Jonathan Judkins v. Kelly Pierce

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted September 18, 2023*
Decided September 20, 2023
Before
DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judge
MICHAEL B. BRENNAN, Circuit Judge
DORIS L. PRYOR, Circuit Judge
No. 23-1202
JONATHAN JUDKINS,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
KELLY PIERCE, et al.,
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Illinois.
No. 21-288-SPM
Stephen P. McGlynn,
Judge.
O R D E R
Jonathan Judkins, an Illinois prisoner, appeals the judgment dismissing his civil
rights action against several officials at his former prison. The district court, after
dismissing two prior versions of Judkins’s complaint for failure to state a claim,
* The Appellees were not served with process and are not participating in this
appeal. We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the brief and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 23-1202 Page 2
ultimately dismissed the case for failure to prosecute. See F ED. R. C IV. P. 41(b). We
affirm.
Judkins, currently held at Hill Correctional Center in Galesburg, Illinois, brought
this action for alleged violations of his constitutional rights while he was confined
between 2018 and 2019 at Menard Correctional Center in Menard, Illinois. See 42 U.S.C.
§ 1983. Specifically, he alleged that officials who presided over his disciplinary
proceedings for an infraction violated his due process rights by failing to consider
exculpatory evidence (phone records and witness testimony) or give him adequate
notice of the charge. He also alleged that an official fabricated the disciplinary report
and that Kelly Pierce, a grievance officer who had reviewed his grievance about the
disciplinary hearing, failed to properly investigate his complaint.
The district court screened the complaint, see 28 U.S.C. § 1915A, and dismissed it
without prejudice for failure to state a claim. The court concluded that Judkins failed to
state a due process claim under the Fourteenth Amendment because the discipline he
apparently received—six months each of disciplinary segregation, demotion to C-grade
status, and restrictions of his commissary and contact-visit privileges—did not
implicate a protected liberty interest. Relatedly, the court dismissed Judkins’s claim
about the false disciplinary report because he did not allege that the report led to the
deprivation of a protected interest. To the extent Judkins believed he might be able to
show that the conditions of his segregation were atypical and imposed a significant
hardship, the court invited him to amend his complaint with additional information
about the segregation conditions. With regard to his claim against Pierce, the court
ruled that any mishandling of his grievance did not implicate a constitutional right.
Judkins then filed an amended complaint, which—as relevant to this appeal—
renewed his earlier claims, elaborated upon allegations against Pierce, and introduced
new allegations that the guard had issued him a false disciplinary ticket in retaliation
for an earlier grievance.
The district court concluded that Judkins’s amended complaint did not state a
claim. The court explained that the amended complaint did not shed any more light on
Judkins’s time in disciplinary segregation, that the additional allegations regarding
Pierce largely were conclusory in nature and did not allege that she was personally
involved in the alleged misconduct that gave rise to the grievance, and—with regard to
the claim of retaliation—that the alleged events did not plausibly support a claim that
the guard had fabricated the report in order to retaliate against Judkins. As for this latter
ruling, the court, “out of an abundance of caution,” allowed Judkins to submit another

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No. 23-1202 Page 3
amended complaint to replead only his claim of retaliation. The court warned Judkins
that his failure to file another amended complaint consistent with its instructions would
result in the entire case being dismissed with prejudice under Federal Rule of Civil
Procedure 41(b) for failure to comply with its order or failure to prosecute.
Judkins’s deadline for amending his complaint came and went, so the court
dismissed the case with prejudice for failure to prosecute.
On appeal, Judkins continues to press a two-pronged due process argument
arising out of his time at Menard. First, he maintains that the disciplinary report was
fabricated and that many of the disciplinary procedures were flawed. But the district
court correctly concluded that Judkins cannot state a due process claim about the
disciplinary report and proceedings because he did not allege that he was deprived of a
protected liberty interest. See Lisle v. Welborn, 933 F.3d 705, 720 (7th Cir. 2019). The
sanctions he appears to have received—six months in segregation and six months’ loss
or restriction of privileges—do not, without more, implicate a protected liberty interest.
See Hardaway v. Meyerhoff, 734 F.3d 740, 744 (7th Cir. 2013) (six-month disciplinary
segregation alone); Lekas v. Briley, 405 F.3d 602, 605, 613 (7th Cir. 2005) (temporary loss
of contact visitation and restricted commissary); Whitford v. Boglino, 63 F.3d 527, 533 n.7
(7th Cir. 1995) (six-month disciplinary segregation and demotion to C grade). Nor does
Judkins argue that the combination of disciplinary measures deprived him of a
protected liberty interest. See Kervin v. Barnes, 787 F.3d 833, 836 (7th Cir. 2015).
Second, Judkins argues that his due process rights were violated by the Menard
grievance system (which he says is inadequate to redress his grievances) and Pierce’s
alleged mishandling of his grievance. But a state’s grievance procedure does not give
rise to an independent liberty interest protected by the due process clause, see Antonelli
v. Sheahan, 81 F.3d 1422, 1430 (7th Cir. 1996), and Pierce, who simply reviewed his
grievance about the disciplinary process, lacked personal involvement in the conduct
that formed the basis of the grievance, see Owens v. Evans, 878 F.3d 559, 563 (7th Cir.
2017).
We have considered Judkins’s other arguments; none merits discussion.
AFFIRMED

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