United States of America v. Marvin Love

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted May 12, 2023
Decided May 15, 2023
Before
MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge
MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge
THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge
No. 22-1997
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
MARVIN LOVE,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Indiana,
Indianapolis Division.
No. 1:20CR00046-001
Tanya Walton Pratt,
Chief Judge.
O R D E R
Marvin Love pleaded guilty to two counts of possession with intent to distribute
controlled substances, 21 U.S.C. § 841(a)(1), one count of being a felon in possession of a
firearm, 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), and one count of carrying a firearm during and in relation
to a drug trafficking crime, id. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i). The district court sentenced him to 240
months’ imprisonment and three years’ supervised release. Love appeals, but his
appointed counsel asserts that the appeal is frivolous and moves to withdraw.
See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738, 744 (1967). Counsel’s brief explains the nature of
the case and addresses the issues that an appeal of this kind might be expected to
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 22-1997 Page 2
involve, and Love did not respond to counsel’s motion. See C IR . R. 51(b). Because
counsel’s analysis appears thorough, we limit our review to the subjects he discusses.
See United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014).
Two-and-a-half months after his release from federal prison on a felony
conviction under 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1), Love was pulled over for a traffic violation. He
gave officers permission to search the car, and they found a handgun in it. A search
incident to arrest revealed drugs on Love’s person. Possessing drugs and a firearm
violated the conditions of Love’s supervised release.
At a combined change-of-plea, revocation, and sentencing hearing, Love
admitted the alleged supervised-release violations and admitted to the four criminal
counts charged in the indictment. The court, accepting the presentence investigation
report prepared by a probation officer, designated Love a career offender because of
two prior robbery convictions, see U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1, calculated a guidelines range of 262
to 327 months, and imposed a sentence of 240 months followed by three years’
supervised release.
Counsel informs us that he consulted with Love and confirmed that Love wishes
to challenge only his sentence, so counsel properly refrains from discussing the validity
of the guilty plea. See United States v. Konczak, 683 F.3d 348, 349 (7th Cir. 2012); United
States v. Knox, 287 F.3d 667, 670–71 (7th Cir. 2002).
Counsel then addresses whether Love could raise nonfrivolous arguments about
his sentence on appeal and rightly concludes that he could not. As counsel notes, the
district court correctly computed a 262 to 327-month guidelines range based on a total
offense level of 29 and a criminal history category of VI. See U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1(b). The
court also properly sentenced Love as a career offender under U.S.S.G. § 4B1.1A
because he had two prior felony convictions for crimes of violence (the two robberies,
which were never actually consolidated into a single offense). No other potential
procedural errors were preserved with an objection or are evident from the record.
See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). Further, we would presume that Love’s
below-guidelines sentence is substantively reasonable, see Rita v. United States, 551 U.S.
338, 341 (2007); United States v. Bonk, 967 F.3d 643, 650 (7th Cir. 2020), and nothing in the
record would rebut this presumption. The court appropriately considered the relevant
factors listed in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), highlighting Love’s history and characteristics (his
“difficulties during childhood” and “repeated criminal history” as well as his familial
support and desire to “stop his criminal lifestyle”) and the “strong” need for the
sentence to provide adequate deterrence.

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No. 22-1997 Page 3
Finally, we agree with counsel’s conclusion that any challenge to the $500 fine
would be fruitless. In imposing the fine, the court considered the requisite U.S.S.G.
§ 5E1.2(d) factors, including the seriousness of Love’s offense and his ability to pay.
Therefore, we GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.

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