United States of America v. Eva Buck

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted April 5, 2023 *
Decided April 6, 2023
Before
DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge
AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge
JOHN Z. LEE, Circuit Judge
No. 22-2417
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
EVA BUCK,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Southern District of
Indiana, Evansville Division.
No. 3:15-cr-5-RLY-CMM-05
Richard L. Young,
Judge.
O R D E R
Eva Buck, who is currently serving a 240-month sentence in federal prison,
appeals the denial of her third motion for relief under 18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). She
primarily argued that she would receive a shorter sentence if sentenced today because
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. FED. R. A PP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. A PP. P. 32.1

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No. 22-2417 Page 2
of non-retroactive changes to Indiana and federal law. The district court determined
that Buck did not establish an extraordinary or compelling reason for a sentence
reduction. We affirm.
In 2016, Buck pleaded guilty to conspiring to possess with the intent to distribute
and to distribute 500 grams or more of methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846,
and was sentenced to 240 months in prison, the statutory minimum at the time.
See 21 U.S.C. § 841(b) (2016).
In July 2022, Buck filed her most recent motion for a sentence reduction under
18 U.S.C. § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). (The district court previously had denied her requests for
compassionate release and a sentence reduction under the First Step Act.) In this
motion, Buck invoked Concepcion v. United States, 142 S. Ct. 2389, 2404 (2022), which
held that “the First Step Act allows district courts to consider intervening changes of
law or fact in exercising their discretion to reduce a sentence pursuant to the First Step
Act.” Buck argued that developments in Indiana law and a non-retroactive statutory
change to § 841(b) no longer would subject her to the statutory minimum 240-month
sentence. She also highlighted disparities among districts across the country in how
compassionate-release motions were decided, as well as her own efforts at
rehabilitation, including her training to become a nursing assistant and her good
conduct in prison.
The district court denied Buck’s motion. The court explained that non-retroactive
changes to sentencing statutory minimums, perceived disparities, and rehabilitation
were not extraordinary and compelling reasons for compassionate release, either before
or after Concepcion.
On appeal, Buck maintains that Concepcion allowed the district court to reduce
her sentence and insists that she presented extraordinary and compelling reasons for
release. But we have rejected arguments that Concepcion called into question our
understanding that non-retroactive sentencing changes alone—including the changes to
§ 841(b)—cannot establish an extraordinary or compelling reason for release under
§ 3582(c)(1)(A)(i). United States v. King, 40 F.4th 594, 596 (7th Cir. 2022); United States v.
Von Vader, 58 F.4th 369, 371 (7th Cir. 2023). Our discretion is confined by the limits set
by Congress, and we decline to interpret § 3582(c)(1)(A)(i) inconsistently with
Congress’s decision to make its amendments to § 841(b) apply only prospectively.
See United States v. Peoples, 41 F.4th 837, 842 (7th Cir. 2022). Concepcion concerned the
factors a court may consider when resentencing but not “the threshold question
whether any given prisoner has established an ‘extraordinary and compelling’ reason

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No. 22-2417 Page 3
for release.” King, 40 F.4th at 596. The district court rightly determined that a non-
retroactive change to the statutory minimum applicable to Buck’s offense did not
support release.
Buck’s other arguments for release fare no better. She maintains, for instance,
that the denial of her motion illustrates the wide disparities across the country in the
number of defendants who get released. But we have acknowledged the differing
rulings among courts on such matters and reiterate that the proper analysis when
evaluating a motion for compassionate release involves two steps: first, whether the
defendant presents an extraordinary and compelling reason for release, and second,
whether release would be consistent with the factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). See, e.g.,
United States v. Thacker, 4 F.4th 569, 573, 575 (7th Cir. 2021). Because Buck fell short at
the first step, the court did not need to address the second. See United States v. Ugbah,
4 F.4th 595, 598 (7th Cir. 2021). Buck also relies on her rehabilitative efforts, but
rehabilitation is not a stand-alone ground for relief. Peoples, 41 F.4th at 842.
AFFIRMED

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