James Shaw v. Illinois Sportservice, Inc.

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Argued February 15, 2023
Decided July 18, 2023
Before
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge
DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judge
JOHN Z. LEE, Circuit Judge
No. 21-2645
JAMES SHAW,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
ILLINOIS SPORTSERVICE, INC.,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Northern District of Illinois,
Eastern Division.
No. 1:19-cv-08415
Matthew F. Kennelly,
Judge.
O R D E R
Plaintiff James Shaw sued Illinois Sportservice, Inc., for violating the Americans
with Disabilities Act after Sportservice declined to hire Shaw. The district court granted
summary judgment for Sportservice, holding that Shaw was not a “qualified
individual” under the ADA because he had not shown that he could perform the
essential job functions of the position, with or without reasonable accommodations. We
affirm.
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 21-2645 Page 2
I
The district court thoroughly explained the undisputed facts of this case, see Shaw
v. Ill. Sportservice, Inc., 2021 WL 3497348 (N.D. Ill. Aug. 9, 2021), and so we will only
briefly summarize them here. In 2009, James Shaw suffered a gunshot wound to the
head; he was left with significant long-term physical and mental impairments. Since the
incident, Shaw has been primarily nonverbal, unable to read or write. He makes
mistakes with basic arithmetic, struggles to identify words and pictures, and sometimes
cannot follow simple commands.
In February 2019, Shaw interviewed for a job as a “porter” with Illinois
Sportservice, Inc., a company that provides and manages concession services at
Guaranteed Rate Field (the baseball stadium where the Chicago White Sox play). The
porter job posting included a section titled “Knowledge, Skills, and Abilities,” which
(according to Sportservice) sets forth the prerequisites for the position:
• Must be pleasant, courteous with ability to adhere to the Company’s
GuestPath Universal Service Standards
• Ability to work in a fast paced environment
• Ability to work cooperatively with others
• Ability to read and interpret delivery forms and purchase orders
• Basic math skills for counting inventory
• Ability to follow job procedures and supervisor instructions
The job posting also included a section titled “Essential Functions” which listed the
following:
1. Delivers food, beverages and other products throughout the facility, in
an efficient and timely manner,
2. Stocks products in commissary; ensures that inventory levels are
maintained,
3. Reports all needed commissary repairs to the supervisor,
4. Keeps work area and equipment neat and clean,
5. Performs other duties as assigned.
The interview for the porter position involved a series of questions followed by a
few basic arithmetic problems. Shaw was unable to respond to the interview questions,
though his mother provided answers on his behalf. He was unable to answer any of the
basic arithmetic questions correctly. Sportservice declined to extend a job offer. Shaw
then sued the company for discriminating against him on the basis of his disability in
violation of the Americans with Disabilities Act, 42 U.S.C. § 12101 et seq.

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No. 21-2645 Page 3
The district court granted summary judgment for Sportservice. Viewing the record
as favorably to Shaw as it could, the court first held that Sportservice had not provided
sufficient evidence that the job’s prerequisites were consistent with business necessity,
and that therefore a genuine dispute of material fact existed regarding whether the
prerequisites barred Shaw’s candidacy outright. But the court nevertheless concluded
that summary judgment was proper because Shaw had not shown that he could
perform the essential job functions of the porter position, with or without reasonable
accommodations.
II
We evaluate de novo a district court’s grant of a motion for summary judgment,
drawing all inferences in favor of the nonmoving party. Pontinen v. U.S. Steel Corp., 26
F.4th 401, 405 (7th Cir. 2022). Summary judgment is appropriate only when “there is no
genuine dispute as to any material fact and the movant is entitled to judgment as a
matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(a).
The ADA prohibits an employer from discriminating against a “qualified
individual” on the basis of disability in its hiring process. 42 U.S.C. § 12112(a). A
qualified individual is a person “who, with or without reasonable accommodation, can
perform the essential functions of the employment position that such individual holds
or desires.” 42 U.S.C. § 12111(8). To determine whether a plaintiff is a qualified
individual, we use a two-step test. First, we consider whether the plaintiff satisfies the
“prerequisites” for the position, which “might include an appropriate education
background, employment experience, particular skills and licenses.” Rodrigo v. Carle
Found. Hosp., 879 F.3d 236, 241–42 (7th Cir. 2018); 29 C.F.R. § 1630.2(m). Second, we
consider whether the plaintiff can perform the essential functions of the position, with
or without reasonable accommodations. Rodrigo, 879 F.3d at 241. The plaintiff carries the
burden of showing that she is a qualified individual. Taylor-Novotny v. Health All. Med.
Plans, Inc., 772 F.3d 478, 493 (7th Cir. 2014).
The district court determined that there was a genuine dispute of material fact as to
the first step, but not the second. Though we are inclined to think that Sportservice has
shown that at least some of its specified prerequisites stem from legitimate business
necessity, we need not reach this issue. We agree with our district-court colleague that
Shaw has not shown that he can perform the essential functions of the porter position.
That is enough to foreclose his ADA claim.
On appeal, only three essential functions are at issue. (Sportservice does not
dispute that Shaw can fulfill the fourth essential function—keep the work area and
equipment neat and clean—nor does it dispute the district court’s finding that
performing other duties as assigned (the fifth duty) is not an essential function of the

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No. 21-2645 Page 4
porter position.) For present purposes, Sportservice and Shaw agree that “porters”
must:
1. Deliver[ ] food, beverages and other products throughout the facility, in
an efficient and timely manner,
2. Stock[ ] products in commissary; ensure[ ] that inventory levels are
maintained,
3. Report[ ] all needed commissary repairs to the supervisor … .
Shaw argues, however, that there is not a singular job of “porter.” He urges that the
record reveals the existence of two distinct jobs: first, a “concession” porter, and second,
a “warehouse” porter. Only concession porters, he says, are responsible for the first
essential function (delivering products throughout the stadium), while only warehouse
porters are responsible for the remaining essential functions (stocking products,
maintaining inventory, and reporting needed repairs). Sportservice disputes this
characterization. There is only one porter position, it contends, and porters must be
willing and able to switch between concession and warehouse assignments.
Even if we were to agree with Shaw—though we find scant support in the record
for his view—it would be of no consequence. There is undisputed evidence that Shaw
cannot perform the essential functions he ascribes to either position.
First, no reasonable jury could find on this record that Shaw could deliver food,
beverages, and other products throughout the stadium in a timely and efficient manner.
Sportservice is responsible for supplying over 100 concession stands with over 300
products. The differences between products can be nuanced. For example, Sportservice
stocks over 70 different kinds of canned beer. To fulfill this essential duty, a “concession
porter” must, at a minimum, be able to read order forms, identify each product, and
discern how many of each product to deliver to a given stand. But it is undisputed that
Shaw cannot read, cannot consistently identify basic objects, and makes mistakes with
addition, subtraction, and multiplication.
Shaw relies on an expert report from Dr. Leslie Freels Lloyd, a vocational
rehabilitation consultant, as evidence that he can perform this duty with reasonable
accommodations. But Dr. Lloyd’s report cannot carry the day for Shaw. As an initial
matter, we agree with the district court that Dr. Lloyd “does not come right out and say
that Shaw would be able to perform the specific functions [Sportservice] deems
essential for the job.” The report’s statements are broad and inconclusive. For example,
Dr. Lloyd states that Shaw “may require modified training”; that he “would most likely
benefit” from certain vague accommodations; that Shaw might be able to train for the
concession porter position “[i]f he were to successfully learn and complete” the

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warehouse porter duties; and that her suggested accommodations “could change if
[she] were able to perform an on-site job analysis and perform an on-site evaluation of
Mr. Shaw attempting to perform the job.” Lloyd Expert Rep. at 33–34 (emphasis added).
We have previously considered expert testimony of this ilk to be too “speculative” and
“conclusory” to satisfy a plaintiff’s burden at summary judgment, unless there is more
in the record. See Stern v. St. Anthony’s Health Ctr., 788 F.3d 276, 288–89 (7th Cir. 2015)
(holding that an expert’s statement that “it is possible that [the disabled plaintiff] would
be more likely to be able to complete” essential functions if certain accommodations were
provided was insufficient to carry the plaintiff’s burden at summary judgment).
Another problem is that Dr. Lloyd’s report does not identify with any specificity
the accommodations that would permit Shaw to overcome his limitations with respect
to reading, identifying products, and performing basic math—tasks that would be
necessary to deliver products throughout the stadium efficiently in either role. As far as
we can tell, the expert’s only suggestion is that another employee could perform this
function on Shaw’s behalf or constantly shadow Shaw to ensure that he is performing
his duties correctly. But “[w]e have repeatedly held that ‘[t]o have another employee
perform a position’s essential function, and to a certain extent perform the job for the
employee, is not a reasonable accommodation.’” Id. at 289 (quoting Majors v. Gen. Elec.
Co., 714 F.3d 527, 534 (7th Cir. 2013)). Therefore, Shaw has not provided evidence that
he can perform the first essential function.
No reasonable jury could find on this record that Shaw could stock products in the
commissary and maintain Sportservice’s extensive inventory as a “warehouse porter.”
Once again, Shaw’s inability consistently to identify basic objects or read labels or
delivery forms is fatal. Shaw does not genuinely dispute his inability to do these things.
Nor does he propose any accommodation that specifically identifies how he would
overcome these impairments. To the extent that Shaw suggests that another employee
should read order forms on his behalf or identify and count out the needed products,
that argument is a nonstarter. As discussed, requiring someone else to perform an
essential job function is not a reasonable accommodation.
Finally, no reasonable jury could find on this record that Shaw has the ability to
report needed repairs to a supervisor. It is undisputed that Shaw is primarily nonverbal
and cannot communicate in writing. He has provided no evidence to suggest that he
would be capable of reporting issues to his supervisor. Moreover, neither Shaw nor his
expert proposed a reasonable accommodation that would allow Shaw to perform this
function.
In sum, Shaw has not carried his burden of showing that he can perform any of the
three essential functions at issue. It is therefore irrelevant, as a legal matter, whether

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there are one or two porter positions. Either way, Shaw is not a “qualified individual”
under the ADA, and thus his discrimination claim fails.
We AFFIRM the district court’s grant of summary judgment for Sportservice.

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