ǯ
C. Appointment of Counsel
Finally, Dorsey asks us to reverse the district court’s denial
of his motion to appoint counsel. Under 28 U.S.C. § 1915(e)(1),
ȱȃȱ¢ȱȱȱĴ¢ȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȬ
ȱ ȱ ěȱ ǯȄȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ
counsel, the court asks: “(1Ǽȱȱȱȱěȱȱȱ
ȱĴȱȱȱȱȱȱě¢ȱȬ
ȱȱȱǲȱȱȱǰȱǻŘǼȱȱȱĜ¢ȱȱȱ
ǰȱ ȱ ȱ ěȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ȭ
self?” Ĵȱǯȱ, 503 F.3d 647, 654 (7th Cir. 2007) (en banc)
ǻȱ ĴǼǯ The second question involves an inquiry
ȱȃȱĜ¢ȱȱȱěȂȱȱȱȱěȂȱ
competence to litigate those claims himself,” id. at 655, as well

-- 15 of 23 --

16 No. 21-1132
as the “strength or weakness” of the claims. Ĵȱǯȱ ,
42 F.4th 755, 761 (7th Cir. 2022).
We review the denial of a motion to appoint counsel for
abuse of discretion. Ĵ, 503 F.3d at 658. We ask “whether
the district court applied the correct legal standard and
reached a reasonable decision based on facts supported by the
record.” Id. Where there is an abuse of discretion, we grant
ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ěȱ ȱ ȱ —that is,
when there is “a reasonable likelihood that the presence of
counsel would have made a ěȱȱȱȱȱȱ
litigation.” Id. ȱŜśşȱǻȱĴǼǯ
The district court found that Dorsey made a reasonable at-
tempt to obtain counsel himself, but it declined to recruit
counsel because he was capable of litigating his claims him-
self. Dorsey contends that the denial of his motions to appoint
counsel was an abuse of discretion because the district court
failed to consider the complexity of his claims, the seriousness
of his alleged injury, and changed circumstances. We, how-
ever, see no abuse of discretion.
1. Complexity
As for the complexity of his claims, Dorsey argues that the
Ĝ¢ȱȱȱthat the defendants acted with deliberate
ěȱ ȱȱȱ¢ obligated the district court
to appoint counsel. We disagree. While we have observed that
ȱȱěȱȱ¡ and may require a
court to appoint counsel, we have emphasized that there is no
rule that a district court must appoint counsel in certain types
of cases or at certain stages of litigation. See, e.g., James v. Eli,
889 F.3d 320, 327 (7th Cir. 2018). Further, the complexity of
ȱȱȱěȱȱȱȱȱȱ

-- 16 of 23 --

No. 21-1132 17
progresses. Id. Here, Dorsey’s requests for counsel came at the
PLRA screening stage, when his only tasks were to comply
with the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and to plausibly al-
lege facts that, if true, would entitle him to relief. The court’s
instructions about how to replead his claims and the liberal
ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ęȱ urther lessened the
complexity of his tasks. Dorsey’s claims are not so complex
that the district court abused its discretion by declining to ap-
point counsel for him.
2. Seriousness
Dorsey next argues that “[t]he severity of [his] injury and
the serious nature of his claim regarding the psychiatric med-
ication, further weighed in favor of the appointment of …
counsel.” He relies on Perez v. Fenoglio, which stated in dicta
that “[w]here an inmate alleges an objectively serious medical
ǰȱȱ¢ȱȱĴ to appoint counsel … than to dis-
miss a potentially meritorious claim and leave the prisoner in
harm’s way.” 792 F.3d at 784. But this warning concerned dis-
missing a claim when the alleged injury itself may have con-
ȱȱȱěȂȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȬ
ȱ ěǯȱ See id. There is no indication that Dorsey’s
injury ěȱȱȱȱ ¢—indeed, Dorsey’s ę were
impressively cogent. Thus, the seriousness of Dorsey’s al-
leged injury did not make the district court’s decision not to
appoint counsel an abuse of discretion.
3. Changed Circumstances
Finally, Dorsey argues that the onset of the COVID-19
pandemic was a material change from the circumstances that
¡ȱ ȱȱęȱmoved for the court to appoint counsel.
Beginning with his third motion to recruit counsel, Dorsey

-- 17 of 23 --

18 No. 21-1132
explained that he was unable to access the prison’s law library
and was therefore unable to perform research. He contends
that our decisions in Eagan v. Dempsey, 987 F.3d 667 (7th Cir.
2021), and Santiago v. Walls, 599 F.3d 749 (7th Cir. 2010), estab-
lish that a district court abuses its discretion when it denies a
subsequent motion to appoint counsel without considering
changed circumstances since the time of the initial motion.
The changed circumstances ȱ ȱȱȱęȱas
to require the district court to appoint counsel for Dorsey. Ea-
gan and Santiago involved much more dramatic changes than
those Dorsey experienced. In Eagan, the litigation involved
discovery motion practice and had progressed to the sum-
mary judgment stageǰȱȱěȱȱ¢ȱȱ-grade
ȱȱěȱȱȱȱǰȱȱȱȬ
mate who had been helping the ěȱȱȱȱ
to another prison. 987 F.3d at 673–74, 677–79, 684. In Santiago,
ȱěȱhad been ȱȱȱěȱprison, where
he lacked access to witnesses, documents, and defendants,
and he had to prepare to try seven claims against eight de-
fendants, including one unknown defendant. 599 F.3d at 762–
64. Dorsey’s case, in contrast, is in the earliest stages, before
any discovery, summary judgment, or trial obligations have
ǲȱȱȱȱȱ and is a skilled writerǲȱ
and he has alleged no mental illness or intellectual disability
that prevents him from adequately representing himself.
While he lacked access to the law library during the height of
the pandemic, the district court gave clear instructions about
how to replead his claims, and he would not have had to per-
form additional legal research to follow those instructions.
Despite these changed circumstances, the district court did
not abuse its discretion by failing to appoint counsel.

-- 18 of 23 --

No. 21-1132 19
* * *
The fact that the district court did not abuse its discretion
in denying Dorsey’s previous motions does not necessarily
mean that he cannot receive the assistance of counsel later in
this case. The district court’s denials of Dorsey’s motions to
appoint counsel were without prejudice, so he is free to re-
quest counsel again on remand.
III. PLRA Screening and Joinder
We close by discussing the PLRA’s requirement that dis-
ȱȱȱȱęȱ¢ȱ against gov-
ȱǰȱĜǰȱȱ. See 28 U.S.C. § 1915A.
A common issue district courts encounter is whether a com-
plaint properly joins claims against several defendants, but
oȱ ȱ ȱ Ĵȱ ȱ on this point.
Accordingly, ȱěȱa framework a district court might ap-
ply when faced with a joinder issue when screening a com-
plaint under the PLRA. To be clear, we do not mean to imply
that this is the only acceptable screening process.
When a prisoner sues government defendants, we recom-
mend that the district court assess whether joinder is proper
under Rule 20 before considering the merits. The PLRA dis-
ȱȱȱęȱȱ ȱ¢ȱȱ
ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱęȱ
fee in installments, 28 U.S.C. § 1915(b), and denying in forma
pauperis status to prisoners who have accrued three
“strikes”—cases “dismissed on the grounds that [they are]
frivolous, malicious, or fail[] to state a claim upon which relief
may be granted.” § ŗşŗśǻǼǲ see Atkins v. Gilbert, 52 F.4th 359,
361–62 (7th Cir. 2022) (per curiam). ȱȱĴȱȱ
circumvent the PLRA’s fee requirements and avoid strikes by

-- 19 of 23 --

20 No. 21-1132
ęȱȃĴȄȱǰȱ ȱ¢ȱȱȬ
ple unrelated claims against multiple defendants. See, e.g.,
Mitchell v. KallasǰȱŞşśȱ ǯřȱŚşŘǰȱśŖřȱǻŝȱǯȱŘŖŗŞǼǲȱOwens v.
Hinsley, 635 F.3d 950, 952 (7th Cir. 2011). Assessing whether
joinder is proper before resolving the merits ensures that, re-
gardless of the outcome of a case, the plaěȱ¢ȱȱȱ
number of fees under § 1915(b) and receives the proper num-
ber of strikes, if any, under § 1915(g). See Taylor v. Brown, 787
F.3d 851, 853 (7th Cir. 2015) (noting that severing a case re-
ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱęȱǼǲȱGeorge v. Smith, 507
F.3d 605, 607 (7th Cir. 2007) (observing that ¢ȱę ȱĴȬ
shot complaint, a ěȱȱȱȱȱȃȱȱŗȱȱ
his 50 claims were deemed non-frivolous”).
If joinder is improper, the court has several options avail-
able to it. The court may strike the complaint and grant leave
to replead. See Perez, 792 F.3d at 783. The court may dismiss
improperly joined defendants if doing so will not prevent the
ěȱȱtimely ęȱthose claims. See Fed. R. Civ. P.
21 (“[T]he court may …, on just terms, … drop a party.”)ǲ
Elmore v. Henderson, 227 F.3d 1009, 1012 (7th Cir. 2000) (stating
that a district court must not dismiss misjoined claims when
there is a risk of “statute of limitations consequences”). Or the
court may sever the case into two or more actions. Fed. R. Civ.
ǯȱŘŗǯȱȱ¢ȱȱȱęȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȬ
ȱęȱȱȱȱǰȱsee Taylor, 787 F.3d at
853–84, the court should not sever claims ȱȱěȂȱ
consent or acquiescence. Instead, it should allow him to opt
for partial dismissal rather than severance.
We suggest a district court faced with misjoined claims
begin, as the district court did here, by striking the complaint,
explaining the misjoinder, and giving thȱěȱȱȱȱ

-- 20 of 23 --

No. 21-1132 21
ȱȱę¡ȱȱǯȱ ȱȱěȱproves unable or un-
willing to correct the misjoinder by repleading his complaint,
we recommend the approach taken by the district court in
Taylor. The court can ȱȱěȱȱit will dismiss
certain defendants or sever certain claims ȱȱěȱ
otherwise resolves the issue by a deadline. See id. If dismissal
will ȱęȱȱȱȱ the statute of limitations,
the court should make clear the consequences of dismissal
ȱȱȱȱȱěȱȱȱȱȱȬ
cision about his case. This process will spare district courts the
task of screening numerous iterations of complaints without
ȱěs. We emphasize again that dismissing an
entire case for misjoinder is improper and is reversible error
ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ěȂȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ęȱ ȱ ǯ See
Elmore, 227 F.3d at 1012.
Once joinder problems are resolved, the court can consider
the merits, complete the screening process, and return the
case to the familiar path of federal civil litigation.
IV. Conclusion
For the foregoing reasons, ȱĜȱȱȱȱȱȱ
part the district court’s dismissal of Dorsey’s case and its
striking of his third amended complaint. Those decisions are
reversed as to defendants Andrews, Doe, Doyle, and Julius,
ȱ¢ȱȱĜȱȱȱȱ¡ǯȱȱĜȱȱ
denial of Dorsey’s motion to appoint counsel.
On remand, the district court should complete the PLRA
screening process, considering whether Dorsey’s claims can
continue in one proceeding and whether either states a claim
upon which relief may be granted. If the court concludes that
Dorsey’s claims should be severed, it should not sever them

-- 21 of 23 --

22 No. 21-1132
without giving Dorsey the option of abandoning one set of
claims to ȱȱȱȱęȱǯ The court is free
to consider appointing counsel for Dorsey, but it is not obli-
gated to do so at this stage.
ȱȱȱĜȱȱǰȱed in part, and re-
manded for further proceedings consistent with this opinion.

-- 22 of 23 --

No. 21-1132 23
HAMILTON , Circuit Judge, concurring. Based on existing cir-
cuit precedent, I join the court’s opinion, including that por-
tion affirming dismissal of plaintiff’s claims against Wexford
Health Sources, Inc. for lack of plausible allegations that his
injuries were caused by a corporate policy, practice, or cus-
tom. Nevertheless, the Supreme Court has not applied the
Monell standard to private corporations that act under color
of state law. In an appropriate case we should reconsider and
overrule our precedents that have applied Monell and refused
to apply respondeat superior liability to private corporations
like Wexford in cases brought under 42 U.S.C. § 1983. My rea-
sons are explained in detail in Shields v. Illinois Dep’t of Correc-
tions, 746 F.3d 782, 789–96 (7th Cir. 2014); see also, e.g., Dean
v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 18 F.4th 214 (7th Cir. 2021) (both
majority and dissenting opinions illustrating challenges pris-
oners face in seeking relief for deliberately indifferent health
care); Daniel v. Cook County, 833 F.3d 728, 733–34 (7th Cir.
2016) (describing challenges prisoners face in holding indi-
viduals liable where problems in prison or jail health care are
systemic: “individual defendants can defend themselves by
shifting blame to other individuals or to problems with the
‘system,’ particularly where no one individual seems to be re-
sponsible for an inmate's overall care”); Thomas v. Cook County
Sheriff’s Dep’t, 604 F.3d 293, 303 (7th Cir. 2010) (describing
similar challenges in obtaining relief for deliberately indiffer-
ent health care in jail or prison).

-- 23 of 23 --

JERMARI C. DORSEY , ě-Appellant v. John Varga

Full text

Continue your research in ChatGPT or Claude

JERMARI C. DORSEY , ě-Appellant v. John Varga

Full text

Continue your research in ChatGPT or Claude

JERMARI C. DORSEY , ě-Appellant v. John Varga