United States of America v. Franshon Stapleton

In the
United States Court of Appeals
for the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 21-1194
U NITED S TATES OF A MERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
F RANSHON S TAPLETON ,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Central District of Illinois.
No. 18-cr-20028 — James E. Shadid, Judge.
____________________
A RGUED S EPTEMBER 7, 2022 — DECIDED D ECEMBER 27, 2022
____________________
Before SYKES , Chief Judge, and HAMILTON and BRENNAN ,
Circuit Judges.
S YKES , Chief Judge. Franshon Stapleton lured vulnerable
women into prostitution and exploited them for his financial
benefit using threats, force, and other forms of coercion. An
anonymous tip led to his arrest, and a 16-count indictment
for sex-trafficking crimes followed. Stapleton was convinced
that the police had fabricated the anonymous tip and tam-
pered with his cellphone; he wanted his counsel to pursue

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2 No. 21-1194
these theories. The district court appointed a succession of
attorneys to represent him, but he was constantly at odds
with them regarding his police-misconduct claims. His
dissatisfaction came to a head when the judge denied his
motion to suppress the evidence derived from the anony-
mous tip. At that point Stapleton insisted on representing
himself.
After making the inquiries required by Faretta v.
California, 422 U.S. 806, 835 (1975), the judge accepted
Stapleton’s invocation of his right to self-representation and
appointed a standby attorney. About a month before trial,
Stapleton moved for a court-funded expert to investigate his
claim that the police had tampered with his phone. The
judge denied the motion. The case then proceeded to trial.
After a jury was empaneled but before opening statements,
Stapleton announced that he would conditionally plead
guilty to all charges, reserving the right to challenge the
suppression ruling. The judge conducted a Rule 11(b) collo-
quy and accepted Stapleton’s pleas of guilty on all counts.
Before sentencing, however, Stapleton moved to withdraw
his pleas. The judge ruled against him and imposed a sen-
tence of life in prison as recommended by the Sentencing
Guidelines.
Stapleton has not pursued his reserved challenge to the
suppression ruling. Instead, he argues that his guilty pleas
were invalid because he did not have counsel and was
confused about his appellate rights during the plea colloquy.
He also challenges the denial of his motion for a court-
funded expert to investigate his phone-tampering claim.
We reject these arguments and affirm. Stapleton validly
waived his right to counsel after two thorough Faretta collo-

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No. 21-1194 3
quies, and his guilty pleas were likewise knowing and
voluntary. And the judge did not abuse his discretion in
denying Stapleton’s request for a court-funded cellphone
expert.
I. Background
In October 2017 the Urbana Police Department received
an anonymous tip linking Stapleton to an ongoing sex-
trafficking operation in the Champaign-Urbana metro area
in central Illinois. Around the same time, Officer Adam
Marcotte observed a black Ford Expedition suspiciously
parked near a hotel associated with drug and sex-trafficking
activity. The vehicle was registered to “Lamar Stapleton” at
an address in Springfield, Illinois. A search of the law-
enforcement database revealed that Franshon Stapleton
lived at the same address.
One month later Officer Marcotte noticed the same
Expedition parked at a gas station approximately a mile
from the hotel. As the officer was confirming the car’s
registration, he saw a man walk out of the station and enter
the driver’s seat of the Expedition. The man matched the
tipster’s description of Franshon Stapleton. Marcotte knew
that Stapleton had a suspended driver’s license, so he
stopped the vehicle and requested a K-9 assist. When the K-9
alerted for the presence of drugs, Stapleton was arrested. A
full search of the vehicle uncovered cash, drugs, drug para-
phernalia, hundreds of condoms, and four cellphones.
That night while Officer Marcotte was logging the cell-
phones into evidence, a text message popped up on one of
the phones. The message, which referred to drug-trafficking
activity, provided probable cause for several search war-

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4 No. 21-1194
rants. Follow-up investigation and forensic phone analysis
revealed Stapleton’s central role in a sex-trafficking conspir-
acy in which he and two others lured homeless, addicted,
and otherwise vulnerable young women into prostitution by
fraud, threats, violence, and other coercive measures. Addi-
tional investigation culminated in a superseding indictment
charging Stapleton with 16 crimes: conspiracy to commit sex
trafficking, 18 U.S.C. § 371; three counts of sex trafficking by
force, threat, or coercion, id. § 1591(a)(1), (b)(1); one count of
benefitting from sex trafficking, id.; and eleven counts of
using a facility in interstate commerce to aid a racketeering
enterprise, id. § 1952(a)(3)(A).
An assistant federal defender was appointed to represent
Stapleton. About nine months later, however, Stapleton
wrote to the court complaining about his lawyer. After a
hearing to address his complaints, the problem seemed
resolved. But soon after, the federal defender withdrew for
unrelated reasons, and Attorney Monroe McWard was
appointed. At McWard’s request, the court later appointed
Attorney Mark Wykoff as cocounsel. Stapleton’s attorneys
then moved to suppress the incriminating evidence stem-
ming from the text message that Officer Marcotte saw on
Stapleton’s cellphone. The motion alleged in relevant part
that the police had unlawfully accessed the contents of
Stapleton’s cellphone without first obtaining a search war-
rant.
At the suppression hearing, the government called Agent
Michael Mitchell, a forensic expert with the Department of
Homeland Security. He testified that Stapleton’s cellphone
had been set to automatically display all notifications—
including private text messages—even if the phone was

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No. 21-1194 5
locked. Although Stapleton testified to the contrary, Chief
Judge Darrow determined that there was “no credible
evidence that the officers went in and changed the settings”
on the cellphone. She denied Stapleton’s motion to suppress.
A few months later, Stapleton filed a pro se motion com-
plaining about his attorneys and requesting new counsel. By
then his case had been reassigned to Judge Mihm, who
granted the motion and appointed Attorney David Rumley.
But the latest attorney–client relationship did not get off to a
good start; within two months, Rumley reported that
Stapleton would not work with him. Before the court could
step in, Rumley moved to withdraw based on an unrelated
conflict of interest. Judge Mihm granted the motion and was
prepared to appoint another lawyer, but Stapleton said he
wanted to represent himself. After advising Stapleton
against self-representation, Judge Mihm conducted a formal
colloquy pursuant to Faretta v. California, 422 U.S. 806. He
reminded Stapleton of his Sixth Amendment right to an
attorney. He then reviewed with Stapleton the charges
against him, the penalties for each charge, and the applicable
court rules. The judge advised Stapleton that a lawyer would
defend him “far better” than he could defend himself.
Despite Judge Mihm’s warning that proceeding pro se
was “extremely unwise,” Stapleton confirmed that he want-
ed to do so. Judge Mihm therefore found that Stapleton
knowingly and voluntarily waived his right to counsel. But
when Stapleton learned later in the same hearing that he
would need to relocate to a different jail facility to access
discovery material, he changed his mind. He withdrew his
self-representation request and asked for new counsel. Judge
Mihm appointed Attorney Charles Schierer.

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6 No. 21-1194
Several months later, Stapleton filed a pro se letter again
advising the judge that he wanted to represent himself.
Because almost two years had passed since Stapleton’s
indictment, Judge Mihm warned: “I’m definitely not going
to … appoint[] another attorney to represent you. … [T]his
has … to come to an end.” After warning Stapleton that the
decision to proceed pro se was “fraught with problems and
risks,” Judge Mihm conducted a second Faretta colloquy.
Stapleton acknowledged that he had never studied the law
nor represented himself in the past. The judge again con-
firmed that Stapleton was aware of the charges against him,
the corresponding possible penalties, and the applicable
court rules. Judge Mihm advised Stapleton in the “strongest
possible terms” that he would be much better served by “a
trained lawyer.” Then he “strongly urge[d]” Stapleton not to
represent himself. Still, Stapleton confirmed that he wanted
to do so—in part because he wanted to move for reconsider-
ation of his suppression motion. Judge Mihm found that
Stapleton knowingly and voluntarily waived the right to
counsel and accepted his invocation of his right of self-
representation. But the judge asked Schierer to remain on the
case as standby counsel.
Proceeding pro se, Stapleton filed two motions relevant
to this appeal. First, he asked the judge to remove Schierer as
standby counsel and reappoint Mark Wykoff to his case.
Second, he moved for a court-funded expert to examine his
cellphone for possible police tampering.
At the next status hearing, Judge Shadid, who had re-
placed Judge Mihm, denied Stapleton’s motion to reappoint
Wykoff. The judge reminded Stapleton that he himself had
requested Wykoff’s removal and that he had already had

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No. 21-1194 7
“plenty of opportunit[ies] with plenty of lawyers to address
the motions that need[ed] to be addressed.” Stapleton then
refused to accept any further assistance from Schierer, his
standby counsel.
Judge Shadid also denied Stapleton’s motion for a court-
funded cellphone expert. In a written order, the judge
explained that Stapleton had failed to justify the request or
provide the basic supporting information required for an
application for expert-witness funds under the Criminal
Justice Act, 18 U.S.C. § 3006A(e)(1). Stapleton’s request, the
judge concluded, was nothing more than a “fishing expedi-
tion.”
At a status hearing two weeks before the scheduled trial
date, Stapleton asked the judge to continue the trial and
appoint yet another lawyer. Judge Shadid declined to do so,
explaining that the “request for a lawyer at this stage in the
proceeding [was] simply for the purpose of delay.” Staple-
ton then interjected: “I’m not going to trial. I’ll plead guilty
then, and then I’ll come back.” He continued: “I’m going to
plead, but I’m going to withdraw my plea … after I obtain a
lawyer … .”
A week later Stapleton filed a “Motion for Change of
Plea” in which he asserted that he would “change [his] plea
to guilty” so long as he could “obtain counsel” and reserve
“all [his] appeal rights.” Yet by the final pretrial confer-
ence—when the judge addressed the motion—Stapleton had
changed his mind. He requested a continuance and the
appointment of counsel to pursue his theory that the police
had fabricated the initial tip. The judge denied the request
since there was “no indication” that Stapleton would “ulti-

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8 No. 21-1194
mately be satisfied” with another lawyer. Stapleton opted to
proceed to trial.
On September 28, 2020, the first day of trial, Stapleton
again expressed an interest in pleading guilty if he could
preserve the suppression issue for appeal. Although the
judge encouraged Stapleton to accept Schierer’s “expertise
and guidance” and to allow him to help with plea negotia-
tions, Stapleton refused.
Because the situation was fluid and the prosecutor need-
ed to obtain approval from her office before agreeing to a
conditional guilty plea, the judge moved forward with jury
selection. After a jury was empaneled, the judge asked
Stapleton how much time he needed for his opening state-
ment. Stapleton retorted, “I thought that I was pleading
guilty.” The judge asked, “Are you saying that you want to
admit guilt if the government will allow you the right to
reserve [a] challenge [to] the motion to suppress?” Stapleton
answered, “Yes.” The government clarified that it would
agree to a conditional guilty plea. Stapleton then signed a
Notice of Conditional Plea in which he admitted his guilt
and reserved the right to appeal the denial of his suppres-
sion motion.
With that, Judge Shadid placed Stapleton under oath and
conducted a change-of-plea hearing as required by
Rule 11(b) of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure.
During the ensuing colloquy, the judge reiterated that
Stapleton reserved his right to challenge the adverse sup-
pression ruling. Stapleton then pleaded guilty to all
16 counts. The judge found that the pleas were knowing and
voluntary and accepted them.

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No. 21-1194 9
Two months later Stapleton filed four successive pro se
motions to withdraw his guilty pleas, asserting his inno-
cence and alleging government misconduct. Judge Shadid
denied the first in a text order, then addressed and denied
the others at the beginning of the sentencing hearing. He
explained that the transcript of the guilty-plea colloquy
defeated Stapleton’s arguments and clearly established that
his guilty pleas were “knowingly and voluntarily made.”
The judge then turned to sentencing. He began by adopt-
ing the presentence report’s calculation of the Guidelines
sentencing range, which produced a recommended sentence
of life in prison. The government then presented testimony
from Agent Mitchell and the case officer from the Urbana
Police Department. The prosecutor also called one of
Stapleton’s codefendants to testify about Stapleton’s offense
conduct. Lastly, Judge Shadid received victim-impact state-
ments from two of the victims. The prosecutor urged the
judge to impose the life sentence recommended by the
Guidelines. When the opportunity for allocution came,
Stapleton at length denied any wrongdoing.
In his sentencing remarks, Judge Shadid emphasized the
gravity and scope of Stapleton’s sex-trafficking operation,
the irreparable harm he had caused to the victims, and
Stapleton’s history of violence against and exploitation of
women—all of which, he said, justified a life sentence as
recommended by the Guidelines. The judge imposed a
sentence of life in prison, and this appeal followed.
II. Discussion
Proceeding with counsel on appeal, Stapleton has de-
clined to pursue his preserved challenge to Judge Darrow’s

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10 No. 21-1194
suppression ruling.1 He instead raises two issues unrelated
to that ruling. First, he challenges the denial of his motions
to withdraw his guilty pleas, arguing that he did not know-
ingly and voluntarily plead guilty because he was both
deprived of his right to counsel and confused about his
appellate rights. Second, he challenges the denial of his
motion for a court-funded cellphone expert.
A. Plea Withdrawal
A defendant has “no absolute right” to withdraw a guilty
plea after it has been accepted. United States v. Collins,
796 F.3d 829, 834 (7th Cir. 2015). Rather, to prevail on a
motion to withdraw a guilty plea before sentencing, the
defendant has the burden to “show a fair and just reason”
for the request. F ED. R. C RIM . P. 11(d)(2)(B). Successfully
showing that the plea was not knowing and voluntary
obviously satisfies this standard. United States v. Graf,
827 F.3d 581, 583 (7th Cir. 2016). “But the defendant bears a
heavy burden of persuasion” on a motion to withdraw his
guilty plea—especially when, as in this case, the judge
conducted a proper Rule 11(b) colloquy. Collins, 796 F.3d at
834. The purpose of the Rule 11(b) colloquy is to confirm that
the defendant has made a knowing and voluntary decision
to plead guilty; “[o]nce a proper Rule 11 colloquy has taken
place, the ‘fair and just … escape hatch is narrow.’” Id. at 835
(quoting United States v. Mays, 593 F.3d 603, 607 (7th Cir.
2010)).
Stapleton contends that he did not knowingly and volun-
tarily plead guilty for two reasons: (1) he was deprived of his
1 We offered Stapleton an opportunity to file a supplemental brief on the
suppression issue, but he declined to do so.

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No. 21-1194 11
Sixth Amendment right to counsel, and (2) he was confused
about his appellate rights. Because Stapleton presented
neither of these arguments to the district judge in his plea-
withdrawal motions, our review is limited to correcting
plain error. See United States v. Dyer, 892 F.3d 910, 914 (7th
Cir. 2018) (per curiam).
Plain-error review in this context “requires the defendant
to demonstrate a clear or obvious error during the plea
process and ‘a reasonable probability that, but for the error,
he would not have entered the plea.’” United States v. Hogue,
998 F.3d 745, 751 (7th Cir. 2021) (quoting United States v.
Dominguez Benitez, 542 U.S. 74, 83 (2004)). We find no error,
and certainly no plain error, in Judge Shadid’s denial of
Stapleton’s plea-withdrawal motions. Stapleton was not
denied his right to counsel, and the judge had no obligation
to inform him about the consequences of his pleas on a
potential appeal.
We begin with the right to counsel. The Sixth Amend-
ment guarantees a criminal defendant “the right to … the
Assistance of Counsel for his defence.” U.S. C ONST.
amend. VI. It also implies a right to self-representation.
Faretta, 422 U.S. at 819; United States v. Mancillas, 880 F.3d
297, 301 (7th Cir. 2018). To invoke this right, a defendant
must first knowingly and intelligently waive his right to
counsel. Mancillas, 880 F.3d at 301.
To ensure that the defendant is aware of the consequenc-
es of self-representation, we have encouraged judges to
“engage in a thorough and formal inquiry” that probes the
defendant’s “age, education level, and understanding of the
criminal charges and possible sentences.” United States v.
Vizcarra-Millan, 15 F.4th 473, 486 (7th Cir. 2021) (quoting

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12 No. 21-1194
United States v. Johnson, 980 F.3d 570, 577 (7th Cir. 2020)). The
judge “should also inform the defendant of the difficulties of
proceeding pro se.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). Yet we
have recognized that a judge sits “on the razor’s edge” when
a defendant chooses between self-representation and “repre-
sentation by counsel with whom [he] is irrationally dissatis-
fied.” Id. (quoting United States v. Oreye, 263 F.3d 669, 672
(7th Cir. 2001)). If a Faretta colloquy is too cursory, it may be
insufficient to guard against an unknowing waiver of the
right to counsel; if the colloquy is too exacting, it risks
depriving the defendant of his right to represent himself. Id.
We therefore hesitate to “police too closely the details” of a
Faretta colloquy. Id.
Stapleton asks us to do just that. Judge Mihm conducted
two full Faretta hearings, yet in Stapleton’s view the judge
failed to adequately inform him of the assistance that coun-
sel could offer. He contends that if he had known that coun-
sel could file additional motions or locate an expert to
investigate his cellphone settings, he would not have pur-
sued self-representation. He maintains that the absence of
counsel during the “pivotal time” of his decision to plead
guilty caused him to enter his pleas unknowingly.
We disagree. After two thorough Faretta colloquies,
Stapleton twice validly waived his right to counsel. Both
times he confirmed that he understood the charges against
him and the severe penalties he faced if convicted. Judge
Mihm also reminded Stapleton that if he chose to represent
himself, he was “on [his] own.” And Stapleton acknowl-
edged that Judge Mihm could neither “tell” nor “even
advise” him on how to try his case. He also said he under-
stood that he would be expected to follow the rules govern-

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No. 21-1194 13
ing a criminal trial. Judge Mihm concluded both colloquies
by advising Stapleton that a lawyer would represent him
“far better” than he could represent himself. The judge
warned that self-representation was “extremely unwise,”
and he “strongly urge[d]” Stapleton against trying to repre-
sent himself. But both times Stapleton affirmed that he
wanted to do so, and Judge Mihm found both waivers to be
knowing and voluntary.
Moreover, after Stapleton waived his right to counsel for
the second time, Judge Mihm explicitly cautioned him about
standby counsel’s limited role. This led to the following
exchange:
THE COURT: Just a moment. Now I want to
make a point about standby counsel, and that
is he is standby counsel. We are not going to
have a situation where you will do some
things, and then you’ll agree to have him do
some things. Do you understand?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, sir.
THE COURT: You’re going to represent your-
self.
Now, you can ask him maybe to do some
research for you on a particular point or give
some legal advice on some issue that’s raised,
but you’re going to be representing yourself.
Do you understand?
THE DEFENDANT: Yes, Your Honor.
These inquiries were more than sufficient to produce not
just one but two knowing and voluntary waivers of counsel.

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14 No. 21-1194
A Faretta inquiry is not a “talismanic procedure.” Vizcarra-
Millan, 15 F.4th at 486 (quoting Torres v. United States,
140 F.3d 392, 401 (2d Cir. 1998)). Judge Mihm’s questions
adequately advised Stapleton of the dangers of self-
representation, and Stapleton understood that he was giving
up the benefits of trained counsel. Indeed, his invocation of
his right to self-representation seemed to be a strategic, even
if imprudent, maneuver—one that would allow Stapleton to
continue to litigate the adverse suppression ruling. “A
defendant who waives his right to counsel for strategic
reasons tends to do so knowingly.” United States v.
Harrington, 814 F.3d 896, 900 (7th Cir. 2016). We see no error,
let alone plain error, in the judge’s determination that
Stapleton knowingly and intelligently waived his right to
counsel.
Stapleton’s additional argument that Judge Shadid “mis-
represented the appeals process” during the guilty-plea
colloquy is likewise meritless. He concedes that Judge
Shadid fully complied with the requirements of Rule 11(b).
Nonetheless, he insists that he was confused about the scope
of an appeal regarding the reserved suppression issue. But
Judge Shadid told Stapleton that an appellate court would
address only the issues reserved for appeal and would look
at all the evidence related to those issues. We struggle to find
any error in these statements.
At oral argument we sought clarification of Stapleton’s
position on this point. Counsel’s response suggested a
somewhat narrower claim: that Judge Shadid’s statements
during the plea colloquy implied that a reviewing court
would neither receive nor consider the government’s re-
sponse to Stapleton’s appeal. That contention cannot be

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No. 21-1194 15
squared with the record. Judge Shadid stated explicitly that
the reviewing court would receive argument from the
government and review the record “[t]o the extent that[] [it]
related to the motion to suppress.” And in any event, the
judge is not obligated to inform the defendant of the specific
effects of his guilty plea on a potential appeal. Dyer, 892 F.3d
at 914; United States v. Adigun, 703 F.3d 1014, 1020 (7th Cir.
2012). Nonetheless, Judge Shadid took great care to explain
exactly which issues Stapleton was—and was not—reserving
for appeal. Stapleton has not identified an error, plain or
otherwise, in the judge’s denial of his plea-withdrawal
motions.
B. Court-Funded Expert
Stapleton also argues that the judge wrongly denied his
motion for a court-funded expert to investigate the notifica-
tion settings on his cellphone. He theorizes that an investiga-
tion would confirm that prior to its seizure, the phone had
been set to prevent notifications from appearing on the
home screen. Stapleton therefore posits that if Officer
Marcotte saw an incoming text message, he must have
changed these settings despite lacking a warrant to do so.
Under the Criminal Justice Act, § 3006A(e)(1), an indigent
defendant may obtain funding for “investigative, expert, or
other services necessary for adequate representation” by
submitting an ex parte application. If the judge finds that
“the services are necessary and that the [applicant] is finan-
cially unable to obtain them,” he “shall authorize” those
services. Id. “Expert services should be provided where a
reasonable attorney would engage such services for a client
having the independent financial means to pay for them.”
United States v. Smith, 502 F.3d 680, 686 (7th Cir. 2007) (quota-

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16 No. 21-1194
tion marks omitted). But an overly literal application of this
standard could result in the government financing a “fishing
expedition.” United States v. King, 356 F.3d 774, 778 (7th Cir.
2004) (quotation marks omitted). Therefore, before granting
a § 3006A(e)(1) motion, “it is appropriate” for a judge to first
satisfy himself “that a defendant may have a plausible
defense.” Id. (quotation marks omitted). On review we apply
an abuse-of-discretion standard.
We note first that Stapleton’s conditional guilty pleas did
not preserve a challenge to the denial of his § 3006A(e)(1)
motion. But rather than assert waiver, the government
addressed Stapleton’s argument on the merits. We will do
the same. See Adigun, 703 F.3d at 1022 (“An opposing party
can ‘waive waiver’ if it fails to assert the preclusive effect of
the waiver before the appellate court.”).
Stapleton’s challenge fails for two reasons. First, he
lacked a plausible argument that the police tampered with
his cellphone. Agent Mitchell, a forensic expert from the
Department of Homeland Security, testified at the suppres-
sion hearing that Stapleton’s phone was set to display all
notifications—including private text messages—on the home
screen. At the same hearing, Chief Judge Darrow found “no
credible evidence” that the police had altered these settings.
Stapleton’s funding request thus resembles a classic “fishing
expedition.”
Second, Stapleton failed to establish the necessity of his
request. His motion contained several obvious holes: it did
not identify an expert and outline the expert’s qualifications
and likely testimony, nor did it estimate the cost. See United
States v. Knox, 540 F.3d 708, 718 (7th Cir. 2008) (affirming the
denial of a § 3006A(e)(1) motion for an investigative trip

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No. 21-1194 17
where the defendant had not explained “when, where, and
how he would make contact with the witnesses”). Cost is a
particularly relevant factor because absent court approval,
§ 3006A(e)(3) limits government funding to $2,400. In sum,
Stapleton’s motion contained several unresolved unknowns.
The judge did not abuse his discretion in denying it.
A FFIRMED

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