Cristian Ramos v. KRZYSTOF PIECH and WILLIAM O’M ARY

In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
22-1628
C RISTIAN R AMOS ,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
KRZYSTOF P IECH and WILLIAM O’M ARY,
Defendants-Appellees.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 1:18-cv-4446 — John Robert Blakey, Judge.
____________________
A RGUED D ECEMBER 1, 2022 — D ECIDED D ECEMBER 20, 2022
____________________
Before EASTERBROOK , HAMILTON, and KIRSCH , Circuit
Judges.
KIRSCH , Circuit Judge. In 2017, Cristian Ramos settled two
lawsuits he had brought against Cook County Jail correc-
tional officers under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 alleging a failure to pro-
tect Ramos from another inmate and use of excessive force.
The settlement agreements contained an identical 262-word
sentence—labeled a general release—that released the
County and its employees from all claims. Less than a year

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later, Ramos filed another § 1983 lawsuit against two Cook
County police officers based on a 2016 arrest that occurred af-
ter the events that lead to the first two lawsuits but prior to
the execution of the settlement agreements. We are asked to
decide whether the scope of the 2017 release is broad enough
to encompass Ramos’s new lawsuit. While the rambling, 262-
word sentence is no model of clarity, we hold that it unam-
biguously released Ramos’s claims arising out of the 2016 ar-
rest. We therefore affirm the district court’s grant of summary
judgment to the defendants.
I
While being held in the Cook County Jail on charges un-
important to this appeal, Cristian Ramos filed two lawsuits
against correctional officers pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. In
November 2014, he filed a suit alleging that an officer failed
to protect him from attack by another inmate (Ramos v.
Gradowski). In February 2016, he filed a suit alleging that a dif-
ferent officer used excessive force against him after Ramos
threw urine at another inmate (Ramos v. Jones).
After he had been released from jail, Ramos and an asso-
ciate stole a car and drove it to the Melrose Park, Illinois, home
of Oscar Villagran, with whom Ramos had facilitated a drug
deal, to collect proceeds from the transaction. They broke into
the home, tied up and beat Villagran, and demanded money
from Villagran’s wife at knifepoint. Cook County Sheriff’s Po-
lice Officers Krzystof Piech and William O’Mary arrived at the
scene. After a struggle, the officers arrested Ramos and his as-
sociate. According to Ramos, the officers repeatedly yelled ra-
cial slurs, held a gun to his head and threatened to kill him,
demanded that he apologize for his crime, pulled his hair,
punched and kicked him, slammed his head against a

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washing machine resulting in him losing consciousness, and
tased him twice after he regained consciousness and was al-
ready in handcuffs.
Later in 2017 after Ramos’s arrest, Ramos and Cook
County (on behalf of the individual correctional officers) en-
tered two nearly identical settlement agreements in the
Gradowski and Jones cases. The captions of the agreements
read: “CONFIDENTIAL SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT AND
GENERAL RELEASE.” Paragraph 7 of each agreement stated:
Plaintiff for himself, his heirs and personal rep-
resentatives, fully and forever releases, acquits
and discharge Defendant, and its agents, em-
ployees and former employees, either in their
official or individual capacities, from any and
all actions, suits, debts, sums of money, ac-
counts and all claims and demands of whatever
nature, in law or in equity, including but not
limited to any and all claims for Constitutional,
federal law or state law violations against Plain-
tiff, and/or any taken, damaged, disposed of, or
destroyed property, and any costs accrued aris-
ing out of the allegations made against Cook
County and Cook County Sheriff Thomas Dart
and any of their employees or former employ-
ees which are the subject of Cristian Ramos v. Bill
Jones, 16 C 2065, and Cristian Ramos v. Robert
Gradowski, 14 C 9458, in the United States Dis-
trict Court for the Northern District of Illinois,
Eastern Division, or any claim or suit which
they, their heirs, assigns and legal representa-
tives, may heretofore or hereafter have had by

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reason of said allegations, including but not lim-
ited to any and all claims for Constitutional vio-
lations, federal or state law claims, declaratory
or injunctive relief claims, and/or any taken,
damaged, disposed of, or destroyed property
claims, as well as any other such claims against
Cook County, the Cook County Sheriff, Bill
Jones, Robert Gradowski or any current or for-
mer employees or agents thereof, that may have
been brought in connection with any incidents
that occurred while Plaintiff was housed in the
Cook County Jail at any prior to the execution
date of this Agreement by the parties. THIS IS A
GENERAL RELEASE.
Nine months after signing the agreements, Ramos filed
this instant suit, alleging that Officers Piech and O’Mary used
excessive force during his 2016 arrest. Defendants moved for
summary judgment, arguing that the 2017 settlement agree-
ments barred this claim. The district court granted the motion,
finding that the language unambiguously released Ramos’s
claim. Ramos appeals.
II
We review a district court’s interpretation of a settlement
agreement and grant of summary judgment de novo. Richards
v. PAR, Inc., 954 F.3d 965, 967 (7th Cir. 2020); United States v.
Rand Motors, 305 F.3d 770, 774 (7th Cir. 2002). Settlement
agreements are construed as contracts, governed by state law.
Carona v. Ill. Cent. Gulf R. Co., 561 N.E.2d 239, 242 (Ill. App. Ct.
1990). Such agreements may contain releases whereby a party
“abandons a claim to the person against whom the claim ex-
ists.” Fuller Family Holdings, LLC v. N. Trust Co., 863 N.E.2d

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743, 753 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007). But “Illinois … prohibits the blan-
ket release of claims that are ‘not within the contemplation of
the parties.’” Crosby v. City of Chi., 949 F.3d 358, 363 (7th Cir.
2020) (quoting Feltmeier v. Feltmeier, 798 N.E.2d 75, 89 (Ill.
2003)).
Ramos contends that his claims against the arresting offic-
ers were not contemplated at the time he signed the settle-
ment agreements, and therefore, they could not have been re-
leased. Ramos argues that he released only existing or poten-
tial claims in connection with his earlier suits and incidents
that occurred while he was housed in the Cook County Jail,
and therefore, his current suit falls outside of the release.
To determine the scope of release the parties contem-
plated, we look to the language of the document read as a
whole “in light of the circumstances surrounding the transac-
tion.” Id. at 361. When the terms are clear and explicit, we en-
force them as written according to their plain meaning. Plati-
num Supp. Ins., Inc. v. Guarantee Trust Life Ins. Co., 989 F.3d 556,
564 (7th Cir. 2021).
Despite the obvious flaws in the draftsmanship of the re-
lease, it is neither ambiguous nor contradictory. Three
phrases signal that Ramos released all foreseeable claims
against Cook County “and its agents, employees and former
employees” (which includes Piech and O’Mary), including
those stemming from his 2016 arrest, when he signed the set-
tlement agreements in 2017. The first is “GENERAL RE-
LEASE,” which is used in all capital letters in the caption of
the agreements and then again within the release language it-
self. Paragraph 7 concludes, “THIS IS A GENERAL RE-
LEASE.” Unless there is language to the contrary, Illinois law
considers a general release to cover “all claims of which a

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signing party has actual knowledge or that he could have dis-
covered upon reasonable inquiry.” Ostrowski v. Lake County,
33 F.4th 960, 965 (7th Cir. 2022) (quoting Fair v. Int’l Flavors &
Fragrances, Inc., 905 F.2d 1114, 1116 (7th Cir. 1990)). The agree-
ments here contain no contrary language. Clearly, Ramos had
actual knowledge of the claims related to his 2016 arrest when
he signed the agreements in 2017. He was already a repeat lit-
igant who had filed multiple § 1983 suits and understood his
right to sue an officer for use of excessive force.
Ramos insists that the references to the Jones and Gradowski
lawsuits negate the “GENERAL RELEASE” language. This
argument is unsupported. In Crosby v. City of Chicago, the
plaintiff similarly argued that “an agreement’s reference to a
specific claim always limits an otherwise general release to
only the claim mentioned.” 949 F.3d at 361. We rejected this
“significant misunderstanding” of Illinois law and observed
that “[i]t would have been odd for the settlement not to men-
tion the underlying suit that prompted it; the desire to dispose
of those claims is what drove the parties to the bargaining ta-
ble.” Id. The same is true here. Were it not for settling the Jones
and Gradowski suits, the settlement agreements would not ex-
ist. The reference to those underlying suits doesn’t change the
fact that the agreements were drafted to resolve all claims Ra-
mos had against Cook County and its employees at the time,
not just the ones raised in Jones and Gradowski.
The other two important phrases in Paragraph 7 are “any
and all” and “including but not limited to[.]” Ramos contends
that these phrases modify the types of claims he could bring
against Cook County (“claims for Constitutional, federal law,
or state law violations against Plaintiff, and/or any taken,
damaged, disposed of, or destroyed property, and any costs

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accrued”) that arose solely out of the allegations which are the
subjects of the Jones and Gradowski cases. But when read to-
gether, these phrases unambiguously indicate that Ramos re-
leased Cook County from “any and all” claims he had against
it, “including but not limited to” the claims arising out of the
Jones and Gradowski cases. That includes the current lawsuit
against Piech and O’Mary.
A FFIRMED

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