United States of America v. Noah Allen

United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted October 16, 2023*
Decided October 17, 2023
Before
FRANK H. EASTERBROOK, Circuit Judge
AMY J. ST. EVE, Circuit Judge
THOMAS L. KIRSCH II, Circuit Judge
No. 23-1276
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
v.
NOAH ALLEN,
Defendant-Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District
Court for the Central District of Illinois.
No. 18-30021-001
Sue E. Myerscough,
Judge.
O R D E R
Noah Allen, a federal prisoner, appeals the denial of his request to amend his
motion for compassionate release. But the district court permissibly concluded that its
reasons for having denied compassionate release obviated any justification for
amendment. Therefore, we affirm.
* We have agreed to decide the case without oral argument because the briefs and
record adequately present the facts and legal arguments, and oral argument would not
significantly aid the court. F ED. R. A PP . P. 34(a)(2)(C).
NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with F ED. R. APP . P. 32.1

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No. 23-1276 Page 2
Allen pleaded guilty to a conspiracy to distribute methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C.
§§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), 846, and the district court later sentenced him to 15 years’
imprisonment, well below his guidelines range of 30 years to life. Allen had an
appointed lawyer during his plea and sentencing.
Two years later, Allen filed a motion for compassionate release based on his
chronic health conditions and the associated risk of developing severe illness if he
contracted COVID-19 in prison. In this motion, Allen stated that he did not have an
attorney and requested that one be appointed to assist him. Nevertheless, the court
directed “defense counsel” to “file an amended motion for compassionate release, if
appropriate, within ten days.” The court also asked for a recommendation from the
United States Probation Office and a response from the government. The attorney who
had represented Allen through sentencing, and whose appearance was still on file, did
not file an amended motion. (The record shows that multiple people at the attorney’s
firm received electronic notice of the court’s order.) The Probation Office and the
government submitted their materials on the court’s timeline.
About ten days after the government filed its response opposing Allen’s motion,
Allen, pro se, filed what he labeled a “motion for extension of time,” in which he asked
to file an amended motion for compassionate release. He explained that he had “no
idea” who his attorney was and had “no address or phone number” at which to contact
the attorney about his grounds for compassionate release. Allen also asked the court to
appoint a “different attorney.” He did not say how he would amend his motion.
On the same day Allen’s request to amend was entered on the docket, the district
court denied his pro se motion for compassionate release. First, the court ruled that
Allen’s risk of illness from COVID-19 was not an extraordinary and compelling reason
for release because Allen was vaccinated. See United States v. Vaughn, 62 F.4th 1071,
1071–72 (7th Cir. 2023); United States v. Broadfield, 5 F.4th 801 (7th Cir. 2021). The court
also concluded that releasing Allen just 2 years into his 15-year sentence would not
“reflect the seriousness of the offense,” “promote respect for the law,” or “provide just
punishment.” See 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a)(2)(A). But the court stated that its decision did
“not preclude a future motion for compassionate release.”
A week later, the court denied Allen’s request to amend his motion as “moot”
and informed Allen that its decision did not preclude him from filing a future motion
for compassionate release. Allen next filed a motion to reconsider (which was timely
under the prison mailbox rule) and a notice of appeal, which, as we explained in a

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No. 23-1276 Page 3
previous order, became effective when the district court later denied the motion for
reconsideration. See United States v. Rollins, 607 F.3d 500, 504 (7th Cir. 2010).
On appeal, Allen challenges only the court’s decision denying his request to
amend. We review that decision, as we would the denial of a motion to reconsider a
compassionate-release ruling, for an abuse of discretion. United States v. Sarno, 37 F.4th
1249, 1253 (7th Cir. 2022). Allen argues that because his lawyer failed to comply with
the directive to file an amended motion, the court should have allowed him to
supplement the motion himself with additional reasons for release.
The district court did not abuse its discretion. It had directed Allen’s attorney to
file an amended motion if appropriate; therefore, counsel’s inaction might simply reflect
an assessment that amending the motion was unwarranted. We cannot know that, but
we do know that Allen was not prejudiced by the absence of an amended motion—
counsel’s or his own. The district court ultimately denied compassionate release in part
because Allen had served just 2 years of his 15-year sentence, and thus releasing him
would be inconsistent with the sentencing factors under 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a). No
supplementation of Allen’s motion could have changed that § 3553(a) analysis, which
was an independent and sufficient basis for resolving Allen’s motion. United States v.
Williams, 65 F.4th 343, 349 (7th Cir. 2023). Further, Allen does not argue that he could
have supplemented his motion to demonstrate that he is “at greater risk of a dire
outcome inside prison than he would be outside,” and that differential risk is what we
consider now that vaccines have been available for years. Vaughn, 62 F.4th at 1071.
One final point: If there are further proceedings in the district court, the court—
before directing more orders to “defense counsel”—should ascertain whether Allen’s
previously appointed lawyer is still representing him. The government states in its brief
that “Allen was not represented by counsel at the time of” the court’s order allowing
counsel to file an amended motion, but the district court thought otherwise, and there is
no record of defense counsel withdrawing nor of the court terminating the appointment
administratively. Allen’s assertion that he has not had recent contact with the attorney,
who has not been involved in any filings since sentencing, suggests that the attorney
believes the representation came to end. Allen is not entitled to appointed counsel in
seeking post-judgment recourse, United States v. Blake, 986 F.3d 756, 758 (7th Cir. 2021),
but both he and the district court should be aware of Allen’s status.
AFFIRMED

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