Brandon E. Klein v. TOWN OF SCHERERVILLE and ANTHONY BUONADONNA

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Argued November 18, 2022
Decided January 6, 2023
Before
MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge
THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge
JOHN Z. LEE, Circuit Judge
No. 22-1842
BRANDON E. KLEIN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
TOWN OF SCHERERVILLE and
ANTHONY BUONADONNA,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of
Indiana, Hammond Division.
No. 2:17-CV-16-JEM
John E. Martin,
Magistrate Judge.
O R D E R
After learning that Brandon Klein had contacted his estranged wife, Officer
Anthony Buonadonna arrested Klein for allegedly violating a protective order his wife
had obtained against him. In reality, the protective order did not prohibit Klein from
communicating with his wife at all, and Buonadonna knew this because he had read it.
Nevertheless, in order to secure a warrant for Klein’s arrest, Buonadonna attested to a
judge under oath that the order banned Klein from initiating such contacts. Relying on
Buonadonna’s affidavit, the judge issued the warrant, and Buonadonna carried out the
arrest. A short time later, Klein was released, and the charges were dropped.
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1

-- 1 of 6 --

No. 22-1842 Page 2
Klein then sued Buonadonna pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983, claiming that he had
violated Klein’s Fourth Amendment rights by lying in the warrant application. Klein
also sued the Town of Schererville, Buonnadonna’s employer, under Monell v.
Department of Social Services, 436 U.S. 658 (1978), on the grounds that the town had failed
to adequately train its officers. The district court entered summary judgment for both
defendants. We affirm the judgment as to Schererville, but we vacate the judgment and
remand as to Buonadonna because, on this record, a reasonable jury could find that he
intentionally or recklessly included false information or omitted exculpatory
information in his affidavit material to his warrant request.
I. BACKGROUND
In 2014, Klein’s then-wife, Leanne Salatas, obtained an order of protection
against him. The order prohibited Klein from committing “domestic or family
violence,” “stalking” Salatas, and nearing her “residence, school and place of
employment.” It did not bar him from communicating with Salatas, with whom he had
an infant daughter. In fact, Klein and Salatas regularly saw each other and spoke.
Two months later, Klein arrived at a family member’s house for a scheduled visit
with his daughter but found no one at home. Klein texted Salatas and, when she did not
respond, he called and emailed her. Later that day, Salatas reported to the Schererville
Police Department that Klein had violated the protective order by contacting her.
The police department assigned Buonadonna to the case. He first read a printout
of the protective order and discovered that it did not prevent Klein from contacting
Salatas. But, based on his experience with “more than one and less than a thousand”
protective orders, Buonadonna believed that such orders usually prohibited
communication between the parties. And so he sought additional information from the
Indiana Data and Communication System—a law enforcement database that
summarizes criminal records and court orders. The database indicated that the
protective order did prohibit Klein from contacting Salatas. That said, the database
expressly warned users not to rely solely on the database when conducting arrests.
Based upon the information in the database, his experience with other protective
orders, and Salatas’s recollection of the restrictions the protective order imposed,
Buonadonna concluded that Klein had violated the order and filed an application for a
warrant for Klein’s arrest.

-- 2 of 6 --

No. 22-1842 Page 3
As part of the warrant application, Buonadonna signed an affidavit attesting that
he had probable cause to arrest Klein for the state-law crime of invasion of privacy. In
the affidavit, Buonadonna stated that he had “read” the “order . . . on file with
Schererville PD.” More to the point, he stated (under pain and penalty of perjury):
The [order], signed by a Judge and filed in open court, ordered the accused to:
Not make any communication including, but not limited to, personal, written, or
telephone contact, fellow workers, or others whom the communication would be
likely to cause annoyance or alarm to the victim.
Buonadonna made this representation to the court even though he knew (as he
would admit later) “that the paper copy did not explicitly prohibit [Klein] from
communicating with . . . Salatas.” He did not bother to attach a copy of the order. Nor
did he inform the court that he believed that Klein was prohibited from contacting
Salatas based solely on the database and Salatas’s recollection, even though the actual
order did not contain such a limitation.
Relying upon Buonadonna’s affidavit, a judge issued a warrant for Klein’s arrest.
And Klein spent ten days in jail until the charges were dropped.
After the conclusion of discovery in this case, Buonadonna and Schererville filed
motions for summary judgment. The district court granted summary judgment in favor
of Buonadonna, concluding that Klein’s Fourth Amendment claim against the officer
was doomed because Buonadonna had had probable cause to arrest Klein. The court
also granted summary judgment to Schererville, noting that the town undisputedly
lacked notice that a deficiency in its training program would lead to the type of
constitutional violation alleged by Klein here.
II. A NALYSIS
We review de novo a district court’s grant of summary judgment. Lyberger v.
Snider, 42 F.4th 807, 811 (7th Cir. 2022). Summary judgment is appropriate if the record
presents no genuine issues of material fact and the movants are entitled to judgment as
a matter of law. F ED. R. C IV. P. 56(a). But we must remand if, viewing all disputed facts
and drawing all reasonable inferences in Klein’s favor, a reasonable jury could find that
Buonadonna or Schererville violated his constitutional rights. Donald v. Wexford Health
Sources, Inc., 982 F.3d 451, 457 (7th Cir. 2020).

-- 3 of 6 --

No. 22-1842 Page 4
A.
We begin with Klein’s claim against Buonadonna. An officer violates the Fourth
Amendment when he “intentionally or recklessly includes false statements in a warrant
application” that were material to the judge’s finding of probable cause. Rainsberger v.
Benner, 913 F.3d 640, 647 (7th Cir. 2019). An officer similarly violates the Fourth
Amendment by intentionally or recklessly withholding material exculpatory
information from a probable-cause affidavit. Whitlock v. Brown, 596 F.3d 406, 410–11 (7th
Cir. 2010). A statement or omission is reckless if the officer had “obvious reasons to
doubt” the accuracy of the information in the affidavit. See Hart v. Mannina, 798 F.3d
578, 591 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting Betker v. Gomez, 692 F.3d 854, 860 (7th Cir. 2012)). And
to determine whether a statement or omission is material, we ask whether the warrant
application would have established probable cause if it had not included the falsehoods
and had included any omitted exculpatory facts. Rainsberger, 913 F.3d at 647, 651.
Here, a reasonable jury could find that Buonadonna intentionally or recklessly
included material false statements and withheld material exculpatory information.
Buonadonna admits that he read the protective order and knew that it did not bar
communication between Klein and Salatas. Yet, he told the judge in his affidavit that the
protective order “signed by a Judge and filed in open court” forbade such
communication. This was a bald misrepresentation.
For his part, Buonadonna insists that he believed the order was incomplete
because it conflicted with the information in the Indiana database and Salatas’s
erroneous recollection of the order’s contents. But, as his counsel acknowledged, the
information in the database is based upon the actual orders themselves. Thus, between
an actual protective order and the database, a reasonable officer would know that the
order controls. As for Salatas’s recall of the protective order’s contents, this too was
flatly contradicted by the actual order, and Buonadonna knew it. This is not to say that
Buonadonna was prohibited from giving the database and Salatas’s recollection any
weight when deciding to seek an arrest warrant. Court orders sometimes are incorrect,
whether due to administrative snafus or otherwise. But, given the actual terms of the
protective order, it was incumbent upon Buonadonna to provide the judge with a
complete and accurate picture of the circumstances. A reasonable jury could find that he
did not do that here and that his failure to do so was intentional or at the least reckless.
That brings us to qualified immunity. Buonadonna is entitled to qualified
immunity if it would not have been “clear to a reasonable official that his or her conduct

-- 4 of 6 --

No. 22-1842 Page 5
was unlawful in the situation.” Carvajal v. Dominguez, 542 F.3d 561, 566 (7th Cir. 2008).
But it is “clearly established” that an officer violates the Fourth Amendment when he
“with reckless disregard for the truth . . . makes false statements in requesting [a]
warrant and the false statements were necessary to the determination that a warrant
should issue.” Rainsberger, 913 F.3d at 653 (quoting Lawson v. Veruchi, 637 F.3d 699, 705
(7th Cir. 2011)). For the reasons discussed, a reasonable jury could find that
Buonadonna intentionally or recklessly disregarded the truth when seeking a warrant
for Klein’s arrest, and he is not entitled to summary judgment on his qualified
immunity defense on this record. See Abdullahi v. City of Madison, 423 F.3d 763, 774–75
(7th Cir. 2005).
B.
Klein also seeks to hold the Town of Schererville liable for an unconstitutional
policy or practice under Monell, 436 U.S. 658. He relies on two theories of liability, but
he has waived both, and both lack merit.
First, Klein argues that the town failed to adequately train its officers on how to
utilize protective orders. But he spends only one sentence on this argument and, thus, it
is waived. See Puffer v. Allstate Ins. Co., 675 F.3d 709, 718 (7th Cir. 2012) (explaining that
undeveloped arguments are waived). In any event, this argument is meritless. To
prevail, Klein must show that the town was on notice that a deficiency in its training
program was likely to lead to a constitutional violation. See Flores v. City of South Bend,
997 F.3d 725, 731 (7th Cir. 2021). He fails to do so.
Klein also contends that the town had an unconstitutional policy of allowing
officers to rely on database information over actual copies of protective orders. Not only
does he raise this argument for the first time on appeal, thereby waiving it, see Puffer,
675 F.3d at 718, but it too is baseless. To succeed, Klein must show that the allegedly
unlawful practice was “so pervasive that acquiescence on the part of policymakers was
apparent and amounted to a policy decision.” Bridges v. Dart, 950 F.3d 476, 479 (7th Cir.
2020) (cleaned up). His only evidence is the police chief’s attestation that “[a]t all
material times, Officer Buonadonna followed the procedure in place at the Schererville
Police Department.” No reasonable jury could conclude from this broad statement that
the town had a specific policy of disregarding printed orders in favor of the database
summaries, particularly when those summaries contain a warning not to rely on them.
See Reck v. Wexford Health Sources, Inc., 27 F.4th 473, 488 (7th Cir. 2022) (holding that

-- 5 of 6 --

No. 22-1842 Page 6
proof of isolated acts of misconduct is insufficient to survive summary judgment on a
Monell claim).
For these reasons, we AFFIRM the judgment with respect to the claim against the
Town of Schererville, VACATE the judgment with respect to the claim against
Buonadonna, and REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this order.

-- 6 of 6 --