Darlene Barnes-Annabi v. IRIS Y. MARTINEZ, Clerk of the Circuit Court of Cook County

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted February 22, 2023*
Decided February 23, 2023
Before
DIANE S. SYKES, Chief Judge
DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge
JOHN Z. LEE, Circuit Judge
No. 22-1414
DARLENE BARNES-ANNABI,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
IRIS Y. MARTINEZ, Clerk of the Circuit
Court of Cook County,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois,
Eastern Division.
No. 21 C 1674
Gary Feinerman,
Judge.
O R D E R
Darlene Barnes-Annabi sued Iris Martinez in her official capacity as Clerk of the
Circuit Court of Cook County, asserting that the Clerk’s Office violated various federal
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
the record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would
not significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 22-1414 Page 2
laws when employing Barnes-Annabi and ultimately firing her. The district judge
dismissed her complaint, concluding that either sovereign immunity or claim
preclusion barred her claims. Because Barnes-Annabi does not develop any arguments
contesting that decision, we dismiss the appeal.
Barnes-Annabi worked for the Clerk’s Office from 2010 to 2012. Between late
2011 and early 2012, Barnes-Annabi was demoted, fired, rehired, and fired again. Four
lawsuits followed. First, in 2014, Barnes-Annabi filed two actions in the Northern
District of Illinois alleging that the Clerk’s Office discriminated against her (by
demoting, underpaying, harassing, and firing her) based on race, color, national origin,
religion, alleged disability, and sex. The complaints were consolidated into one case (14-
cv-3100, “Barnes II”), which was later dismissed with prejudice for want of prosecution.
In 2015, Barnes-Annabi filed another lawsuit against the Clerk’s Office (15-cv-
9451, “Barnes III”), this time alleging that the Clerk discriminated against her (by paying
her less and perpetrating harassment) on the basis of her national origin and ancestry,
religion, disability, marital status, and status as the grantee of a domestic-violence order
of protection. That case was later dismissed on the ground of claim preclusion.
Barnes-Annabi filed this lawsuit in 2021, asserting that, during her employment,
she was harassed, demoted, and ultimately fired in 2012 because she was related to
then-Clerk Dorothy Brown’s campaign manager, because she had mental disabilities
(depression, insomnia, and anxiety), and because she had filed a discrimination claim
with the Illinois Department of Human Rights. In her pro se complaint, she invoked as
grounds for relief the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101; the
Rehabilitation Act, 29 U.S.C. § 791; Title VII, 42 U.S.C. § 2000e; and 42 U.S.C. §§ 1981,
1983. Barnes-Annabi included with her complaint a new right-to-sue letter from the
Equal Employment Opportunity Commission regarding her claim of discrimination
based on mental disabilities. The defendants moved to dismiss the complaint.
After a hearing, the district judge orally dismissed Barnes-Annabi’s suit. He first
ruled that sovereign immunity barred the official-capacity claims under § 1981 and
§ 1983 because the clerk is a state official. He next determined that Barnes-Annabi’s
discrimination claim based on her relation to Dorothy Brown’s campaign manager
appeared to be precluded but noted that the defendants had not raised that affirmative
defense. He thus dismissed the claim based on sovereign immunity and statute of
limitations grounds. Finally, the judge concluded that claim preclusion barred all
remaining claims because they arose from the same facts as those in Barnes II & Barnes
III. Barnes-Annabi appeals.

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No. 22-1414 Page 3
To the extent that Barnes-Annabi contends that the recent right-to-sue letter
pertaining to disability discrimination renewed her right to bring the claim, the
argument is meritless. The requirement to exhaust administrative remedies is irrelevant
to claim preclusion, the primary reason for the dismissal. Barnes-Annabi claimed
disability discrimination in every prior suit against the Clerk’s Office, and exhausting
her administrative remedies after the fact does not create another chance to do so.
See Barr v. Board of Trustees of Western Illinois University, 796 F.3d 837, 840 (7th Cir. 2015).
Otherwise, Barnes-Annabi does not provide any argument for vacating the
dismissal, see F ED. R. A PP . P. 28(a)(8), so we must dismiss this appeal. See Anderson v.
Hardman, 241 F.3d 544, 545–46 (7th Cir. 2001). Her brief discusses other orders in the
case and refers to general pleading standards, but she does not mention statutes of
limitations, sovereign immunity, or claim preclusion, let alone argue why they do not
apply to her claims. We construe pro se arguments liberally, but we cannot glean any
ground for reversal when the appellant does not engage with the district judge’s ruling
or develop any arguments. See id.; Shipley v. Chicago Board of Election Commissioners,
947 F.3d 1056, 1062–63 (7th Cir. 2020).
DISMISSED

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