Miles Toran v. Robert E. Carter, Jr.

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted May 26, 2023*
Decided May 31, 2023
Before
ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge
DAVID F. HAMILTON, Circuit Judge
MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge
No. 22-2960
MILES TORAN,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
ROBERT E. CARTER, JR., et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Indiana,
Terre Haute Division.
No. 2:22-cv-00018-JRS-MJD
James R. Sweeney II,
Judge.
O R D E R
Miles Toran, an Indiana prisoner, attempted to send a pair of broken eyeglasses
out of the prison for repair. When prison officials denied his request, Toran sued,
alleging that their refusal to allow him to repair his eyeglasses violated his rights under
* Appellees were not served with process and are not participating in this appeal.
We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the appellant’s brief
and the record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument
would not significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 22-2960 Page 2
the First and Fourteenth Amendments. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The district court dismissed
the case at screening after determining that Toran had failed to state a claim. We affirm.
We accept as true the allegations in Toran’s complaint. Arnett v. Webster, 658 F.3d
742, 751 (7th Cir. 2011). Toran possessed a pair of non-state-issued prescription
eyeglasses. Sometime before July 2021, the frames broke—Toran does not discuss how,
but does not allege that any prison officials were involved, that he cannot see, or that he
has been denied replacement eyeglasses.
After the deputy warden denied his request to send the glasses out for repair,
Toran requested clarification as to the repair policy, but was told that the denial was
“an executive decision” by the deputy warden that was not based on a written policy.
The deputy warden told Toran that he should instead submit a healthcare request to
address his optometry needs. Toran filed the healthcare request asking for his glasses to
be sent out for repair, and grieved the issue, but was told that the medical department
could not approve a repair request. Instead, the health services administrator told Toran
he should submit a healthcare request to see an eye doctor if he needed new glasses.
Toran appealed but the denial was affirmed, and, in response to a letter Toran wrote to
the commissioner of the Department of Corrections, he was told to contact the
healthcare department for any optometry needs. During the entire process Toran
reiterated that he did not consider this a medical issue or need new glasses; instead, he
repeatedly stated that this was an “issue with personal property” and that he merely
wanted the opportunity to mail his current eyeglasses for repair.
Toran then sued the prison officials who had denied his requests and appeals,
alleging that they had violated his right to free speech under the First Amendment and
his rights to due process and equal protection under the Fourteenth Amendment. The
district court dismissed the complaint at screening and, after giving Toran an
opportunity to amend, concluded that he still did not state a viable claim: it could
identify no First Amendment right for prisoners to mail personal property for repair,
the availability of an adequate state-law tort remedy meant that any alleged property
deprivation was not a federal due process violation, and Toran had not alleged facts to
support a class-of-one equal protection claim.
On appeal, Toran argues that the district court erred by misconstruing his claims,
first contending that he presented a valid First Amendment claim by alleging that
prison officials were restricting his “right to mail” without a legitimate penological
interest. But Toran’s complaint merely alleges that he attempted to engage in a

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No. 22-2960 Page 3
commercial transaction; he does not provide facts that suggest that the repairs he
sought involved any issue of speech or expressive conduct that might fall under the
protection of the First Amendment. Cf. Aiello v. Kingston, 947 F.2d 834, 836 (7th Cir.
1991) (prisoners buying lottery tickets engaged in “commerce, not speech,” so purchase
restriction fell outside of the First Amendment); United States v. Antzoulatos, 962 F.2d
720, 726 (7th Cir. 1992) (“Regulation of economic activity, such as Antzoulatos’ ability to
sell cars, simply does not implicate the First Amendment.”)
Next, Toran argues that because he still possesses the broken frames but cannot
send them for repair, he lacks any state-law remedy and is thus forced to seek relief in
federal court. To state a Fourteenth Amendment claim, Toran must identify a
constitutionally protected property interest, a loss of that interest amounting to a
deprivation, and that the deprivation occurred without due process of law. See LaBella
Winnetka, Inc. v. Village of Winnetka, 628 F.3d 937, 943 (7th Cir. 2010). While Toran’s
briefing on this issue is sparse, we understand him to argue that the constitutionally
protected property interest he has been deprived of is his ability to send his eyeglasses
for repair. But he does not provide any authority to support his contention that he has a
constitutionally protected property interest in repairing personal property. And, to the
extent Toran contends that his asserted interest is not cognizable under Indiana law, it is
not clear how it would be cognizable under federal law. See O'Gorman v. City of Chicago,
777 F.3d 885, 890 (7th Cir. 2015) (property interests are not created by Constitution, but
“stem from an independent source such as state law.”). Because he has not alleged a
constitutionally protected property interest, Toran has not stated a Fourteenth
Amendment claim. LaBella Winnetka, Inc., 628 F.3d at 943; see also Kowalski v. Boliker, 893
F.3d 987, 994 (7th Cir. 2018) (dismissal can be affirmed on any ground supported by the
record).
Finally, Toran argues that he has alleged facts that support a class-of-one equal
protection claim because he has provided affidavits from two other prisoners who were
able to mail unspecified “personal property” out for repair. But neither Toran nor the
affidavits explain what sort of property the affiants sent. Toran has thus not provided
facts that could support the inference that the other prisoners were similarly situated—
meaning they were facially “identical in all relevant respects”—or that the denial of his
request lacked a rational basis. Paramount Media Grp., Inc. v. Village of Bellwood, 929 F.3d
914, 920 (7th Cir. 2019) (listing elements of class-of-one equal protection claim).
AFFIRMED

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