United States of America v. Lamar C. Chapman, Iii

NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted March 2, 2023*
Decided March 6, 2023
Before
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge
DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judge
JOHN Z. LEE, Circuit Judge
No. 22-3259
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
LAMAR C. CHAPMAN, III,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United
States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois,
Eastern Division.
Nos. 09 CR 741 & 10 CR 642
Elaine E. Bucklo,
Judge.
O R D E R
Lamar Chapman has been convicted of financial crimes. His most recent convic-
tion and sentence were affirmed by United States v. Thomas, 763 F.3d 689 (7th Cir. 2014).
After his release from prison, he asked the district court to terminate his three-year term
of supervised release. The judge declined, observing that Chapman’s long-term pattern
of criminality—including crimes committed while on pretrial release and supervised re-
lease from earlier sentences—implies a substantial risk of recidivism. The judge added
* After examining the briefs and the record, we have concluded that oral argument is unnecessary. See
Fed. R. App. P. 34(a); Cir. R. 34(f).

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No. 22-3259 Page 2
that Chapman, far from expressing remorse, continues to insist that he did nothing
wrong, which implies that Chapman feels free to resume his criminal conduct.
Appellate review of a district judge’s decision not to terminate supervised release
is deferential, United States v. Lowe, 632 F.3d 996, 997 (7th Cir. 2011), and we do not see
any abuse of discretion by the district judge. Indeed, Chapman does not try to show an
abuse. Instead his appellate brief, laden with invective, maintains that the federal judici-
ary persecutes people (like himself) who have done nothing wrong. He accuses of mis-
conduct in office (indeed, of crimes) almost everyone who has had anything to do with
his prosecutions and convictions. Chapman’s brief demonstrates that the district court
was right to label him recalcitrant and unrepentant.
Chapman’s further contention that the district judge should have disqualified
herself is mistaken. Adverse rulings, based on the record of the case, do not demon-
strate bias. See Liteky v. United States, 510 U.S. 540 (1994). Nothing calls Judge Bucklo’s
performance into question.
AFFIRMED

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