Miguel Ruiz v. Anthony Wills

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Argued January 24, 2023
Decided February 27, 2023
Before
DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge
THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge
CANDACE JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit Judge
No. 20-3528
MIGUEL RUIZ,
Petitioner-Appellant,
v.
ANTHONY WILLS,
Respondent-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois,
Eastern Division.
No. 18 C 4429
Jorge L. Alonso,
Judge.
O R D E R
Before questioning Miguel Ruiz about a fatal shooting, detectives told him that
he had a right to silence, a right to an attorney, and, more specifically, a right to have
that attorney present “during” questioning. Because Ruiz’s warning did not expressly
state that his consultation with a lawyer could start “before” (not just “during”)
questioning, he seeks a writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(a). But no Supreme
Court precedent clearly establishes that detectives were required to use words like
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

-- 1 of 5 --

No. 20-3528 Page 2
“before” or “prior to,” and the state appellate court’s rejection of Ruiz’s theory is not an
unreasonable application of Miranda v. Arizona, 384 U.S. 436 (1966). We therefore affirm
the district court’s denial of habeas relief. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d).
An Illinois jury convicted Ruiz of first-degree murder and aggravated discharge
of a firearm, for which he was sentenced to 45 years’ imprisonment, though he was not
himself the shooter. Ruiz drove a truck whose passenger shot and killed a man; then,
after a car chase, the passenger was killed in a shootout with police. At trial there was
no dispute that Ruiz was the driver. His liability thus hinged on his confession to
detectives, during two custodial interviews over several hours, that he and the
passenger had set out with the express intent “to shoot somebody” from a rival gang.
At the start of both interviews, detectives relied on their memory of Miranda to
warn Ruiz of his constitutional rights. At the first interview, a detective reminded Ruiz
of his right to silence and confirmed that Ruiz understood he had “a right to an
attorney” and, specifically, to have an attorney present “during questioning.” At the
second interview several hours later, another detective again confirmed that Ruiz
understood he had a “right to an attorney,” though without specifying any timeframe
for exercising the right.
Before trial and on direct appeal, Ruiz unsuccessfully argued that these warnings
were inadequate under Miranda because they did not specify that he could consult with
counsel before questioning. In his view, a suspect might take these warnings to mean he
must start answering questions before counsel may speak with him.
But the Illinois Appellate Court rejected that argument, citing state-court rulings
that a simple reference to the right to counsel sufficiently implies that the right begins
before questioning and remains throughout the interrogation, even if no timeframe is
spelled out. See People v. Martinez, 867 N.E.2d 24, 28 (Ill. App. Ct. 2007); People v. Walton,
556 N.E.2d 892, 894 (Ill. App. Ct. 1990). The Illinois Supreme Court denied discretionary
review. People v. Ruiz, 93 N.E.3d 1067 (Ill. 2017) (table).
Ruiz then sought a federal writ of habeas corpus under 28 U.S.C. § 2254, again
contending that Miranda requires police to specify that any consultation with a lawyer
may begin “before” the first question. But the district court denied the petition,
concluding that the state court’s pragmatic reading of Miranda was neither contrary to
nor an unreasonable application of federal law as clearly established by the Supreme
Court. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1).

-- 2 of 5 --

No. 20-3528 Page 3
The district court was correct. Ruiz’s view is that telling a suspect that his right to
counsel will apply “during” questioning leaves him uncertain whether he must start
answering questions in order to obtain counsel at all. But under 28 U.S.C. § 2254(d)(1), it
would not be enough for Ruiz to convince us that his view is, on balance, correct.
Instead he must show that the state court’s contrary reading of Miranda is not even
reasonable. Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 103 (2011) (state-court view must be wrong
“beyond any possibility for fairminded disagreement”). He has not done so.
To start, no Supreme Court case directly addresses Ruiz’s narrow problem:
warnings that specify a right to counsel “during” questioning but do not expressly state
that the right may be exercised “before” or “prior to” detectives’ first question. (Ruiz
takes his two interviews and warnings together, rather than arguing that the
suppression inquiry for one differs from the other, and so we do not parse them
separately.) Still, Ruiz insists that the wording of Miranda itself mandates that the
warning must specify the times during which counsel may be consulted: “the need for
counsel to protect the Fifth Amendment privilege comprehends not merely a right to
consult with counsel prior to questioning, but also to have counsel present during any
questioning if the defendant so desires.” 384 U.S. at 470.
Yet at other points Miranda formulates its holding differently, focusing only on
the right to counsel “during” questioning. Just one page later, for instance, there is this
summary: “an individual held for interrogation must be clearly informed that he has
the right to consult with a lawyer and to have the lawyer with him during interrogation
under the system for protecting the privilege we delineate today.” Id. at 471. The first
warning given to Ruiz—“Do you understand that you have a right to an attorney and
have an attorney present during questioning?”—mirrors this part of Miranda.
Later Supreme Court interpretations of Miranda further undercut Ruiz’s strict
reading. Indeed, the Court has repeatedly reversed grants of relief when lower courts
insisted on unduly expansive readings of Miranda. In California v. Prysock, for example,
the suspect was initially told that the right to an attorney applied both before and
during questioning. 453 U.S. 355, 356 (1981). But he also was told that an attorney could
be appointed at public expense, which the California courts worried could confuse a
suspect into thinking that only a privately funded lawyer could attend the interview,
with appointed counsel becoming available only later, as trial approached. Id. at 357–59.
But the Supreme Court reversed that decision as unrealistic: a reasonable suspect would

-- 3 of 5 --

No. 20-3528 Page 4
understand the warning to mean that a lawyer could be appointed before any
questioning. Id. at 360–61.
Later, in Duckworth v. Eagan, the Supreme Court reversed a Seventh Circuit
decision along similar lines. 492 U.S. 195, 205 (1989). The warning in Eagan began by
mentioning the right to appointed counsel before and during questioning but added
this proviso: “We have no way of giving you a lawyer, but one will be appointed for
you, if you wish, if and when you go to court.” Id. at 198. The Seventh Circuit granted
relief, opining that this wording suggested that counsel could not be appointed until a
first court appearance (i.e., sometime after a police interview). Id. at 200. But the
Supreme Court reversed, again reasoning that the warnings, taken together and in
context, conveyed the core right to appointed counsel before and during questioning. Id.
at 200–01.
Most recently, in Florida v. Powell, the justices reversed the Florida Supreme
Court’s grant of relief where the warning did not expressly cite a right to counsel during
questioning; instead, the warning mentioned a right to consult counsel “before”
questioning but then added that all relevant “rights” could be exercised at “any time.”
559 U.S. 50, 54 (2010). Again, the Supreme Court inferred that this was sufficient for a
reasonable suspect. “In combination, the two warnings reasonably conveyed Powell’s
right to have an attorney present . . . at all times.” Id. at 62.
Ruiz objects that he, unlike Powell, was not told his rights could be exercised at
“any time.” Even so, he was told that he could have counsel “during” the interrogation,
and Powell assumes that suspects will not adopt “unlikely” and “counterintuitive”
readings of the warnings they hear. Id. at 62. Yet Ruiz’s argument imagines just such a
scenario: a suspect who thinks that although he may consult a lawyer during
questioning, he cannot consult the lawyer until at least some questioning has taken
place. Reasonable jurists may take that scenario as unlikely. So, even though Powell’s “at
any time” language is absent here, we cannot say the state court’s reading of Powell and
similar cases is unreasonable under § 2254(d)(1).
Next, Ruiz asserts that the facts that led to relief in Miranda are
“indistinguishable” from his facts. But that is incorrect. The cases reviewed in Miranda,
unlike here, involved interrogations with no warning about the right to counsel at all, or
else warnings delivered only partway through a lengthy set of interrogations. 384 U.S.
at 484, 491, 496. The problem there was the absence of timely warnings, not the wording
of warnings actually given.

-- 4 of 5 --

No. 20-3528 Page 5
Finally, Ruiz cites Texas v. Cobb, a case about the scope of the Sixth Amendment
right to counsel, for its fleeting reference to the need to “apprise[]” suspects of the right
“to consult with an attorney before authorities may conduct custodial interrogation.”
532 U.S. 162, 171 (2001). But this language is not focused on the wording of the Miranda
warnings and, in context, merely serves as a reminder that Miranda warnings must
come “before” interrogation.
In sum, then, the state court’s determination that the warnings here adequately
conveyed Ruiz’s rights does not fall outside the bounds of reasonable disagreement.
See Richter, 562 U.S. at 103. We therefore defer to the state court’s conclusion that Ruiz’s
Miranda warnings were adequate. See Dunn v. Reeves, 141 S. Ct. 2405, 2407 (2021).
AFFIRMED

-- 5 of 5 --