22-2802 | Omnilex

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In the
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
____________________
No. 22-2802
U NITED S TATES OF A MERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
T YQUELL ALEXANDER ,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Northern District of Illinois, Eastern Division.
No. 21 CR 190 — John J. Tharp, Jr., Judge.
____________________
A RGUED J ULY 12, 2023 — D ECIDED A UGUST 11, 2023
____________________
Before SYKES, Chief Judge, and ROVNER and WOOD, Circuit
Judges.
R OVNER , Circuit Judge. ȱĜȱĴȱ¢ȱ¡Ȭ
ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ
scene, apprehended and frisked him, and found the gun
ȱȱȱ ǯȱ¡ǰȱ ȱ ȱcharged with
ȱȱęȱȱȱǰȱŗŞȱǯǯǯȱȗ 922(g)(1), moved
ȱ ȱ ȱ ęȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ
cause. The district court denied the motion. Because the

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2 No. 22-2802
Ĝȱ ȱ¡ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ
suspiciousl¢ȱ ȱ¢ȱȱȱȱǰȱ ȱĜǯȱ
Late one night in October 2020, ShotSpotter devices 1
alerted the Chicago Police Department to possible gunshots
ȱȱŚŚŖŖȱȱȱȱȱ ¢, on Chicago’s
west side. Police officers began ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ Ȭ
mote-controlled surveillance cameras called Police Observa-
tion Devices. These camerasǰȱ ȱȱȱ¢ȱȬ
sitioned in high-crime locations, enabled police to watch a
large group congregating on that block. The monitoring offic-
ers saw ȱȱȱȱȱȱ¡ǯȱ¡ȱȱthe
gun ¢ȱȱ¡¢ȱȱȱȱȱ
it in his front waistband. The officers who saw the hand-off
ȱȱȱǯȱȱ¢ȱǰȱ¡ȱȱȱ
opposite direction. He then stepped behind a man standing
alongside him and moved toward a metal fence that blocked
ȱȱ ¢ȱȱȱ. He pushed against the fence
but ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ he officers, who hand-
cuffed and frisked him. One officer felt an L-shaped object in
¡Ȃȱ ȱȱȱȱȱǯȱȱȬ
ȱȱ¡ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ
the police station.
¡ȱ ȱȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȬ
ȱȱȱȱ¢ǯȱŗŞȱǯǯǯȱȗ 922(g)(1). He moved to
ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ǰȱ
1 ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ
noises suggestive of gunshots. “The Chicago Police Department’s Use of
ȱ ¢ǰȄȱ THE CITY O F CHICAGO O FFICE OF INSPECTOR
GENERAL, at 4 (Aug. 24, 2021), https://igchicago.org/wp-content/up-
loads/2021/08/Chicago-Police-Departments-Use-of-ShotSpotter-Technol-
¢ǯ (archived at https://perma.cc/XG4C-WMKC).

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No. 22-2802 3
arguing that the officers’ knowledge that he possessed a gun
before their arrival did not establish probable cause that he
committed or was committing a crime. The government re-
ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ
stop was reasonable suspicion—a standard that justified stop-
ping and frisking ¡ȱȱȱ ShotSpotter alert,
his open possession of a gun, and his evasive actions when
the officers arrived.
ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¡Ȃȱ ǯȱ ǰȱ ȱ
ȱȱȱȱȱ¡Ȃȱ£—whether
ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ
ȱȱ¢ȱȱ—and settled upon
ȱȱȱȱȱ ȱ ȱ¢ȱȱ¡Ȭ
ander that he possessed a gun. The judge then determined
ȱȱȱ¡ǰȱȱbecause ȱ¡Ȃȱe
possession of a gun, but for two other reasons. First, the offic-
ers saw that ¡ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ȭ
ȱ¢ȱǰȱŝŘŖȱILCS 5/24-1(a)(10)(iv), when he carried
an unconcealed ȱȱȱȱ ǯȱǰȱ¡Ȭ
ander tried to ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ
scene after a suspicious handoff just minutes earlier.
¡ȱȱȱȱȱȱǰȱsee
FED. R. C RIM. P. 11(a)(2), preserving his right to appeal the rul-
ing on his motion to suppress. The judge sentenced him to
ȱ¢ȱȱǯ
¡ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ Ȭ
press. As a ¢ȱmatter, it is not obvious at which point
¡ȱ ȱ ǻǯǯǰȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ £ȱ ȱ
ǰȱȱǰȱ ȱ¢ȱransported him to the police
station) andǰȱ¢ǰ whether the officers’ conduct should
ȱ¢£ under a probable cause or reasonable suspicion

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4 No. 22-2802
standard. But the government contends that the standard is
immaterial because the officers “possessed both probable
cause (as the district judge concluded) and reasonable suspi-
ȱȱǰȱǰȱȱȄȱ¡ǯȱ the parties
and district judge all evaluated whether there was probable
ȱ ȱ ȱ ¡ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ
frisked him, and probable cause is the more demanding
ǰȱ ȱȱ¢£ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ
cause.
A warrantless arrest is valid under the Fourth Amend-
ȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱǯȱDistrict of Co-
lumbia v. Wesby, 138 ǯȱǯȱśŝŝǰȱśŞŜȱǻŘŖŗŞǼǯ Probable cause ¡Ȭ
ists, in turn, when ȱ¢ȱȱ—with the
same information ȱ¢ȱȱȱ—would be-
lieve there ȱȱ¢ȱ ȱȱȱȱȱ
¢. Id. When reviewing the denial of a motion to sup-
press, we review the judge’s legal determination of probable
cause de novo and the judge’s factual findings for clear error.
Ornelas v. United StatesǰȱśŗŝȱǯǯȱŜşŖǰȱŜşşȱǻŗşşŜǼǲȱUnited States
v. Key, 889 ǯřȱşŗŖǰȱşŗŘȱǻŝȱǯȱŘŖŗŞǼǯ
¡ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ
ȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱt
ȱȱȱȱ ¢ǯȱȱȱȱȱȱ
more important, broader point. Even if—ȱ ¡ȱ Ȭ
gues—the officers did not know that he ȱȱ¢ȱȬ
tion or lacked a concealed-¢ȱ ǰȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ
cause to believe that he broke Illinois law, that is, the Illinois
ȱȱ¢ȱ. That Act allows a person with
ȱȱȱ¢ȱa ȱȱȱȱȱ¢ȱȱit is “com-
¢ȱȱ¢ȱȱȱ ǰȄȱŚřŖȱILCS ŜŜȦśǰȱŜŜȦŗŖǲȱ

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No. 22-2802 5
see ŝŘŖȱ ȱśȦŘŚ-1(a)(1ŖǼǻǼǰȱȱǰȱȱȱ ȱ¡Ȭ
ȱȱȱȱ¢ȱ¢ȱȱǯ
In a related challenge to the judge’s probable-cause ruling,
¡ȱȱȱȱȃȱȱȱȄȱȱ
the face of the officers’ approach—when he ¢ȱȃȱ
ȱ¢ȄȱȱȃȱȱȱȄ—did not give the of-
ficers reason to believe that his gun possession was unlawful.
True, such behavior alone seems unremarkable for purposes
of probable cause. See United States v. Williamsǰȱŝřŗ ǯřȱŜŝŞ,
ŜŞŝȱǻŝȱǯȱŘŖŗřǼȱǻ“Mȱǰȱ ȱȱ¢ȱȱȬ
ȱǰȱȱ¢ȱȱȱǰȱȱ¢ȱǰȱȱ
ȱ¢ȱȱȱȱȱȱȱȱ ¢ȱȱȱ
area … .Ȅ). ȱ¡Ȃȱȱȱagain too narrow—his be-
havior ȱ ȱ Ȃȱ ȱ ȱ ¢ȱ ȱ ȱ
point among the ¢ȱȱȱthat could establish
probable cause. In United States v. RichmondǰȱşŘŚȱǯřȱŚŖŚȱǻŝȱ
Cir. 2019)ǰȱȱ¢ȱȱǰ we concluded that offic-
ers had reasonable suspicion that the defendant committed a
crime based on ȱȃȱȄȱȱȱ shirt pocket, his
ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȱ ȃǳȄȱ ȱ
their approach, and his placement of an unidentifiable object
on the threshold of his front door. Id. at 408-09. A similar set
of circumstances was present here: ¢ȱȱof-
ficers could infer ȱ¢ȱȱȱ ȱȱ
he possessed a gun (which is undisputed), and his furtive
movements upon their approach. See also United States v.
Adair, 925 F.3d 931, 934, 938 ǻŝȱǯȱŘŖŗşǼ (officers had rea-
sonable suspicion in part because defendant tried to evade of-
ȱ¢ȱ ȱȱ Ǽǯ
For these reasons, we AFFIRM the district judge’s denial
of Al¡Ȃȱȱȱȱǯ

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United States of America v. Tyquell Alexander

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