United States of America v. Latherio Meadows

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted October 4, 2023
Decided October 10, 2023
Before
DIANE S. SYKES, Chief Judge
DIANE P. WOOD, Circuit Judge
CANDACE JACKSON-AKIWUMI, Circuit Judge
No. 22-2660
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
LATHERIO MEADOWS,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Eastern District of
Wisconsin.
No. 21-CR-252-JPS
J. P. Stadtmueller,
Judge.
O R D E R
Latherio Meadows pleaded guilty to seven counts of robbery under the Hobbs
Act, 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a), and two counts of brandishing a firearm in furtherance of a
violent crime under 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii). The district judge sentenced him to
264 months in prison and three years of supervised release. He filed a notice of appeal,
but his appointed counsel asserts that the appeal is frivolous and moves to withdraw.
See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). We grant the motion and dismiss the
appeal.
Meadows committed seven armed robberies of tow-truck drivers in the
Milwaukee area. After lineups in which each of the victims identified Meadows as their
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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attacker, a grand jury indicted him with seven counts of robbery under the Hobbs Act,
see 18 U.S.C. § 1951(a), and brandishing a firearm in furtherance of a violent crime,
see 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(ii), as well as two counts of possessing a stolen firearm,
see 18 U.S.C. § 922(j), and one count of being a felon in possession of a firearm,
see 18 U.S.C. § 922(g)(1). Meadows moved to suppress the lineup evidence because he
had not received requested counsel, but he withdrew the motion after entering a plea
deal.
In the plea deal, Meadows agreed to plead guilty to all seven robbery counts and
two brandishing counts. He admitted to using a firearm in each robbery and conceded
that they affected interstate commerce. He also acknowledged that each robbery count
carried a statutory maximum of 20 years in prison and 3 years of supervised release,
and each firearm count carried a statutory minimum of 7 years in prison (to run
consecutively), and up to 5 years of supervised release. Meadows also agreed to pay all
fines, assessments, and restitution. The prosecutor agreed to dismiss the remaining
counts.
The plea agreement also addressed the Sentencing Guidelines. The parties
agreed to recommend a maximum combined offense level of 35. If Meadows continued
to accept responsibility, the prosecutor agreed to recommend a maximum offense level
of 32. The parties did not agree upon Meadows’s criminal history category, but the
prosecutor agreed to recommend a sentence at the low end of the guidelines range as
calculated by the sentencing judge once the judge had determined that history.
Finally, the plea agreement contained a broad appeal waiver. Meadows waived
his right to appeal his conviction and sentence, including any term of imprisonment,
supervised release, or probation, as well as supervised release conditions, fines,
forfeiture orders, and restitution orders. Meadows additionally waived “any claim that
(1) the statutes or Sentencing Guidelines under which the defendant is convicted or
sentenced are unconstitutional, and (2) the conduct to which the defendant has
admitted does not fall within the scope of the statutes or Sentencing Guidelines.”
After this plea agreement came a change-of-plea hearing and sentencing. A
magistrate judge conducted the plea colloquy, and the district judge entered Meadows’s
guilty plea, accepting the magistrate judge’s recommendation. At sentencing, the
district judge calculated a total offense level of 31 on the robbery counts and a criminal
history category of III, yielding a guidelines range of 135 to 168 months in prison. The
judge then reiterated that the statutory minimum for each of the firearm counts was

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No. 22-2660 Page 3
7 years, to run consecutively. Neither party objected. After discussing the sentencing
factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a), the judge then imposed concurrent, 96-month prison
terms on each of the robbery counts and the minimum, consecutive, 84-month prison
terms for the firearm counts, for a total term of 264 months. The judge also imposed a
concurrent, 3-year term of supervised release on each count and ordered $10,146 in
restitution along with a total of $900 in special assessments.
Counsel’s Anders brief explains the nature of the case and raises potential issues
that we would expect to appear in this appeal. Because the analysis appears thorough,
we limit our review to the subjects discussed in counsel’s brief and Meadows’s response
under Circuit Rule 51(b). See United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014).
Having confirmed that Meadows wishes to withdraw his guilty plea, counsel
first considers whether Meadows could raise any nonfrivolous argument that the plea
was invalid. See United States v. Konczak, 683 F.3d 348, 349 (7th Cir. 2012); United States v.
Knox, 287 F.3d 667, 671 (7th Cir. 2002). Because Meadows did not challenge his plea in
the district court, we would review the decision to accept the plea for plain error.
See United States v. Davenport, 719 F.3d 616, 618 (7th Cir. 2013). The transcript reflects
that, but for two harmless omissions discussed below, the magistrate judge complied
with Rule 11 of the Federal Rules of Criminal Procedure. The magistrate judge informed
Meadows of the nature of the charges and their potential penalties, his right to plead
not guilty and the consequences of pleading guilty, his trial rights, and the role of the
Sentencing Guidelines, all of which Meadows confirmed that he understood. See F ED R.
C RIM . P. 11(b). Meadows confirmed that he was not coerced or promised anything in
exchange for his plea, and these sworn statements are presumed true. See United States
v. Smith, 989 F.3d 575, 582 (7th Cir. 2021). Meadows also admitted that an adequate
factual basis existed to support his guilty plea.
The magistrate judge deviated from Rule 11 in two ways, but the deviations do
not create arguable issues. First the judge was required to, but did not, advise Meadows
that his sworn statements could be used against him in a prosecution for perjury.
See F ED. R. C RIM . P. 11(b)(1)(A). The judge was also required to, but did not, discuss the
terms of Meadows’s appeal waiver. See F ED. R. C RIM . P. 11(b)(1)(N). For Meadows to
succeed on appeal under a plain-error standard based on these omissions, he would
need to show that they affected his substantial rights. See United States v. Blalock,
321 F.3d 686, 689 (7th Cir. 2003) (failure to advise of perjury risk); United States v. Brown,
973 F.3d 667, 718 (7th Cir. 2020) (failure to discuss appeal waiver). That would require
Meadows to show a reasonable probability that he would not have entered the plea but

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for the omissions. See United States v. Schaul, 962 F.3d 917, 924 (7th Cir. 2020). But we
agree with counsel that, for two reasons, Meadows could not plausibly show that. First,
nothing in the record suggests that Meadows gave perjurious statements at his change-
of-plea hearing. See Blalock, 321 F.3d at 689. Second, Meadows acknowledged in his plea
agreement that he had discussed the appeal waiver with his attorney and understood it,
and he confirmed to the magistrate judge under oath that he had discussed the whole
agreement with his attorney and understood it. These facts assure us that the judge’s
omissions did not affect Meadows’s substantial rights, see F ED. R. C RIM . P. 11(h), much
less amount to plain error.
We also agree with counsel that because the agreement and plea are valid, the
appeal waiver is enforceable and renders frivolous any argument Meadows could raise
on appeal. See United States v. Nulf, 978 F.3d 504, 506 (7th Cir. 2020). When a defendant
has validly agreed to waive his right to appeal, the only potential issues are whether the
sentence exceeded the statutory maximum or the judge considered constitutionally
impermissible factors. See United States v. Campbell, 813 F.3d 1016, 1018 (7th Cir. 2016).
But as counsel notes, neither Meadows’s 264-month prison term nor his 3-year term of
supervised release exceeded the relevant statutory maximums. See 18 U.S.C. §§ 1951(a),
924(c). And nothing in the record suggests that the judge considered any
constitutionally impermissible factors. See Campbell, 813 F.3d at 1018.
In his response to counsel’s motion to withdraw, Meadows proposes three
grounds for appeal, but they are all frivolous. First, he believes that the government
breached the plea agreement by recommending a sentence above what it had promised
to recommend. Were such a breach arguably present, it might invalidate the appeal
waiver and present a plausible ground for appeal. See Puckett v. United States, 556 U.S.
129, 136 (2009). But the prosecutor complied with her promise to recommend a
maximum total offense level of 32 by not objecting when the district judge calculated a
total offense level of 31. The prosecutor also agreed to recommend a sentence at the low
end of the guidelines range as calculated by the district judge and complied with that
promise by recommending a 303-month total sentence. Meadows’s suggestion that,
before he entered his plea agreement, the prosecutor orally promised to seek a 168-
month sentence is twice refuted by Meadows’s own statements. First, in his plea
agreement, he acknowledged “that no threats, promises, representations, or other
inducements [had] been made, nor agreements reached, other than those set forth in
[the plea] agreement.” Second, he confirmed that fact under oath at his change-of-plea
hearing. Meadows proposes two other grounds for appeal—challenges to the validity of
his indictment and to his statutes of conviction. But his broad appeal waiver would

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block any appellate claim that the indictment and statutes of his convictions are invalid
or do not cover the conduct to which he admitted.
We thus GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw, DISMISS the appeal, and DENY
Meadows’s motion to appoint new counsel.

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