United States of America v. Kevin L. Adams

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted March 9, 2023*
Decided March 10, 2023
Before
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge
MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge
AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge
No. 22-2906
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
KEVIN L. ADAMS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Central District of Illinois.
No. 3:10-cr-30086-SEM-KLM-1
Sue E. Myerscough,
Judge.
O R D E R
Kevin Adams, who has served more than half of his 20-year prison sentence for
distributing crack cocaine, appeals the denial of his motion for resentencing under
§ 404(b) of the First Step Act or, alternatively, for compassionate release under 18 U.S.C.
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 22-2906 Page 2
§ 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). He argues primarily that a change in the law under which he was
sentenced provides an extraordinary and compelling reason for his release. We affirm.
Adams pleaded guilty in 2011 to three counts of distributing and possessing with
intent to distribute crack cocaine. See 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(B), (b)(1)(C). Because of
his prior convictions for felony drug offenses, the maximum penalty on Count 1
increased from 20 to 30 years, and the statutory-penalty ranges on Counts 2 and 3
increased from 5-to-40 years to 10-years-to-life. See id. § 841(b)(1)(B), (b)(1)(C). The court
sentenced Adams to 240 months in prison, followed by concurrent 6 and 8-year terms of
supervised release. This was below the guideline sentencing range of 324 to 405 months.
In mid-2022, Adams filed his third motion for a sentence reduction. (The district
court previously denied similar motions in 2016 and 2020.) This time, Adams relied on
an amendment to § 841(b) in the First Step Act of 2018 that retroactively applied the
lower penalties enacted in the Fair Sentencing Act, Pub. L. No. 111-220, 124 Stat. 2372
(2010), to defendants who committed covered offenses before August 2010. See Pub. L.
No. 115-391, § 404, 132 Stat. 5194 (2018). If he were sentenced under the amendment, he
urged, he no longer would face the 10-year statutory minimum on Counts 2 and 3.
Alternatively, Adams argued that his request could be construed as a compassionate-
release motion under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c), and that the non-retroactive changes to
§ 841(b) in the First Step Act constituted an extraordinary and compelling reason for a
sentence reduction.
The district court denied Adams’s motion. The court first concluded that § 404 of
the First Step Act did not apply to Adams’s offense. The conviction was not a “covered
offense” under § 404(b) of the First Step Act, the court found, because Adams had
committed the offenses after August 3, 2010, and had been charged and sentenced
under the Fair Sentencing Act. Next, construing Adams’s motion alternatively as a
request for compassionate release, the court found relief unwarranted because non-
retroactive sentencing changes—without more—cannot establish an extraordinary and
compelling reason for release under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). See United States v. Thacker,
4 F.4th 569, 576 (7th Cir. 2021); United States v. King, 40 F.4th 594, 595 (7th Cir. 2022).
On appeal, Adams argues only that he qualifies for compassionate release under
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). He argues that our precedent regarding non-retroactive
sentencing changes and § 3582(c)(1)(A) was overruled by the Supreme Court’s holding
in Concepcion v. United States, 142 S. Ct. 2389, 2404 (2022). Concepcion held that “the First

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No. 22-2906 Page 3
Step Act allows district courts to consider intervening changes of law or fact in
exercising their discretion to reduce a sentence pursuant to the First Step Act.” Id.
In other published decisions, we have rejected Adams’s argument that anything
in Concepcion called into question our understanding that non-retroactive sentencing
changes alone—including the changes to § 841(b)—cannot establish an extraordinary
and compelling reason for release under § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). See King, 40 F.4th at 595;
United States v. Von Vader, 58 F.4th 369, 371 (7th Cir. 2023). Our discretion is confined by
the limits set by Congress, and we decline to interpret § 3582(c)(1)(A) inconsistently
with Congress’s decision to make its amendments to § 841(b) apply only prospectively.
See United States v. Peoples, 41 F.4th 837, 842 (7th Cir. 2022). “We take the Supreme Court
at its word that Concepcion is about the matters that district judges may consider when
they resentence defendants. … [and not] the threshold question whether any given
person has established an ‘extraordinary and compelling’ reason for release.” King,
40 F.4th at 596. The district court thus appropriately applied Thacker in concluding that
the non-retroactive changes to § 841(b) do not entitle Adams to compassionate release.
AFFIRMED

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