Joshua Lee Hoskins v. Nathan Chapman

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted April 28, 2023 *
Decided May 5, 2023
Before
MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge
MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge
AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge
No. 22-1847
JOSHUA LEE HOSKINS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
NATHAN CHAPMAN,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Illinois.
No. 3:20-cv-00508-GCS
Gilbert C. Sison,
Magistrate Judge.
O R D E R
Joshua Hoskins, an Illinois prisoner, sued a prison dentist, alleging that the
dentist was deliberately indifferent to a serious medical need and retaliated against him
for filing grievances. A magistrate judge, sitting by consent, see 28 U.S.C. § 636(c),
granted the dentist’s motion for summary judgment. Reviewing the facts properly
before us in Hoskins’s favor, we affirm.
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. FED. R. A PP. P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. A PP. P. 32.1

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No. 22-1847 Page 2
This suit addresses the dental treatment that Hoskins sought between June 2019
and June 2020. When Hoskins arrived at Illinois’s Pinckneyville Correctional Center in
June 2019, he had an unfilled cavity and was placed on the “fill list.” Within a month of
arriving at Pinckneyville, Hoskins began to complain (including through a grievance)
about unresolved dental pain. Then, in September, he saw the prison’s dentist,
Dr. Nathan Chapman, about a blow to his face. Dr. Chapman ordered an X-ray, gave
him a mouth guard, and saw him again a few weeks later for a follow-up appointment.
About a month later, Dr. Chapman filled the cavity, identified a new cavity, and placed
Hoskins on the fill list for that new cavity. When, about four months later (around
March 2020, the onset of the COVID-19 pandemic), that cavity remained unfilled,
Hoskins filed grievances complaining of unresolved dental issues. Dr. Chapman
examined Hoskins and reported no swelling, bleeding, pus, or signs of distress.
Dr. Chapman did not fill the cavity then; at that time, the prison had restrictions on
dental care to reduce the spread of COVID-19. Eventually, that tooth was extracted.
Hoskins sued Dr. Chapman under the Eighth and First Amendments,
see 42 U.S.C. § 1983, and the case ended at summary judgment. He accused the dentist
of deliberate indifference to his serious medical needs and of retaliating for Hoskins’s
grievances by delaying filling his cavities. After Dr. Chapman moved for summary
judgment, the district court gave Hoskins extended opportunities to file materials
supplementing his opposition. Based on the material to which the parties directed its
attention, the district court ruled that no reasonable jury could find against
Dr. Chapman. It reasoned that the cavities and tooth pain were not serious and the
treatment did not substantially depart from accepted medical practice; also, because
Hoskins received treatment from Dr. Chapman, no jury could find that the grievances
motivated Dr. Chapman to withhold other treatment. Hoskins filed a flurry of post-
judgment motions, but the court denied them. In addition to rejecting Hoskins’s other
arguments, the court reasoned that Hoskins’s “new” evidence was redundant and
immaterial, and Hoskins did not explain why he failed to cite it earlier.
On appeal, Hoskins principally argues that his deposition testimony, which he
did not submit to the district court and to which he never directed the district court’s
attention, creates factual disputes requiring a trial on both of his claims. In his
deposition, Hoskins asserted that Dr. Chapman said that he (Dr. Chapman) was
delaying treatment for Hoskins “because” of the grievances and was falsifying medical
records to create the appearance that Hoskins did not need faster treatment. This
argument is waived. Hoskins bore the burden of directing the district court to any
evidence supporting his claim. See Packer v. Trs. of Ind. Univ. Sch. of Med., 800 F.3d 843,

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No. 22-1847 Page 3
849 (7th Cir. 2015). Despite receiving extended opportunities to do so, his response to
Dr. Chapman’s motion for summary judgment never alerted the district court to the
portions of his deposition that he now asks us to consider. Even pro se litigants “must
inform the trial judge of the reasons, legal or factual, why summary judgment should
not be entered.” Gruenberg v. Gempeler, 697 F.3d 573, 581 (7th Cir. 2012) (citation
omitted). Once a civil litigant has failed to raise a factual issue with the district court,
the litigant may not belatedly insist that an appellate court consider it. See Packer,
800 F.3d at 849; see also Scheidler v. Indiana, 914 F.3d 535, 540 (7th Cir. 2019) (“A party
generally forfeits issues and arguments raised for the first time on appeal.”).
When reviewing the record properly before the district court, see Packer, 800 F.3d
at 849, we conclude that summary judgment was correct. We begin with Hoskins’s
deliberate-indifference claim. For that claim to go to trial, the record must allow a
reasonable jury to conclude that he faced a substantial risk of harm from a serious
medical condition that Dr. Chapman ignored. See Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 828
(1994). But even if we assume that Hoskins’s dental issues were serious, Hoskins’s
desire to have the cavities filled faster (and the tooth’s later extraction) is not evidence
that Dr. Chapman knew about and ignored a serious risk of harm. See Pyles v. Fahim,
771 F.3d 403, 409 (7th Cir. 2014). Moreover, Dr. Chapman indisputably demonstrated
care for Hoskins by regularly examining him, filling one cavity, diagnosing another,
and placing Hoskins on the fill list (which was interrupted by COVID-inspired
restrictions that were outside of Dr. Chapman’s control). The district court thus
correctly ruled that no reasonable jury could find that Dr. Chapman deliberately
ignored a serious medical risk.
Likewise, Hoskins’s First Amendment claim fails. Hoskins must identify
evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that his complaints were “at
least a motivating factor” in Dr. Chapman’s treatment decisions. See Bridges v. Gilbert,
557 F.3d 541, 546 (7th Cir. 2009). He argues that the district court erroneously reasoned
that, because his grievances did not name Dr. Chapman individually, the dentist could
not be angered by them. But the district court pointed to more than the mere absence of
Dr. Chapman’s name from the grievances. As the district court also rightly explained,
Hoskins received consistent care from the dentist; thus, no reasonable jury could find
that the grievances motivated him to deny care.
Finally, Hoskins argues that the district court erred in denying his post-judgment
motions. In his view, because the evidence he wished to submit was already in the
record, Dr. Chapman would not be prejudiced by its submission. But if the evidence

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No. 22-1847 Page 4
was already in the record, then it was not “newly discovered” and thus could not
satisfy the standard of Rule 60(b)(2) of the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure.
We have considered Hoskins’s other arguments, and none has merit.
AFFIRMED

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