United States of America v. Kory C. Murphy

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. A PP. P. 32.1
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted February 14, 2023
Decided February 16, 2023
Before
DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judge
MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge
CANDACE JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit Judge
No. 22-1552
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
KORY C. MURPHY,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of
Wisconsin.
No. 14-CR-224
William C. Griesbach,
Judge.
O R D E R
Kory Murphy appeals the 20-month prison sentence imposed upon the
revocation of her supervised release. Her lawyer, however, moves to withdraw from
the appeal, arguing that it is frivolous. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). We
grant the motion to withdraw and dismiss the appeal.
Murphy pleaded guilty, under a plea agreement, to receipt of child pornography,
18 U.S.C. § 2252A(a)(2), and was sentenced to 30 months’ imprisonment followed by
7 years’ supervised release. Three years after completing her prison sentence, Murphy

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violated the terms of her supervised release when she consumed cannabis, left the
judicial district, and failed to register an alias. The district court modified the conditions
of her release to include four months of electronic monitoring.
As part of the probation office’s investigation into her supervised release
violations, Murphy surrendered her laptop and cellphone. More than a year later,
approximately 150 images of child pornography were identified on her computer. The
probation office then petitioned for revocation of Murphy’s supervised release.
At a revocation hearing, the court sentenced Murphy to 20 months’
imprisonment and 5 years’ supervised release. The parties had jointly recommended a
sentencing range of 18–24 months—above the 12–18 month range suggested by the
policy statements in Chapter Seven of the Sentencing Guidelines—in exchange for the
government’s not charging Murphy with a new federal offense.
A defendant does not have an unqualified constitutional right to counsel in
revocation proceedings. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790–91 (1973). Although
we are not obligated to apply the Anders safeguards, our practice is to apply them.
See United States v. Wheeler, 814 F.3d 856, 857 (7th Cir. 2016). Counsel’s brief explains the
nature of the case and addresses the potential issues that an appeal like this might be
expected to involve. Because the analysis appears thorough and Murphy has not
responded to counsel’s motion, see C IR . R. 51(b), we limit our review to the issues
counsel discusses. See United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014).
As for the motion to withdraw, counsel does not tell us, as she should have done,
whether Murphy wants to challenge the revocation of her supervised release.
See Wheeler, 814 F.3d at 857. But any such challenge would be frivolous because the
hearing transcript reflects that Murphy knowingly and voluntarily admitted violating
conditions of her release. See United States v. Wheaton, 610 F.3d 389, 390 (7th Cir. 2010).
Counsel does consider whether there were any procedural defects in the
revocation hearing and correctly concludes there were not. Murphy received the
revocation petition as well as the evidence against her. She was represented by counsel
at the hearing, and she had the opportunity to make a statement and present mitigating
arguments. See FED. R. C RIM. P. 32.1(b)(2); United States v. LeBlanc, 175 F.3d 511, 517
(7th Cir. 1999). Counsel notes that Murphy was not expressly advised of the statutory
sentencing range, but any error is harmless and did not affect her substantial rights

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No. 22-1552 Page 3
because the information was set forth in the probation report and the sentence was
below the statutory maximum. See Wheeler, 814 F.3d at 858.
Counsel next considers whether Murphy could plausibly challenge the
calculation of her guidelines range, and properly concludes that she could not. Murphy
did not object to the district court’s calculation, so our review would be for plain error.
See id. at 857. The court correctly ruled that Murphy committed a Grade A violation and
that the applicable policy-statement range for the violation—based on Murphy’s
undisputed category I criminal history at the time of her original sentencing—was 12–
18 months in prison. See U.S.S.G. §§ 7B1.1(a)(1), 7B1.4(a); United States v. Brown,
823 F.3d 392, 394 (7th Cir. 2016).
Counsel also considers but rightly rejects a challenge to the reasonableness of the
20-month prison term. As required, the district court took into account the pertinent
statutory factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), including the seriousness of the offenses
(characterizing Murphy’s recidivism and concealment as a “serious breach of the court’s
trust”) and the need to protect the public and deter Murphy from further criminal acts
(highlighting the repetitive pattern of her behavior, her ongoing dishonesty, and her
lack of candor throughout the investigation). Under these circumstances, we would not
regard the new prison term to be plainly unreasonable. See United States v. Raney,
842 F.3d 1041, 1043 (7th Cir. 2016).
Therefore, we GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.

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