United States of America v. Christopher Van Alstine

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted January 19, 2023
Decided January 20, 2023
Before
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge
MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge
JOHN Z. LEE, Circuit Judge
No. 22-1897
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
CHRISTOPHER VAN ALSTINE,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of
Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 1:17-CR-00785(2)
Gary Feinerman,
Judge.
O R D E R
Christopher Van Alstine appeals the sentence imposed upon the revocation of
his supervised release. But his appointed counsel asserts that the appeal is frivolous and
moves to withdraw. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). We grant the
motion and dismiss the appeal.
A defendant does not have an unqualified constitutional right to counsel in
revocation proceedings, see Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790–91 (1973), so the Anders
safeguards need not govern our review. Even so, our practice is to apply them. United
States v. Wheeler, 814 F.3d 856, 857 (7th Cir. 2016). Because counsel’s analysis appears
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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adequate, we limit our review to the subjects he discusses. See United States v. Bey,
748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014). (We notified Van Alstine of the motion, but he did not
respond. See C IR . R. 51(b).)
We briefly summarize this case’s procedural history. In May 2020, Van Alstine—
having served time in prison for transporting a stolen vehicle in interstate commerce—
began a three-year term of supervised release. One condition of his supervision barred
possession of firearms. Several months later, Illinois police tried to arrest Van Alstine
after spotting him in a truck with allegedly stolen construction equipment. He fled and,
during the ensuing chase, ran a red light, drove onto the sidewalk, struck a car and a
street sign, pointed a loaded handgun at an officer, and then struck that officer’s car
when he lost control of his own. For this conduct, Van Alstine pleaded guilty to the
Illinois crimes of theft and aggravated unlawful use of a weapon and was sentenced to
six years’ imprisonment. The probation office, in turn, petitioned to revoke his
supervised release.
At a revocation hearing, Van Alstine admitted two violations: possessing a
firearm and committing state crimes. The district court ruled that Van Alstine’s most
serious violation—his conviction for aggravated unlawful use of a weapon—was a
Grade A violation. See 720 ILCS 5/24-1.6; U.S.S.G. § 7B1.1(a)(1)(A)(iii), (b). This resulted
in his policy-statement range totaling 33 to 41 months, given his criminal-history
category of VI as calculated at the original sentencing. U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4(a) & cmt. n.1. But
because Van Alstine’s original offense was a Class C felony, see 18 U.S.C. §§ 2312,
3559(a)(3), the 24-month statutory maximum replaced the policy-statement range. Id.
§ 3583(e)(3); U.S.S.G. § 7B1.4(b)(1). The court sentenced Van Alstine to 21 months’
reimprisonment to be served consecutively to his 6-year state sentence, with no further
supervised release.
As for the motion to withdraw, counsel does not tell us, as he is required to,
whether Van Alstine wants to challenge the revocation of his supervised release.
See Wheeler, 814 F.3d at 857. But any such challenge would be frivolous because Van
Alstine admitted violating conditions of his release, and revocation and reimprisonment
were mandatory because one of those conditions prohibited gun possession.
See 18 U.S.C. § 3583(g)(2); United States v. Dawson, 980 F.3d 1156, 1161 (7th Cir. 2020).
Counsel first considers and appropriately rejects challenging the court’s
calculation of the applicable policy-statement range. The range of 33 to 41 months
(capped at 24 months because of the statutory maximum) was proper based on Van
Alstine’s Grade A violation and criminal-history category of VI from his original

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No. 22-1897 Page 3
sentencing. See U.S.S.G. §§ 7B1.1(a)(1)(A)(iii), (b), 7B1.4(a), (b)(1), & cmt. n.1; United
States v. Boultinghouse, 784 F.3d 1163, 1170, 1178 (7th Cir. 2015). Finally, the court
followed the policy statement’s recommendation that Van Alstine serve the new federal
sentence consecutive to his state sentence. See U.S.S.G. § 7B1.3(f); United States v. Brown,
823 F.3d 392, 394 (7th Cir. 2016).
Next, counsel rightly concludes that challenging Van Alstine’s sentence as
substantively unreasonable would be frivolous. We would presume the prison sentence
to be reasonable because it is below the policy-statement range. See United States v.
Dewitt, 943 F.3d 1092, 1098 (7th Cir. 2019). Nothing in the record would rebut that
presumption. When sentencing Van Alstine, the court reasonably weighed the
sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), highlighting the seriousness of and danger
posed by Van Alstine’s conduct (he stole, led police on a car chase, crashed into other
cars, and pointed a loaded gun at an officer); Van Alstine’s background and
characteristics (he had a “history of emotional and cognitive issues”); and the need to
deter Van Alstine from committing future crimes (especially relevant, given the
similarities between Van Alstine’s theft violation and his original offense of
transporting a stolen vehicle).
We GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.

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