United States of America v. Lawrence O. Daniels

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted May 4, 2023*
Decided May 8, 2023
Before
ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge
JOHN Z. LEE, Circuit Judge
DORIS L. PRYOR, Circuit Judge
No. 22-2066
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
LAWRENCE O. DANIELS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Illinois.
No. 3:08-CR-30185-NJR
Nancy J. Rosenstengel,
Chief Judge.
O R D E R
Lawrence Daniels, who is serving a 370-month prison sentence for multiple
crack-cocaine and firearm-possession offenses, challenges the district court’s denial of
his motion for a sentence reduction under the First Step Act of 2018. We affirm.
* We granted the parties’ joint motion to waive oral argument and have agreed to
decide the case on the briefs and the record. FED. R. A PP . P. 34(f).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 22-2066 Page 2
Daniels was convicted by a jury in 2009 of seven charges: three counts of
distributing cocaine base, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), two counts of possessing with intent to
distribute cocaine and cocaine base, id., one count of unlawfully possessing a firearm as
a felon, 18 U.S.C. §§ 922(g)(1), 924(e)(1), and one count of possessing a firearm during a
drug trafficking crime, id. § 924(c)(1)(A). Daniels already had a lengthy criminal history,
and the court sentenced him as a career offender and an armed career criminal to 370
months’ imprisonment (within the guideline range of 360 months to life) followed by 5
years’ supervised release.
In 2019 Daniels moved, pro se, under § 404 of the First Step Act, Pub. L. No. 115–
391, 132 Stat. 5194 (2018), for a sentence reduction based on his cocaine-base offenses
that, he argued, were covered by the Act and required a shorter sentence. The district
court denied the motion because Daniels was sentenced as an armed career criminal
and, thus, his offense level under the Guidelines did not change.
On appeal, we granted the government’s motion to vacate the judgment and
remand the proceedings. Relying on United States v. Hudson, 967 F.3d 605 (7th Cir. 2020),
we accepted the government’s concession that Daniels was eligible for a discretionary
sentence reduction on all counts because he had been convicted of at least one covered
offense under § 404 of the First Step Act. See No. 19-2506 (7th Cir. Sept. 29, 2020).
In the district court, Daniels, now represented by counsel, amended his motion
for a sentence reduction, reiterating that his three convictions under § 841(b)(1) were
“covered offenses” under § 404(b) of the First Step Act. He also argued that he was
incorrectly sentenced as an armed career criminal, because a recent decision of ours,
United States v. Haney, 840 F.3d 472 (7th Cir. 2016), indicated that his two burglary
convictions, which had been used as predicate offenses under the Armed Career
Criminal Act (“ACCA”), no longer counted as “violent felonies” for purposes of the
enhancement. See 18 U.S.C. § 924(e).
The district court denied Daniels’s motion. The court agreed with Daniels that he
was eligible for a sentence reduction because his cocaine-base offenses were “covered”
under the First Step Act (because they were committed before August 2010 and their
statutory penalties had been modified by the Fair Sentencing Act). But the court pointed
out that the Fair Sentencing Act did not change the guideline range for Daniels’s other
offenses, leaving unaffected his range of 360 months to life, given his status as a career
offender convicted of a § 924(c) offense. See U.S.S.G. §§ 4B1.1(c), 4B1.4(c)(2); 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c)(1)(A), (e). The court then determined that the sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C.

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No. 22-2066 Page 3
§ 3553(a) weighed against any reduction, citing Daniels’s extensive criminal history and
his continued violations in prison, consisting of assault with a serious injury, possessing
a weapon, and fighting with another person.
On appeal, Daniels challenges the district court’s refusal to reduce his sentence
despite acknowledging that some of his charges qualified as covered offenses under the
First Step Act. He argues that the court’s reliance on his criminal background in its
discussion of the sentencing factors amounted to personal bias against him and violated
his right to be free from cruel and unusual punishment.
Motions for reduced sentences under § 404 of the First Step Act are reviewed in
two parts: First, the resentencing court determines whether the defendant is eligible for
relief, and then, if eligible, whether the sentence should be reduced. United States v.
Clay, 50 F.4th 608, 611 (7th Cir. 2022). When deciding whether to reduce the sentence of
an eligible defendant, the court may consider the § 3553(a) sentencing factors, the
current Guidelines, the defendant’s post-sentencing conduct, and other relevant
information about the defendant’s history and conduct. Id. at 612 (citations omitted).
We review this determination for abuse of discretion. United States v. Fowowe, 1 F.4th
522, 526 (7th Cir. 2021).
The district court acted well within its discretion to deny Daniels’s motion. Even
though three of his offenses met the eligibility threshold for relief under the First Step
Act, the court appropriately grounded its ruling in the relevant § 3553(a) factors,
alluding to Daniels’s lengthy criminal history and continued violations in prison.
Contrary to Daniels’s suggestion, it is not cruel and unusual punishment for a
sentencing court to exercise its discretion and conclude that no reduction is warranted,
even if a defendant is otherwise eligible for relief under the First Step Act. Lastly, the
court’s references at sentencing to his criminal history do not reflect bias. See Liteky v.
United States, 510 U.S. 540, 555 (1994). Indeed, nothing in this record calls the court’s
performance into question.
AFFIRMED

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