Adama Njie v. Wayne Steele

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted December 2, 2022*
Decided January 6, 2023
Before
DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge
MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge
CANDACE JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit Judge
No. 22-1045
ADAMA NJIE,
Plaintiff- Appellant,
v.
WAYNE STEELE, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Central District of Illinois.
No. 1:14-cv-1079-SLD
Sara Darrow,
Chief Judge.
O R D E R
Adama Njie, an Illinois prisoner and a Rastafarian, sued officials at Hill
Correctional Center in Galesburg, Illinois, for preventing him from participating in
religious services, not allowing him contact visits because of his natural hair, and
denying him an Ital diet compatible with his faith. He alleged violations of the Religious
Land Use and Institutionalized Persons Act, 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000cc—2000cc-5 (“the Act”)
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

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and the Constitution, by way of 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Some of his claims went to trial, and a
jury found that the denial of contact visits at Hill substantially burdened his religious
practice and therefore violated the Act. But the district court correctly determined that,
because Njie is no longer incarcerated at Hill and showed no likelihood of his return,
his request for injunctive relief—the only remedy available— is moot. Thus, we affirm.
Njie’s religious observance requires that he let his hair grow freely (it naturally
forms dreadlocks), follow an Ital diet, and attend regular chapel service. A policy at Hill
provided that hairstyles deemed “unsearchable” might allow the concealment of
contraband and posed a safety threat, so prisoners with these hairstyles could not have
contact visits. Under this policy, officials at Hill limited Njie to non-contact visits during
which visitors were separated from him by a glass divider. At least once, Hill officials
forcibly cut Njie’s hair. The rest of the time, he had to choose between having contact
visits and observing his religion by wearing his hair in dreadlocks.
Njie’s other relevant claim relates to his religious diet. In response to his request
for an Ital diet, which is based on natural and unprocessed fruits, grains, and
vegetables, officials offered a lacto-ovo vegetarian diet consisting of limited fruits and
vegetables (rarely fresh), plus eggs and dairy products. Hill accommodated other
religious diets, such as kosher and halal, precisely.
Njie sued the then-warden in her official capacity along with other staff, alleging
that these practices violated the Act and, under 42 U.S.C. § 1983, the First, Eighth, and
Fourteenth Amendments. The district court entered summary judgment for the
defendants. We vacated that judgment in part and remanded for a trial on the claims
that the “unsearchable hairstyle” provision of the visitation policy and non-Ital diet
substantially burdened Njie’s religious practices. See Njie v. Dorethy, 766 F. App’x 387
(7th Cir. 2019). About a year later, Njie was transferred to Menard Correctional Center
as part of his discipline for drug activity. The defendants again moved for summary
judgment, arguing that the matter was moot because of Njie’s transfer. The district
court rejected the argument because a trial might show that the challenged policies
remained a threat to Njie.
At trial, where Njie was represented by recruited counsel, the jury found in favor
of Njie on his claim that Hill restricted his contact visits in violation of the Act, but it
returned verdicts for the defendants on the remaining claims. The trial court ordered
Njie to file a motion specifying “what, if any” equitable relief he sought on his
successful claim. His counseled motion requested an injunction:

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No. 22-1045 Page 3
1. Requiring Defendant Warden to facilitate/request Plaintiff’s transfer back
to Hill Correctional Center; 2. Enjoining Defendant Warden and all agents
and employees … from cutting/shaving or otherwise removing Plaintiff’s
dreadlocks; and 3. Enjoining Defendant Warden and all agents and
employees … from denying Plaintiff contact visits because of Plaintiff’s
dreadlocks.
Alternatively, Njie asked for an injunction against the warden of Menard prohibiting
the cutting of his dreadlocks and the denial of contact visits based on his hairstyle.
In his pro se reply brief, Njie submitted an affidavit from an assistant warden at
Menard that was filed in another inmate’s case; it explained that some inmates are
denied contact visits if their hair is deemed “unsearchable.” The defendants provided a
contradictory affidavit from the security chief at Menard stating that no such policy
currently existed at the facility. The defendants also presented evidence that Njie had
been transferred to Menard because a prison investigation found he conspired to
smuggle narcotics into Hill. (Njie says that those charges were dismissed, but the
evidence is to the contrary.) The district court denied Njie’s motion for a permanent
injunction, concluding that his request was moot because of his transfer. The court also
stated Njie did not show that he had been denied contact visits at Menard because of his
dreadlocks, nor that it was reasonably likely that he would return to Hill.
On appeal, Njie argues that the court erred in concluding that it could not enter a
remedial injunction because he was no longer subject to the practice at Hill that violated
his rights. We review the jurisdictional issue de novo. Speech First, Inc. v. Killeen,
968 F.3d 628, 645 (7th Cir. 2020). A controversy must remain live throughout all stages
of litigation for a federal court to have jurisdiction. See Already, LLC v. Nike, Inc., 568 U.S.
85, 90–91 (2013). A case is moot if a court “can no longer affect the rights of litigants in
the case before it.” N.J. by Jacob v. Sonnabend, 37 F.4th 412, 421 (7th Cir. 2022) (quoting St.
John's United Church of Christ v. City of Chicago, 502 F.3d 616, 626 (7th Cir. 2007)).
The Act permits only declaratory or injunctive relief. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(f).
Thus, a claim under the Act becomes moot when a realistic possibility of future
violations no longer remains. Maddox v. Love, 655 F.3d 709, 716–17 (7th Cir. 2011). A
transfer from the complained-about prison generally moots equitable and declaratory
claims. Ortiz v. Downey, 561 F.3d 664, 668 (7th Cir. 2009) (citing Young v. Lane, 922 F.2d
370, 373 (7th Cir. 1991)). Further, the Prison Litigation Reform Act applies to claims
under the Act. 42 U.S.C. § 2000cc-2(e). Therefore, prospective relief for unconstitutional

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prison conditions must be narrow, extending no further than necessary to correct the
violation. See 18 U.S.C. § 3626(a)(1)(A); Rasho v. Jeffreys, 22 F.4th 703, 711 (7th Cir. 2022).
Njie insists that there is still a remedial injunction to be had. First, he argues that
he should be sent back to Hill because he presented evidence that his transfer to
Menard was retaliatory. Alternatively, he wants an injunction against officials at
Menard because, he asserts, a similar policy exists there and he remains under threat of
having his hair forcibly cut, or his contact visits denied, because of his dreadlocks.
We agree with the district court that the relief Njie seeks would not be effective
to remedy the one violation of his rights that he proved at trial: the denial of contact
visits at Hill because of his dreadlocks. The only injunction that could address that
claim—an order that Hill repeal, or cease enforcement of, its rule about “non-
searchable” hair—would have had no effect on Njie’s rights because he is no longer at
Hill. Further, the district court concluded based on the evidence that Njie did not show
he was likely to be transferred back to Hill or denied contact visits there again. See
Neely-Bey Tarik-El v. Conley, 912 F.3d 989, 1005 (7th Cir. 2019) (district court must
determine likelihood of return to transferring institution). The fact that he was
transferred to a higher-security facility because of his drug-related disciplinary
conviction, which he unsuccessfully challenged, is significant. The record does not
allow the conclusion that there is a realistic possibility of Njie’s return to Hill; therefore,
injunctive relief against its warden is inappropriate. See Ortiz, 561 F.3d at 668.
Njie further contends that even though this suit is not against anyone at his
current prison, the district court could have enjoined officials at Menard because they
acted in concert with officials from Hill. See Fed. R. Civ. P. 65(d)(2)(C). But he has no
evidence of any involvement by anyone at Menard in the transfer decision, which
resulted from disciplinary action. Njie now makes assertions about violations at
Menard, but they are unproven and beyond the scope of the claim he successfully
litigated, which did not target any policy throughout the Illinois Department of
Corrections or any violation of his rights at Menard. Relief for any unlawful restrictions
on his religious practice at Menard would have to come in a separate lawsuit against
those responsible or against the Department under the Act, if he alleges that it has a
statewide policy.
As for Njie’s request for an injunction returning him to Hill, this is also outside
the scope of relief he can obtain based on the verdict. The complaint did not contain a
claim that he was transferred in retaliation for bringing this suit. Such a claim would be
based on the First Amendment, not the Act. See Holleman v. Zatecky, 951 F.3d 873, 878

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No. 22-1045 Page 5
(7th Cir. 2020). He cannot skip the step of filing and proving a claim of retaliatory
transfer yet obtain, as part of the remedy here, an injunction voiding the transfer. And
the chance of Njie suing over the transfer and succeeding is too remote and speculative
to allow us to infer a realistic possibility of his return to Hill. See Ortiz, 561 F.3d at 668.
Finally, Njie also requests a new trial because, he says, his recruited pro bono
counsel did not present to the jury all the evidence he provided about his requests for
an Ital diet and the accommodation of other types of religious diets at Hill. Njie asserts
that the jury would have found in his favor if it had heard all the evidence. But his
counsel presented this information through the testimony of Hill officials. A
disagreement between lawyer and client over trial tactics does not signify poor
performance by the lawyer. We are confident that Njie was better off with the generous
assistance from the counsel who agreed to represent him in the district court than if he
had tried the case on his own. (In any case, we would not vacate a jury verdict based on
an argument that a civil plaintiff received ineffective assistance of counsel at trial.
Stanciel v. Gramley, 267 F.3d 575, 581 (7th Cir. 2001). Even if a lawyer were to perform
deficiently—and we see no evidence of that in this case—ineffective assistance would
not be a ground for reversal. Litigants in civil cases like this one have no constitutional
right to counsel. Diggs v. Ghosh, 850 F.3d 905, 911 (7th Cir. 2017).)
AFFIRMED.

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