United States of America v. Tyran Floyd

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted February 3, 2023*
Decided February 3, 2023
Before
ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge
AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge
THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge
No. 22-2388
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
TYRAN FLOYD,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois,
Western Division.
No. 12 CR 50012
Iain D. Johnston,
Judge.
O R D E R
Tyran Floyd, a federal prisoner, appeals the denial of his motion for
compassionate release under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)( 1)(A)(i). He unsuccessfully asked his
warden to move for his release based on his rehabilitation and then sought relief in the
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

-- 1 of 3 --

No. 22-2388 Page 2
district court for new reasons. Because Floyd did not exhaust his administrative
remedies with respect to these new reasons, we affirm.
Floyd was arrested after multiple arranged drug and firearm transactions with a
confidential informant. He was charged with possession with intent to distribute
heroin, cocaine, and marijuana, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1); possession with intent to distribute
cocaine base, id.; possession of a weapon as a felon, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1); and possession
of a firearm in furtherance of a drug-trafficking crime, id. § 924(c)(1)(A). The
government also filed notice of its intent to seek an enhanced sentence under 21 U.S.C.
§ 851(a) based on previous drug felonies. Floyd pleaded guilty to possession with intent
to distribute cocaine base, and in the process, he agreed that he qualified for a career-
offender enhancement and was subject to a range of 188 to 235 months’ imprisonment
under the Sentencing Guidelines. The district court imposed a 188-month sentence, and
the government dismissed the remaining counts.
After serving over half of his prison sentence, Floyd wrote his warden requesting
compassionate release based on how much time he had served and his rehabilitative
efforts while imprisoned. The warden determined that those reasons were not
extraordinary and compelling and declined to move for a sentence modification. Floyd
then filed his own motion in district court, now arguing that his high blood pressure
increased his risk of complications from COVID-19 and that his sentencing range would
be shorter for various reasons if he were convicted today. Appointed counsel amplified
the latter reason, primarily arguing that Floyd would no longer be subject to the career-
offender enhancement. See United States v. Ruth, 966 F.3d 642 (7th Cir. 2020).
The government opposed the motion because Floyd had not presented his
current grounds for relief to the warden and therefore had not exhausted administrative
remedies. In the alternative, the government argued, neither post-sentencing changes in
the law nor the alleged health risk warranted an early release.
The district court denied Floyd’s motion without resolving the exhaustion
defense. The court explained that Floyd failed to show that changes in sentencing laws
applied to him and, regardless, under this court’s precedent, such changes are not
extraordinary and compelling reasons for compassionate release. Further, Floyd lacked
evidence that he is at an elevated risk of becoming seriously ill from COVID-19 because
of an underlying medical condition or prison conditions. Finally, the court analyzed the
sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a) and determined that the 188-month
sentence remained appropriate. While acknowledging Floyd’s coursework in prison, his

-- 2 of 3 --

No. 22-2388 Page 3
remorse, and the support of friends and family, it concluded that “the large quantities
of multiple types of drugs,” the involvement of a firearm, and a “significant” criminal
history weighed in favor of Floyd completing his sentence.
Floyd appeals, primarily arguing that the district court erred by rejecting
intervening changes in sentencing law as an extraordinary and compelling reason for
his compassionate release and by failing to fully consider the § 3553(a) factors. Without
suggesting any flaw in the court’s reasoning, we need not dwell on these arguments
because Floyd did not exhaust his remedies as required by 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A).
Floyd asked his warden to move for his release because he had completed over
50% of his prison sentence and demonstrated substantial rehabilitation through
personal-development courses. But in his motion and on appeal, Floyd cites post-
sentencing changes and his health risks from the COVID-19 pandemic. Because Floyd
never asked the Bureau of Prisons to move for his release on these grounds, he did not
properly exhaust his remedies. United States v. Williams, 987 F.3d 700, 703–04 (7th Cir.
2021). Affirming on that ground is appropriate because the government argued the
issue in the district court and on appeal (albeit in footnotes), and the facts about
exhaustion are not in dispute. United States v. Sandford, 986 F.3d 779, 782 (7th Cir. 2021).
AFFIRMED

-- 3 of 3 --