Thomas J. Lasnoski v. Heidi Michel

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted June 15, 2023*
Decided June 28, 2023
Before
DIANE S. SYKES, Chief Judge
THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge
JOHN Z. LEE, Circuit Judge
No. 22-2928
THOMAS J. LASNOSKI,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
HEIDI MICHEL, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of Wisconsin.
No. 20-C-1836
Lynn Adelman,
Judge.
O R D E R
Thomas Lasnoski sued health care providers and officials who worked at the
Brown County Jail in Wisconsin while he was detained there pretrial. He alleged that
the defendants denied him necessary pain medications and physical therapy, bathed
him infrequently, and ignored his complaints of inadequate treatment. The district
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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judge entered summary judgment for the defendants, concluding that Lasnoski had not
created a triable issue that the defendants acted unreasonably. We affirm.
I. Background
Because we are reviewing the district court’s grant of summary judgment, we
recite the facts in the light most favorable to Lasnoski. See McCann v. Ogle County,
909 F.3d 881, 886 (7th Cir. 2018). In April 2019, Lasnoski was seriously injured in a car
accident. Because he had an outstanding warrant, he was arrested and taken to the
hospital, where he was diagnosed with hemopneumothorax (blood in the lungs),
multiple spinal and rib fractures, a pelvic fracture, and a liver laceration. The following
day, he underwent orthopedic surgery for the pelvic fracture, which left a wound on his
hip from the incision. Six days after the surgery, Lasnoski was transferred to the Brown
County Jail, where the defendants worked as medical providers (employed by Wellpath
LLC) and administrative staff.
A. Medical Defendants
When Lasnoski arrived at the jail, Dr. Kenechi Anuligo reviewed the hospital’s
discharge instructions. Hospital doctors had prescribed, among other medications,
oxycodone as needed for pain, for up to two weeks, and gabapentin three times per
day. The instructions stated that the oxycodone “should be the first medication to be
tapered and weaned off.” Dr. Anuligo immediately discontinued the oxycodone and
subsequently stopped the gabapentin after Lasnoski said it was not working. Dr.
Anuligo prescribed two other pain medications—duloxetine and meloxicam. Over the
following months, Lasnoski complained multiple times that he was in pain and that he
was not receiving the medications prescribed by the hospital. Dr. Anuligo responded by
providing Lasnoski an additional mattress and blanket, allowing him to dim the lights
in his cell, educating him on stretches to perform, and prescribing topiramate and
prednisone for pain. Nurse Diane Jensen rejected several of Lasnoski’s grievances about
his pain.
Dr. Anuligo also allowed Lasnoski to attend appointments with external
specialists. Four months after his surgery a doctor noted that Lasnoski was “using
appropriate pain medications” for his condition and “most likely [would] continue to
have some pain for some time from these fractures.” Medical providers also made
several comments about his physical therapy needs. Upon Lasnoski’s discharge from
the hospital, a physical therapist recommended outpatient physical therapy at the jail

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but also said that Lasnoski had “been educated on self management of residual
deficits,” so “no post hospital therapy” was needed. Several months after his surgery, a
doctor twice stated that Lasnoski was “an appropriate candidate for physical therapy”
for his neck and thoracic pain; in one of those notes the doctor wrote that Lasnoski
“may need physical therapy” depending on the results of future imaging studies.
Lasnoski’s injuries required that he receive assistance bathing. He asserts that he
was not supposed to shower for seven to ten days after he arrived at the jail because of
his bandages and pain. Though Nurse Emily Blozinski told him that he would be able
to clean and wipe himself with bath wipes, Lasnoski had difficulty obtaining them.
After a few days with no wipes, Blozinski and Nurse Aida Gonzales assisted him to
bathe. In the first month of his detention, Blozinski and Gonzales helped Lasnoski bathe
himself seven times (April 20, April 25, April 28, May 3, May 8, May 10, and May 14). In
between, he says, he was left in his feces and urine.
B. Brown County Defendants
Captain Heidi Michel—a jail administrator—was aware that Lasnoski had been
transferred to the jail with serious injuries. Michel received occasional updates from jail
medical staff about Lasnoski’s medical status, but she did not have direct contact with
him until November 2019, when they met at his request. He told her that jail medical
staff were not following the hospital’s discharge instructions and that he was receiving
inadequate care. Michel investigated his complaints by talking to medical staff, who
informed her that Lasnoski had been evaluated several times within the jail and by
outside specialists and that his needs were being monitored and addressed. Michel told
Lasnoski that she had spoken with his medical providers about his complaints and that,
from the information she obtained, she believed that he was receiving appropriate care.
Lieutenant Kristy Jolly responded to two of Lasnoski’s grievances. In the first
grievance, Lasnoski complained about the grievance process and that jail medical staff
were “deliberately indifferent to [his] serious medical needs.” Jolly responded that,
though Lasnoski “may not agree with the grievance process, … it’s the process that is in
order,” and his medical claims were unsubstantiated because he “d[id] not cite a
specific incident in which [his] needs are not being met medically.” In the second
grievance, Lasnoski asked about the status of a prior unanswered grievance appeal.
Jolly informed him that the appeal was still being evaluated by medical staff.

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C. Procedural History
Lasnoski sued the medical defendants and the Brown County defendants under
42 U.S.C. § 1983, alleging that they violated his Fourteenth Amendment rights by failing
to follow the hospital’s discharge instructions regarding his pain medications and
physical therapy needs, refusing him wipes and regular showers, and ignoring his
complaints of these problems.
The Brown County defendants moved for summary judgment. They argued that
Jolly had not caused or participated in a constitutional violation merely by responding
to Lasnoski’s grievances, and Michel acted reasonably by relying on medical
professionals’ opinions that he was receiving appropriate treatment.
Three months after the deadline for dispositive motions passed, when the
medical defendants still had not moved for summary judgment, Lasnoski asked the
judge to deem his facts undisputed. The medical defendants responded by seeking an
extension of the deadline, explaining that staffing changes at counsel’s firm and his
heavy caseload caused the delay, and asked to file their motion for summary judgment
instanter. In it, they argued that they had exercised reasonable medical judgment in
treating Lasnoski and responding to his complaints.
Lasnoski then responded to the medical defendants’ summary judgment motion
and provided his own declaration and several grievances and medical records. The
medical defendants objected that, apart from the declaration, his evidence was not
authenticated and should not be considered.
The judge eventually granted the medical defendants’ request to file the
summary judgment motion instanter. He held that good cause existed for extending the
deadline because counsel provided an “adequate explanation for the delay,” and
addressing Lasnoski’s claims at summary judgment would be more efficient than doing
so at trial.
In the end, the judge granted the summary judgment motions by both groups of
defendants. The judge first explained that he would not consider Lasnoski’s evidence
apart from his declaration because it was not authenticated. The judge then concluded
that a reasonable jury could not find that Dr. Anuligo’s treatment was unreasonable
because he was not bound by the hospital’s discharge instructions, and Lasnoski
provided no evidence that Dr. Anuligo did not conform to professional standards. The

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judge also found that summary judgment was appropriate for Blozinski and Gonzales
because they helped Lasnoski bathe multiple times, and there was no evidence that the
nurses knew that Lasnoski had an untreated medical need. Finally, the judge concluded
that Lasnoski had presented no triable claim against Jensen, Jolly, or Michel, because
Jensen and Jolly had merely ruled on his grievances, and Michel was entitled to rely on
medical staff’s representations about Lasnoski’s care.
II. Analysis
In this appeal, Lasnoski first, argues that the judge should not have extended the
medical defendants’ deadline for filing dispositive motions. Under Rule 16(b)(4) of the
Federal Rules of Civil Procedure, a district judge may modify a scheduling order for
good cause. We review the judge’s ruling only for abuse of discretion. Preddie v.
Bartholomew Consol. Sch. Corp., 799 F.3d 806, 820 (7th Cir. 2015).
Here, the judge acted within his discretion to grant the defendants’ motion for
the purpose of judicial economy. By the time he ruled, the summary judgment motion
had already been fully briefed, and Lasnoski did not identify any prejudice he suffered
because of the belated filing.
Lasnoski next challenges the judge’s decision to exclude his exhibits because they
were unauthenticated. See F ED. R. C IV. P. 56(c)(2) (requiring a party to authenticate
documents when an objection is made). But even if we consider the unauthenticated
documents, we agree with the district judge that Lasnoski failed to furnish evidence
from which a reasonable jury could find that the medical defendants had acted
unreasonably.
Claims of inadequate medical care while in pretrial detention are evaluated for
objective reasonableness. See James v. Hale, 959 F.3d 307, 318 (7th Cir. 2020); Miranda v.
County of Lake, 900 F.3d 335, 352 (7th Cir. 2018). To make a showing of objective
unreasonableness, Lasnoski must demonstrate that the defendants (1) acted purposely,
knowingly, or recklessly, and (2) their conduct was objectively unreasonable given the
totality of the relevant circumstances. McCann, 909 F.3d at 886.
Lasnoski first argues that Dr. Anuligo should have followed the instructions
from the hospital and outside orthopedic specialists, and that even a lay person should
know that he needed stronger pain medications and physical therapy. Defendants do
not dispute that Dr. Anuligo discontinued two of Lasnoski’s prescriptions for pain

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medications—oxycodone and gabapentin—and did not reinstate them despite
Lasnoski’s complaints of ongoing pain. But Dr. Anuligo did not ignore his complaints.
He prescribed additional pain medications, adjusted them on two occasions, ordered
cell accommodations, and gave Lasnoski stretches to perform to ease his pain.
Cf. Williams v. Ortiz, 937 F.3d 936, 943–44 (7th Cir. 2019) (doctor not objectively
unreasonable by responding to pain complaints with medications, knee brace and
bandage wrap, and instructions for exercise). Indeed, at least one specialist opined that
some amount of pain would be expected given the severity of Lasnoski’s injuries.
Moreover, the record reveals that the hospital had prescribed oxycodone for only two
weeks and warned several times that the medication is addictive and should be
discontinued as soon as possible. And Lasnoski told doctors that gabapentin was not
helping his pain. On these facts, a jury could not conclude that Dr. Anuligo’s decision to
switch pain medications was based on unreasonable medical judgment.
As for physical therapy, no reasonable jury could find that Dr. Anuligo was
unreasonable for not prescribing physical therapy or that the lack of physical therapy
increased Lasnoski’s pain or caused him harm. See Gabb v. Wexford Health Sources Inc.,
945 F.3d 1027, 1034 (7th Cir. 2019) (affirming summary judgment for defendant where
plaintiff lacked evidence that course of treatment negatively affected his health).
Moreover, while Lasnoski’s injuries were serious, and some external specialists
suggested physical therapy might help, others qualified their recommendations by
suggesting physical therapy upon release from jail or upon further testing. They also
stressed the value of home exercises that Lasnoski could perform while incarcerated.
Dr. Anuligo facilitated these recommendations for “home exercise” by educating
Lasnoski about various stretches. Under these circumstances, a jury could not find that
Dr. Anuligo acted unreasonably in not ordering physical therapy.
Lasnoski mentions Blozinski and Gonzales only once on appeal, arguing that
they violated his rights by leaving him in feces and urine for days and refusing to
supply wipes and proper bathing. But the record shows that he received assistance
showering every two to five days during the first month he was detained, and that the
nurses regularly offered to bathe him, help him use wipes, shave and dry his neck,
replace his bandages, and dress him. Lasnoski furnished no evidence that Blozinski and
Gonzales knew or should have known the frequency of his bathing would result in
unsanitary conditions. See McCann, 909 F.3d at 886–87 (affirming judgment for nurse
because “nothing show[ed] that she foresaw or ignored the potential consequences of

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her actions”). Critically, Lasnoski did not assert, and the contemporaneous medical
notes do not reveal, that the nurses knew he was left in feces and urine.
Nor is there evidence from which a reasonable jury could conclude that Michel
had acted unreasonably. After speaking to Lasnoski about his complaints, Michel
investigated the situation and relied on information provided by jail medical staff that
Lasnoski’s needs were being monitored and addressed. “When detainees are under the
care of medical experts, non-medical jail staff may generally trust the professionals to
provide appropriate medical attention.” Miranda, 900 F.3d at 343. Lasnoski’s evidence
does not suggest that Michel had any reason to doubt that he was receiving adequate
treatment.
Finally, summary judgment for Jolly and Jensen was proper. Lasnoski asserted
only that they had rejected or ignored his grievances. A defendant cannot be liable for a
constitutional violation simply because she denied or mishandled a grievance.
See Owens v. Hinsley, 635 F.3d 950, 953 (7th Cir. 2011); George v. Smith, 507 F.3d 605, 609
(7th Cir. 2007).
AFFIRMED

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