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22-1610•United States of America v. Torrence Larry
22-1610Court of Appeals for the Seventh CircuitFeb 21, 2023
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Argued February 15, 2023
Decided February 21, 2023
Before
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK , Circuit Judge
D IANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judge
J OHN Z. LEE , Circuit Judge
No. 22-1610
U NITED STATES OF A MERICA ,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
T ORRENCE LARRY,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States
District Court for the North-
ern District of Indiana, Fort
Wayne Division.
No. 1:17CR40-001
Holly A. Brady, Judge.
Order
Torrence Larry was convicted of six crimes and sentenced to a total of 420 months’
imprisonment. This appeal contests only two of these convictions: Count 4 (possession
with intent to distribute less than 500 grams of cocaine and more than 5 grams of meth-
amphetamine) and Count 5 (possession of a firearm in furtherance of distributing the
drugs charged in Count 4). The sentence on Count 4 runs concurrently with the sen-
tences on Counts 1, 2, 3, and 6, three of which concern drug distribution and one of
which concerns possession of a firearm by a felon. Given the convictions on Counts 1, 2,
and 3, it would be hard to see the point of contesting Count 4—except for the fact that
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No. 22-1610 Page 2
the “furtherance” charge in Count 5 is linked with the intent-to-distribute charge in
Count 4, and the sentence on Count 5 is 300 months, consecutive to the 120-month sen-
tences on the other five convictions. Larry’s objective is to get rid of that 300-month sen-
tence, either directly or through a challenge to Count 4.
The sole argument levied against either Count 4 or Count 5 is insufficiency of the ev-
idence. That’s an uphill task, given the standard of appellate review. We ask whether a
rational jury could have found guilt beyond a reasonable doubt, not how we would
have voted were we on the jury. And it is easy to see how a rational jury could have
convicted Larry on Counts 4 and 5.
A search of his residence, from which he had repeatedly sold drugs to an informant,
turned up a nightstand that contained (among other things) 8 grams of cocaine (4 of
crack and 4 of powder), 10 grams of methamphetamine, and a stolen Glock pistol, plus
a loaded magazine that fit the pistol. Larry argued at trial that the drugs were for his
personal use. That’s possible, but evidence at trial showed that the normal user quantity
of cocaine is about 0.2 grams, and the normal user dose of meth between 0.3 and 0.5
grams. Scales, baggies, and similar items used in distribution were present. And Larry
as much as admitted that the drugs were for distribution. In a conversation recorded
while Larry was in jail, a woman urged him to argue that the drugs were for personal
use: “if everything was less than a gram, I mean, you could say that it was like personal
use”. To which Larry replied: “Yeah but that—the stuff that was laying there was like
ten and ten. Ten grams. Ten grams. That’s the thing.” Indeed so; the jury could draw the
same conclusion that Larry did about the significance of the quantity, found in a setting
that included paraphernalia associated with distribution.
As for the gun: The presence of the Glock reinforces the impression that Larry in-
tended to distribute rather than consume the drugs. And the close proximity of the gun
to the drugs supports an inference that Larry possessed the firearm in furtherance of
distribution by having it available to protect his inventory (and himself) from predatory
customers or stash-house robbers. We remarked in United States v. Stevens, 380 F.3d
1021, 1027 (7th Cir. 2004), that when drugs and guns are found in the same place it is
“nearly an inescapable conclusion” that one is in furtherance of the other—especially so,
United States v. Perryman, 20 F.4th 1127, 1134 (7th Cir. 2021), adds, when the gun is sto-
len and cannot be justified as a lawful tool of self-defense. Larry, as a felon, was not en-
titled to possess any gun, let alone a stolen one. The jury was entitled to infer that Larry
possessed the Glock in furtherance of his distribution business.
A FFIRMED
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