William R. Shaw v. ROBERT T. McQUEENEY

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted February 3, 2023*
Decided February 6, 2023
Before
ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge
AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge
THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge
No. 22-1025
WILLIAM R. SHAW,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
ROBERT T. McQUEENEY,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of
Wisconsin.
No. 20-C-483
William C. Griesbach,
Judge.
* We have agreed to decide this case without oral argument because the briefs
and record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would
not aid the court. See FED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 22-1025 Page 2
O R D E R
William Shaw, a Wisconsin state prisoner, appeals from the district court’s
summary judgment against him in this suit asserting Fourteenth Amendment claims
arising from his medical treatment as a pretrial detainee. We affirm.
While in custody at the Milwaukee County Jail as a pretrial detainee, Shaw had
been receiving an antidepressant, three tablets of Effexor/Venlafaxine 75mg, every
morning. Five months after being prescribed the antidepressant, prison psychiatrist
Robert McQueeney—out of concern for Shaw’s blood pressure and family medical
history—changed Shaw’s prescription to one tablet, three times daily.
Three months later, Shaw complained of chest pain and told a nurse that he had
not received his morning’s dose of medication. A nurse told him she would follow up
with his mental-health providers. Shaw also did not receive his afternoon dose. Around
3:20 that afternoon, Shaw fell down some stairs and hurt his shoulder, neck, and back.
He said that he felt dizzy, more so than earlier in the day. Soon thereafter, around 3:30,
a nurse practitioner gave him his afternoon dose. He received his evening dose at
7:00 p.m. and his regularly scheduled doses thereafter.
Shaw sued McQueeney on a Fourteenth Amendment claim that the psychiatrist
abruptly canceled his prescription, causing him to become dizzy and lightheaded, and
then fall down the stairs. The district court granted McQueeney’s motion for summary
judgment, concluding that no reasonable jury could find that the psychiatrist had
canceled Shaw’s prescription. The court later denied Shaw’s motion for reconsideration.
On appeal, Shaw argues that he offered enough evidence to survive summary
judgment. He points to declarations from himself and two fellow prisoners, stating that
each was a pretrial detainee who received psychiatric medications that were abruptly
discontinued without notice by their psychiatrists.
We review medical-care claims brought by pretrial detainees under the
Fourteenth Amendment, subject only to the objective unreasonableness inquiry
identified in Kingsley v. Hendrickson, 576 U.S. 389 (2015). Miranda v. Cnty. of Lake,
900 F.3d 335, 352 (7th Cir. 2018); see McCann v. Ogle Cnty., 909 F.3d 881, 887 (7th Cir.
2018). The record here would not allow a reasonable jury to conclude that McQueeney
discontinued Shaw’s medication or provided care to Shaw that in any way was
unreasonable under the Fourteenth Amendment. As the district court explained,
McQueeney denied that he canceled Shaw’s prescription at the time in question, and

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No. 22-1025 Page 3
the medical records support this characterization. With regard to the prisoners’
declarations, none of these mentions McQueeney or explains why the medications were
abruptly discontinued. As such, the declarations are merely speculative, and
speculation cannot preclude summary judgment. See Weaver v. Champion Petfoods USA
Inc., 3 F.4th 927, 934 (7th Cir. 2021); see also F ED. R. C IV. P. 56(c)(4).
Shaw next challenges two of the district court’s rulings denying his pretrial
motions. First, he contests the court’s decision not to hold in contempt two non-parties
(the medical contractor WellPath and its regional medical director) after they did not
respond to his subpoenas for medical records. The district court denied this motion
because Shaw could have obtained these records—without subpoenaing these parties—
simply by following the jail’s procedures for obtaining medical records. Under these
circumstances, the court’s ruling was an appropriate exercise of discretion.
Second, Shaw argues that the court wrongly denied his request to extend the
discovery deadline by four months, which he said he needed to review 3,000 pages of
medical records from the Jail in order to ascertain that the discovery responses he
received were “complete.” The court, in denying the request, determined that Shaw
had “more than enough” time to serve his discovery requests. Because the court’s time
limits were reasonable and Shaw already had been granted two prior extensions, there
was no abuse of discretion. See Kuttner v. Zaruba, 819 F.3d 970, 974 (7th Cir. 2016).
Lastly, Shaw asserts that the district judge—“arbitrarily, secretly and without the
knowledge of any of the parties”—improperly transferred venue and jurisdiction from
the Milwaukee division to the Green Bay division. This charge is baseless. The Eastern
District of Wisconsin is the judicial district where Shaw resides and where the events
giving rise to the claim occurred, 28 U.S.C. § 1391(b), and cases from that district may be
heard in either Milwaukee or Green Bay. From the litigation’s outset, this suit had been
heard in the Green Bay Division of the Eastern District, and Shaw has identified no
reason why this was improper.
The district court warned Shaw about his cumulative and repetitive motions, and we
repeat that warning. If Shaw persists in filing frivolous claims or appeals, he risks sanctions
from this court. See Support Sys. Int’l, Inc. v. Mack, 45 F.3d 185 (7th Cir. 1995).
AFFIRMED

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