United States of America v. LAWRENCE FLETCHER a/k/a ALI ABDUL KARIM EL

I’d
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted June 15, 2023
Decided June 28, 2023
Before
DIANE S. SYKES, Chief Judge
THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge
JOHN Z. LEE, Circuit Judge
No. 22-2401
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
LAWRENCE FLETCHER a/k/a
ALI ABDUL KARIM EL,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Southern District of Indiana,
Indianapolis Division.
No. 1:21CR00319-001
Jane Magnus-Stinson,
Judge.
O R D E R
Lawrence Fletcher (who calls himself Ali Abdul Karim El) pleaded guilty to
conspiring to distribute 40 grams or more of fentanyl. See 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), 846. In
his written plea agreement and at his change-of-plea hearing, he waived his right to
appeal the conviction and sentence. He was then sentenced to 70 months’ imprisonment
followed by 48 months’ supervised release.
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with FED. R. A PP. P. 32.1

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No. 22-2401 Page 2
Fletcher now appeals, and his appointed counsel moves to withdraw because,
without his consent, she may not raise the only nonfrivolous issue presented by this
appeal—a challenge to the validity of his plea. See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738
(1967). Fletcher, for his part, asks us to grant counsel’s motion and allow him to
represent himself on appeal (as he did in the district court). See C IR . R. 51(b). But “the
constitutional right to counsel requires only that an indigent’s appeal be resolved ‘in a
way that is related to the merit of the appeal.’” United States v. Maday, 799 F.3d 776, 780
(2015) (quoting Smith v. Robbins, 528 U.S. 259, 272–78 (2000)). Fletcher’s counsel cannot
present frivolous arguments, and Fletcher has no right to raise them on his own.
Because counsel’s brief appears thorough, we limit our review to the issues that she
identifies and the issues that Fletcher raises in response. See United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d
774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014).
Counsel first informs us that she attempted to ask Fletcher whether he wishes to
withdraw his plea, but he “steadfastly refused to speak with counsel over the telephone
and has not responded to any of the mail counsel has sent to him.” Counsel rightly
points out that vacating the plea could have negative consequences for him. For
example, he could lose his three-level reduction for acceptance of responsibility,
see U.S.S.G. § 3E1.1, which would result in a higher sentencing guidelines range.
Counsel nonetheless discusses potential challenges to the plea and concludes that
Fletcher could reasonably argue that the conspiracy plea lacked a factual basis. But
because withdrawing the plea could potentially harm him, and counsel did not “obtain
[his] informed consent to the risks,” she had no duty to raise the argument. United States
v. Caviedes-Zuniga, 948 F.3d 854, 855 (7th Cir. 2020). Moreover, nothing in Fletcher’s
Rule 51(b) response or his other filings suggests that he wants to withdraw his plea.
See United States v. Knox, 287 F.3d 667, 671–72 (7th Cir. 2002).
Counsel next briefly considers whether Fletcher could make a nonfrivolous
argument that federal courts do not have jurisdiction over him because he is a Moorish
sovereign citizen. Fletcher repeatedly pressed this argument in the district court and
tries once more in responding to counsel’s motion. But as counsel properly recognizes,
“nonsensical assertions of sovereignty and immunity … should be rejected summarily.”
United States v. Benabe, 654 F.3d 753, 767 (7th Cir. 2011).
Finally, counsel considers whether Fletcher could reasonably challenge his
sentence, given that he waived his right “to appeal the conviction and sentence imposed
in this case on any ground, including the right to appeal conferred by 18 U.S.C. § 3742.”
Because an appeal waiver “stands or falls” with the underlying guilty plea, United States

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No. 22-2401 Page 3
v. Nulf, 978 F.3d 504, 506 (7th Cir. 2020), we agree with counsel that the waiver is
enforceable. No exception to the enforceability of the waiver could apply—Fletcher’s
70-month sentence does not exceed the statutory maximum, the judge did not consider
any constitutionally impermissible factors at sentencing, and the proceedings did not
lack a “minimum of civilized procedure.” United States v. Campbell, 813 F.3d 1016, 1018
(7th Cir. 2016) (citation omitted).
Because the only issues Fletcher presents in response to counsel’s thorough
Anders brief are frivolous, we GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw, DENY Fletcher’s
pending motion to expedite the appeal, and DISMISS the appeal.

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